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ABSTRACT 
 
The uncertainty and complexity of the interdependent global economy have amplified 
collective exposure of supply chains to disruptive events. In the construction world, the 
fragmented nature of the temporary project teams and the uncertain operating environment 
make construction supply chains more vulnerable to these disruptive events. In Malaysia, the 
construction industry has become the focal point for development through the Government’s 
“Malaysia Vision 2020” transformation programme, in the effort to become a developed 
country by the year 2020. However, despite good plans for the development of public 
projects, the Malaysian Auditor General Report 2014 identified several weaknesses in the 
delivery of construction projects that caused poor project performance.	The dynamics and 
effects of interconnected risks among construction organisations tend to be overlooked across 
the Malaysian public project supply chains, making them highly vulnerable to supply chain 
disruptions. This calls for the need to go beyond the traditional silo approach of the risk 
management process. This research aims to investigate the Malaysian public sector supply 
chain’s resilience capabilities and vulnerabilities in handling disruptions in the effort to build 
supply chain resilience against disruptions and improve the delivery of public projects. 
A comprehensive questionnaire survey was conducted with 105 construction professionals 
from two groups of respondents, the public and private organisations in the public sector 
supply chain to identify their current vulnerabilities and capabilities. Data were analysed 
using descriptive statistics and compared using the Mann-Whitney U and Kruskal-Wallis 
tests. The findings revealed that the public organisations faced significantly higher political 
threats whilst the private organisations faced significant market pressures. Subsequent semi-
structured interviews were conducted with 12 professionals in the field to identify the inherent 
pathogens that make the supply chain highly vulnerable in these critical areas. The emergent 
pathogenic influences include practice, circumstance, convention, organisation and behavior. 
Finally, a resilience response framework was developed based on the triangulation of these 
results. The framework allows the experts from the public sector supply chain to understand 
the critical vulnerabilities and pathogenic influences of their organisation and their supply 
chain members, along with the set of capabilities to reduce the disruptive impacts arising from 
these critical vulnerabilities. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Research Background 
 
The modern world has changed and it is now a highly interconnected one. With the innovation 
and growth and the interdependence of the global economy through worldwide 
communications and advanced technology, organisations from various regions are more 
interconnected than ever before. Countless benefits come along with these advances, 
including an unprecedentedly high level of international trade, lean supply chains that deliver 
low-cost consumer goods, and an improved standard of living in many developing countries 
(Kosansky and Taus, 2014). However, the uncertainty, complexity, and transparency of this 
interdependent global economy have also amplified collective exposure of supply chains to 
catastrophic events and disruptions.  
	
Within a global context, risk can occur in many ways, including supply chain disruption, 
geopolitical risk, cyber risk, natural catastrophes, regulatory risk and unforeseen events. As 
an increasingly global marketplace brings greater complexity and risks for all players, it is 
not surprising that big organisations that were once listed as top-performing companies in the 
past, such as Lehman Brothers, General Motors and Worldcom, took a wrong turn and went 
bankrupt due to their inability to tackle risks in the global marketplace (see case studies in 
Swedberg, 2010; Monks and Minow, 2011). It is indeed a major shock to the global economy 
when big companies like this fail unexpectedly, as it sends cascading effects out into other 
industries in various regions. In some cases, events from completely unrelated sectors could 
also be the root cause of disruptions that occur in another industry, such as what the 
pharmaceutical industry faced a few years ago (see case study in Appendix A). This shows 
how interconnected risks have become in a global economy, and how these risks are beyond 
any single organisation’s control.  
	
Another example of interconnected risks can be seen in Figure 1.1, where the underlying 
connections between the recent global risks are highlighted based on a survey done by the 
World Economic Forum in 2014. It illustrates how risk can cascade from one point to another 
and how risks influence different sectors of the global economy. This goes to show how 
important it is for a supply chain to continue its function to supply the world’s population 
	 15	
with essential goods, regardless of any disruptive event, (Kosansky and Taus, 2014) in order 
to continue in the long run.  
	
 
Figure 1.1: The global risks 2014 interconnections map (World Economic Forum, 2014) 
 
One of the industries driven by supply chains and affected by interconnected risk of 
disruptions is the construction industry. In the construction world, this logic of 
interdependence can be seen through the diverse set of project team members (i.e. project 
manager, architects, consultants, contractors, suppliers) involved from initiation to the 
completion of the project. As in other industries, supply chains in construction also face 
disruptions that cause poor project performance and deviations from project objectives. 
Studies conducted on performance in construction often identify delays and cost overruns as 
affecting project outcomes (Mehdi-Riazi et al., 2011; Joshi, 2009; Le-Hoai et al., 2008). The 
factors that cause these delays and cost overruns suggest that they are contextually dependent, 
although some commonalities could be identified from country to country. Whilst these 
studies add value to the existing body of knowledge in improving performance, they hardly 
concentrate on the modern day complexities related to supply chain risks and to risks which 
are interdependent across the construction supply chain dominant in many countries. The 
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interdependencies of the supply chain in the construction industry differ from those in other 
industries, such as the retail and manufacturing sectors, as construction involves a project-
based supply chain that is transient in nature with overlapping risks that are wider than their 
immediate contractual responsibilities (Loosemore, 2000). Project team members come from 
different disciplines and are involved at different stages of the project (planning, design, 
tender, construction). Each of these groups has their own objectives as they participate in the 
project, and the team arrangement may change as the project progresses. This level of 
segmentation, especially in complex supply chains of large-scale projects, makes 
construction supply chains more vulnerable to disruptive events. Construction projects also 
often feature multiple overlapping risks that include commercial, design, project, quality and 
safety issues that have to be dealt with at the same time (Zurich, 2014).	This is evident not 
just in the developed countries, but also in various developing countries. 
	
One of the developing countries facing disruption to construction activities across supply 
chains due to interconnected risks is Malaysia. Research conducted by Joshi (2009), Abdul-
Rahman et al. (2006) and Pratt (2000) reveals that large local construction projects have 
frequently ended up being delivered late, with cost overruns. The recent National Audit 
Department Report also points out the non-performance of some key engineering projects at 
several scales that led to catastrophic outcomes to the client and other public and private 
organisations (National Audit Department, 2014). Poor performance of the supply chain 
results in the Government not obtaining the best value for money on the expenditure incurred, 
thus affecting the public’s perception of the Government’s credibility in managing public 
sector projects. The Government is therefore calling for improvements in handling 
disruptions to improve public project performance. This is vital as numerous public projects 
are to be implemented under the Tenth and Eleventh Malaysian Plans, under the provision of 
the “Malaysia Vision 2020” transformation programme, with the aim of becoming a 
developed country by the year 2020. 
	
In this case, although risk management is widely practised in Malaysia, it can be seen that as 
the nature of the supply chain becomes more complex, it is difficult for the associated risks 
to be mitigated by individual participants in the supply chain. Furthermore, as the project 
progresses from one phase to another, its associated risks also shift among the general 
contractors, sub-contractors, suppliers and other parties in the supply chain. This level of 
exposure and vulnerability to risk show how vital it is for the Malaysian public sector supply 
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chains to build capabilities and mitigate their vulnerabilities to handle disruptive events 
collectively. This calls for an integrated approach to the risk management process to 
effectively manage supply chain risks and disruptions.  
	
Although it is impossible for the supply chain managers to eliminate all risks, the challenge 
now is how to make systems and supply chains sufficiently resilient to bounce back and thrive 
from catastrophes and disruptive events. As risks are increasingly shared across local, 
regional and national boundaries, building resilience to disruptive events requires key players 
not only to focus on their own interests, but also to take into consideration the interests of 
others. Thus, instead of taking a silo approach, all parts of the Malaysian public sector supply 
chain need to work together to build resilience to disruptive events and improve project 
performance, hence adopting an integrated approach. 
	
This research therefore continues investigation of this area, by assessing the Malaysian 
construction supply chain’s resilience capabilities and vulnerabilities in the above context. 
This will give project teams a better understanding of their supply chain disruptions and 
develop the actions required to utilise the supply chain’s capabilities and mitigate their 
vulnerabilities, in the effort to improve public projects performance. 
	
1.2 Research Problem 
	
As discussed above, interconnected risks within the global economy have had catastrophic 
impacts on global supply chains (Kosansky and Taus, 2014; Wagner and Bode, 2006; Sheffi, 
2005). In the United Kingdom, 80% of businesses disrupted by a major incident close within 
18 months (Federation of Small Businesses, 2014). Large organisations in Europe, the Middle 
East and Africa also faced disruptions to their value chains which cost almost £450,000 per 
incident to recover, including costs associated with lost sales, lost customers, product recall 
and the work involved in having to rebuild the value chain (BDP International, 2013). These 
arguments show that survival and success in this uncertain environment demand that supply 
chains improve their risk management approach by incorporating resilience. This approach 
is hereby referred to in this study as the risk resilience approach. Risk resilience here means 
the ability to anticipate and adapt to change, absorb and recover from a broad range of risk 
events (including unexpected ‘black swan’ events), and to seize the opportunities hidden 
within those risk events (Kinman, 2012).	The construction industry will also benefit from this 
as the industry’s supply chains face constant disruptions in their day-to-day operations. The 
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discussion below highlights the underlying research problem, by looking at the disruptions 
currently challenging construction supply chains from the global point of view, in developing 
countries, and specifically in the Malaysian construction context. 
	
1.2.1 Supply chain disruptions in the global construction sector 
	
Looking at the worldwide view of supply chain disruptions in the engineering and 
construction sector, the recent Business Continuity Institute (BCI) supply chain survey 
(2014) reported that adverse weather is the most common cause of disruption(71.4%), , 
followed by unplanned information technology outage (66.7%), data breach (33.3%), loss of 
talent or skills (33.3%), and transport network disruption (33.3%). The survey reported loss 
of productivity as the primary consequence of these supply chain disruptions, followed by 
increased cost of working and loss of revenue (Business Continuity Institute, 2014). The 
biggest concern in the findings is that although 84% of organisations reported supply chain 
incidents in 2014, with reported losses of more than €1million, almost three-quarters of them 
still have no full visibility of their supply chains. It was reported that the increased lack of 
top management commitment to supply chain resilience is one of the reasons why 
organisations are still vulnerable to supply chain disruptions.  
	
Another recent survey on global construction supply chains conducted by StrategicRISK in 
2014 found that almost two-thirds of construction sector risk managers viewed supply chain 
disruption as their number one concern; 71% of respondents believed that the overall level of 
supply chain risk in the construction industry would increase over the next 10 years 
(StrategicRISK, 2014). Supply chain, human capital, political instability and increased 
competition from rival businesses are other supply chain disruptions highlighted by these risk 
professionals. Understandably, managing project teams from different tiers of the 
construction supply chain is indeed challenging, especially with global disruptive events that 
cause large swings in capacities and resources in project delivery. This is evident from the 
global economic collapse of 2008, where the consequences were felt in the global 
construction sector, leaving half-built housing developments and empty building sites in 
countries such as Spain, Portugal and Ireland. The survey concluded that the construction 
industry has not yet adapted to the globalised nature of the modern commercial environment, 
making it challenging to keep up with modern supply chain complexities within the 
construction industry (StrategicRISK, 2014). 
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This shows that key players in the construction industry around the world are still vulnerable 
to supply chain disruptions. It is also worth noting that some of these disruptions may 
originate from the bottom tiers of the supply chain, which is often hard to foresee especially 
in a large supply chain. Hence, it is important for construction professionals to be aware of 
the disruptive events faced not only by their own organisation, but also by other supply chain 
members, in order to build the capability to respond efficiently to disruptive events. This will 
enable construction projects to progress effectively, reducing susceptibility to poor project 
performance.   
 
1.2.2 Supply chain disruptions in developing countries 
	
As in developed economies, various developing countries have also been affected badly by 
supply chain disruptions, with increasing reports on project performance deficiencies such as 
cost and time overruns, poor quality of work, technical defects, poor durability, and 
inadequate attention to safety, health and environmental issues (Ofori, 2012; Abdul-Rahman 
et al., 2007). Although the supply chain in developing countries shares many of the problems 
that arise in the developed countries, there are even greater adverse implications for poor 
performance of construction projects on long-term national socio-economic development 
(Ofori, 2012). Differences in economic development and the quality of infrastructure, such 
as road and rail networks, may also mean certain developing countries are more susceptible 
to certain disruptions than more mature, developed countries (Tukamuhabwa et al., 2015). 
For instance, acquiring the required resources, especially in rural areas, is more challenging 
as access might be more difficult than in developed countries.  
 
The shortage of supply of the required professional skills is also prevalent in developing 
countries, as a result of lack of governance and training of the construction workforce. As a 
result, higher accident rates on site are frequently reported in developing countries 
(StrategicRISK Asia, 2014). It is indeed challenging to deal with a construction workforce 
that does not provide the extent or quality of service that firms in developed countries are 
used to (Ofori, 2012). This could be even more problematic in joint ventures that involve 
multinational organisations. Furthermore, developing countries are more vulnerable to 
particular supply chain threats such as political turmoil, including rebel activities and post-
election violence, and to bribery, corruption and other unethical business practices 
(Transparency International, 2013). This goes to show that supply chains operating in the 
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current dynamic environment in developing countries are exposed to formidable disruptions, 
some of which may not be an issue in developed nations, but could potentially have an 
adverse impact on the other nations if not handled appropriately. Indeed, emerging countries, 
especially in Asia, are currently building up their infrastructure to meet consumers’ demand 
for a better standard of living. As construction is booming in Asia, so is the need to manage 
these related complexities of risk and supply chain disruption. It is therefore important for 
key players in developing countries to find a way to build resilience into their construction 
supply chains.  
 
1.2.3 Supply chain disruptions in the Malaysian construction industry 
	
Much like many efforts made by other developing countries, the Malaysian Government 
introduced its own transformation programmes under Vision 2020. One of the programmes 
was the Tenth Malaysia Plan which lasted from 2011 until 2015. Under this plan, an allocation 
of RM138 billion (€34.5 billion) was to be spent on physical development to be undertaken 
directly by the construction sector, including public sector projects. However, as discussed in 
Section 1.1, despite the ministries and Government departments’ well meaning plans to meet 
this construction provision, the Malaysian National Audit Department (2014) identified 
several weaknesses and disruptions in terms of implementation which prevented the project 
objectives from being fully achieved, resulting in little impact of the projects on the targeted 
groups. The report consists of observations from the audit of 17 public projects of 14 Federal 
Agencies, managed by the Malaysian Public Works Department (PWD). The PWD is the 
umbrella organisation for public sector works and acts as a technical advisor to the 
Government on public projects governance (PWD, 2012). It is the main implementer of public 
projects and is responsible in managing public sector professionals across the various federal 
ministries and public states organisations in delivering public projects and maintaining the 
government’s infrastructure assets.  
	
Based on the report, the public sector organisations are still vulnerable in areas such as the 
management of their stakeholders and construction project teams, insufficient technical 
expertise, no coordination among parties involved in the supply chain, as well as several 
internal problems faced by contractors (National Audit Department, 2014). For instance, the 
construction of Paya Peda Dam in Terengganu faced significant delay due to the lack of 
expertise of the contractors hired to lead the construction of the dam. The contractors’ lack 
of experience resulted in poor functionality of the dam’s hydro mechanical gate system, 
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causing an area of paddy fields to be flooded, so that the production of rice did not meet the 
stipulated demand in the district of Besut in 2014. This demonstrates the interdependent 
nature of the construction industry and other sectors, and how disruptions in the construction 
supply chain may have knock-on effects on other industries. Disruptions in public projects 
could also result in a considerable negative impact on the Government’s revenue, 
performance and public reputation. 
 
Other delays in local public projects caused by supply chain disruptions have also been 
highlighted in the past by researchers (Riazi et al., 2011; Joshi, 2009; Abdul-Rahman et al., 
2006; Pratt, 2000). For instance, the Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation 
(MATRADE) project experienced nine years of delay and a 70% cost overrun due to 
disruptions arising from the first contractor abandoning the project and the appointment of 
another contractor (Riazi et al., 2011). Other projects include the Middle Ring Road 2 that 
underwent post-occupational ratification due to the appearance of cracks in 31 of its flyover 
piers, and the second Penang Bridge, which had recently been completed, that faced a delay 
of more than 12 months resulting from additional technical aspects that had not been 
considered in the early stages (Riazi et al., 2011). The inability to manage supply chain 
disruptions and inadequate execution of works have indeed affected the development of 
public projects in Malaysia, preventing the Government from receiving the best value for 
money on the expenditure incurred. 
	
Furthermore, the current sudden plunge in global oil prices, tight fiscal budget measures, and 
the newly implemented federal 6% goods and services tax (GST) have also had a significant 
impact on local construction supply chains (Puspadevi, 2015). The downwards trend in global 
oil prices resulted in major uncertainties in the overall economic situation. Given the 
reduction in oil revenue, it is generally believed that the Government may postpone some 
major public projects (Malaysia Report, 2014). The implementation of GST in April 2015 
also raised clients’ concerns over the rise of construction costs, the compliance costs of 
operating supply chain concerns and the effect on competitiveness. This shows that the 
interdependent nature of the supply chain could also be triggered by the national economy. 
Considering the numerous large-scale projects underway, such as the Pan-Borneo Highway 
(RM27 billion) and the West Coast Expressway (RM5 billion) under the national plan, 
construction players need to build up their ability to adapt and thrive in the face of such 
challenges, to ensure the survival and growth of the Malaysian construction sector.  
	 22	
1.2.4 The need for a risk resilience approach 
	
In this case, it can be seen that as the implementer of the public sector projects, the public 
organisations and their supply chain partners (referred to as the public sector supply chain 
from hereon) are to some degree still vulnerable to a diverse set of risks and disruptive events. 
This has resulted in the poor project performances highlighted by previous researchers and 
the Auditor’s report. It is indeed not surprising that the Director General of the PWD 
described the industry as still living in the 1960’s, with the management of disruption in 
public projects still poor (Zaini, 2000). The ‘blame-game’ culture is also often played out by 
key players in the supply chain when disruptions occur, even though in reality the 
construction processes are interrelated. In fact, supply chains should be able to deliver the 
maximum intended value of the project even if there are several disruptive events. As 
highlighted in the Malaysian public project cases outlined in Section 1.2.3, disruptions in 
public projects have become barriers to the public sector supply chain’s achieving project 
objectives, resulting in poor project outcomes, and huge losses for the Government, 
contractors and suppliers. Disruptions in the construction supply chain are also sometimes 
beyond the direct control of project managers, and the fragmentation of the construction 
supply chain makes it even more challenging to build supply chain resilience in the 
construction industry.  
 
With higher expectations from the public for the public sector professionals to deliver the 
intended large-scale projects, and with the rising challenges of the twenty-first century, it is 
time for the public organisations and their supply chain partners to move beyond the 
traditional risk management approach and change the way supply chain disruptions are 
managed. More flexible, resilient, and risk-resistant supply chains are needed to operate in 
this volatile construction environment in order to maintain growth in the Malaysian 
construction industry. Previous researchers such as Zaini (2000), Abdul-Rahman et al. 
(2005), Ibrahim et al. (2010) and Riazi et al. (2011) also believe that only with enhanced 
capabilities and capacity can the local industry withstand challenges in both good and bad 
times. There is therefore no doubt that there are possibilities for substantial improvements in 
the public sector supply chain operational strategies and competencies. This therefore calls 
for the need to build a risk resilience response framework to effectively manage supply chain 
disruptions in public projects and improve the supply chain’s performance in delivering 
public projects.  
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1.3 Research Gap  
	
The research into global supply chains indicates that interconnected risks are beyond a single 
organisation’s control, and that key players worldwide are still vulnerable to supply chain 
disruptions (see Section 1.1). As there global supply chains are involved in construction (see 
Section 1.2.1), this area is important and vital for the performance of both developed and 
developing countries. Within the supply chain resilience literature, to date, researchers 
(Zsidisin and Wagner, 2010; Ponomarov, 2012; Pettit et al., 2013; Boone et al., 2013) have 
been focusing on the developed countries, particularly in the European Union and the USA. 
As discussed in Section 1.2.2, the economic differences that exist between developed and 
developing economies suggest that perceptions and responses to threats may differ between 
these contexts (Tukamuhabwa et al., 2015). The lack of good quality empirical work on 
supply chain resilience in developing countries represents a distinct knowledge gap that this 
study intends to address. Malaysia, a developing country, has very ambitious goals (as stated 
in section 1.2.3); however, disruptions faced by the supply chain involved in delivering public 
projects have prevented the Government from meeting its construction provisions. This 
scenario offers a major opportunity for the researcher to undertake the study within the 
Malaysian public sector context. 
	
Looking at the existing literature, several views of resilience and disruption have evolved 
over time through multidisciplinary studies conducted by previous researchers (see Sections 
2.3 and 2.4). However, to date, there have been few studies on resilience to disruptions in 
commercial supply chains. The wide-ranging consequences of disruption on the networked 
chains or supply chains within a commercial environment have not received adequate 
attention, either in theory or in practice. As pointed out in Section 1.1, supply chains dominate 
the construction industry and disruptions in this sector can cascade into other industries, 
sectors and regions. Resilience in the construction industry still remains under-researched.  
Previous resilience studies are broad but limited in depth, most looking at various 
organisations across different industries (Pettit et al., 2013; Stephenson, 2010; McManus, 
2008). More industry-specific research, such as in the context of the construction industry, is 
required to address this gap in the literature. It is also difficult to understand resilience by 
studying a single entity in the supply chain; it need to be examined across multiple related 
organisations in the network (Tukamuhabwa et al., 2015). Previous studies typically assessed 
resilience based on a single respondent from each firm, overlooking the effects of 
	 24	
connectivity between organisations in the supply chain. The lack of empirical studies on the 
supply chain limits the current understanding of the interdependent risk of disruptions 
(discussed in Section 1.1) between organisations in the chain. As the resilience of a firm is 
determined by the resilience of its network (Sheffi and Rice, 2005; Wedawatta et al., 2010), 
and as the emerging risk of disruptions reaches the level of networks, this calls for studies 
beyond organisational boundaries to develop resilience characteristics within organisations 
and supply chains. 
Furthermore, although many resilience strategies have been proposed by previous 
researchers, building resilience can mean different things in different supply chains. For 
instance, previous disaster management strategies that worked well in a specific location, 
time, or context have led to very poor performance in slightly different environments (such 
as the construction industry), as the disaster relief supply networks differ from commercial 
supply chains (Day, 2014). For example, Day (2014) argued that in natural disaster relief 
efforts, it is more important to ensure that sufficient resources such as food are procured and 
moved as rapidly as possible to places where they are needed, than to hold the traditionally 
efficient minimal stock levels. Large stocks must therefore be on hand in this case to be 
distributed as widely as possible following a disaster event. However, with commercial 
supply chains, holding large stocks or inventories may cause waste or erode profits, especially 
if firms over-invest in resources that are not necessary (Pettit et al., 2013). In this case, the 
commercial supply chains need to find a strategic balance between the resources required and 
the uncertainty in demand, and to ensure that the best quality of service or product can be 
provided even when disruptions occur. Hence there seems to be wide scope for study in this 
area, although several successful strategies already exist. Malaysian public sector 
construction can certainly adopt some of the good practices currently available. However, 
some of the unique interdependent impacts that affect supply chains in construction shape 
and determine the broader strategies of fostering resilience in this context. The existing 
resilience studies in Malaysia are also still limited to the field of individual psychology, 
assessing how individuals cope in changing environments (Buang, 2012; Madihie, 2009); 
and disaster management, assessing how organisations respond to extreme weather events 
(Roosli and O’Keefe, 2013; Billa et al, 2006). This general theoretical gap shows that there 
is still room for improvement in the resilience literature with regard to building supply chain 
resilience within the Malaysian construction industry. 
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A further specific gap was also identified from the literature. Researchers in the Malaysian 
construction industry (Goh and Abdul-Rahman, 2013; Siang and Ali, 2012) are still focusing 
on the risk management process at the pre-disruption stage, by analysing the probability and 
impact of the risk of ‘potential disruption’ in construction projects. Little work is presented 
on post-disruption activities in terms of the supply chain’s response and recovery following 
an ‘actual disruption’ (see Section 2.3). Hence the supply chain’s ability to learn from existing 
disruptions and utilise current capabilities to mitigate such problems have not received much 
attention in the literature, which this study intends to address. Furthermore, although the 
proactive strategies may be preferred in practice as they can be applied to prepare for a 
disruption rather than to respond to it, managers may be reluctant to implement such proactive 
strategies due to the financial implications of mitigating potential disruptive events which 
may not ultimately occur (Tukamuhabwa et al., 2015). More elaborate and comprehensive 
supply chain resilience strategies are needed to justify investment. Assessing the capability 
and vulnerability factors of the supply chain in dealing with disruptions as they materialise 
can help to determine their level of resilience, which in turn enables the researcher to develop 
specific resilience strategies to cater for different levels in which the supply chain is 
vulnerable. 	
	
This study therefore intends to address the identified gap in the knowledge by developing a 
resilience response framework to build up the resilience of the Malaysian public sector supply 
chain to disruptions. Understanding the level of resilience of the supply chain in responding 
to a wide array of unexpected events and disruptions will help the public sector supply chain 
to manage disruptions effectively in future projects, and thereby improve public projects 
performance. The aim and objectives of the research are presented in the following section. 
 
1.4 Research Aim and Objectives 
	
This research aims to develop a resilience response framework to improve the preparedness 
and build resilience of the supply chain against disruptions in the effort to improve the 
Malaysian public sector projects delivery. The following objectives are identified in order to 
achieve the research aim: 
1. To examine the phases of supply chain disruptions faced by Malaysian public sector 
projects. 
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2. To examine the concept of resilience and its applicability in managing supply chain 
disruptions. 
3. To analyse the emergent vulnerability and capability factors of the public sector supply 
chain in coping with supply chain disruptions.  
4. To identify the causes and the cascading effects of supply chain disruptions to the 
Malaysian public sector project performance.  
5. To establish and validate the resilience response framework to improve supply chain 
performance on meeting its resilience goals to mitigate against disruptive events in 
Malaysian public sector projects. 
 
1.5 Research Contributions 
	
Whilst past studies on managing risks in the construction industry have added value to the 
existing body of knowledge in improving performance, they rarely concentrate on the modern-
day complexities related to supply chain risks and to risks which are interdependent across the 
construction supply chain. This study bridges this theoretical gap by assessing supply chain 
disruptions beyond organisational boundaries to develop resilience characteristics within 
organisations and their supply chain partners. Another theoretical contribution to knowledge 
is the assessment of supply chain resilience in the context of a developing country, Malaysia, 
where research in this area is not adequately available. Although poor project performance 
such as delays and cost overruns are common in Malaysia, there has been limited empirical 
investigation into developing resilience of the construction supply chain. This research 
therefore potentially bridges this gap by identifying the construction supply chain’s 
vulnerability, which undermines their capability to recover and even thrive from disruptions, 
as shown in the case of the Paya Peda Dam (see Section 1.2.3). Furthermore, as the resilience 
assessment in this study is tailored particularly to the construction industry, this will help to 
expand the applicability of supply chain resilience assessment to a new context, adding 
valuable findings and significant new knowledge to the existing literature. Finally, the study 
has the potential to advance the overall state of knowledge in mitigating disruptive events 
affecting supply chains which are globally networked. 
 
In terms of the study’s practical contributions, this research will offer public organisations’ 
managers relevant insights into their organisations’ critical areas of vulnerability and their 
current resilience capabilities. The management will also be given significant information on 
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the links between their vulnerabilities and capabilities, allowing them to utilise their 
capabilities to mitigate the critical vulnerabilities and prioritise their investments on areas that 
need further improvement. In addition, the public organisations will be able to gain a better 
understanding of the resilience capabilities and vulnerabilities of the contractors and 
consultants engaged in delivering public projects, which might not have been obvious to the 
managers before. Overall, it is believed that the output from this study will help to inform and 
guide the public organisations and their supply chain partners in building resilience to supply 
chain disruptions in public project delivery. 
 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is structured into seven chapters as described below:   
 
Chapter 1 provides the background of the research to introduce the research topic. It includes 
the problem statement, research gap, research aims and objectives, the study’s contribution 
to knowledge and practice, and the outline of the thesis.  
 
Chapter 2 discusses the current state of the Malaysian construction industry and introduces 
the industry’s key players. This is followed by a thorough review of the literature of supply 
chain disruption, supply chain resilience, supply chain vulnerability and capability, and 
pathogenic influences. It also includes the development of the conceptual framework.   
 
Chapter 3 describes in detail the research design and methodology. This includes the 
philosophical stance of the researcher that leads to the selection of a suitable research 
approach, strategy and techniques to fulfil the research aim and objectives. The reliability 
and validity of the adopted research techniques are also addressed. This is followed by a 
summary of the research process along with ethical considerations.  
 
Chapter 4 presents the results of the questionnaire survey. The results are analysed using 
descriptive statistics and further inferential statistics to make comparisons between the 
vulnerabilities and capabilities of the groups of respondents.  
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Chapter 5 presents the analysis of the interviews with key players in the industry. It 
highlights the emergent critical pathogens identified from the interviews that make the public 
sector supply chain vulnerable to disruptions in public projects. 
 
Chapter 6 discusses the key findings of the study by triangulating the results from the 
questionnaire survey in Chapter 4, with justification from the interview findings and 
pathogenic influences in Chapter 5. Critical links between the concepts and factors are also 
presented in developing the final resilience response framework. The final framework and its 
validation are then discussed at the end of the chapter.  
 
Chapter 7 (Conclusion) provides a summary of the study by revisiting the research aim and 
objectives and presenting the key findings of the study. It underlines the theoretical and 
practical contributions, along with the limitations of the study and suggestions for future 
research areas. References and appendices are presented at the end of the thesis.  
 
1.7 Summary 
 
Chapter 1 presents the research area, the Malaysian construction industry’s supply chain 
resilience to disruptions and the justification of the research context. The research problem 
areas and significant gap in knowledge were discussed, and the research aim and objectives 
identified to address these issues. The expected contribution of this study to knowledge and 
practice, and a brief description of the structure of the thesis, were presented. Overall, this 
chapter set the context of the research areas which will be discussed in detail in the following 
chapters. The next chapter is a review of the literature.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In fulfilling the research objectives, this chapter begins by providing the background of the 
Malaysian construction industry, with a critical discussion on the current state and the 
challenges faced by the supply chain in the local construction industry. The significant role 
of the Malaysian PWD in managing the public sector professionals and delivering public 
projects is first discussed. This is followed by a comprehensive literature review of the 
definition and various phases of disruptions, in order to develop a workable definition of 
supply chain disruptions in construction. The term resilience and its applicability in managing 
supply chain disruptions are defined, leading to the breaking down of the concept of supply 
chain resilience into two key elements: vulnerability and capability. Finally, the additional 
related concept of pathogens and its applicability to the resilience context is presented. These 
concepts collectively lead to the development of the conceptual framework for this study.  
 
2.2 Background of the Malaysian Construction Industry 
	
The Malaysian construction industry has played a significant role in the lifestyle of the local 
community, contributing to the economic development of the country ever since 
independence in 1957. The industry generally consists of two types of work: general 
construction work such as building and civil works, and special trades such as plumbing and 
electrical works (Ibrahim et al., 2010). These provide numerous jobs for foreign and local 
workers, with thousands of people working in the client organisations (including both public 
and private sector), contractors, surveying, engineering, architecture, management, and 
manufacturing. Indeed, besides generating wealth for the country’s overall development, the 
construction industry has also contributed to the growth of other industries in the 
manufacturing, financial services and professional services sectors (CIDB, 2008). For 
instance, the construction of advanced buildings and infrastructure uses highly mechanised 
production techniques from both the manufacturing and professional services sectors, 
acquiring new technologies and expert advice in delivering such innovative projects. 
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Both the public and private sector play a significant role in the Malaysian construction 
industry. The former involves Government bodies such as the Ministry of Works, the Public 
Works Department (PWD), the Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB), the 
Contractor Service Centre (PKK), the Board of Engineers, the Board of Architects and the 
Board of Surveyors (Kamal and Flanagan, 2012). According to Ibrahim et al. (2010), the 
industry has been largely spurred on by Government spending to improve the nation’s 
infrastructure. This includes expenditure for the delivery of public buildings and 
infrastructure projects such as Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA), the Petronas 
Twin Towers and the administrative capital of Putrajaya. These public bodies therefore play 
a significant role in the overall growth and development of the Malaysian construction 
industry. Apart from the public bodies, larger contributions from the private sector could also 
be seen when the Ninth Malaysia Plan (9MP) (2006 to 2010) was introduced by the 
Government. Under this plan, construction organisations from the private sector were 
encouraged to become involved with the development of Government projects.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: The series of Malaysian national plans  
(Source: Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister’s Department, Malaysia)	
	
Following the 9MP, the national plan to become a developed country by the year 2020 
(through Vision 2020, in Figure 2.1) continued with the Tenth Malaysia Plan (10MP), 2011 
to 2015. The 10MP basically charted the development of all the national economic sectors 
within the stipulated five years, including the budget allocated to fulfil both the Government 
Transformation Programme and the New Economic Model, as presented by the Economic 
Planning Unit (EPU) of the Prime Minister’s Department and the Finance Ministry. A total 
of RM138 billion (€34.5 billion) was allocated to physical development in the construction 
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sector, including the development of public projects (CIDB, 2008). The PWD played a 
significant role in this plan in becoming the Government’s main technical advisor on all 
matters involving the public professionals and public projects delivery (e.g. technical auditor, 
building competencies, coordination of resources, policies), and is responsible for the 
construction and maintenance of the Government projects. The Malaysian Construction 
Industry Development Board (2008) also targeted a growth in the construction industry of 
3.7% per annum over the five-year period.  
	
Based on the Department of Statistics Malaysia (2014), the industry grew at a rate of 14.3% 
in the first half of 2014 with projects worth RM69 billion carried out until the third quarter of 
2014. Overall, with the increased Government spending on public infrastructure, the 
construction industry output was expected to record a considerable annual growth rate of 
11.48% from 2013 to 2017 (CIDB, 2012). In 2014, a total of RM46.5 billion was set aside 
for federal Government development expenditure, of which 2.4% was allocated to the housing 
sector, 19.6% to the infrastructure or transport sector, and 7.7% to public utilities (Department 
of Statistics Malaysia, 2014). The significant key economic indicators below signify the 
growth of the construction sector in the year 2014 (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2014): 
• A 6.2% economy growth rate during the first quarter of 2014,  
• A 7.4% increase in domestic demand in the first quarter of 2014 led by the expansion in 
consumption and private investment, 
• A public consumption growth rate of 11.2% in the first quarter of 2014. 
Other factors include changes in the demographics of the country, with an annual population 
growth rate of about 2%; the migration of foreign workers and socio-economic growth also 
contributed to the expansion of the construction market (CIDB, 2012).  
 
The Eleventh Malaysia Plan (11MP), from 2016 to 2020, was introduced as the closing 
chapter of the Vision 2020 plan (Figure 2.1). Although some of the objectives had been 
achieved in 10MP, the Government are still facing challenges in raising the nation’s economy 
to be on a par with those of developed countries. 11MP therefore includes the aim of 
strengthening the infrastructure to support economic expansion, to re-engineer economic 
growth for greater prosperity (including transforming the construction industry), and 
transforming the public service to increase productivity. The growth of the construction 
industry particularly is evident under the 11MP, with a proposed contribution of RM327 
billion or 5.5% to GDP by 2020 (EPU, 2015). This is due to the increasing demand for 
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housing and continued investment in future large-scale projects such as new power plants, 
highways, urban transport systems, ports and airports (CIDB, 2015). Most importantly, the 
plan also highlights the need to transform public sector service delivery in order to be more 
cost effective and better equipped to meet the future demands and expectations of the nation. 
This includes improving service delivery with citizens at the centre, rationalising public sector 
institutions for greater productivity and performance, strengthening talent management for 
the public service of the future, enhancing project management for better and faster outcomes 
and capitalising on local authorities for quality services at the local level (EPU, 2015). This 
shows that considering the rapid development of the economy and the construction industry, 
there are still key areas in the public sector that need to be improved to efficiently deliver the 
key construction projects. 
 
Overall, the 11MP identified key challenges faced during the implementation of 10MP, that 
are crucial to address. Understandbly, the challenges facing the Malaysian construction 
industry and the public sector are becoming increasingly complex due to global economic 
uncertainties, technological changes, and the rapidly rising expectations of citizens for the 
Government to deliver sophisticated infrastructure and services. Further challenges faced by 
the Malaysian construction industry are discussed in the following section.  
 
2.2.1 Challenges in the Malaysian Construction Industry 
	
According to Abdul-Rahim (2010), in 9MP (2006–2010), the public sector supply chain 
experienced poor project delivery despite various strategies and recovery measures taken to 
implement over 7,000 projects of this plan. Some of the projects were not completed within 
the stipulated time, even after introduction of 10MP. Abdul-Rahim (2010) pointed out the 
failures of the public projects with regard to issues pertaining to the traditional success factors 
of time, cost and quality, as follows: 
• 80% of the public projects until 2009 could not be completed within the original contract 
period (Joshi, 2009). 
• Changes in scope are common in public projects, resulting in cost overruns and delays.  
• Poor quality has always been associated with public projects, despite various quality 
systems adopted during their implementation. 
Some of the completed buildings were also reported to be non-functional due to inappropriate 
execution of works (Jaafar and King, 2011), suggesting that the problems may have derived 
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from not only from the public organisations’ internal capacities, but also their supply chain 
partners. These problems have together become a permanent issue for the Government in 
meeting the targets stipulated in the provisions. Furthermore, despite the progress of the 
infrastructure developments achieved in the 10MP, problems such as road congestion in urban 
areas, inadequate public transport, capacity constraints in ports, and bottlenecks in logistics 
are still prevalent in the Malaysian construction industry. The Government therefore calls for 
further improvements in the industry to improve overall productivity and performance of 
public sector services. 
	
In addition, there is growing concern about the prevalent payment issues in the Malaysian 
construction industry, including non-payment, slow payment and under-payment which 
continue to rise (Judi and Abdul-Rashid, 2010). These payment issues have resulted in the 
construction organisations facing cash flow problems which make it difficult to complete the 
projects undertaken. They have also resulted in poor trust between the contracting parties and 
the project owners. Financial difficulties can also ultimately hamper productivity and the 
quality of the construction projects. Accidents on construction sites are another growing issue 
in the local construction industry. In 2007 3,395 accidents were reported, of which 2.8% and 
0.3% resulted in death and permanent disabilities respectively in the construction industry 
(CIDB, 2008). These accidents caused the authorities to stop the work on site, causing 
significant delays in project delivery. Such accidents also tarnish the reputation and image of 
the construction industry. 
 
As discussed in Section 1.2.3, the Malaysian construction industry is also facing significant 
external challenges such as global economic shocks and geopolitical risks. The severe fall in 
the prices of major export commodities, decline of the Ringgit Malaysia against major 
currencies, and the risk of economic slowdown of the national major trading partners are 
some of the key challenges highlighted in the 11MP (EPU, 2015). These have indeed affected 
the local supply chain, especially in terms of rises in the price of construction materials due 
to inflation and the depreciating currency. Considering the global economic uncertainties, 
inadequate fiscal measures by the Government are also recognised as a great challenge under 
the 11MP in ensuring the successful delivery of stipulated key infrastructure projects. These 
challenges can indeed siginificantly affect the Government’s efforts to transform the nation’s 
infrastructure and economy. 
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Overall, although both the public and private sectors of the construction industry face 
significant challenges in adapting to the challenges (Jaafar and Aziz, 2009), the public sector 
is governed by a strict set of rules and regulations, a burden with the additional responsibility 
of ensuring the public’s money is spent properly and wisely. This is not surprising as the 
public organisations ultimately exist for the benefit of the citizens (Gould, 1997). In this case, 
the private sector has much more freedom when proceeding with a project (Gould, 1997) as 
it is not tied up to any specific Government rules, as long as the process undertaken is legal 
and ethical (CIDB, 2008). It is therefore important for the public sector to overcome these 
challenges to the industry, as any failures in its projects are highly visible to the public. This 
can result in the loss of trust of the public in Government bodies, which can subsequently 
damage the overall plans for national development.  
 
2.2.2 The Role of the Malaysian Public Works Department (PWD) 
	
As discussed in Section 1.2.3, PWD is the umbrella organisation for public sector works, 
formed in 1972 under the Malaysian Ministry of Works. The PWD’s main role is as technical 
advisor to the Government, with responsibility for the implementation of public projects and 
the maintenance of the country’s infrastructure assets (PWD, 2012). From a policy-maker’s 
point of view, PWD is at the heart of policy making to improve the competencies of the public 
sector professionals across the federal ministries and public state organisations and mitigate 
disruptions that affect construction supply chains’ performance. The aim of the department is 
to provide world-class services and become a centre of excellence for asset management, 
project management and engineering services in developing Malaysia’s infrastructure 
through creative and innovative human resources and state-of-the-art technology.  
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Figure 2.2: Organisational Structure of Malaysian Public Works Department (PWD, 2012) 
 
The PWD is structured in three main sectors, business, specialist and management, as shown 
in Figure 2.2. According to Ngah (2011), there are still miscommunications among the 
branches and departments as every department is led by different project managers and 
functional managers. The unclear roles and responsibilities of departments in PWD also 
contribute to the delays and errors of public sector professionals across the states and federal 
organisations in delivering public projects. Under PWD, the public sector organisations serve 
numerous clients consisting of departments, authorities, and states, including the twenty-eight 
ministries. Consultants and contractors are engaged by the public organisations under the 
traditional, design and build and public private partnership procurement routes to deliver the 
public projects. Overall, the public organisations had over 1,900 projects worth RM25 billion 
allocated under 10MP (PWD, 2012). Considering the importance of the public organisations 
in delivering the projects for the development of the nation’s economy, and with the large 
number of parties involved in the public organisations’ supply chain, improved performance 
between the parties is significant in fulfilling the country’s construction provision. The public 
sector supply chain network is discussed further in the following section.  
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2.3 Supply Chain Disruptions 
	
Supply chains in the face of disruption is a subject that has motivated the interest of numerous 
researchers and practitioners. Zsidisin et al. (2000) defined a disturbance as a consequential 
situation that significantly threatens the normal course of operations of the affected supply 
chain members. This scenario entails making decisions or taking actions in order to minimise 
such effects. Similarly, Svensson (2000), Hendricks et al. (2008) and Kleindorfer and Saad 
(2005) defined supply chain disruption as an unplanned and unanticipated event that disrupts 
the normal flow of goods and materials in a supply chain. Craighead et al. (2007) pointed out 
that the occurrence of such disturbances that negatively affect a supply chain is an 
unavoidable fact, and all supply chains are inevitably at risk. 
	
Some authors refer to disturbances as ‘disruptions’ (Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009), while 
others refer to them as ‘risk’ (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Goh et al., 2007), ‘errors’ (Love and 
Smith, 2016), ‘uncertainty’ (Mason-Jones and Towill, 1998) or even as ‘crisis’ (Loosemore, 
2000). In the context of this research, the term used to refer to such disturbances is disruption, 
which is defined as a foreseeable or unforeseeable event which affects the usual operation 
and stability of an organisation or a supply chain (Barroso et al., 2008). It is an event that 
takes place at one point in the chain and can adversely affect the performance of one or more 
parties located elsewhere in the supply chain and the normal flow of goods and materials 
within a supply chain (Craighead et al., 2007). The supply chain risk, on the other hand, is 
the expected exposure of a supply chain to the potential impact of disruptions, usually 
characterised by the likelihood of a disruption and the impact of disruption if it occurs 
(Zsidisin et al., 2005).   
	
In the context of the construction sector, a supply chain consists of upstream and downstream 
linkages. The upstream linkage in relation to the position of a main contractor consists of the 
activities and tasks leading to preparation of the production on site, involving construction 
clients and design team; downstream consists of activities and tasks in the delivery of 
construction products involving construction suppliers, sub-contractors and specialist 
contractors in relation to the main contractor (Akintoye et al, 2000). This fragmentation of 
the sequential design-construction process often results in construction organisations 
working in silos, reducing the organisations’ ability to detect any risk of disruption that may 
occur along the supply chain network. Figure 2.3 presents a basic example of the supply chain 
network in construction. The main contractors with a direct commercial relationship with the 
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client and design team are considered as Tier 1. Tier 2 consists of sub-contractors and 
suppliers with a direct contract with the Tier 1 main contractor, and Tier 3 contains sub-
contractors and suppliers working for the sub-contractors in Tier 2. Tier 3 sub-contractors 
may also employ suppliers and sub-contractors, hence, there could be up to four or five tiers 
of supply chain involved in delivering the project as it grows more complex. The source of 
disruption may be located inside or outside the chain and can occur in any node (i.e. a 
contractor or supplier) or link (i.e. the transportation of raw material between supplier and 
contractor) of the supply chain network.  
 
 
Figure 2.3: Construction supply chain network (Adapted from Hope, 2012) 
 
From the point of view of this study, a typical supply chain network in the context of the 
Malaysian construction industry is represented in Figure 2.4.  
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Figure 2.4: Superimposed public and private supply chains in the 
Malaysian construction sector 
 
The public sector, indicated as supply chain A in Figure 2.4, includes public organisations 
that act as the project owners on behalf of their clients (i.e. local ministries), and are in charge 
of implementing the public projects funded under the Government’s stipulated provisions. A 
majority of the contractors and consultants working in the public projects are from the private 
sector. In addition to the public sector work these consultants and contractors also serve 
private clients within the private sector supply chain, depicted as B, C and D in Figure 2.4. 
Due to the growing complexity of the structure, this research considers the public sector 
initiated supply chain (supply chain A) as the main focus of this study. It can be observed 
here how managing the complex interdependencies both within and between these several 
supply chains is indeed challenging, as disruptions arising from any part of this chain will 
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subsequently have a cascading impact on others, both locally and internationally. For 
instance, the failure of timely payment by the public organisations to the contractors in supply 
chain A will subsequently affect the contractors’ cash flow and pre-planned programmes for 
other private sector projects involved in supply chain C. As the contractors are also working 
with other supply chains, the payment issues may subsequently lead to further impacts such 
as the contactors sacrificing time, cost and quality or, in the extreme case, the abandonment 
of projects in order to survive financially. In this case, practitioners often underestimate the 
interdependencies of this payment-related issue which may result in extreme consequences 
across the industry and the economy. As discussed in Section 2.2.1, delayed payment and 
non-payment in the Malaysian construction industry have often led to disputes and financial 
problems for industry players (Judi and Abdul-Rashid, 2010; Ameer-Ali, 2006), affecting the 
survival of the construction organisations in the entire delivery chain.  
 
The interdependent nature of the supply chain has also resulted in the poor project delivery 
reported in the series of Malaysian Plans (2006–2015), that included non-functional buildings 
due to inadequate execution of the work (Jaafar and King, 2011). This reflects the complex 
nature of supply chain impacts. The negative effects of disruptions frequently cascade through 
the supply chain, due to dependencies (temporal, functional and relational) between supply 
chain entities (Svensson, 2000), as portrayed in Figure 2.4. Disruptions caused by clients are 
also common in public projects, where frequent changes in the scope of public sector projects 
result in cost overruns and delay (Abdul-Rahim, 2010). Certainly, the phenomenon such as 
the bullwhip effect shows that regardless of its magnitude, disruptions such as a small change 
in demand can spread and amplified from tier to tier in the supply chain (Lee et al., 1997; 
Taylor 2000), causing disruption to the operational flow of the entire supply chain. The 
discussion above shows that the fragmentation nature of the supply chain and the inability to 
manage the interdependencies of supply chain disruptions are recurrent issues for the 
Malaysian Government in meeting the 2020 targets. This is not surprising as the 
fragmentation of the construction industry have also been highlighted in the past Latham 
(1994) and Egan (1998) reports as one of the barriers to efficiency in supply chain 
performance. The reports show the relevance of adopting practices such as partnering and 
supply chain management in managing interdependent supply chain to overcome poor project 
performance (Latham ,1994; and Egan, 1998). Hence, in this case, due to the interdependent 
nature of the supply chain, the disruptions faced by both the public organisations and the 
respective supply chain partners (referred to as the private organisations from hereon) are 
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considered in this study to obtain a more balanced perspective on the magnitude of the impact 
of disruptions in public sector projects.  
 
2.3.1 Managing the Pre-, During and Post-Disruption Phases 
	
In order to build the public sector supply chain’s capability to withstand disruptive events, it 
is important to understand how to manage supply chain disruptions. Previous literature exists 
on managing supply chain disruptions from the manufacturing, retail (Xiao and Yang, 2008; 
Oke and Gopalakrishnan, 2009), automotive and oil and gas sectors (Behdani, 2013), but 
little attention has been paid to the disruptions faced by the supply chain in the construction 
industry, especially in the Malaysian context. By looking at disruptions as a process, the 
existing literature can be categorised into three main phases: the pre-disruption, during 
disruption and post-disruption phases, as tabulated in Table 2.1.		
	
Despite the differences in terminology used in the framework presented by researchers from 
different disciplines (see the extended version of Table B1 in Appendix B), there is a level of 
agreement that the pre-disruption phase involves the proactive approach of identifying, 
assessing and mitigating the risk of disruption by assigning the necessary treatments to the 
risk identified. For instance, Billa et al. (2006) studied flood disaster management in Malaysia 
and described the activities at the pre-disruption phase to include the ‘detection’ of flood 
through the collection of meteorological data, flood ‘forecasting’ through the interpretation 
of the data collected, and the dissemination of ‘warnings’ to the public (see row 2 of Table 
2.1). In the crisis management literature, Cockram and Van Den Heuvel (2012) believe that 
managers should have a wide range of proactive resilience activities in place at the pre-crisis 
phase to both prevent and mitigate the impact or duration if the crisis occurs. Sheffi and Rice 
(2005) agree with this and find that the effects of disruption can be minimised if a company 
can foresee and prepare for disruption before it occurs.  
 
In the context of this study, this pre-disruption phase is equivalent to the risk management 
process before construction begins on site. This proactive approach to risk management is 
common in the Malaysian construction industry. However, despite this approach being 
widely practised in Malaysia, as the nature of the supply chain becomes more complex, it is 
difficult for the associated risks to be mitigated by individual participants in the chain. As the 
project progresses from one phase to another, its associated risk also shifts among the general 
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contractors, sub-contractors, suppliers and other parties in the supply chain. Most research in 
the Malaysian construction industry (Goh and Abdul-Rahman, 2013; Siang and Ali, 2012) 
focuses on the risk management process in the pre-disruption phase, and there is a paucity of 
literature on the supply chain’s response following ‘actual disruptions’ in construction. 
Hence, the supply chain’s ability to learn from existing disruptions or utilise the supply 
chain’s current capabilities to overcome such problems has received little attention.	
	
During the disruption, an effective reactive response is important to reduce the spread of its 
impact. The response should include the implementation of the contingency plans set up 
during the pre-disruption phase. Berg et al. (2008) termed this ‘reactive supply chain risk 
handling’, which directly defines the success of the risk management process and includes 
the process of ‘incident handling’, ‘accident handling’ and ‘execution of contingency plans’ 
(see row 1 of Table 2.1). In other words, for this study, the effectiveness of the risk 
management programmes set by the construction organisations in the supply chain can be 
determined during this phase by assessing how well the incidents/accidents are handled (i.e. 
the time to react) or how well the developed contingency plans are followed during 
disruptions. However, Sheffi (2005) argues that in some cases, the pre-planned contingency 
measures might not be able to contain the disruptions, hence alternative responses outside the 
traditional work routines and standard operating procedures are usually required to prevent 
the spread of the disruption. This may be due to the large number of uncertainties and the 
difficulty in interpreting low-probability events beforehand during the decision-making 
process (Camerer and Kunreuther, 1989). It is therefore important for this study to consider 
the ability of the supply chain to react outside the traditional system responses to counter 
such disruptive events.  
	
The post-disruption phase involves the recovery and learning process. It means dealing with 
the long-term effects or impacts of an event and how to return to ‘business as usual’ or the 
new ‘normal’, if major change has taken place (Cockram and Van Den Heuvel, 2012). The 
management should review the disruption management procedure, so that the company can 
take corrective actions (product design, process control, supplier audits, etc.) to prevent or 
reduce the likelihood of future disruptions (Pyke and Tang, 2010). The supply chain can then 
be re-designed to become more resilient in future (Blackhurst et al., 2005).  
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Table 2.1: Summary of disruption phases from previous literature (see extended version in Appendix B) 
No.	 Authors	(Year)	
Disruption	Phases	
Area	of	Study	
Pre-Disruption	 During	Disruption	 Post	Disruption	
1.	 Berg	et	al	(2008)	 1.	Proactive	Risk	
Management		
				-	Identify,	evaluate,	manage							
and	monitor	risks	
2.	Reactive	Risk	Handling		
				-	Incident/accident		handling	
				-	Execution	of	contingency					
						plans	
	
3.	Results	and	Outcomes	
				-	Achievement	of		
						business	objectives	
				-	Cost	of	risks	
	
Assessing	supply	
chain	risk	
management	
programs		
2.	 Billa	et	al	(2006)	 1.	Detection	
2.	Forecasting	
3.	Warning	
	
4.	Response	 5.	Reaction	 Flood	
management	
planning	
3.	 Blackhurst	et	al	(2005)	 	 1.	Disruption	Discovery	 2.	Disruption	Recovery	
3.	Supply	Chain	
Redesign	
	
Managing	supply	
chain	disruptions	
4.	 Cockram	and	Van	Den	
Heuvel	(2012)	
	
1.	Pre-crisis	Preparation	 2.	Crisis	Response	 3.	Post-crisis	Recovery	 Crisis	management	
5.	 Pyke	and	Tang	(2010)	 1.	Readiness	 2.	Responsiveness	 3.	Recovery	 Mitigating	product	
safety	risks	via	3Rs	
	
6.	 Sheffi	and	Rice	(2005)	 1.	Preparation	 2.	Disruptive	Event	
3.	First	Response	
4.	Initial	Impact	
5.	Time	of	Full	Impact	
	
6.	Preparation	for	
Recovery	
7.	Recovery	
8.	Long-term	Impact	
Supply	chain	view	
of	the	resilient	
enterprise	
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Looking at the literature in the context of the Malaysian construction industry, the researcher 
has found little work on post-disruption activities in the response of the supply chain to 
‘actual disruption’. Busby and Zhang (2008) suggested that risk analysis should not simply 
be a consensual analysis of threats and consequences; it should also involve inspecting how 
different actors respond to these threats, and how some of these responses are themselves 
threats in other actors’ eyes. It is therefore important for this study to consider an integrated 
approach of both pre- and post-disruption stages and the proactive and reactive approach in 
an effort to improve project performance and build resilience within the Malaysian public 
sector supply chain. 	
 
An example of the integrated approach of handling disruptions can be seen in the 3R 
framework presented by Pyke and Tang (2010), which has three main stages: readiness, 
responsiveness and recovery (see row 5 of Table 2.1). The 3R framework was presented for 
a specific case of product safety risk (see Figure 2.5). Under this framework, it was suggested 
that the related company should prepare the necessary channels in case a recall becomes 
necessary or disruptions occur (readiness), create an action plan which allows a quick 
response to the problems at hand (responsiveness), and after a disruption, take steps to restore 
its supply chain back to normality (recovery). Although this framework presents the overall 
link between the pre-disruption, during disruption and post-disruption phases 
comprehensively in a closed loop, its drawback is that it is difficult to implement due to the 
lack of details of the sub-steps required to handle a disruptive event. The framework was also 
designed for a specific type of disruption, which is the risk of product safety. It is therefore 
important for this study to consider a wide range of supply chain disruptions in developing 
the resilience response framework for the public sector supply chain.  
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: The 3R framework for mitigating a disruptive event (Pyke and Tang, 2010) 
	
Another integrated approach to handling disruptions was presented by Sheffi and Rice (2005) 
through eight stages of disruption, as shown in Table 2.1 (see Appendix B for the full 
Readiness Responsiveness Recovery 
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description of the disruption stages). Unlike Pyke and Tang (2010), these researchers 
considered the level of performance of an organisation or supply chain before, during and 
after disruption in a timeline graph showing the level of impact of the disruption on business 
performance (see Figure 2.6). They stressed that it is important for managers to consider the 
impact of disruption as it is not always immediate; it may take time for the abnormality to 
show its full effect on system performance. For example, if the client relationship or 
organisation’s reputation is damaged, the impact of disruption can be long lasting and difficult 
to recover from.  
 
 
Figure 2.6: The eight stages of disruption (Sheffi and Rice, 2005) 
 
However, although the framework in Figure 2.6 is useful in mapping the impact of disruption 
on performance, the drawback is that it does not provide details on how the organisation can 
improve their performance at the preparation, response and recovery stages. One of the ways 
to tackle this drawback is by listing the necessary capability factors needed to maintain the 
organisation’s performance at different stages of disruption. Another drawback of the 
framework is that it does not indicate the factors that cause the organisation’s performance to 
drop significantly during the initial or full impact stage. Although Sheffi and Rice (2005) 
pointed out the vulnerabilities of organisations (such as the loss of key suppliers, and quality 
problems) that cause poor performance, these vulnerabilities were listed in a separate 
framework in their study. Hence, one of the ways to improve the framework in Figure 2.6 is 
by incorporating the vulnerabilities in the main framework, so that supply chain managers 
can clearly see both the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the supply chain in resonding to 
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disruptions. Along with the interdependent impacts of disruptions (discussed in Section 2.3), 
this research will also consider the emergent capability and vulnerability factors of the supply 
chain in developing the resilience response framework. These elements are reflected in 
Objectives 3 and 4 of this study (see Section 1.4). 
	
A summary of the integrated disruption phases in this study is presented in Figure 2.7. The 
construction supply chain’s response to disruptive events can be assessed against these 
disruption phases. The pre-disruption phase includes the proactive risk management plan, 
followed by its implementation during disruption. The degree of severity of a certain 
disruption depends on factors specific to the structure of the supply chain (density, complexity 
and criticality), and supply chain mitigation capabilities (readiness, responsiveness and 
recovery). The adoption of significant measures in managing supply chain disruptions will 
enable the supply chain to quickly return to its original state, or an even better state (Peck, 
2005) in the post-disruption phase, and therefore demonstrate resilience. 
	
	
Figure 2.7: Summary of the disruption phases 
 
Next, we look at the literature on the supply chain resilience in managing the supply chain 
disruptions. 
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2.4 Supply Chain Resilience  
	
Resilience is a multidisciplinary concept, of considerable interest to various industries in 
different countries, with various backgrounds such as the social, ecological, computing and 
engineering sciences (Peck, 2005; Ponomarov and Hollcomb, 2009; Pettit et al., 2010; 
Limnios and Mazzarol, 2011). Limnios and Mazzarol (2011) highlighted two opposing 
concepts of resilience: either offence (adaptation) or defence (resistance) to internal or 
external disruption. A system or supply chain may be adaptive in reacting to disruption by 
changing its structure, processes and functions to increase its ability to survive. On the other 
hand, a supply chain may also be resilient in terms of its ability to resist such changes and 
absorb the shocks by maintaining its current structure and processes. 
	
However, earlier research by Miller and Friesen (1980) pointed out that some organisations 
demonstrate a combination of both adaptive capacity and resistance to change. The 
researchers believed that organisations would neither be able to change their tactics and 
reaction to each slight change in their environment, nor remain static, as they have to evolve 
through time. Hence, even if an organisation or supply chain has a tendency to adapt its 
strategies to its changing environment, it is also equally important to reinforce or improve 
these strategies in order to persist in the long run. This shows how the current state and 
attributes of the organisation and its supply chain have a significant influence over thee 
strategic approach in responding to disruptive events.   
	
In the supply chain context, Peck (2005) defines supply chain resilience by relating it to the 
ability to recover from or adjust easily to adversity or change (i.e. supply chain disruptions 
caused by disturbances). Fiksel (2006) proposes a similar definition, but considers that a 
resilient system will have the ability not only to “survive and adapt in face of turbulent 
change”, but to also “grow” or thrive in the face of disruption. Ponomarov and Hollcomb 
(2009) define resilience as the capability of the supply chain to prepare for unexpected events, 
respond to disruptions, and recover from them by maintaining continuity of operations at the 
desired level of connectedness and control over structure and function. For the purpose of 
this research, supply chain resilience is defined as the supply chain’s ability to react to the 
negative effects caused by disruptions that occur at a given moment in order to maintain the 
supply chain’s objectives or recover to a better state (Barroso et al., 2008).  
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In order to deal with resilience it is important to identify the disruption areas, vulnerabilities, 
and how the disruptions can be mitigated through the development of capabilities. Indeed, 
Pettit et al. (2010) suggested that supply chain resilience can be assessed in terms of two 
dimensions: vulnerabilities and capabilities, which are explored in this study. They believe 
that empirical studies can provide management insight into linkages between each 
vulnerability and a set of successfully employed capabilities to combat that vulnerability. 
Hence, by reducing its vulnerabilities, the supply chain can increase its resilience to 
disruptive events (as per Figure 2.8). Most supply chain resilience literature (Pettit et al., 
2013; McManus, 2008), however, seems to cover multi-sectoral issues and the coverage of 
construction per se is limited. A more industry-specific research, such as in the context of the 
construction industry in this study, is required to address this theoretical gap. The assessment 
of the capabilities and vulnerabilities could benefit this study considerably in determining the 
current level of resilience of the public organisations and their supply chain. This in turn, will 
help to highlight key areas that need to be improved in the effort to build resilience to 
disruptions in public projects. The following sections provide further discussion on the 
vulnerability and capability factors. 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Measurement of resilience (Pettit et al, 2010) 
 
2.5 Supply Chain Vulnerability 
	
The term vulnerability has been used and defined by various researchers in the field of supply 
chain risk and resilience, although there is still no clear agreement in the literature as to what 
vulnerability is. Indeed, the term vulnerability is often confused with risk (Ezell, 2007). The 
main difference between them is that vulnerability highlights the notion of susceptibility to a 
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disruption by defining the characteristics of the system or supply chain that will change the 
possibility for harm (Ezell, 2007; Brooks, 2003). On the other hand, risk focuses on the 
likelihood and severity of the consequences of disruption. This was highlighted inand 
Rausand’s (1998) study, where they argue that unlike risk analysis, vulnerability analysis 
focuses on the whole disruption period including the actions to mitigate, restore and restart 
the activities after a disruption occurs, until a new stable situation is obtained. 
	
While risk includes positive and negative impacts, vulnerability is seen as a combination of a 
disruption and the resulting negative consequences. Svensson (2000) defined vulnerability as 
the existence of random disruptions that lead to deviations in the supply chain of components 
and materials from normal, expected or planned activities, all of which have negative 
consequences for the manufacturer and its sub-contractors. Similarly, Christopher and Peck 
(2004) suggested that supply chain vulnerability can be defined as an exposure to serious 
disruptions, arising from risks within the supply chain as well as risks external to the supply 
chain. Juttner et al. (2002) defined vulnerability as “the propensity of risk sources and risk 
drivers to outweigh risk mitigating strategies, thus causing adverse supply chain 
consequences”. 
	
On the other hand, Wagner and Bode (2006) defined the concept of vulnerability in a supply 
chain context more precisely, stating that “supply chain vulnerability is a function of certain 
supply chain characteristics and that the loss a firm incurs is a result of its supply chain 
vulnerability to a given supply chain disruption”. In their next work, Wagner and Bode (2009) 
further defined the concept of supply chain vulnerability as follows: 
While a supply chain disruption is the trigger that leads to the occurrence of risk, it is 
not the sole determinant of the final loss. It seems consequential that also the 
susceptibility of the supply chain to the harm of this situation is of significant relevance. 
This leads to the concept of supply chain vulnerability. The basic premise is that supply 
chain characteristics are antecedents of supply chain vulnerability and impact both the 
probability of occurrence as well as the severity of supply chain disruptions (p. 278).  
For the purpose of this research, the latter definition is adopted. Supply chain vulnerability is 
defined as the “fundamental factors that make an enterprise susceptible to disruptions” (Pettit 
et al., 2010). According to Sheffi and Rice (2005), reducing these vulnerability factors means 
reducing the likelihood of a disruption and increasing resilience: the ability to recover from a 
disruption. If supply chain managers can alleviate these supply chain attributes, they can 
	 49	
reduce vulnerability and the detrimental effects on the focal organisation and the supply chain 
as a whole. 
	
Looking at the vulnerability drivers, Wagner and Neshat (2010) categorised them into three 
groups: supply side, demand side and supply chain structure vulnerabilities. Those on the 
demand side reside in the downstream supply chain operations. These include the customer 
(i.e. customer dependence, financial situation of the customer), the product and its 
characteristics (i.e. its complexity and lifecycle), the outbound supply chains (i.e. the physical 
distribution of products to the end customer), and the distribution and transportation operation 
required for serving the customer (Wagner and Neshat, 2010; Svensson, 2000). The demand 
side vulnerability drivers can also reside in the uncertainty surrounding the random demands 
of customers (Wagner and Neshat, 2010). In the case of the construction industry, constant 
changes in customer requirements during construction can cause significant time and cost 
overruns and reduce project performance. 
		
Meanwhile, vulnerability drivers on the supply side reside in the supply base, the supplier 
portfolio or the supplier network (i.e. supplier-supplier relationships, supply base complexity, 
supply base structure). Wagner and Neshat (2010) pointed out that the characteristics of 
individual suppliers in an organisation’s supplier portfolio also influence supply chain 
vulnerability. This includes financial instability of the suppliers and the consequences of 
supplier insolvency or bankruptcy. This is an important consideration in construction as poor 
financial performance or insolvency of contractors and suppliers can hamper the progress of 
the project, making the supply chain more vulnerable to any disruptive events that occur 
during project delivery. The last category, supply chain structure vulnerabilities, result to a 
large degree from the disintegration of supply chains and the globalisation of value-adding 
activities (Wagner and Neshat, 2010). When supply chains have to cover a larger number of 
international markets and regions of the world, the more susceptible are they to natural and 
man-made disasters. In fact, Zsidisin et al. (2005) argued that today’s supply chains contain 
less slack, with lower inventories, fewer buffers and leaner logistics operations, making them 
more fragile and vulnerable to disruptions. 
	
On the other hand, Pettit et al. (2010) consolidated 39 vulnerability factors into seven main 
categories: turbulence (i.e. natural disasters, fluctuations in prices, political disruptions) that 
are beyond the supply chain’s control; deliberate threats such as theft and terrorism which 
are aimed at disrupting operations or causing human or financial harm; external pressures 
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that create business constraints or barriers (i.e. competitive innovation, price pressures); 
resource limits which include supplier, production and distribution capacity; sensitivity which 
involves the importance of carefully controlled conditions for product and process integrity; 
connectivity which includes the degree of interdependence and reliance on outside entities; 
and supplier or customer disruptions. It can be seen here that there are overlapping 
vulnerability factors between Pettit et al. (2010) and Wagner and Neshat’s (2010) work, 
despite the different category terminology used. 
 
Meanwhile, Sheffi et al. (2010) and Blos et al. (2009) highlighted that vulnerability can be 
expressed in terms of financial vulnerability (i.e. fluctuations in prices, price pressures from 
competition), strategic vulnerability (i.e. extent of supply network, ineffective planning), 
hazard vulnerability such as natural disasters, and operations vulnerability (i.e. supplier 
disruptions, utilities availability). Chowdhury et al. (2012) adopted the same main factors: 
hazard, operational and financial vulnerabilities, and added another category: demand and 
supply vulnerabilities, which includes factors such as unpredictability of demand and 
customer disruptions. In determining the vulnerability parameters for this study, the 
vulnerability factors are grouped into four main categories as described below (McManus, 
2008; Christopher and Peck, 2004; Einarsson and Rausand, 1998): 
a) Organisation Vulnerability - Vulnerabilities arising from within the organisation that 
are under direct control of the organisation 
b) Operational Vulnerability - Vulnerabilities arising from the supply chain network that 
the organisation has little or no control over 
c) External Vulnerability - Frequent changes in external factors that are beyond the 
organisation and its supply chain’s control 
d) Financial Vulnerability - Negative financial impact caused by the market and economy 
that are beyond the organisation and its supply chain’s control 
These factors were incorporated in the survey described in Chapter 4 to determine the 
quadrant or area shown in Figure 2.9 in which the supply chain members are most vulnerable, 
in the attempt to build supply chain resilience. The vulnerability may derive from sub-factors 
within the organisation, external to the organisation but within the supply chain network, or 
from factors external to the supply chain network, as depicted in Figure 2.9. Taking into 
account the factors discussed above, a summary of the supply chain vulnerability factors is 
presented within the stated categories in Table 2.2 below.  
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Figure 2.9: Supply chain vulnerability factors 
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      Table 2.2: Summary of Supply Chain Vulnerability Factors 
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Although the supply chain vulnerability factors in Table 2.2 above are classified into 11 
categories, it is worth noting that certain factors may overlap and have very close links. These 
sub-factors are further discussed below. 
 
2.5.1 Organisation Vulnerability 
 
In this study, ‘strategic vulnerability’ refers to the inadequate business decisions undertaken 
by an organisation on its products or services, that may put the organisation at significant risk 
of failure to achieve its business objectives when disruptions occur. They include decisions 
to outsource operations to different suppliers, reliance upon specialty sources, operating in a 
geographically concentrated area, and a high degree of complexity of the products themselves 
(Pettit et al., 2010). Pettit et al. (2010) also discussed how the degree of interdependence and 
reliance on outside entities can make an organisation vulnerable to disruptions. When 
connectivity extends beyond suppliers and customers, as organisations move toward more 
outsourcing, these additional layers of management contribute to increased interdependencies 
(Pettit et al., 2010). Even though outsourcing can be effective in reducing costs or obtaining 
specialised resources (e.g. special information technology services), it also brings about 
significant risks that can make the organisation more vulnerable to disruptions. 
 
On the other hand, ‘management vulnerability’ refers to the management level of the 
organisation in executing the business decisions. Vulnerability can arise from inadequate 
management oversight to control or supervise supply chain members, late information and 
decision making, budget overruns due to poor planning, poor information flow, and poor 
control of deficiencies in the operations that can be highly visible to the organisation’s 
stakeholders. Lastly, ‘personnel vulnerability’ relates to the staff within the organisation. 
Factors such as the shortage of skilled workers, labour disputes, hazardous working 
conditions, and the loss of key personnel during operations can influence the vulnerability of 
an organisation or supply chain (Einarsson and Rausand, 1998).  
 
2.5.2 Operational Vulnerability 
	
The vulnerability factors within the supply chain network can be categorised in three groups: 
process vulnerability, supplier or customer disruptions and technology vulnerability.  Process 
vulnerability refers to vulnerability arising from any link of the supply-production-
distribution chain (see Figure 2.10), as described below:  
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• The inbound or supply side of the chain relates to the creation, delivery and availability 
of supplies when and where needed (i.e. the availability of restricted materials, utilities 
or raw materials). 
• The processes or production part including all the activities and manufacturing steps 
performed to produce the completed project (i.e. production capacity, reliability of 
material or equipment used). 
• The outbound or distribution side of the chain including all the distribution processes 
and transportation operations required for serving the customer. The quality of service 
or product provided is also considered here. 
According to Sheffi and Rice (2005), in any organisation’s supply chain, disruptions can 
occur at any section of the chain as material and information flows from supplier through a 
production or conversion process to the distribution channels. In construction, during the 
conversion process, materials are combined with labour, information, technology and capital 
to produce the completed project (Benton and McHenry, 2010). There is a high level of 
interdependence between the supply-production-distribution chain in delivering construction 
projects which can create vulnerability in the supply chain. Project quality, budgets and 
completion times can easily be affected if disruptions occur. Therefore, it is important to 
manage vulnerability within this chain to mitigate disruptive events in construction projects. 
 
Figure 2.10: Supply chain elements (adapted from Sheffi and Rice, 2005) 
	
Meanwhile, the ‘supplier or customer disruptions’ relate to the susceptibility of suppliers and 
customers to disruptions (Pettit et al., 2010), which can affect an organisation’s ability to 
produce their products or services, especially in an interdependent environment such as the 
construction industry. Supplier disruptions could arise from an infinite list of possibilities, 
such as supplier equipment failure, supplier’s poor capacity in dealing with unplanned 
changes in demand and insolvency (Svensson, 2000). This is an important consideration in 
construction as incompetent contractors and suppliers can hamper the progress of the project, 
making the supply chain more vulnerable to any disruptive events that may occur during 
project delivery. Customer disruptions are equally important, often resulting from unexpected 
changes in customer demands. In this case, the organisation must be prepared with flexible 
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options to mitigate short-term disruptions and adapt as necessary if long-term impacts are 
expected (Pettit et al., 2010). Lastly, ‘technology disruptions’ include the vulnerability of the 
supply chain to technology changes in the industry and unexpected technology failures faced 
by the supply chain during operation. 
2.5.3 External Vulnerability 
According to Pettit et al. (2010), external pressures are influences, not specifically targeting 
the organisation, that create business constraints or barriers. They include ‘political or legal 
pressures’ such as changes in Government regulations that may enforce limitations or add 
expenses to operations. Other vulnerabilies under this category include ‘environmental 
factors’, such as natural disasters and health pandemics, and ‘physical damage disruptions’ 
involving accident or deliberate threats such as piracy and theft aimed at disrupting operations 
or causing human or financial harm (Pettit et al., 2010).  
2.5.4 Financial Vulnerability 
‘Market pressures’ in this category involve fluctuation in material prices that may rise above 
acceptable levels and make it impossible to continue cost-effective production (Einarsson and 
Rausand, 1998). A system may also be vulnerable to price pressures from competitors 
offering similar products or services at a lower price, resulting in the loss of business 
opportunity. Lastly, ‘liquidity or credit vulnerability’ involves issues relating to money and 
management of monetary assets that might be affected by changes in financial and economic 
policies (Pathirage et al, 2012).  
The following section discusses the supply chain capabilities that could help mitigate the 
vulnerabilities. 
2.6 Supply Chain Capability 
	
Supply chains need to be capable of resilience against disruptions (Christopher and Peck 
2004). Indeed, resilience is the capacity of a supply chain to prepare for unexpected events, 
respond to disruptions, and recover from them by maintaining continuity of operations at the 
desired level of connectedness and control over structure and function (Ponomarov and 
Hollcomb, 2009).  
	
According to Pettit et al. (2010), capabilities are attributes that enable an enterprise to 
anticipate and mitigate disruptions. They can prevent an actual disruption (i.e. security 
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measures deterring a terrorist attack), mitigate the effects of a disruption (i.e. stock piles of 
emergency supplies) or enable adaptation following a disruption (i.e. development of new 
products or services, or entering a new market). Through the proposed Supply Chain 
Resilience Assessment and Management (SCRAM) tool, Pettit et al. (2010) investigated 14 
main capability factors: flexibility in sourcing, flexibility in order fulfilment, capacity, 
efficiency, adaptability, visibility, anticipation, recovery, dispersion, collaboration, market 
position, organisation, security and financial strength. 
	
On the other hand, Christopher and Peck (2004), researchers from the Cranfield Centre for 
Logistics and Supply Chain Management, developed an initial framework for a resilient 
supply chain. They suggested four key principles in building supply chain resilience: i) 
resilience can be built into a system in advance of a disruption (i.e. re-engineering), ii) a high 
level of collaboration is required to identify and manage risks, iii) agility is essential to react 
quickly to unforeseen events, and iv) the culture of risk management is a necessity 
(Christopher and Peck, 2004). The secondary capability factors mentioned in their research 
are supply chain agility, availability, efficiency, flexibility, redundancy, velocity and 
visibility. Similar to the Cranfield studies, researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology analysed many case studies of supply chain disruptions with a focus on 
identifying vulnerability characteristics and management responses: flexibility (i.e. 
interchangeability, flexibility of supply, postponement for flexibility), redundancy (i.e. 
inventory for redundancy, redundant capacity, redundant IT systems), customer relation 
management, security and collaboration (Sheffi, 2005).  
	
The discussion above shows a number of common capability factors that existing researchers 
agree on. Flexibility is one of the most important. In construction, flexibility in a project is 
the capability to adjust the project to the prospective consequences of uncertain 
circumstances within the context of the project (Husby et al., 1999 as cited in Olsson, 2006). 
In other words, flexibility is the possibility of construction and technical changes with 
minimum cost and disruption. Pettit et al. (2010) highlighted two main flexibility factors: 
flexibility in sourcing and flexibility in order fulfilment. This can be assessed by looking at 
the supply chain members’ ability to quickly change inputs or the mode of receiving inputs 
from the supply side, and their ability to quickly change outputs or the mode of receiving 
outputs at the demand side. Flexibility can be improved by utilising materials or inputs that 
can be incorporated in multiple finished products. In construction, this could be the utilisation 
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of standardised components that can be used in many components of the building design 
during construction. This would reduce the cost of inventory and the risk of an individual 
stock out. The use of alternative suppliers is also important in the event of a single or multiple-
supplier disruption. 
	
Olsson (2006) pointed out that flexibility in products could also be related to the degree of 
modularity in projects. Modularity refers to the possibility of dividing the project into more 
or less independent sub-units. According to Miller and Lessard (2000), modularity can enable 
projects to cope with uncertainty because individual components do not have a critical role. 
Major ‘one-piece’ projects such as bridges and tunnels have a low level of modularity, based 
on the ‘we do not build half a bridge’ approach. On the other hand, for flexibility in the 
demand side, the ability of a supply chain to quickly increase the capacity of storage and 
distribution services to meet surge demand without carrying large amounts of excess capacity 
is extremely profitable when facing unpredictable demand (Pettit, 2008). Alternate 
distribution channels are also important when a supply chain faces transport disruptions or if 
an entire network is disrupted. 
	
Another key capability factor is the system’s efficiency (see Tables 5.4 and 5.5). Efficiency 
is linked to the immediate outcome of a project. It is a question of doing things right and 
producing project outputs in terms of the agreed scope, quality, cost and time (Olsson, 2006). 
As stated by Pettit (2008), the capability to produce outputs with minimum resource 
requirements is important to improve efficiency. The goal is to reduce all cost drivers while 
still meeting customer demands. Waste elimination is one of the ways to improve system 
efficiency. This concept is the core of the lean philosophy derived from the Toyota 
Production System. The wastes here are the unnecessary output through overproduction, 
excessive rework and high inventory stock of materials. By controlling these wastes, a project 
can be completed on time and within cost with fewer disruptions. The resources used in 
construction, including labour, plant and materials, can similarly determine the supply 
chain’s level of efficiency. Consistently producing the most from labour and equipment will 
reduce overall costs for a given amount of output. Bottlenecks in the process need to be 
reduced, as they are the key cause of the loss of efficiency in construction, hampering the 
progress of the production process.  
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Other main capability factors (such as adaptability, capacity and visibility) identified by 
previous researchers are also considered for assessment in this study. However, it is worth 
noting here that despite the importance of these capabilities, past researchers (Wedawatta and 
Ingirige, 2016; Juttner and Maklan, 2011) argued that improving resilience against one threat 
might increase vulnerability to another. For instance, improving collaboration among supply 
chain partners may cause additional threats due to sharing sensitive information (Jüttner and 
Maklan, 2011). On the other hand, increasing flexibility through sub-contracting may 
increase the susceptibility of the construction supply chain to severe weather conditions in 
different geographic regions (Wedawatta and Ingirige, 2016). Hence, the fact that the 
resilience strategies are interrelated suggests that it is important to understand the trade-offs 
between appropriate capabilities to mitigate particular critical areas of vulnerability. The 
effects of an organisation’s vulnerabilities and capabilities on another organisation’s 
resilience to disruption in a supply chain are, however, under-researched and tend to have 
been overlooked by previous researchers (Pettit et al., 2013; Zsidisin and Wagner, 2010; 
McManus, 2008). It is therefore important for this study to consider the dynamics of the 
effects between the public organisations and their supply chain partners’ vulnerabilities and 
capabilities to mitigate disruptive events collectively in public projects. 
 
Overall, the main categories of capability factors from Pettit et al.’s (2010) work are adapted 
in this study, as the researcher has found that it provides a comprehensive list of capabilities 
that are applicable and useful to guide the assessment of the supply chain in this study. The 
definitions of the capability factors are summarised in Table 2.3 and the related sub-factors 
are listed in Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.3:  Definition of the main capability factors that enable resilience  
(Adapted from Pettit et al., 2010) 
Main Capability 
Factors Definition 
Flexibility Ability to quickly change inputs/outputs or the mode of 
receiving inputs/delivering outputs 
Capacity Availability of resources to enable sustained production levels 
Efficiency Capability to produce outputs with minimum resource 
requirements 
Visibility Knowledge of the status of operating resources and the 
environment 
Adaptability Ability to modify operations in response to challenges or 
opportunities 
Anticipation Ability to detect potential future events or situations 
Recovery Ability to return to normal operational state rapidly 
Dispersion Broad distribution or decentralization of resources 
Collaboration Ability to work effectively with other entities for mutual 
benefit 
Market Position Status of a company or its products in specific markets 
Security Defense against deliberate intrusion or attack 
Financial Strength Capacity to absorb fluctuations in cash flow 
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 Table 2.4: Summary of Supply Chain Capability Factors 
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The 12 main capability factors and sub-factors listed in Table 2.4 above will be assessed in 
the survey in this study, along with the 11 main vulnerability factors previously identified in 
Figure 2.9. The following section describes the pathogenic influences that affect the supply 
chain resilience. 
 
2.7 Pathogenic Influences 
	
In addition to the supply chain vulnerability factors discussed in Section 2.5, it is important 
to consider the underlying reasons as to why a supply chain member might be more 
vulnerable in certain areas than others. Previous studies on supply chain resilience tend to 
look at vulnerability as a static condition without considering the latent conditions, thus 
missing some of the key driving forces that influence the dynamics of supply chain 
vulnerability. These latent conditions have been referred to as ‘pathogens’ in previous studies 
(Busby and Hughes, 2004; Busby and Zhang, 2008; Love et al., 2008) and identified as the 
key factors that set the conditions for disruptions such as errors, failure and disputes to occur 
in construction projects. The characteristics of pathogens in construction and their 
applicability to this study are further discussed in the following sections. 
 
2.7.1 Pathogens in Construction Projects 
	
In studying the latent conditions in projects, Busby and Hughes (2004) found that earlier 
studies on error, accidents and failure in projects have traditionally concentrated on 
individuals’ errors rather than considering team errors (Reason, 1990). Furthermore, most 
studies assessed the relationship between the general qualities of the project organisation and 
its success or failure overall (Munns and Bjeirmi, 1996), without considering the mechanisms 
that produce such specific errors and failures in the first place (Busby and Hughes, 2004). 
Busby and Hughes (2004) attempted to address this issue by taking into account Reason’s 
(1990) and Turner’s (1978) work, which they provided a distinctly systemic way of thinking 
about error and failure; they introduced the term ‘pathogens’, whose greatest conceptual 
value is that they remain dormant in the system until an actual failure occurs. This term 
originated in the field of biology as an analogy for the development of disease in natural 
organisms. Pathogens were defined by Busby and Hughes (2004, p. 428) by the following 
qualities: 
• They are relatively stable phenomena that have been in existence for a substantial 
time before the problem occurs. 
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• Before the problem occurs, they would not have been seen as obvious stages in an 
identifiable sequence failure. 
• They are strongly connected to the problem, and are identifiable as principal causes 
of the problem once it occurs. 
Subsequently, through interviews conducted with 22 staff in a UK engineering firm, they 
identified eight main categories of pathogen that had caused significant problems in large-
scale engineering projects, as listed in Table 2.5. They include pathogens arising from an 
organisation’s or individual’s ‘practice’, such as reusing existing design solutions without 
considering the distinct nature of the project, causing substantial rework; and pathogens 
arising from ‘convention’ where standard routines have been used in projects, overlooking 
the fact that the standard task is inappropriate until disruptions occur.  
Table 2.5: The main categories of pathogen (Busby and Hughes, 2004) 
Category Description 
Practice Pathogens arising from people’s deliberate practices 
Task Pathogens arising from the nature of the task being performed 
Circumstance 
Pathogens arising from the situation or environment the project was 
operating in 
Convention 
Pathogens arising from conventions, standards, routines and codes of 
practice 
Organisation Pathogens arising from organisational structure or operation 
System Pathogens arising from an organisational system 
Industry Pathogens arising from the structural property of the industry 
Tool Pathogens arising from the technical characteristic of the tool 
 
It can be seen that many of the pathogens involve practices or strategic decisions that have 
been deliberately adopted as a way of dealing with disruptions, and that until the practices or 
decisions are shown to be faulty, they remain a fundamental part of the organisation’s day-
to-day practice (Busby and Hughes, 2004; Love et al., 2008). This ultimately results in the 
increasing probability of a problem occurring over time in subsequent projects. It is therefore 
important to identify and mitigate these pathogens before a disruptive event occurs, to ensure 
projects are not repeatedly exposed to the same risk. 
	
The same pathogen metaphor was used in a subsequent study by Busby and Zhang (2008) to 
emphasise the causes of organisational breakdown that are built into projects at their 
inception. The study found that project participants sometimes have different interpretations 
of what actions or decisions are pathogenic and what decisions are taken as adaptive or 
protective measures. For instance, a person’s protective measure to adhere to standard 
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procedures to limit risk might be seen as a pathogen by another person for the inflexibility 
and limited possible lines of action it imposes in tackling problems during project delivery. 
Busby and Zhang (2008) believe that this kind of discrepancy could become problematic 
during project delivery. Despite identifying the pathogens and their effect on project 
performance, neither study addressed the managerial actions that should be taken to mitigate 
such pathogens in projects.  
	
In a different context, Love et al. (2008) adopted the pathogen metaphor to address the 
underlying conditions that contribute to project disputes. Although they did not sub-
categorise the pathogens like Busby and Hughes (2004) did, they made an attempt to find the 
interrelated connections between these pathogens as they discovered that the combination of 
a number of pathogens could lead to disruptive events, such as disputes in construction 
projects. Ultimately, Love et al. (2011) supported the view of Busby and Hughes (2004) that, 
essentially, before the problem becomes apparent, project participants often remain unaware 
of the impact upon project performance that particular decisions, practices or procedures can 
have. Furthermore, similar to Reason’s (2000) point of view, Love et al. (2011) believe that 
these pathogens, once combined with active failures (inappropriate acts by people who are in 
direct contact with the system) could cause significant problems and have an adverse impact 
on project performance. While their study was able to provide some useful links between the 
pathogens, the researchers did not look into other parties in the supply chain; only the client 
and contracting groups were assessed. A more comprehensive study would look into other 
members of the supply chain, such as consultants and sub-contractors, to obtain a more 
balanced perspective of the pathogenic influences. Nor were the inherent vulnerability and 
capability factors of the organisation and supply chain considered in any of the studies 
reviewed, which this study aims to assess.   
 
2.7.2 Integration of Pathogens in Resilience Studies 
	
Thus, past studies have adopted the concept of pathogens in various contexts: Reason (1990) 
addressed them in relation to human errors in the medical sector, Busby and Hughes (2004) 
in relation to error in construction projects and Busby and Zhang (2008) in organisational 
breakdown, while Love et al. (2008) conducted a series of studies evaluating the pathogens 
of project disputes. Although no studies relating to pathogens in supply chain resilience exist, 
their use by previous researchers suggests that the concept can be adopted in other areas of 
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research, especially research relating to failure. In this study, failure generally means failure 
to achieve project objectives due to a foreseeable or unforeseeable disruptive event that 
affects the usual operation and stability of an organisation or supply chain (Barroso et al., 
2008).  
	
Identifying the pathogens in the resilience context will also help address the research gap in 
previous resilience studies, which tended to overlook the latent conditions that made an 
organisation vulnerable to disruptive events in the first place. Researchers have focused on 
the performance and capability of organisations to survive, adapt and grow in the face of 
disruptions (Pettit et al, 2013; McManus et al, 2007; Sheffi, 2005), without addressing the 
root cause or inherent pathogens that reside in the system. However, implementing resilience 
strategies without considering pathogens means that organisations will make the same 
mistakes repeatedly, making them more vulnerable to disruptive events. Considering the 
increasing complexity of construction projects and the uncertain environment, there is need 
for a clear understanding of the pathogens listed in Table 2.5 that influence the vulnerability 
of the supply chain. While disruptions in construction projects are often difficult to foresee 
and to eliminate entirely, pathogens can be identified and mitigated before a disruptive event 
occurs. This further supports the possibility of adopting pathogens in this supply chain 
resilience context. 
	
Overall, the identification of the pathogens in this study will help the researcher 
systematically to assess how vulnerable the public sector supply chain members are to 
making significant errors, thus providing the foundation to build appropriate strategies for 
their prevention. Indeed, it is difficult for public organisations to see the whole of their supply 
chain operations, given the large scale of public projects (Section 2.2) and the extent of their 
supply chain network (Figure 2.4). This makes it harder for the public organisations to detect 
any hidden pathogens that lie within their supply chain network, and they tend to be 
overlooked in current risk management practice. Although the pathogens are hidden and may 
not be causing any problem at the moment, they might be triggered later and manifest 
themselves in catastrophic disruptions (Busby and Hughes, 2004) if they are not identified 
and mitigated much earlier in the project. The pathogens can also undermine the supply 
chain’s capabilities, as discussed in Section 2.6, making further analysis important. In short, 
by tackling these pathogens or root causes, the supply chain vulnerabilities can be reduced 
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and the risk of disruptions avoided in the first place. This also allows the researcher to obtain 
a holistic view in assessing and building resilience in the construction supply chain. 
 
2.8 Development of the Conceptual Framework 
The discussion on the background of the Malaysian construction industry in Section 2.2 
shows that, despite the Government’s plan for developing the nation’s economy, the public 
sector supply chain still faces challenges in fulfilling the Government’s provisions in the 
delivery of large scale infrastructure projects through the series of national plans. This in turn, 
affects their public reputation and their overall performance in delivering public projects, 
with calls for improvements in the competencies of the public organisations and their supply 
chain to mitigate the challenges discussed in Section 2.2.1. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 deal with 
Objectives 1 and 2 of this study (Section 1.4) in examining the phases of supply chain 
disruptions and understanding the concept of resilience. The discussion shows that there is a 
link between the disruption management and resilience literature in terms of how building 
resilience can help supply chains to adapt, survive and grow in the face of disruptions. It is 
also evident from the literature that in order to develop resilience, a supply chain needs certain 
capabilities to respond to the vulnerabilities and uncertainties it is facing. Vulnerability 
(Section 2.5) and capability (Section 2.6) factors were gathered from the literature to be used 
in the survey later in this study to assess the current level of resilience of the Malaysian public 
sector supply chain. This is an important step in fulfilling Objective 3.  
Section 2.7 discussed the pathogenic influences that must be considered in identifying the 
root cause of supply chain disruptions (to fulfil Objective 4). Existing researchers (such as 
Busby and Hughes, 2004; Busby and Zhang, 2008) did not assess pathogens in relation to the 
supply chain’s resilience capabilities and vulnerabilities, only looking at the pathogenic 
effects on projects. By bringing the pathogens into a different domain and combining the 
pathogenic influences with the supply chain’s vulnerability and capability factors, the 
researcher will be able to assess supply chain resilience in a different approach, hence 
providing significant new knowledge to the existing construction and resilience literature. 
Once the first four objectives have been achieved, the resilience response framework 
proposed in Objective 5 can be developed. 
The factors discussed above are conceptualised in Figure 2.11. The conceptual framework 
shows the overall links between the key issues discussed in the literature review. The top 
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section of the diagram represents the phases identified in the disruption management 
literature, and the bottom section the factors identified from the supply chain resilience 
literature. The interactions between these two parts are represented explicitly in the 
conceptual framework.  
	
Figure 2.11: Conceptual framework of the study 
	
Revisiting the research problem presented in Section 1.2.3, it is evident that supply chain 
disruptions are a constant problem in public sector projects. The literature showed that it is 
important to mitigate these disruptions, as their impacts are not always immediate and could 
have long-term effects on the public sector supply chain’s operations. Understandably, 
considering that the public organisations deal with a large supply chain network and serves 
28 ministries as clients, this makes it harder to detect any disruptions arising from the supply 
chain’s operations. However, the conceptual framework presented in Figure 2.11 shows that 
supply chain disruptions can be managed by developing a specific set of capability factors 
that can reduce key areas of vulnerability. For example, referring to Figure 2.11, increasing 
‘flexibility in production’ (capability) can reduce the supply chain’s vulnerability to 
‘unplanned changes in demand’ (vulnerability). Pathogenic influences are also included in 
the framework, to understand why the supply chain members are more vulnerable in certain 
areas than others. For instance, the individual’s ‘practice’ of reusing existing design solutions 
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without considering the distinct nature of the project (pathogen) can increase the 
organisation’s vulnerability to ‘unpredictability of design changes by client’ (vulnerability), 
in turn delaying project delivery (disruption consequence). By tackling these pathogens, the 
supply chain vulnerabilities can be reduced and the risk of disruptions reduced in the first 
place.  
Emerging questions also arise from the conceptual framework in terms of the dynamics of 
these vulnerabilities and capabilities: to what extent can a supply chain member’s 
vulnerability or capability impact another party’s level of resilience to disruptions? 
Furthermore, one could also question what is considered as pathogenic to the supply chain 
members, and whether the identified pathogens might be perceived as a capability or 
resilience measure by other parties in the supply chain? These emerging questions will 
therefore be considered and investigated empirically in this study. Overall, this framework is 
a useful guide for the researcher to fulfil the study’s aim of building the public sector supply 
chain resilience to disruptions in public projects. 
2.9 Summary 
This chapter set the research context, the Malaysian construction industry, reviewing the 
background, national policies, key players and challenges. The literature confirm that the 
Malaysian construction industry plays a significant role in the economic growth of the 
country, particularly through the development of large-scale infrastructure projects. 
However, despite the industry’s rapid growth, the public organisations are still facing 
constant challenges in dealing with their supply chain members and disruptive events in 
construction projects. These challenges are reflected in the series of national plans, showing 
that there are still key areas in the Government and public projects that need to be improved.  
The chapter highlighted one of the ways to mitigate supply chain disruptions, by developing 
the public sector supply chain members’ resilience to such disruptive events. The chapter 
reviewed and synthesised the literature on supply chain disruptions and resilience, followed 
by a compilation of a classified list of vulnerability and capability factors to be assessed in 
this study. The concept of pathogens in construction projects and the integration of pathogens 
in resilience studies were also critically discussed to fill the gap identified in the literature. 
Lastly, the conceptual framework was introduced, integrating the three major knowledge 
domains: supply chain disruptions, supply chain resilience, and pathogens. The research 
methodology is discussed in the next chapter of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The research methodology encompasses the rationale and the philosophical assumptions that 
underlie a particular study (Dainty, 2008). In fulfilling the aim and objectives of the study, 
the researcher has to decide upon the appropriate research methodology and formulate the 
adopted research strategy, while at the same time, ensuring an original contribution to an 
existing body of knowledge (Grix, 2001). Thus, in order to address the research problem 
highlighted in Chapter 1, the underpinning methodology adopted for this study is presented 
and discussed in this chapter.  
	
 
	
Figure 3.1: The Research Onion (Saunders et al, 2007) 
 
For the purpose of this study, Saunders et al.’s (2007) research model, also known as the 
‘research onion’, is adapted as a guideline to discuss the researcher’s selected methodology.  
The research onion, as shown in Figure 3.1, is a metaphor used to demonstrate the layers of 
key elements in developing an appropriate and effective research design. The following 
sections will discuss and justify the methodology adopted for this research by going through 
the main layers of this onion: the research philosophy, approach, strategy and techniques 
selected to address the research aim and objectives.	
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3.2 Research Philosophy 
	
The research philosophy contains important assumptions about the way in which a particular 
researcher views the world, and these assumptions will underpin the research strategy and 
the methods chosen as part of the strategy (Saunders et al., 2007). Here, the main influence 
of the research philosophy is the researcher’s personal view of what constitutes acceptable 
knowledge and the process by which this is developed. The researcher’s philosophical stance 
may be specified by its ontological and epistemological tenets.   
	
Ontology looks at the researcher’s view on the nature of reality (Blaikie, 2000), subjectively 
or objectively. It has to be identified here whether the study is objective and external to the 
researcher, or socially constructed (subjective) and only understood by examining the 
perceptions of the human actors (Collis and Hussey, 2003). Epistemology refers to the “claim 
about what exists, what it looks like, what units make it up and how these units interact with 
each other” (Blaikie, 2000). The epistemological assumption is concerned with drawing the 
relationship between the researcher and his/her research. It is characterised either by a 
positivist or interpretivist perspective. The positivist view assumes that the the social world 
exists externally and that its properties should be measured through objectively instead of 
subjectively (Saunders et al, 2007). The epistemological assumption of the positivist 
paradigm is that the researcher is independent from what is being researched (Creswell, 2003) 
and thus the research is conducted in a value-free way. On the other hand, the interpretivist 
view sees reality as subjective and multiple as seen by participants in a study (Creswell, 
2003). The epistemological assumption behind the interpretivist paradigm is that the 
researcher interacts with what is being researched, and thus are more concerned with the 
understanding of the research problem that is unique to the context instead of generalisability 
(Maxwell, 2006). The merits of these two paradigms, positivism and interpretivism, are 
widely debated in social science, resulting in the emergence of a new paradigm, pragmatism, 
which utilises a mixed method research inquiry (Johnson et al., 2007). Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie (2004) stressed that it is a practical and outcome-oriented method of inquiry 
that is based on action, and leads, iteratively, to further action and the elimination of doubt. 
Pragmatism accepts, philosophically, that there are singular and multiple realities that are 
open to empirical inquiry and orients itself toward solving practical problems in the real 
world (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007).  
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Ontologically this study favours a pragmatic view that combines objectivism and 
subjectivism. This pragmatic view allows the researcher to choose the methods (or 
combination of methods) that work best for answering the objectives of this study (Johnson 
and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). In developing the resilience response framework for this study, the 
researcher needs to firstly identify the critical vulnerability factors that currently challenge 
the public sector supply chain operations and assess the main capability factors that they 
currently employ in handling disruptions during project delivery. This can be achieved 
through the use of a questionnaire (see Section 3.3) that will allow the respondents to rate the 
extent of their agreement or disagreement with the statements listed under the vulnerability 
and capability factors previously compiled by the researcher from the literature review (see 
factors listed in Tables 2.2 and 2.4). It is worth noting that at this phase, the researcher does 
not attempt to predict the significant factors affecting the subject under study; instead, the 
statistical analysis will drive the result of the respondents’ current level of resilience. The 
researcher will therefore maintain an objective stance and positivist view at this stage, not 
influencing the respondents, and the results are value free. 
	
However, the researcher acknowledges that the quantitative data from the questionnaire alone 
does not capture and describe the complex interactions of the operation environment, 
organisational issues and societal culture (Kiessling and Harvey, 2005). In assessing the 
public sector supply chain, these factors are important as they could be pathogens (see Section 
2.7) that influence the level of vulnerability assessed in the questionnaire. The subjectivist 
ontology approach and interpretivist view benefit this part of the study as they allow the 
researcher and respondents to justify the questionnaire results through argument in detail by 
relating the results to reality, enabling the researcher to obtain rich and complex data in terms 
of tacit knowledge, perception and human experience which could not be measured in the 
quantitative approach. This subsequently results in an in-depth study of the root cause of the 
respondents vulnerability to disruptions. The cascading effects of disruptions to the supply 
chain and project performance can also be assessed in this manner. This fulfils the fourth 
research objective, stated in Section 1.4.  
	
In addition to the ontological and epistemological view, it is important to determine the 
position of the researcher’s values in his/her research. This is also known as axiology, a 
branch of philosophy that studies the judgements of values (Saunders et al., 2009). 
Axiologically, this research favours a value bias or value-laden research approach as, 
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ultimately, the researcher’s values affect how the results of the study are interpreted. 
Although this research adopts a mixed method approach, which combines both quantitative 
and qualitative data, epistemologically it inclines more towards interpretivism, which 
acknowledges the difference between the objects of natural science and people within the 
phenomenon under study through the respondents’ validation of the questionnaire results. 
Figure 3.2 shows the overall philosophical stance of this research. 
	
 
Figure 3.2: Philosophical stance of the research (Adapted from Sexton, 2007) 
	
Based on this discussion, the researcher agrees with Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) that, in 
practice, at one point one may more easily stand apart from what one is studying and takes 
the objectivist stance (in assessing the questionnaire), while at another point, the knower and 
the known must be interactive (through the respondents’ validation of the questionnaire 
results). Hence, as a pragmatist, the researcher’s goal is to search for useful points of 
connection between the objectivist and subjectivist stances. This approach also allows the 
researcher to fulfil the research objectives that cover both exploratory (what) and explanatory 
(why) questions.		
 
3.3 Research Approach 
In choosing the appropriate research approach, Saunders et al. (2007) suggested that the 
researcher should consider whether the study is guided by the generation of theory, also 
known as the inductive approach, or the testing of a theory through the deductive approach. 
The difference between the two approaches is that the inductive approach involves gathering 
empirical data to develop a theory in a situation where there are few or no theoretical 
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preconceptions; in the deductive approach, the researcher typically develops hypotheses from 
existing theories, which are then tested against the data collected (Young, 2007). Although 
these two approaches differ considerably, Wallace (1971) argued that the logics of induction 
and deduction should be combined in an ongoing cycle to provide an explicit link between 
theory and research, as depicted in Figure 3.3. Saunders et al. (2007) also suggested that it is 
possible to combine these two approaches in a study through the utilisation of mixed methods. 
	
 
Figure 3.3: The research approach adopted in this study  
(Adapted from Wallace, 1971 and De Vaus, 2001)  
	
This researcher agrees with Wallace (1971), that research typically involves the ongoing 
cycle of theory building and theory testing, as depicted in Figure 3.3. In the case of this study, 
a deductive approach to first gather related theories on the topic of interest is necessary, 
especially at the beginning of the research phase, as pure induction with no initial theory may 
result in the researcher not obtaining any benefit from valuable existing theory. In this case, 
the topic of interest is supply chain resilience. The information collected from the literature 
review is adopted by the researcher as variables in the questionnaire survey, to analyse the 
emergent vulnerability and capability factors of the public organisations and their supply 
chain, as shown in Figure 3.3. According to Trochim (2005), this deductive reasoning is 
indeed most commonly associated with quantitative research whereby questionnaires, 
surveys and experiments are typically used to gather data that is revised and assessed in 
numbers through statistical analysis. Furthermore, at this point, although the deductive 
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approach is less in-depth than the inductive approach, the deductive approach provides more 
breadth of information across a large number of cases (Young, 2007) and is therefore more 
generalisable than the inductive approach. 
 
However, in order to fulfil the fourth objective of the study (Section 1.4), interviews would 
be best suited to gather underlying meaning of the results from the questionnaire. The 
interviews allow the researcher to discover issues or effects which may not have been obvious 
at the earlier stage of the investigation. This means that, although different respondents may 
discuss different capability and vulnerability factors in the questionnaire based on their 
particular situation, the interviews allow the opportunity to gather new constructs which are 
relevant in developing the resilience response framework. The pathogens identified through 
the interviews can also provide a comprehensive discussion to justify the questionnaire 
results. Collecting data through this interview process involves part of the inductive approach 
in developing new knowledge or theory for study, as shown in Figure 3.3. Subsequently, the 
outcome of this study will either adapt the existing theory or present an alternative theoretical 
framework in fulfilling the research aim. 
	
Overall, the main difference between the quantitative and qualitative method adopted above 
is that the quantitative method is more structured, with the theory preceding observation, 
whereas the qualitative research is open and interactive and observation generally precedes 
the theory (Corbetta, 2003). Creswell (2003) suggested that it is possible to combine these 
methods to better understand the research problems, especially when the researcher’s 
knowledge is based on pragmatic grounds, as in this study. Sale et al. (2002) claimed that the 
combination of these two methods is possible when both approaches share the same goal of 
understanding of reality and share the same tenets on the theory as well as the inquiry process.  
	
According to Abowitz and Toole (2010), this mixed methods approach is particularly 
relevant for research in the construction industry, where social and natural science methods 
are frequently intertwined. Multiple approaches are also required in order to develop a 
holistic understanding of operations and supply chain management phenomena (Boyer and 
Swink, 2008). Newman et al. (2003) added that the complex nature of the research questions 
often necessitates the use of mixed methods. Hence, by using quantitative methods and 
qualitative interpretation of the empirical data in this study, the researcher will be able to 
triangulate the results and improve confidence in the resilience response framework.  
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As discussed in the research approach above, the researcher will use the quantitative and 
qualitative method sequentially (QUAN > QUAL). Creswell and Clark (2007) contend that 
this two-phase sequential approach makes it easier to implement the study as it allows a 
straightforward way to describe and report the data. This is also known as the explanatory 
sequential design, whereby the researcher starts with the quantitative data collection and 
analysis in Phase 1, followed by qualitative data collection and analysis in Phase 2, which 
builds on Phase 1 (Creswell and Clark, 2007), as depicted in Figure 3.4. This approach is 
useful for researchers who want to explore a phenomenon and expand on the quantitative 
findings. The research process will be further discussed in detail in Section 3.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
	
	
	
 
Figure 3.4: The explanatory mixed method sequential design  
(Adapted from Creswell and Clark, 2007) 
 
3.4 Research Strategy 
The purposes of this research are to analyse the emergent vulnerability and capability factors 
of the public sector supply chain, and identify the causes and cascade effects of the disruptions 
on project performance. In achieving these objectives, various research strategies have been 
considered by the researcher, as deliberated below: 
i. Case Study: The case study method involves the investigation of a contemporary 
phenomenon within the context of the real world through an empirical inquiry, and is 
usually applied when there is no clear evidence of the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and context (Yin, 2003). This method is usually adopted to address ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ research questions whereby multiple sources of evidence are used through an 
in-depth study of the relevant cases. Case studies are also generally used for exploratory, 
descriptive and explanatory purposes in research (Yin, 2003). 
 
However, one of the drawbacks of the case study method is that the findings are only 
applicable to similar projects or cases, making generalisation of the findings to other 
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types of project difficult. Furthermore, research bias may occur when adopting this 
method, due to the substantial reliance on self-interpretation of the cases in guiding the 
findings and recommendations. This researcher believes that it is important to obtain the 
project participants’ views on the capability and vulnerability factors to guide the 
findings.  
	
ii. Action Research: This method allows the researcher to actively participate in the 
process under study to identify and evaluate problems and potential solutions (Fellows 
and Liu, 2008). One of the benefits of conducting action research is that the researcher 
would be able to gather findings that have strong practical implications, gaining a deeper 
level of access to relevant information by working closely and building trust with the 
subject matter or organisational representatives.  
	
However, it will be difficult to gain full access to the Government body for privacy 
reasons and geographical distance, Malaysia. This method is also time consuming as the 
researcher would have to be employed by the organisation in order to carry out the study.  
iii. Survey: Surveys are usually applied for theory testing, in which the researcher develops 
a conceptual framework through existing theories, designs an instrument to measure 
relevant constructs and collects relevant data to test the conceptual framework. Kraemer 
(1991) suggested that a survey is generally used to quantitatively describe specific 
aspects or variables of a given population and examine the relationships among them. 
Surveys are also particularly useful when the researcher intends to generalise the 
findings to the population under study. 
	
However, there are a number of issues that the researcher needs to consider in a survey 
to ensure that the findings are reliable and valid, such as the population and its 
accessibility, the appropriate size of the sample for the study, and how to efficiently 
administer the survey (Trochim, 2005). Bell (1996) pointed out that the reliability of the 
survey data also depends on the respondents’ knowledge of the subject matter, the type 
of questions used, and the different interpretation of respondents of the questions or 
options of answers. 
In fulfilling the aim and objectives of this study, the researcher finds that the survey method 
would be the best research strategy to be adopted in this study. Although the reliability of 
surveys greatly depends on the selected sample of respondents and how the respondents 
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interpret the questions, by designing the survey appropriately with careful consideration in 
selecting the sample and relevant questions, the survey can be really useful in answering the 
‘who, what, where, how’ form of questions addressed in the research objectives. The survey 
is also a cost-effective method of gathering data from a range of project participants, including 
those who may not like to be identified in the report. The survey can also be developed and 
assessed within the time frame available for this study. 
 
Figure 3.5: Research design of this study 
 
Figure 3.5 summarises the overall research design adopted. It provides a holistic map, 
highlighting the researcher’s philosophical stance, the appropriate selection of the research 
approaches, strategies for fieldwork, and the selected data collection and analysis techniques, 
identified from the available alternatives through a set of essential stages. It is important to 
show the sequence of stages of the research and to demonstrate the logical practical empirical 
plan (Yin, 2003). The data collection and analysis techniques are further discussed in the 
following section. 
	
3.5 Research Techniques 
There is a range of possible approaches to collecting data under the selected survey method, 
including questionnaires and interviews.  
	
	
3.5.1 Questionnaire 
	
A questionnaire survey is used to determine the emergent vulnerability and capability factors 
of the public sector supply chain. According to Fellows and Liu (2008), the questionnaire is 
a useful tool in collecting data scientifically from a large number of people in a short period 
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of time. The researcher also believes that by using a questionnaire, a high validity of results 
can be obtained by gathering data from a range of relevant construction professionals working 
in the field. Self-administered questionnaires are used in this study, enabling the respondents 
to complete the questionnaire in their own convenient time, through the medium they prefer, 
either on paper or electronically. The same sets of questions are distributed to all respondents, 
making it easier for the researcher to analyse and arrange the data later in the study. A 
translated version of the questionnaire in the Malay language is also used where necessary. 
	
However, in using the questionnaire tool, the researcher must take into account the risk of 
receiving a low response rate. To overcome this problem, a larger sample size is considered 
initially. There is also a risk of lack of control over how the respondents might interpret the 
questions, so to avoid misinterpretation the researcher decided to conduct a pre-test with 
experts in the field, to gain necessary feedback and insights on the content of the 
questionnaire. This also allows the researcher to ensure the validity and clarity of the 
questionnaire. 
3.5.1.1 Data Sample for Questionnaire 
The target population for the questionnaire distribution is all the professionals involved in 
Malaysian public sector projects. The probability sampling used in this study is stratified 
random sampling, whereby the target population is first separated into mutually exclusive, 
homogeneous groups, and then a simple random sample is selected from each stratum or 
group (Trochim, 2005).	In order to reflect a balanced and unbiased point of view and ensure 
the validity of the research, two principal groups were targeted: 
i) Public sector professionals working under the Malaysian public organisations 
engaged in delivering public projects. 
ii) External private professionals from the private organisations engaged by the public 
organisations to undertake public projects: consultants (architects, quantity surveyors, 
engineers) and contractors.  
Unlike simple random sampling, stratified random sampling is the best way to obtain the 
views of a representative sample from each stratum. It also allows the researcher to make 
inferences from within the strata or groups and comparisons across the groups (Trochim, 
2005).  
	
In recruiting these participants, the list of consultants was retrieved and selected randomly 
from the database of PWD contacts and from the respective professional bodies, such as the 
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Malaysian Institute of Architects (PAM), the Malaysian Institute of Engineers, and the 
Malaysian Institution of Surveyors. For the contractors, the data was collected from the 
Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB). Letters of invitation to participate in the 
study were sent out along with the participant information sheet (see Appendix C) before the 
survey was conducted.		
	
According to the PWD, the estimated number of construction professionals from the public 
organisations working in public projects in 2014 was 3,800. The total number of contractors 
in Malaysia registered with CIDB at the end of September 2014 was 66,953, (see the first 
row of the second column in Table 3.1). However, due to the large numbers, the researcher 
decided to reduce the sample group by targeting contractors registered under Class G7 
(projects greater than RM10 million) from the state of Selangor and the Federal Territory of 
Kuala Lumpur (also known as Wilayah Persekutuan), (see Total G7 column of Table 3.1). 
These states were chosen as they are the centre areas of cultural, economic and administrative 
development in Malaysia and it is assumed that such characteristics qualify the sample to 
represent the Malaysian construction industry as a whole. The population size of these 
targeted contractors was thereby reduced to 2,754 (total of class G7 contractors in Selangor 
and Wilayah Persekutuan). However, 12% of these contractors are inactive, resulting in the 
final total population of 2,424 active contractors, as highlighted in the ‘active’ column in 
Table 3.1. The total number of registered consultants (architects, quantity surveyors, 
engineers) is listed in Table 3.2 below. 
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  Table 3.1: Total Registered Class G7 Contractors by State (CIDB, 2014) 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Local Professional Consultants Registered by Type (CIDB, 2014) 
Type of Professional Consultants 2011 2012 2013 
Architect1 1,782 1,844 1,858 
Quantity Surveyor2 888 930 975 
Engineer3 6,841 N.A N.A 
Source : 1 Board of Architects Malaysia 
      2 Board of Quantity Surveyors Malaysia 
      3 Board of Engineers Malaysia 
Note   : N.A – Not Available 
 
Overall, a summary of the total estimated population size for this study is tabulated in Table 
3.3 below. In order to determine the appropriate sample size (n) from the total population 
(N), the researcher adopted the formula given by Yamane (1967) whereby, for a 95% 
confidence level and the desired precision level of 10% (e), the optimum sample size for this 
study is 99 people. The calculation is shown below: 
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                     N       15,898    
               1 + N(e)2       1 + 15,898(.10)2 
 
The total population (N) is based on Table 3.3. The level of precision (e), sometimes referred 
to as sampling error, is the range in which the true value of the population is estimated to be. 
This range is often expressed in percentage points (e.g., ±10%). This means that in this case, 
if 60% of professionals in the sample ranked strongly agree on the statement of supply chain 
flexibility with a precision rate of ±10%, then the researcher can conclude that 50% to 70% 
of the professionals in the population agree with the statement. The precision rate in previous 
studies normally ranges from 4% to 10% at the 95% confidence level, depending on the 
maximum sampling error that the researcher is willing to accept and the specific objectives 
or analysis used.	Roscoe (1975) used 10% as a rule of thumb of acceptable precision level, 
whereas Israel (1992) suggested that for a population of 15,000, a sample of 99 should suffice 
for a 10% precision level, a confidence level of 95% and p=.5. Previous researchers in the 
Malaysian construction industry (Abdul-Karim, 2013; Al-Tmeemy et al., 2012) also used the 
same 10% precision rate, which they found acceptable in obtaining the required sample of 
construction professionals in Malaysia. Therefore, in line with the calculation above, it was 
established that an overall target of a minimum valid 99 respondents was acceptable for the 
analysis in this study. 
 
       Table 3.3: Summary of Total Estimated Population Size of Respondents 
Targeted Respondents Number Source (Year) 
Professionals in public 
organisations 
3,800 Public Works Department 
(2014) 
Registered 
Contractors (Class G7) 
2,424 Construction Industry 
Development Board (2014) 
Registered Architects 1,858 Board of Architects 
Malaysia (2013) 
Registered Quantity 
Surveyors 
975 Board of Quantity Surveyors 
Malaysia (2013) 
Registered 
Professional Engineers 
6,841 Board of Engineers 
Malaysia (2011) 
Total 15,898  
 
	
According to Fellows and Liu (2008), the normal expected useable response rate for research 
in the construction field ranges from 25% to 35%. Hence, in order to obtain more than 35% 
n =  =  = 99 
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response rate, the researcher distributed 220 questionnaires: 100 sets to the public 
organisations, 60 to contractors, and 60 to consultants. Overall, of the 220 questionnaires 
distributed covering the targeted population, 105 responses were received (response rate 
48%), as listed in Table 3.4. The response rates from all respondents are within the acceptable 
range, as suggested by Fellows and Liu (2008). In line with the analysis of this study, research 
samples larger than 30 respondents can also ensure the benefits of central limit theorem (see 
for example, Roscoe, 1975, p.163; or Abranovic, 1997, p. 307-308). Fraenkel and Wallen 
(2007) also contended that for correlation studies, such as in the case of this study, a sample 
of at least 50 was deemed sufficient to establish the existence of a relationship. 
 
      Table 3.4: Questionnaire data collected 
Respondents Targeted Sample Size 
Questionnaire 
sent 
Questionnaire 
received 
Response 
rate 
Public Organisations 50 100 54 54% 
Contractors 25 60 25 42% 
Consultants 25 60 26 43% 
Total : 100 220 105 48% 
 
Overall, the sample size is acceptable within the context of the Malaysian construction 
industry, based on previous studies conducted by Sambasivan and Soon (2007), Alzan et al. 
(2011) and Abdul-Aziz and Ali (2004). Their sample sizes ranged between 50 and 150 
respondents: Sambasivan and Soon (2007) studied the causes and effects of delays in the 
Malaysian construction industry with 150 respondents consisting of clients, consultants and 
contractors; Alzan et al. (2011) surveyed 100 contractors registered with CIDB Grade 7 to 
gather their perceptions on factors contributing to project delay; and Abdul-Aziz and Ali 
(2004) questioned 47 quantity surveyors from the public organisations to assess the quality 
performance of outsourced quantity surveying services. Hence, it was established that an 
overall sample of 105 respondents is sufficient for the analysis of this study. 
 
3.5.1.2 Questionnaire Design 
	
The questionnaire design was developed based on existing literature of similar studies (Pettit 
et al., 2010; Stephenson, 2010; Zhao et al., 2001). An example of the questionnaire is 
presented in Appendix C. The questionnaire is divided into five sections: 
• Section 1 involves closed questions on the respondents’ general profile; 
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• Section 2 involves closed questions on the respondents’ past experience of disruptive 
events in public projects; 
• Section 3 involves the use of a 5-point Likert scale (1-strongly disagree, 2-disagree, 3-
neither agree nor disagree, 4-agree, 5-strongly agree) to determine the degree of 
agreement or disagreement of the respondents on statements relating to the supply chain 
vulnerability factors; 
• Section 4 involves the use of the same 5-point Likert scale to determine the degree of 
agreement or disagreement of the respondents on statements relating to the supply chain 
capability factors; 
• Section 5 involves a 5-point Likert scale on the relative level of importance (range from 
not very important, moderately important, to critical) of the main vulnerability and 
capability factors. 
 
3.5.1.3 Method of Analysis for Questionnaire 
	
The Statistical Package for the Social Science (SPSS Version 24) software was used to 
compute the data collected, conduct rigorous statistical data analysis and compare and 
analyse the relationships between the variables in the study. The results are presented using 
visual tools such as diagrams, frequency tables, bar charts and scatterplots computed by 
SPSS. The internal consistency and reliability of the survey measures were tested during the 
initial pilot study using Cronbach’s Alpha Coefficient. According to Cavan et al. (2001), 
well-developed scales will have a Cronbach’s Alpha value of 0.70 or greater; above this value 
indicates a good correlation between the item and the true scores (Churchill, 1979).  
 
For the overall questionnaire results, the analysis was divided into five main sections 
corresponding to the sections in the questionnaire. Data from Sections 1 and 2 was subjected 
to descriptive statistics. According to Trochim (2005), the simplest distribution involves the 
list of every value of a variable and the number or percentage of the persons who selected 
each value. In this case, the respondents’ background (Section 1) is presented as frequency 
and percentage in a table, and past experience of disruptive events (Section 2) as percentages 
through visual tools such as bar graphs and pie charts. 
	
The composite scores for the Likert scales in Sections 3 to 5 were analysed on the interval 
measurement scale. The descriptive statistics used for the interval scale items include the 
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measurement of mean for central tendency and standard deviations for variability, computed 
through SPSS. The use of mode was also taken into consideration in assessing the likert scale 
of the vulnerability and capability factors. An example of analysis of the mean and mode of 
the main vulnerability factors of the public organisations are presented in Table 3.5 below to 
compare the results between the two analysis. Table 3.5 shows that both analysis of the mean 
and mode yield quite similar results. However, in this case, as the composite scores of the 
sub-factors are considered in ranking the main vulnerability and capability factors, the mean 
score were ultimately used in the final analysis (see analysis in Section 4.4). 
 
Table 3.5: Example of the results of mean and mode of the public organisations’ vulnerability factors 
Rank Main Vulnerability Factors Factor Label Mean Mode 
1 Political/Legal Pressures V6 3.66 4.00 
2 Management Vulnerability V2 3.58 4.00 
3 Liquidity/Credit Vulnerability V10 3.40 4.00 
4 Strategic Vulnerability V1 3.36 3.25 
5 Market Pressures V9 3.24 3.25 
6 Process Vulnerability V4 2.98 3.00 
7 Environmental Factors V7 2.96 3.00 
8 Supplier/Customer Disruptions V5 2.87 3.00 
9 Personnel Vulnerability V3 2.81 3.00 
10 Physical Damage Disruptions V8 2.62 2.40 
 
Overall, the mean allows the researcher to compute the average score of the vulnerability and 
capability factors of the respondents. The computed standard deviation establishes the 
dispersion of the results through the assessment of the common trends running through the 
responses. Factors with a highly dispersed distribution of data will obtain a higher standard 
deviation than those with low distribution. This measurement of central tendency was used 
by previous researchers, such as Pettit (2008) and Stephenson (2010), in assessing the 
vulnerability and capability factors of respondents. Furthermore, scatterplots were used to 
assess the critical vulnerability and capability of the respondents by comparing their current 
vulnerability and capability scores (from Sections 3 and 4 of the questionnaire respectively) 
against the rated importance of the variables in Section 5 of the questionnaire. The 
scatterplots (see Section 4.5) present a two-dimensional coordinate graph, showing the 
relationship between the two abovementioned quantitative variables, with each observation 
in a data set plotted as a point in the graph (Lewis-Beck et al., 2003). 
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Additional non-parametric data analysis such as the Mann-Whitney U and Kruskal-Wallis 
tests were conducted to make judgments of the probability of observed difference between 
two or more groups of respondents being dependable or having happened by chance (Field, 
2009). The Mann-Whitney U test is suitable here instead of the t-test, due to the expected 
skewed distribution in the data obtained from the Likert-scales construct measuring 
vulnerability and capability. For instance, when the majority of respondents select the positive 
anchor of ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ in the construct, the distribution is expected to be 
negatively skewed; conversely, when the majority select the negative anchor of ‘disagree’ or 
‘strongly disagree’, the distribution is expected to be positively skewed. Pallant (2013) agreed 
that many scales and measures used in the social sciences are not normally distributed and 
have scores that are skewed, either positively or negatively. It is worth noting here, however, 
that this does not necessarily indicate a problem with the scale, but rather reflects the 
underlying nature of the construct being measured. In this case, instead of violating the 
assumption of a normally distributed data in a parametric analysis, the used of non-parametric 
analysis, such as the Mann-Whitney U test, is preferred (Field, 2009; Pallant, 2013).  
 
Correlational analysis using Spearman rho was also conducted to identify significant 
relationships among the vulnerability and capability factors. Correlation is a relationship 
measure among different factors or parties indicating the level of strength and direction of the 
relationship (Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006). The Spearman rho correlation was also used to test 
the level of agreement or disagreement among the different groups of respondents (public 
organisations, consultants and contractors) on these factors. Spearman’s correlation results 
range between the value of 1 and −1, whereby values closer to 1 indicate a perfect positive 
relationship (or high degree of agreement) and -1 implies a perfect negative relationship (or 
disagreement) (Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006).  
 
3.5.2 Semi-structured Interviews 
	
While questionnaires can provide evidence of patterns amongst large populations, qualitative 
interview data often produces more in-depth insights into participants’ attitudes, thoughts and 
actions (Kendall, 2008). Semi-structured interviews are conducted after the questionnaire 
results have been analysed. Naoum (2007) pointed out that some of the limitations of the 
questionnaire can be overcome by supplementing it with personal interviews. Conducting 
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interviews with respondents also enables the researcher to obtain additional input that might 
not be available through the questionnaire findings. The researcher also aimed to gather the 
pathogenic influences (discussed in Section 2.7.1) through the interviews. Subsequently, the 
pathogens identified through the analysis of the interview data are compared against the 
pathogens laid out in Table 2.5. Semi-structured interviews were chosen to provide flexibility 
for the researcher to build arguments and gather as much as possible of the information 
required in addressing the specific issues. This also allows the researcher to meet the 
objective of identifying the causes and cascading effects of disruptions on public project 
performance. 
	
The drawback of this approach, however, is that it might be difficult to make comparisons 
between the results as only a small number of interviews can take place, given time 
constraints. Nevertheless, this will not be an issue here, as the interview is treated as a 
complementary method to fill potential gaps in the questionnaire, as previously discussed. 
The interviews were conducted either by phone, video conference or face-to-face through the 
appointments agreed between the researcher and the participants. To give participants 
sufficient time to think about the subject matter, the interview questions (see Appendix D) 
were sent to them in advance. 
	
In analysing the qualitative data, the computer software package NVivo (version 11) was 
used to identify relationships between existing themes and emergent new themes. These 
emergent themes from the interviews are useful in developing the final resilience response 
framework. As in previous studies (Love et al., 2010, 2011), content analysis and cognitive 
mapping were used to analyse and present the qualitative data. Content analysis is a technique 
in which the researcher interrogates data for constructs and ideas that have been decided in 
advance (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). This technique is useful for the researcher to analyse 
key issues identified from the previous questionnaire findings. Furthermore, as different 
respondents may discuss different pathogenic influences based on their own situation, 
emergent pathogenic themes relevant to the study are also considered. Interviews were 
recorded and transcribed in Malay, and relevant parts were translated into English before the 
analysis.  
 
Cognitive mapping was used to present the relationships between different issues gathered 
from the interviews. Cognitive mapping is a method of spatially presenting the data to 
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identify patterns that will allow the researcher to understand the relationships between the 
data and its significance (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). In this study, the transcribed 
interviews were imported in the NVivo software. Predetermined pathogenic themes from the 
literature (see Section 2.7.1) were used to construct the nodes in the software. These nodes 
are used to represent the concept, code or themes of the data (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). It 
also allows the researcher to break the pathogenic themes into sub-themes during the analysis 
of the interview data. Emergent pathogenic themes from the interview were also identified to 
reflect the respondents’ perceptions on the pathogenic influences that may not be within the 
predetermined pathogenic themes in the literature. The cognitive maps are then developed 
based on these nodes, and presented in the data analysis in Chapter 5 of the thesis.  
	
3.5.2.1 Data Sample for Interviews 
	
For the interviews, the non-probability method of purposive sampling was adopted, using the 
expert sampling approach to include particular professionals from both the public 
organisations and their supply chain (i.e. private organisations). These categories of 
professionals may have a unique, different or important perspective on the phenomenon in 
question, hence their presence in the sample should be ensured (Mason, 2002). The interview 
sample involved the participants that had responded to the earlier questionnaire. In the 
participant consent form distributed earlier with the questionnaire (see Appendix C), 
participants were given the option of whether they would be interested to take part in the 
subsequent interviews. This option helped the researcher to contact and assemble the relevant 
experts or professionals with experience working in public projects.  
	
In terms of sample size for the interview, previous researchers (Pettit et al., 2013) conducted 
10 to 40 interviews within a firm for their study on supply chain resilience. For this study, 
considering that the interview is supplementary to the questionnaire and is treated as 
qualitative data to fill any gaps in the questionnaire, 12 professionals were considered 
sufficient to be assessed. The interview sample comprised five professionals representing the 
public organisations, three engineering consultants representing the external private 
organisations working with public projects, and four contractors engaged by the public 
organisations, sufficient to represent the different groups of respondents. All respondents had 
over 20 years of experience working in public projects, hence were able to provide a 
meaningful perspective on their experience in dealing with disruptions in public projects. The 
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respondents were also mainly involved in the large-scale engineering projects (roadworks, 
bridges, dams) in which the public sector supply chain is widely involved in. The 12 
respondents were sufficient to provide an overview of the current real-world scenario of 
public sector projects, in identifying critical pathogenic influences.  
An invitation letter, participant information sheet and a consent form for signature were given 
to the respondents before the interview was conducted. The interviewees were given the 
option to withdraw from the study at any point. Names and personal information remained 
anonymous throughout the data collection and analysis. 
 
3.5.3 Validity 
	
Validity is defined as the extent to which an instrument measures what it purports to measure 
(Kimberlin and Winterstein, 2008). Validity and reliability estimates, as Messick (1994) 
suggests, “should be uniformly addressed for all assessments because they are not just 
measurement principles, they are social values that have meaning and force outside of 
measurement wherever evaluative judgments and decisions are made” (p. 13). Using mixed 
methods research, a panel of experts could provide the data that would allow the 
quantification of the consensus of those social values that are key to the audience at hand 
(Newman et al., 2013). Hence, in order to attain validity for this study, a panel of experts was 
used to pre-test the survey instrument. The validition process is iterative as the experts provide 
feedback, the literature is reviewed, and consensus is sought (Cronbach, 1970, 1971; Haynes 
et al., 1995; Newman et al., 2003). Strategies to address issues: face, content, construct, 
internal and external validity, are discussed below. 
	
Face Validity  
Face validity involves	the evaluation of an instrument’s appearance by a group of experts to 
determine the extent to which the contents have actually been translated into meaningful 
constructs (Trochim, 2005). It is useful in establishing an instrument’s ease of use, clarity and 
readability (Burton and Mazerolle, 2011). Lawshe (1975) suggested a minimum of four 
experts for pre-test to ensure validity. In this study, five experts (three professionals from the 
public organisations and two researchers) were invited to participate to provide 
recommendations to improve the instrument. These panelists from the construction industry 
were deemed to be experts for the purposes of this study as each practitioner has more than 
10 years of experience in the field, and both researchers possess a PhD degree. Their initial 
	 91	
comments on the conceptual framework are discussed Section 3.6.1 and their feedback on the 
survey instrument Section 3.6.2 (Table 3.6). 
	
Content Validity 
Content validity essentially addresses how representative instrument items represent the 
content or subject matter that the instrument seeks to measure (Newman et al., 2013). It can 
be estimated either qualitatively, through oral indication by a panel of experts who judge the 
appearance, relevance and representativeness of the survey’s elements (Netemeyer et al., 
2003); quantitatively, by quantifying the degree of consensus about the survey instrument 
among the experts (Newman et al., 2013); or by using a combination of both methods. For 
this study, content validity was established using both methods in two stages. The first stage, 
qualitative, was the intensive review of the literature; the second stage quantified the validity 
of a scale, requiring the panel of experts to rate the relevance of each item.  
 
Widely used methods to quantify content validity for multi-item scales, as in this study, are 
by computing Lawshe’s (1975) content validity ratio (CVR) and Waltz and Bausell’s (1983) 
item-level content validity index (I-CVI). The former involves requesting the panel of experts 
to rate items according to the degree of relevance of the items in assessing the construct that 
they are assigned to. A 3-point rating scale was used; 1=Irrelevant, 2=Important, but not 
essential, and 3=Essential. For each item, a CVR was computed, the proportion of experts 
that considered the items to be important or essential. The formula to calculate the ratio 
(Lawshe, 1975) is: 
Equation 1:               ne - N / 2  
                               N / 2 
 
Where ne is the number of experts who considered the item to be Essential or Important, but 
not essential and N is the total number of experts. The CVR values range from -1 to +1.	The 
formula gives a negative result when less than 50% of the experts rate the item as essential or 
important, a null result when 50% rate it as irrelevant, and a positive result when more than 
half rate it as essential or important. Hence, the more experts perceiving one item as being 
important or essential, the more confident the researcher can be in considering that item as 
part of the construct. Lawshe (1975) suggested that the minimum acceptable value of CVI is 
0.99 for five experts at 5% level of significance. The researcher can also compute the content 
validity index (CVI) of the scale by computing the mean of the CVR values of the retained 
CVR = 
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items. The overall content validity will be higher if the value of the CVI is closer to 0.99 and 
vice versa (Lawshe, 1975). 
	
Another way to measure the item’s content validity is by computing the item-level content 
validity index (I-CVI) proposed by Waltz and Bausell (1983). The difference between this 
measure and Lawshe’s index is that experts rate the items on a 4-point rating scale with 
slightly different anchors: 1=not relevant, 2=somewhat relevant, 3=quite relevant, and 4=very 
relevant (Davis, 1992). This index also gives the percentage of experts that rate quite relevant 
or very relevant of an item. However, a different formula is used by Waltz and Bausell (1983) 
to calculate this, hence the researcher decided to compute both indexes to ensure the content 
validity of the construct. The formula is represented as: 
 
Equation 2:		 							 					No. of judges rated 3 or 4 
                                        Total no. of judges 
 
The scale-level content validity index (S-CVI) can also be computed by averaging the I-CVI 
of all items in the construct. For a scale to be judged as having excellent content validity, it 
would be composed of items that had I-CVIs of .78 or higher (Polit et al., 2007) and a 
minimum S-CVI of .80 (Davis, 1992).  
 
Both the former content validity ratio (CVR) and the latter item-level content validity index 
(I-CVI) have widely been used in social and health sciences researches to test the content 
validity of questionnaire instruments involving likert-scale items that measures the 
characteristics or properties of an individual or a system (Sangoseni et al, 2013; Khazaee-
Pool et al., 2016), such as in the case of this study. The questionnaire instrument in this study 
involves the assessment of the likert-scale items against the vulnerability and capability 
factors of the respondents’ organisation. The content validity of the instrument is achieved 
by a rational analysis of the instrument by raters or experts on the research subject that are 
familiar with the construct of interest (Bolarinwa, 2015). However, it is worth noting here 
that the risk of using the index of CVR and I-CVI is that they might not adjust for chance 
agreement (Wynd et al., 2003). Nevertheless, Bolarinwa (2015) argued that researchers could 
combine more than one form of validity to increase the validity strength of the questionnaire. 
In this study, the content validity is combined with the following construct validity to 
strengthen the validity of the questionnaire. 
 
I-CVI = 
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Overall, to select items in the final draft of the questionnaire in this study, the following 
criteria were applied: 
• Accept unconditionally if CVR is equal to or larger than 0.99 (Lawshe, 1975).  
• If CVR is lower than 0.99, the researcher considered the item’s I-CVI value, and accepted 
it if I-CVI is 0.78 or higher (Polit et al., 2007) and S-CVI is 0.80 or higher (Davis, 1992). 
• Items that do not meet the above criteria were considered as having low content validity 
and discarded.  
The results from this quantitative content validation are tabulated in Table 3.7 in Section 
3.6.2.  
 
Construct Validity 
Construct validity refers to the degree to which inferences can legitimately be made from the 
operationalisations in the study to the theoretical constructs on which those 
operationalisations were based (Trochim, 2005). It raises the basic question of whether the 
measures chosen by the researcher “fit” together in such a way as to capture the essence of 
the construct (Straub et al., 2004). There are two types of construct validity: convergent and 
discriminant. Convergent validity is the degree to which measures of constructs that should 
be related theoretically are observed to be interrelated in reality, and discriminant validity is 
the degree to which measures of constructs that should not be related theoretically are, in 
fact, not interrelated in reality (Trochim, 2005). Construct validity can be tested using 
multitrait-multimethod analysis (MTMM), factor analysis and Q-sorting.  
	
MTMM is a matrix or table of correlations that measure each of several constructs by each 
of several methods (i.e. a paper-and-pencil test, a direct observation, a performance measure) 
(Campbell and Fiske, 1959). However, MTMM has received little use since its introduction 
in 1959 (Trochim, 2005) as its rules of thumb are ambiguous (Alwin, 1973) and it is labour-
intensive, requiring the use of two or more different methods in gathering all data (Straub et 
al., 2004). As this study only uses one method (survey instrument) in measuring the 
vulnerability and capability factors, it would not be reasonable to apply the MTMM method. 
An alternative method to test construct validity is factor analysis. Factor analysis involves the 
use of a mathematical tool in a complex and multi-step process to validate a scale or index by 
demonstrating that its constituent items load on the same factor; proposed scale items which 
cross-load on more than one factor are dropped. Factor analytic studies, however, require a 
large sample size of at least 300 to 500 respondents (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007; Comrey 
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and Lee, 1992). If the sample size is inadequate, factor analysis may not be appropriate as 
researchers will not be able to interpret the results of the factor solution (Burton and 
Mazerolle, 2011). Since this study does not meet the required sample size (n=105) for factor 
analysis, an alternative method to establish construct validity is used, as discussed below. 
	
Another variant of factor analysis is the use of Q-sorting (Moore and Benbasat, 1991; Segars 
and Grover, 1998; Storey et al., 2000). Q-sorting combines validation of content and construct 
through experts who group items according to their similarity. This process also eliminates 
(discriminates among) items that do not match posited constructs (Straub et al., 2004). There 
are two ways in which this can be done (Storey, et al., 2000): 
• Exploratory, when respondents are given the items and asked to group and identify 
category labels for each group. 
• Confirmatory, when the categories are already labelled and respondents are asked to 
classify each item in one of the categories. 
The latter procedure was adopted in this study, whereby categories or constructs and their 
definition were developed from the literature and presented in a short Q-sort instrument with 
a separate sheet of random listing of items or factors. The Q-sorting was conducted with a 
different panel of experts from the ones used in the previous face and content validity pre-
test. In this case, three researchers from Malaysia and three key industry players with more 
than 10 years of experience in the field were involved. They were asked to indicate which 
construct was most closely associated with each scale item.  
	
Analysis for this confirmatory procedure was made by calculating the percentage of 
respondents that have correctly classified an item (Straub et al., 2004). When this percentage 
is low, there are items that do not discriminate well in relation to other items in a different 
construct (Zait and Bertea, 2013). Hinkin (1998) suggested that a minimum correct item 
classification of 75% is sufficient in providing evidence of construct validity. However, as 
only a small number of expert judges (n=6) assessed the pre-test, the decision was made to 
measure what half of the experts perceived as the appropriate construct. Hence, the researcher 
considered items with a good level of construct validity to be those that were correctly 
classified at a rate of 50% and above. The results of this Q-Sorting can be seen in Table 3.8 
in Section 3.6.2. 
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			Internal and External Validity 
Internal validity is related to the extent to which conclusions can be drawn about the causal 
effects of one variable on another. Relationships are more likely to be causal in research that 
has high internal validity; with low internal validity, causality cannot be inferred as 
confidently (Judd et al., 1991). For this study, the following methods recommended by 
Merriam (1998) were adopted to maximise internal validity:  
• Triangulation. In order to strengthen the validity of the findings in this study, data were 
collected from several sources: theoretical concepts in the literature, questionnaires and 
semi-structured interviews. This allows the researcher to explain the relationships and 
causal effects between the constructs, hence ensuring validity of the findings. 
• Member checks. The survey results and interpretations of this study are presented to the 
respondents after analysis for validation. For instance, the interview transcripts are sent 
back to the interviewees to ensure that the content and conversation were accurately 
captured in the transcript. This ensured credibility and truthfulness in the data collected. 
• Peer examination. Research data and findings were reviewed and commented on by 
several non-participants in the field who are familiar with the subject. This was done 
through the University’s Interim Assessment and Internal Evaluation process, whereby 
two to three experts review and provide comments on the survey data and findings.  
• Participatory or collaborative modes of research. Respondents are involved in both the 
questionnaire and interview phases of the study. This enables the researcher to arrive at 
significant conclusions as a result of consensus among respondents from different 
perspectives, which can significantly strengthen the research findings and interpretations. 
• Researcher’s bias. To reduce researcher’s bias, data are collected, analysed and 
interpreted as impartially as possible. This includes conforming to ethical rules and 
principles, performing the evaluation as accurately as possible and reporting the findings 
reliably.  
Meanwhile, external validity is the extent to which one can generalise the results of the 
research to the populations and settings of interest (Judd et al., 1991). External validity was 
designed into the study through the use of a random sample that includes both ends of the 
supply chain: both public organisations and external private organisations who are 
representatives of the target population. The generalisability of the assessment tool was also 
further improved by basing it on a broad set of extant literature, followed by a pre-test by a 
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panel of eleven experts. This ensures that the questions reflect how the target population talks 
and thinks about the issue under study. 
	
3.5.4 Reliability of Survey Instrument 
	
The term reliability has several synonyms including consistency, repeatability, 
reproducibility, precision, dependability and stability (Sharma and Petosa, 2012). Reliability 
estimates are useful in assessing the degree of consistency with which it measures the attribute 
it is supposed to be measuring	(Polit and Hungler, 1999), assessing how reproducible the 
survey instrument’s data are (Litwin, 1995), and the extent to which the instrument is free 
from random error (Hoyle et al., 2002), so that interpretations based on current and future use 
of the instrument can be made with confidence. The common methods observed in the 
literature to assess reliability are test-retest reliability and internal consistency reliability. 
	
Test-retest reliability evaluates reliability across time, and is measured by having the same 
set of respondents complete a survey at two different points in time to see how stable the 
responses are (Litwin, 1995). The correlation or strength of association of the two sets of 
scores is then calculated (Kimberlin and Winterstein, 2008). However, the problem with test-
retest reliability is that if the time between tests is too short, respondents may remember how 
they answered on the first occasion and might simply provide the same response during the 
retest, resulting in an overestimate of the test’s reliability. Alternatively, if the duration is too 
long, learning or a change in health status could alter the way respondents perform in the 
second test (Kimberlin and Winterstein, 2008), causing significant bias to the reliability 
results. The test-retest method is also time-consuming and there is no information about its 
reliability until the results of the second test are collected.  
	
Another statistical technique to test reliability is the measurement of internal consistency. The 
most widely used method for estimating internal consistency reliability is Cronbach’s alpha, 
whereby the internal consistency of a group of items is measured to test how well the different 
items measure the same issue (Litwin, 1995). Cronbach’s alpha is based on the average inter-
item correlation among the items on a scale. The assumption here is that items measuring the 
same construct should be correlated; significant correlations indicate reliability of the 
construct being measured. The value of Cronbach’s alpha ranges from zero to one, with 
values closer to one indicating higher internal consistency. An acceptable level is generally 
considered to be equal or over 0.70 (Carmines and Zeller, 1979; Nunnally and Bernstein, 
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1994). However, in developing newer scales,	other researchers considered lower values such 
as 0.50 and 0.60 to be acceptable (Hair et al., 1998; Loehlin, 1998; Min and Mentzer, 2004; 
Sharma and Petosa, 2012; Pettit et al., 2013). The item-total correlations can also be examined 
along with Cronbach’s alpha to ensure that the measurement scale is uni-dimensional; that is, 
it measures only one concept, rather than a mixture of different concepts. The corrected item-
total correlations are the correlations between scores on each item and the total scale score 
(Field, 2009). These correlations should be reasonably strong if the scale is internally 
consistent. An item-total correlation higher than 0.30 (Kline, 1993; De Vaus, 2001) suggests 
that each item has a good correlation with the domain. 
	
In this study, reliability was controlled through the pre-test and pilot study of the survey 
instrument. The initial pre-test with five experts and the subsequent Q-sorting with six experts 
were designed to rectify interpretation issues in relation to the format and content of the 
instrument. Following initial improvements, 20 targeted respondents (10 professionals from 
the public organisations, and 10 professionals from the private organisations engaged to 
deliver public projects) completed the entire resilience assessment along with additional 
open-ended questions in a feedback sheet, providing their views on the format, readability 
and arrangement of the instrument. Verbal feedback was also captured by the researcher. By 
clearly defining terms and removing ambiguous items , the reliability of the instrument was 
improved. Furthermore, as the questionnaire involves a group of items in a construct, 
Cronbach’s alpha and item-total correlations were examined to establish the reliability and 
uni-dimensionality of the scale. Previous researchers such as Pettit et al. (2013) have also 
used Cronbach’s alpha to assess the reliability of their survey, in which the minimum 
acceptable value of alpha was set at 0.50. For this study, a higher alpha value limit of 0.60 
(Hair et al., 2010) is used to demonstrate reliability (see results in Table 3.9 of Section 3.6.2). 
	
3.6 Research Process 
	
The research process highlights the step–by-step action-wise sequence of activities from the 
very early stage of the research through the data analysis and presentation of findings (Oates, 
2005). Figure 3.6 summarises the overall research process including the research methods 
and outcomes of the study. The research is divided into three phases: 
• Phase I – Development of Conceptual Framework 
• Phase II – Development of Survey Instrument 
• Phase III – Development of Resilience Response Framework 
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Figure 3.6: Research methods and expected outcomes 
Phase	I	–	
Development	of	
Conceptual	
Framework:	
Phase	II	–	
Development	of	
Survey	Instrument:	
Phase	III	–	
Development	of	
Resilience	Response	
Framework:	
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The phases depicted in Figure 3.6 are further discussed in the following sections.  
 
3.6.1 Phase I - Development of Conceptual Framework 
	
Phase I is the development of the conceptual framework, whereby the first step taken (see 
Figure 3.7) is to define the research parameters and specify the research needs so that the 
themes or constructs could be generated to match the research aim and objectives. In this 
case, the researcher specified the need to develop a risk resilience approach to effectively 
manage supply chain disruptions in Malaysian public projects, as discussed throughout 
Chapters 1 and 2.  
	
 
 
Figure 3.7: Research process Phase I – Development of Conceptual Framework 
 
In sourcing the literature, the university library’s Summon search engine and Google Scholar 
were used in accessing a range of electronic databases (i.e. Science Direct, Emerald, Elsevier, 
and EBSCOhost), including a range of books and working papers. The key strategy in 
reviewing the literature includes assessing the research topic area at the general level (i.e. 
worldwide and other industries), before reviewing the literature specifically in the context of 
the construction industry, followed by the Malaysian construction industry. The researcher 
began with using keywords such as ‘supply chain disruptions’, ‘supply chain risk’, and 
‘construction risk’ to understand the research phenomena and establish a workable definition 
of the terms. In this case, further research on the causes of supply chain risks had resulted in 
the identification of a new keyword; ‘pathogens’. The pathogenic influences were then 
reviewed in greater detail to understand the theories behind it and how it is applicable to the 
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research under study. The researcher also reviewed the literature on ‘resilience’, ‘supply chain 
resilience’, ‘supply chain capability’, and ‘supply chain vulnerability’ to identify how 
resilience could improve the supply chain’s ability to respond and recover from supply chain 
disruptions. This allows the researcher to review contrasting theories or procedures and 
determine the current level of knowledge surrounding the research area in establishing the 
scope of the study.  
 
Overall, the literature review resulted in the generation of three main research constructs: 
supply chain vulnerability (Section 2.5), supply chain capability (Section 2.6) and pathogenic 
influences (Section 2.7). This stage was crucial for the recognition of gaps in the literature 
and in establishing the scope and boundaries of the research. Key factors or variables 
contributing to the main constructs and their sub-constructs were then gathered through an 
extensive review of the literature, and the connections between these main constructs were 
illustrated in the conceptual framework presented in Section 2.8. The first five steps in Phase 
I were discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. The last two steps, on internal and external validation 
of the conceptual framework, are further discussed below. 
 
Following the development of the conceptual framework, internal validation was conducted 
to check both the integrity and logic of the framework by revisiting the research needs 
(Macmillan et al., 2001) and by gaining expert feedback. Revisiting the research aim, to build 
resilience to disruptions of the Malaysian public sector construction supply chain, the purpose 
of the conceptual framework is to show the link between key issues discussed in the literature 
review and how the interactions between the main research constructs (vulnerability, 
capability and pathogens) can assess supply chain resilience. In order to ensure the internal 
validity of the conceptual framework, the researcher adopted the factors that were collected 
from previous literature to be further assessed in this study.	
	
The researcher then obtained initial feedback on the conceptual framework from five experts: 
three professionals from the public organisations and two researchers. This was useful in 
ensuring the clarity of the content of the framework. Following the feedback, wordings and 
terms for factors used in the framework were amended and the links between constructs were 
made explicit by using words such as influence, trigger, causes and reduce. The professionals 
from the public organisations found these words useful in making the framework self-
explanatory, and the simple terms used made it easier for managers to understand the focus 
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of the study. Therefore, it can be established that the framework theoretically succeeded in 
presenting its purpose.  
	
However, due to the conceptual nature of the framework, further external verification from 
the real world was needed to ensure its validity. This is the final step of Phase I, in preparation 
for the questionnaire and interviews to collect data from professionals in the field. Overall, 
the outcome of Phase I is a conceptual framework that is subject to subsequent revision or 
expansion following data collection and analysis.  
 
3.6.2 Phase II – Development of Survey Instrument 
	
Phase II, illustrated in Figure 3.8, begins with the experts’ pre-test of the initial draft of the 
survey instrument, inorder to gather initial feedback on the list of vulnerability and capability 
factors identified in Phase I, and to identify areas in the survey that need further development 
or refinement. It is also important to pre-test the survey to ensure that researchers and 
respondents interpret the survey in the same way and that it will function as a valid and 
reliable assessment tool (Converse and Presser, 1986).  
	
Figure 3.8: Research process Phase II – Development of Survey Instrument 
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The results from the pre-test of the survey instrument and the pilot study to assess reliability 
as shown in Figure 3.8 are further discussed below. 
 
Pre-test Data Analysis 
The following three steps were undertaken during the pre-test: 
First, the initial questionnaire draft, which includes the identified variables and research 
constructs from the literature review, were presented to the same five experts as in Phase I; 
they were requested to make initial recommendations on the layout of the questionnaire, 
clarity of the contents and instructions (presented as the second step in Figure 3.8). This 
procedure allows the researcher to test the face validity and content validity of the 
questionnaire (as discussed in Section 3.5.3). The necessary changes were made following 
the experts’ feedback, as indicated in Table 3.6 below.	Some irrelevant factors were deleted, 
and statements reworded to improve clarity.  
	
Table 3.6: Feedback on questions and changes addressed through the pre-test  
 
 
Focus 
 
Description 
 
Feedback and recommended changes 
 
C
on
te
nt
 Is the content of the 
questions appropriate to 
the research? 
Are the questions 
relevant? 
 
• All experts agreed that the content of the questions were 
appropriate and relevant for the research area. 
In
st
ru
ct
io
ns
 a
nd
 c
ov
er
 p
ag
e 
 
Are the instructions of 
the questionnaire clear? 
 
 
 
 
 
• The cover page which includes the research problem 
and the research aim and objectives was helpful and 
easy to understand. 
• A suggestion was made to highlight the purpose of the 
questionnaire in the cover page as well. 
• Some of the words in the instructions of the sections 
need to be underlined and bold to attract respondents’ 
attention. 
• Instructions in Section 5 were not self-explanatory and 
need to be further clarified by the researcher. The 
instructions were therefore reworded accordingly to 
avoid confusion. 
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Q
ue
st
io
ns
 
 
Are all the wordings 
used in the questions 
and vulnerability and 
capability statements 
clear or ambiguous? 
 
• Generally, all the wordings in the questions are clear. 
Some experts suggested using simple terms that all 
managers and operatives can understand. Some terms 
were therefore reworded accordingly. 
• It was suggested to allow the respondents to tick more 
than one option for question number 4 in Section 1 as 
they might be involved in more than one project phase 
in construction. 
• The term suppliers in questions in Sections 3 and 4 
needs to be defined as ‘a separate firm that provides 
either products or services to the respondent’s firm’. A 
footnote was therefore added to define what suppliers 
meant in this context. 
• To include both products/services in the vulnerability 
and capability statements as some respondents might be 
offering services instead of products in the supply chain. 
 
L
ay
ou
t How appropriate is the 
layout or order of the 
questionnaire? 
 
• All experts agreed that the layout and order of the 
sections are very good and easy to read. 
 
L
en
gt
h 
 
How acceptable is the 
length of the survey to 
the respondents? 
 
• Once duplicated questions are deleted, and factors are 
refined to shorten the questionnaire, the experts find that 
the duration of approximately 20 to 30 minutes was 
viewed as a reasonable length to complete the 
questionnaire. 
 
	
Another key recommendation was on the classification of the vulnerability factors. Although 
the experts found that the pre-established scales and constructs of the capability factors in Pettit 
et al.’s (2013) study are useful and can be directly adopted in the survey to assess the resilience 
of the public sector supply chain, for the vulnerability factors, the experts argued that it would 
be valuable to the public sector supply chain to assess the vulnerability based on where the 
vulnerability arises (i.e. from within the organisation, from the supply chain, or from external 
factors beyond the control of the firm and its supply chain). Hence, in line with the theoretical 
concept and the experts’ feedback, the vulnerability factors were regrouped and classified as 
discussed below. 
 
Secondly, as it was suggested that the vulnerability factors be regrouped; the content validity 
of the vulnerability factors was assessed by the five experts to ensure the definition of the 
vulnerability constructs was clear. To calculate the content validity ratio (CVR) discussed in 
Section 3.5.3, through a short questionnaire, each industry expert was asked to rate if the 
vulnerability factors measured by the construct were either essential, useful but not essential 
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or irrelevant in assessing the public sector supply chain resilience. This help the researcher to 
further refine the vulnerability factors based in their importance.The experts were also asked 
to rate on a four-point Likert scale (1=not relevant, 2=somewhat relevant, 3=quite relevant and 
4=very relevant) each item based on its relevance and clarity in measuring the construct it was 
supposed to measure, for the purpose of computing the item-content validity index (I-CVI). 
Using Equations 1 and 2 (Section 3.5.3), the CVR and I-CVI for the vulnerability factors were 
calculated accordingly, as shown in Table 3.7. 
Looking at the CVR values in Table 3.7, 11 out of the 41 items fell below the 0.99 threshold, 
as highlighted in red. This includes items such as V3.3-operating in extreme or hazardous 
conditions, V3.4-loss of key personnel, V4.1-large number of members in supply chain, V4.7-
limited distribution capacity, and V5.2-suppliers have limited capacity in dealing with demand 
changes. Despite obtaining a CVR value of 0.60, it is worth noting here that four out of the five 
experts selected these items as essential or important, but not essential, as seen through the 
breakdown of the results in Table E1 of Appendix E. Although there is 80% agreement on the 
essentiality of these items, Lawshe’s (1975) formula and stringent minimum CVR value of 
0.99 for a small number of experts seems to require all experts to agree that those items are 
essential or important, but not essential be retained in the study. Hence, in this case, the 
researcher took into account the I-CVI value to determine whether to retain or discard the items 
with a CVR value of 0.60. It can be seen from Table 3.7 that these items obtained a high I-CVI 
value of 0.80, which is above the minimum of 0.78. Thus it was decided that these items be 
retained in the study. 
The lowest CVR value of 0.20 was identified in items under the technology disruptions and 
environmental factors constructs, whereby two of the five experts perceived these items (V6.2-
unforeseen technology failures and V8.2-health pandemic/spread of disease affecting 
employees) to be irrelevant to the study. The I-CVI values of both of these items were also 
below the 0.78 threshold. However, looking at the total average of the scale content validity 
index (S-CVI), the environmental factors construct is still within the acceptable S-CVI value 
of 0.80; thus the researcher decided to retain the item in the construct for further analysis. 
However, the technology disruptions construct fell below the S-CVI’s 0.80 threshold, with the 
S-CVI value of 0.70. This construct was therefore considered to have low content validity and 
was eliminated. Overall, considering that more than 70% of the 41 items obtained a CVR and 
I-CVI value of 1.00, it can be considered that the rest of the constructs have a good level of 
content validity.  
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Table 3.7: Results of the items’ content validity ratio (CVR), item content validity index (I-CVI) and scale content validity index (S-CVI)  
 
	
* Where ne = number of experts selected “essential” or “important, but not essential”, N = total number of experts, 
* N3 or 4 = number of experts rated “3=quite relevant” and “4=very relevant
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Thirdly, Q-sorting was conducted with three researchers from Malaysia and three key industry 
players to ensure that the relevant vulnerability factors fall in the right constructs (as discussed 
in Section 3.5.3). The correct classification percentage was calculated by identifying the 
frequency of experts that selected the correct construct for each item. Based on the computed 
Q-sorting results in Table 3.8, seven items obtained 100% correct classification (value shown 
as 1.00 in the table), six items were correctly classified at a rate of 83%, 14 items received a 
correct classification rate of 67%, and 11 items were correctly classified by half (50%) of the 
respondents. The high percentage of correct classification shows that these 38 items exhibit 
consistent meaning across the panel of experts, thus confirming their adequacy in capturing the 
pre-specified vulnerability constructs. 
   Table 3.8: Results of Q-sorting analysis 
 
Vulnerability Factors Percent 
Strategic Vulnerability   
V1.1 Degree of outsourcing to different suppliers 0.67 
  V1.2 Reliance upon specialty sources in delivering products/services 0.50 
V1.3 Threat by competitive innovations 0.50 
V1.4 Concentration of suppliers/operation facilities at the same area 0.67 
V1.5 Complexity of services/production operations 0.50 
Management Vulnerability   
V2.1 Inadequate management oversight 1.00 
V2.2 Late information and decision making 1.00 
V2.3 Visibility of errors or deficiencies to stakeholders 0.33 
V2.4 Reliance upon information flow in operations 0.50 
V2.5 Budget overruns/Unplanned expenses 0.67 
Personnel Vulnerability   
V3.1 Shortage of skilled workers 0.67 
V3.2 Labor disputes or strikes 0.67 
V3.3 Operating in extreme or hazardous conditions 0.17 
V3.4 Loss of key personnel 0.67 
Process Vulnerability   
V4.1 Large number of members in supply chain 0.33 
V4.2 Unpredictability of demand by client 0.67 
V4.3 Scarce or limited raw material availability  0.50 
V4.4 Poor availability of utilities (electrical power, water, sewer) for 
production 
0.50 
V4.5 The use of failure-prone equipment/product 0.67 
V4.6 Limited production capacity 0.83 
V4.7 Limited distribution capacity 0.67 
V4.8 Product quality problem 0.67 
V4.9 Transportation disruption during operation 0.67 
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Supplier or Customer Disruptions   
V5.1 Suppliers face frequent disruptions 0.83 
V5.2 Suppliers have limited capacity in dealing with demand changes 0.67 
V5.3 Loss of key supplier 0.67 
V5.4 Customer face frequent disruptions 0.83 
Technology Disruptions   
V6.1 Technology changes in the industry 1.00 
V6.2 Unforeseen technology failures 1.00 
Political or Legal Pressures   
V7.1 Exposure to political disruptions 0.83 
V7.2 Political/Regulatory changes affecting operation 0.83 
Environmental Factors   
V8.1 Exposure to natural disasters 1.00 
V8.2 Health pandemic/spread of disease affecting employees 0.50 
V8.3 Pressure from public opinion/reputation 0.50 
Physical Damage Disruptions   
V9.1 Products regularly stolen or vandalised 0.50 
V9.2 Accidents during operation (i.e. fire, workers accident) 0.50 
V9.3 Terrorism & sabotage 0.50 
Market Pressures   
V10.1 Fluctuations in prices  1.00 
V10.2 Price pressures from competition  1.00 
Liquidity or Credit Vulnerability   
V11.1 Finance policies & procedures affecting management of money & assets 0.67 
V11.2 Lack of financial resources 0.83 
 
However, three items in Table 3.8 (highlighted in red) obtained below the previously selected 
minimum 50% correct classification rate: V2.3-visibility of errors or deficiencies to 
stakeholders and V4.1-large number of members in supply chain, for which only two out of 
the six experts (0.33 percent) classified the items to the pre-specified construct; for V3.3-
operating in extreme or hazardous conditions only one expert classified it correctly (0.17 
percent). It is worth noting here that these items had higher percentage values, but for a 
construct other than the one posited by the researcher. Hence, the decision was made to 
reclassify them according to the construct proposed by the majority of experts: visibility of 
errors or deficiencies to stakeholders was a strategic vulnerability rather than a management 
vulnerability; large number of members in supply chain was considered as supplier or customer 
disruptions instead of process vulnerability; and operating in extreme or hazardous conditions 
was perceived to be more suitable under the environmental factors construct that are beyond 
the supply chain’s control, instead of personnel vulnerability. These amendments were 
therefore made accordingly before the pilot study of the completed survey draft was conducted. 
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Pilot Study to Assess Internal Consistency of Survey Instrument 
After the pre-testing, the survey was ready for the reliability test, as depicted in Figure 3.8. The 
pilot study was conducted with 20 respondents (10 respondents from the public organisations 
and 10 respondents from the private organisations representing the public organisations’ supply 
chain members). This is a useful process to test the survey from a methodological standpoint, 
allowing the researcher to assess the validity and reliability of the survey instrument and to 
predict any difficulties that may arise during the data analysis of the complete sample (N=105), 
which might otherwise have gone unnoticed (Litwin, 1995).  
 
Cronbach’s alpha and corrected item-total correlations were computed in SPSS, based on the 
data collected (N=20) to test the internal consistency and uni-dimensionality of the 
vulnerability (V1 to V11) and capability (C1 to C12) constructs. Table 3.9 presents the number 
of items and the Cronbach’s alpha value for each construct. The table highlights three of the 
23 constructs that fell below the Cronbach’s alpha limit of 0.60 for the pilot study. The 
construct V6-technology disruptions obtained the lowest alpha value of 0.333. The validity of 
this construct was also an issue based on the low S-CVI value computed previously (Table 
3.7). Plus, the item-total correlation of the items in the construct was also below the 0.30 
threshold, with a value of 0.20 (see Table F1 in Appendix F). The poor correlation between 
these items suggests that the items are too heterogeneous to form a construct and are therefore 
not reliable to measure the construct technology disruptions. The researcher therefore decided 
to remove this construct in the main study, to ensure that the survey instrument remain valid 
and reliable.  
	
The construct V9-physical damage disruptions also fell slightly below the 0.60 threshold, with 
an alpha value of 0.586. The item-total correlation of the items in the construct, however, was 
encouraging, ranging from 0.32 to 0.51 (Table F1 in Appendix F). This indicates that each item 
has a good correlation with the domain. The low alpha value of this construct might therefore 
be due to the low number of questions in the construct or the small number of respondents 
assessed in the pilot study. Hence it was decided that the construct remain in the study for 
further analysis as it could possibly bring significant	managerial insights to the study. 
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       Table 3.9: Internal reliability of vulnerability and capability factors 
Vulnerability Factors V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Number of Items 6 4 3 8 5 2 
Cronbach's Alpha  
(Pilot Sample N=20) 0.723 0.615 0.814 0.916 0.852 0.333 
Cronbach's Alpha 
(Main Sample N=105) 0.520
a 0.649 0.586a 0.872 0.819 0.734 
Vulnerability Factors V7 V8 V9 V10 V11   
Number of Items 2 4 3 2 2   
Cronbach's Alpha  
(Pilot Sample N=20) 0.695 0.842 0.586 0.750 0.726   
Cronbach's Alpha  
(Main Sample N=105) 0.683 0.645 0.785 0.737 0.699  
Capability Factors C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
Number of Items 5 3 4 3 4 5 
Cronbach's Alpha  
(Pilot Sample N=20) 0.929 0.537 0.917 0.788 0.796 0.840 
Cronbach's Alpha  
(Main Sample N=105) 0.829 0.715 0.882 0.816 0.825 0.829 
Capability Factors C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 
Number of Items 3 4 3 4 3 3 
Cronbach's Alpha  
(Pilot Sample N=20) 0.884 0.735 0.793 0.839 0.737 0.824 
Cronbach's Alpha  
(Main Sample N=105) 0.861 0.747 0.633 0.770 0.777 0.804 
a The mean inter-item correlation for V1 is 0.2 and V3 is 0.3 indicating that each item has good correlation    
with the domain (Briggs and Cheek, 1986) 
 
Another factor that remains below the 0.60 threshold is the capability factor, C2-capacity, with 
an alpha value of 0.537. This construct was also an issue in Pettit’s (2013) study, whereby a 
lower Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.515 was obtained for the same construct. However, despite 
the lack of uni-dimensionality, Pettit (2008) had argued that the classification maintains a 
logical structure that allows for the computation of an overall capacity capability score. He 
believes that the construct represents multiple independent measures of capacity at the 
production locations, including internal assets such as inventory, equipment, labour,and 
utilities (Pettit, 2008). Furthermore, it can be observed through Table F2 in Appendix F that 
the construct’s low Cronbach’s alpha is due to the poor item-total correlation of the sub-factor, 
reserve capacity (materials, assets, labour, inventory). This item may not correlate well with 
the other two items in the construct because reserve capacity might not be perceived as a 
significant capability, as it can be cost-prohibitive to some respondents to store additional 
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capacity. Hence it was suggested by Pettit (2008) to further explore this factor in detail in the 
subsequent phase of the study to obtain a comprehensive result. The construct therefore 
remains in this study for further analysis. Overall, the remaining factors’ reliability estimates 
ranged from 0.615 to 0.929, proving that the survey instrument was reliable and consistent for 
the total sample (N=105).  
 
3.6.3 Phase III – Development of Resilience Response Framework 
	
Once the validity and reliability of the survey instrument have been determined, data analysis 
of the final survey in Phase III of the study begins (see Figure 3.9). This includes an assessment 
of the critical areas of vulnerability and the current level of capability of the public sector 
supply chain.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Research process Phase III – Development of  
Resilience Response Framework 
 
The critical vulnerabilities and capabilities identified from the survey were used to develop the 
questions for the subsequent semi-structured interviews with 12 targeted respondents (Section 
3.5.2.1). By highlighting the identified critical areas in the interviews, the researcher was able 
to validate the survey findings. The pathogenic influences, critical impacts and pathogenic 
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mitigations of the critical vulnerabilities were also identified through the interviews, to 
understand the root cause of the problem and identify appropriate solutions accordingly. 
Overall, the data collected and analysed throughout all phases of this study contribute to the 
development of the final resilience response framework. Upon validation by the professional 
experts, the empirical results from the final phase of the study allow the researcher to fulfil the 
aim of developing a resilience response framework to build resilience of the public sector 
supply chain to disruptions in public projects. The results and analysis of the data collected 
from Phase III are presented in detail in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
 
3.7 Ethical Considerations 
	
Ethical approval for this research had been obtained from the researcher’s previous university, 
the University of Salford’s Ethics Panel (see document attached in Appendix G), and was 
verified by the researcher’s current place of study, the University of Huddersfield. First, a letter 
requesting consent from the Malaysian Public Works Department to distribute questionnaires 
and conduct interviews with professionals engaged in delivering public projects was sent to the 
management office of PWD before the survey was conducted (see Appendix C). The letter 
ensured that the respondents understood the purpose of the study, their involvement in the 
study, and the possible benefits of taking part in the survey. The relevant contact details of the 
researcher for further inquiries were also included in the letter. 
	
Once the researcher had gained the relevant consent from the managers, the questionnaires 
were sent out to relevant parties and a written consent was obtained from respondents who 
decided to participate, through a standard participant consent form (see Appendix C). A 
covering letter was also included with the questionnaire to provide relevant information to the 
respondents on the research background, the objectives of the questionnaire, how their 
responses would contribute to the research work, and the researcher’s contact details.  
	
For the semi-structured interviews, participants were given the interview questions beforehand 
to give them enough time to think about the subject matter and decide whether to be involved 
in the research study or not. As with the questionnaire, a signed standard consent form was 
obtained from participants (Appendix C).  
	
In terms of data protection, data stored electronically is on a password protected computer and 
hard-copy data is stored in locked filing cabinets, accessed only by the researcher. The 
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researcher also password protected the database and Excel spreadsheet containing the primary 
data on the researcher’s own personal laptop; the data would be destroyed within three years of 
the researcher’s graduate award. The interviews were transcribed as soft copy in the 
researcher’s database and codified on the researcher’s password protected personal laptop. As 
the data is coded, no names, addresses or specific references to individuals are held. All hard 
copy data is destroyed as per the standard procedures.  
	
In disposing of the soft copy data three years after graduation, files on the researcher’s personal 
laptop will be deleted and overwritten to ensure they are erased and disposed of securely. As 
for hard copy data, shredders will be used to physically destroy the papers in accordance with 
the required standard code of ethics. All publications will be written in such a way as to disguise 
the identity of the research participants involved, unless prior consent has been obtained from 
the individual involved.  
 
The following chapter presents the data analysis of the questionnaire survey. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DATA ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
 
4.1 Introduction  
	
Statistical analysis through SPSS was used to analyse the data collected in the questionnaire 
survey (Section 3.5.1.3). This chapter presents the results of the analysis of the questionnaire 
survey as part of the subsequent Phase III (Section 3.6.3). The development of the 
questionnaire survey and its validity and reliability were discussed in Section 3.6.2, under 
Phase II of the study. The main purpose of the questionnaire is to identify the critical 
vulnerability and capability factors of the public organisations and its supply chain members 
(referred to as private organisations) involved in public projects delivery. The method of 
analysis for the questionnaire follows that outlined in Section 3.5.1.3 (research methodology 
chapter).  
 
The analysis of the questionnaire results from the total 105 respondents is presented below 
according to the five sections in the questionnaire (see Appendix C): 
• Section 1 of the questionnaire involves close-ended questions on the respondents’ 
general profile; 
• Section 2 involves close-ended questions on the respondents’ past experience of 
disruptive events in public projects; 
• Section 3 involves the use of a 5-point Likert scale (1-strongly disagree, 2-disagree, 3-
neither agree nor disagree, 4-agree, 5-strongly agree) to determine the degree of 
agreement or disagreement of the respondents with the statement relating to the supply 
chain vulnerability factors; 
• Section 4 involves the use of the same 5-point Likert scale to determine the degree of 
agreement or disagreement of the respondents with the statement relating to the supply 
chain capability factors; 
• Section 5 involves a 5-point Likert scale on the relative level of importance (range from 
not very important, moderately important, to critical) of the main vulnerability and 
capability factors. 
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4.2 Respondents’ Profiles	
	
Two main groups of respondents were sampled in the public sector supply chain: the 
professionals from the public organisations and the private organisations (parties engaged by 
the public organisations to undertake public projects). Based on the respondents’ professional 
background as presented in Table 4.1, 51% came from the public organisations responsible for 
delivering and managing public projects, and 49% from the supply chain (25% consultants and 
24% contractors) external to the public organisations, involved in public project delivery. The 
almost equal distribution among these two groups of respondents makes later statistic 
comparisons possible. 
 
 Table 4.1: Breakdown of Respondents’ Organisation 
Respondents’ Organisation 
Number of 
Respondents Percent 
Public Organisations 54 51% 
Contract Consultant / Quantity Surveyor  3 3% 
Civil and Structural Engineering Consultant 17 16% 
Architecture Consultant 6 6% 
Contractor 25 24% 
Total 105 100% 
 
In terms of the respondents’ profession, more than half (55%) of the respondents are civil and 
structural engineers, as shown in Table 4.2. According to the PWD’s official website, more 
than half of the civil and structural engineers out of the total professionals are employed in 
public sector projects (PWD, 2015). Some also act as project managers who manage the supply 
chain during public project delivery, making their insights valuable to this study. Other 
respondents include project managers (8%), architects (7%), quantity surveyors (5%) and 
contractors (20%). The other (8%) professional background in Table 4.2 includes project 
assistants and geographical information system executives.  
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 Table 4.2: Breakdown of Respondents’ Professional Background 
Respondents’ Profession Number of Respondents Percent 
Project Manager 8 8% 
Civil and Structural Engineer 55 52% 
Architect 7 7% 
Quantity Surveyor 5 5% 
Contractor 21 20% 
Other 9 8% 
Total 105 100% 
 
These professionals are significant to this study as they are responsible for the management 
and operational work of the supply chain and are at the frontline of the project team during the 
planning (25%), design (21%), tender (18%) and construction (36%) phases of projects, as 
tabulated in Table 4.3. 
 
 Table 4.3: Breakdown of Respondents’ Involvement based on Project Phase(s) 
Respondents’ involvement in  
project phase(s) Number of Respondents Percent 
Planning 54 25% 
Design 47 21% 
Tender 39 18% 
Construction 80 36% 
Total 220 100% 
 
The majority of the respondents (80%) have more than 6 years of working experience in the 
construction industry, as shown in Table 4.4, with most of them involved in more than one 
project phase during public project delivery. These significant demographic characteristics 
therefore ensure that valuable insights and reliable data are obtained in assessing the supply 
chain’s vulnerability and capability factors. 
	
 Table 4.4: Breakdown of Respondents’ Work Experience in the Construction Industry 
Respondents’ Work Experience Number of Respondents Percent 
Less than 3 years 12 11% 
4-5 years 9 9% 
6-10 years 35 33% 
More than 10 years 49 47% 
Total 105 100% 
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4.3 Respondents’ Past Experience of Disruptive Events in Public Projects 
	
Based on the respondents’ past experience as reported in Figure 4.1, the survey results reveal 
that the public organisations put more emphasis on quality problems (26%) than did the 
contractors and consultants (13%) in addressing the frequent disruptions they often face. 
Conversely, contractors and consultants were more concerned with the failure of their key 
supplier or customer (17%) and their financial situation (16%). No disruptions due to loss of 
critical services were reported by the public organisations, suggesting that these occur more 
frequently in the contractors’ and consultants’ operations. The contractors’ and consultants’ 
operations also faced more severe weather conditions (12%) and transportdisruption (7%) than 
the public organisations (7% and 3% respectively). On the other hand, the public organisations 
faced more disruptions due to regulatory issues (12%) compared to the private organisations 
(9%). Both the public and private organisations gave the same ratings of 8% for disruption due 
to technological change. 
	
Figure 4.1: Frequent disruptive events experienced by respondents 
 
The survey results show that a majority of the respondents from both the public and private 
organisations (56%) find that acute disruptions to project performance caused delay in 
delivering products or services to customers, as shown in Figure 4.2. However, there seems to 
be a gap in terms of the effect of disruptions on the quality of the public projects, with a higher 
rating (21%) given by the public organisations than that from the private organisations (7%). 
The public organisations (14%) were also more concerned about damage to their reputation 
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than the private organisations (7%). On the other hand, the private organisations faced higher 
repercussion from disruptions on their internal performance and profitability measures (i.e. 
higher cost of operation (18%), loss of productivity (16%), and decrease in profit (15%)) 
compared to the public organisations. Only 13% of the public organisations rated loss of 
productivity, with 4% given to decrease in profit and the lowest, 3%, to loss of skilled workers. 
	
 
Figure 4.2: Critical effects of disruptive events 
 
In terms of the level of frequency of disruptive events, a total of 65% of the private 
organisations (contractors and consultants) reported that they often or always face disruptions 
in dealing with public projects (see Figure 4.3). However, 33% of professionals from the public 
organisations claim that disruptions only occur sometimes in project delivery. The different 
perceptions of the frequency of disruptions suggest that the parties from the bottom tier of the 
supply chain (refer to Figure 2.4) face more frequent disruptions in project delivery than other 
parts of the chain. This is an important consideration as the disruptions might have a knock-on 
effect on the upper tier of the supply chain (i.e public organisations) if not managed properly. 
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Figure 4.3: Level of frequency of disruptions faced by respondents 
	
Based on the results presented in Figure 4.4, a majority of respondents from both the public 
organisations (63%) and contractors and consultants (39%) dealt with disruptions as part of 
business-as-usual. On the other hand, a total of 40% of the contractors and consultants found 
that the disruptions challenged them and were moderately or very disruptive. However, only 
26% of the public organisations answered in this way. This shows how the disruptions have 
different levels of impact on different parts of the supply chain. Both the public and private 
organisations, however, agreed that the disruptions did not shut down their operation 
permanently, based on the number of ratings given for this option in Figure 4.4. 
 
	 119	
 
Figure 4.4: Severity of disruptions experienced by respondents 
 
Comparison of Level of Frequency and Impact of Disruptions Between Groups of Respondents 
Further Kruskal-Wallis tests as discussed in Section 3.5.1.3 were conducted on the results from 
question 3 on the level of frequency of disruptions (see Figure 4.3) and question 4 on the 
severity of impact of disruptions (Figure 4.4). For the purpose of this test, the answers to 
question 3 were computed as 1-never, 2-rarely, 3-sometimes, 4-often, and 5-always, and the 
answers to question 4 as 1-we dealt with it as part of business-as-usual, 2-it challenged us but 
was not overly disruptive, 3-it definitely challenged us and was moderately disruptive, 4-it 
definitely challenged us and was very disruptive, and 5-it could have shut us down 
permanently. 
 
The reults of the Kruskal-Wallis test (Table 4.5) revealed a statistically significant difference 
in disruption frequency levels across the three groups of respondents (Gp1, n = 54: public 
organisations, Gp2, n = 25: contractors, Gp3, n = 26: consultants), χ² (2, n = 105) = 11.21, р 
= .004. Pairwise comparisons with adjusted p-values showed no significant differences in the 
disruption frequency between the public organisations and consultants (p = 1.00, r = .00). 
However, significant differences in the frequency level of disruptions were identified between 
the contractors and consultants (p = .018, r = .38) and the public organisations (p = .005, r 
= .36). The contractors overall recorded higher mean rank of 70.08 than the public 
organisations (mean rank = 47.68) and consultants (mean rank = 47.63). The discrepancy 
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between the contractors’ and the consultants’ and public organisations’ perceptions suggest 
that although all parties of the supply chain face disruptions in public projectsthose at the 
bottom tier of the supply chain, in this case the contractors, faced more frequent disruptions 
during public project delivery. This is an important consideration as the disruptions might have 
a knock-on effect on the upper tier of the supply chain if not managed properly. 
 
Table 4.5: Level of Frequency and Impact of Disruptions in Public Projects Perceived Differently by 
Public Organisations, Consultants and Contractors using Kruskal-Wallis Test 
 Mean Rank Test Statistics 
  Public Organisations Consultants Contractors 
Chi-
Square df 
P-
value 
Frequency of 
Disruptions 47.68 47.63 70.08 11.213 2 0.004 
Severity of Impact of 
Disruptions 47.22 47.77 70.92 13.419 2 0.001 
 
In terms of the disruptions impacts, the Kruskal-Wallis test results in Table 4.5 revealed that 
there is a statistically significant difference in the impact of disruptions across the three groups, 
χ² (2, n = 105) = 13.42, р = .001. Pairwise comparisons with adjusted p-values showed that 
there was no significant difference in the impact between the public organisations and 
consultants (p = 1.00, r = .00). However, significant differences in the level of impact were 
identified between contractors and consultants (p = .010, r = .41) and the public organisations 
(p = .001, r = .39). The contractors overall recorded a significantly higher mean rank score 
(70.92) than the public organisations (mean rank = 47.22) and consultants (mean rank = 47.77), 
as per Table 4.5. This shows how the disruptions to public projects have different levels of 
impact on different parts of the supply chain, with greater disruption to the contractors’ 
operations than to the consultants and public organisations. 
 
In managing disruptions, the highest proportion of respondents (42% from the public 
organisations and 25% of the private organisations) reported that risk management is adopted 
by the firm to manage disruptions in public sector projects (see Figure 4.5). Apart from the 
traditional risk management approach, 16% of the public organisations also have disaster 
management in place to deal with disruptive events. This differs considerably from the case of 
the private organisations: only a small percentage (6%) employ disaster management in their 
operations, preferring emergency management (21%) and crisis management (13%). The major 
concern in the result here, however, is the fact that many of the private organisations (28%) do 
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not employ any of these strategies in their operations, suggesting that they have no specific 
management plans in place to handle disruptions. In the public organisations, 15% of the 
respondents claimed to have no formal management system to reduce disruption.  
	
 
Figure 4.5: Current management of disruptive events 
	
of the largest percentage of respondents from the public organisations believe that the best way 
to manage disruptions is through planning (35%), followed by collaboration with supply chain 
members (26%) and staff involvement (24%). Similarly, most of the contractors and 
consultants (38%) find that good planning will help the supply chain to anticipate, respond to 
and recover from disruptions in public projects. However, it can be seen from Figure 4.6 that, 
compared to the public organisations (14%), having insurance is perceived to be more 
important to contractors and consultants (19%) to recover from disruptions.  
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Figure 4.6: Suggestions for managing disruptions 
 
 
4.4 Supply Chain Vulnerability and Capability Assessment 
	
Supply Chain Vulnerability Assessment 
	
Public Organisations 
The results of the public organisations’ vulnerability scores and rankings are presented in Table 
4.6 (main factors) and Table 4.7 (sub-factors). As shown in Table 4.6, the top five critical 
vulnerability factors are political or legal pressures, management vulnerability, liquidity/credit 
vulnerability, strategic vulnerability and market pressures. The respondents from public 
organisations identified that they are widely exposed to political disruptions (3.76 average 
score) and are vulnerable to political or regulatory changes (3.56), as per Table 4.7. In terms 
of management vulnerability, the most significant sub-factors are the timing of business 
decisions (4.00), reliance upon information flow (3.74) and inadequate management oversight 
(3.41). Looking at the liquidity/credit vulnerability sub-factors, the public organisations are 
highly susceptible to financial policies and procedures (3.48) and the lack of financial resources 
(3.31). Finally, process vulnerability, environmental factors, supplier/customer disruptions and 
personnel vulnerability appear to be moderate vulnerabilities, and physical damage disruption 
is rated as a minor issue.  
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    Table 4.6: Ranking of the Public Organisations’ Vulnerability Main Factors 
Rank Main Vulnerability Factors Factor Label 
Average 
Score 
Standard 
Deviation 
1 Political/Legal Pressures V6 3.66 0.78 
2 Management Vulnerability V2 3.58 0.48 
3 Liquidity/Credit Vulnerability V10 3.40 0.69 
4 Strategic Vulnerability V1 3.36 0.42 
5 Market Pressures V9 3.24 0.69 
6 Process Vulnerability V4 2.98 0.67 
7 Environmental Factors V7 2.96 0.63 
8 Supplier/Customer Disruptions V5 2.87 0.65 
9 Personnel Vulnerability V3 2.81 0.63 
10 Physical Damage Disruptions V8 2.62 0.65 
 
Table 4.7: Ranking of the Public Organisations’ Vulnerability Sub-factors 
Rank Vulnerability Sub-factors Mean Rank 
Vulnerability Sub-factors 
(cont’d) 
Mean 
1 V2.2 Timing of business decisions 4.00 21 V7.4 Potential safety hazards 3.04 
2 V6.1 Exposure to political disruptions 3.76 22 V4.2 Raw material availability 3.02 
3 V2.3 Reliance upon information flow 3.74 23 V1.3 Innovation (competition) 2.96 
4 V1.1 Degree of outsourcing 3.72 24 V7.1 Natural disasters 2.94 
5 V1.6 Visibility of disruption to 
stakeholders 
3.61 25 V8.1 Piracy & theft 2.94 
6 V6.2 Political/Regulatory changes 3.56 26 V4.6 Distribution capacity 2.94 
7 V1.2 Reliance upon specialty sources 3.54 27 V5.2 Supplier capacity 2.93 
8 V4.1 Unpredictability of demand 3.52 28 V4.5 Production capacity 2.91 
9 V10.1 Finance policies and procedures 3.48 29 V4.4 Reliability of equipment 2.87 
10 V2.1 Inadequate management oversight 3.41 30 V4.3 Utilities availability 2.80 
11 V5.5 Scale/extent of supply network 3.35 31 V5.3 Loss of key supplier 2.74 
12 V10.2 Lack of financial resources 3.31 32 V4.8 Transportation disruption 2.72 
13 V7.3 Public Reputation 3.28 33 V5.1 Supplier disruptions 2.69 
14 V3.1 Human resources 3.26 34 V3.3 Loss of key personnel 2.69 
15 V9.2 Price pressures (competition) 3.24 35 V5.4 Customer disruptions 2.67 
16 V9.1 Fluctuations in prices 3.24 36 V8.2 Accident in plant  2.59 
17 V1.5 Complexity 3.20 37 V7.2 Health pandemic 2.57 
18 V2.4 Budget overruns 3.19 38 V3.2 Labor disputes 2.50 
19 V1.4 Concentration of capacity 3.13 39 V8.3 Terrorism & sabotage 2.31 
20 V4.7 Product quality problem 3.09    
 
Private Organisations 
The vulnerability scores and rankings of the contractors and consultants are presented in Table 
4.8 (main factors) and Table 4.9 (sub-factors). The contractors and consultants are seen to be 
facing vulnerabilities arising from market pressures, management vulnerability, liquidity/credit 
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vulnerability, political/legal pressures and strategic vulnerability. Table 4.9 shows that 
contractors and consultants are facing market pressures from strong price competition and 
severe price fluctuation (both ranked in the top ten vulnerability sub-factors) caused by the 
construction market and economy. As market pressure is external to the supply chain network 
and beyond the contractors’ and consultants’ control, important resilience measures must be 
taken to sustain their place in the market. As in the public organisations, timing of business 
decisions is ranked as the sub-factor (3.84) with the susceptibility, followed by the high reliance 
on information flow (3.67) under the main factor of management vulnerability. In terms of 
liquidity/credit vulnerability, the sub-factor that contributes to the high ranking is financial 
policies and procedures (3.67). However, contrary to the public organisations, the lack of 
financial resources (3.06) is rated low by the private organisations, as per Table 4.9. As with 
the public organisations, environmental factors, supplier/customer disruptions, process 
vulnerability, and personnel vulnerability are rated as moderate and physical damage 
disruptions are not an issue.  
 
    Table 4.8: Ranking of the Private Organisations’ Vulnerability Main Factors 
Rank Main Vulnerability Factors Factor Label 
Average 
Score 
Standard 
Deviation 
1 Market Pressures V9 3.59 0.78 
2 Management Vulnerability V2 3.44 0.74 
3 Liquidity/Credit Vulnerability V10 3.36 0.76 
4 Political/Legal Pressures V6 3.33 0.66 
5 Strategic Vulnerability V1 3.29 0.46 
6 Environmental Factors V7 3.11 0.63 
7 Supplier/Customer Disruptions V5 2.91 0.64 
8 Process Vulnerability V4 2.88 0.56 
9 Personnel Vulnerability V3 2.79 0.77 
10 Physical Damage Disruptions V8 2.63 0.77 
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Table 4.9: Ranking of the Private Organisations’ Vulnerability Sub-factors 
 
Supply Chain Capability Assessment 
	
Public Organisations 
Based on the data presented in Table 4.10, the public organisations scored adaptability as their 
strongest capability factor. This essentially means that the public organisations are able to 
modify operations in response to disruptions, particularly in areas such as learning from 
experience through continuous improvement programmes (3.69), adapting new technologies 
to their operations (3.63), and process improvement by constantly striving to reduce their 
operation time in project delivery (3.52), all in the top ten capability sub-factors (see Table 
4.11). Nevertheless, despite these strengths, the public organisations’ ability to seize advantage 
from disruptions is still weak, based on the reported low ranking of this sub-factor in the 
adaptability category (ranked 34 from 44 overall sub-factors in Table 4.11). This was followed 
by security capability, showing that the public organisations have good security defences 
against deliberate intrusion or attack on their facilities, equipment, digital information and 
employees. The public organisations also seem to have strong market position, due to their 
Rank Vulnerability Sub-factors Mean Rank 
Vulnerability Sub-factors 
(cont’d) 
Mean 
1 V2.2 Timing of business decisions 3.84 21 V10.2 Lack of financial 
resources 
3.06 
2 V10.1 Finance policies and procedures 3.67 22 V8.1 Piracy & theft 3.04 
3 V2.3 Reliance upon information flow 3.67 23 V4.2 Raw material availability 3.04 
4 V1.2 Reliance upon specialty sources 3.63 24 V4.8 Transportation disruption 3.02 
5 V9.2 Price pressures  3.61 25 V7.4 Potential safety hazards 3.00 
6 V9.1 Fluctuations in prices 3.57 26 V5.2 Supplier capacity 2.98 
7 V1.1 Degree of outsourcing 3.47 27 V5.1 Supplier disruptions 2.80 
8 V6.2 Political/Regulatory changes 3.35 28 V7.2 Health pandemic 2.78 
9 V7.1 Natural disasters 3.33 29 V4.6 Distribution capacity 2.78 
10 V5.5 Scale/extent of supply network 3.33 30 V4.5 Production capacity 2.78 
11 V7.3 Public Reputation 3.31 31 V4.4 Reliability of equipment 2.78 
12 V6.1 Exposure to political disruptions 3.31 32 V5.4 Customer disruptions 2.76 
13 V4.1 Unpredictability of demand 3.29 33 V4.7 Product quality problem 2.69 
14 V1.4 Concentration of capacity 3.27 34 V3.2 Labor disputes 2.67 
15 V1.3 Innovation (competition) 3.20 35 V5.3 Loss of key supplier 2.65 
16 V2.1 Inadequate management 
oversight 
3.14 
36 
V3.3 Loss of key personnel 2.65 
17 V1.5 Complexity 3.10 37 V4.3 Utilities availability 2.61 
18 V2.4 Budget overruns 3.10 38 V8.2 Accident in plant  2.49 
19 V1.6 Visibility of disruption to 
stakeholders 
3.08 39 V8.3 Terrorism & sabotage 2.37 
20 V3.1 Human resources 3.06    
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long-term relationships and effective communication with their clients; both scored in the top 
10 capability sub-factors. Their strong reputation for quality (ranked 11 of 44 capability sub-
factors) is also critical in surviving the threats of the competitive construction market. The 
public organisations, however, have yet to control a significant share of the market (a bottom 
10 capability sub-factor), an area that can be further improved on over time. 
  
At the other end of the spectrum, the public organisations have low capability scores in 
collaboration, capacity, flexibility, efficiency and financial strength, as shown in Table 4.10. 
In terms of flexibility, four out of five sub-factors of this construct were ranked in the bottom 
ten capability sub-factors in Table 4.11. They rated the ability to quickly move orders to 
alternative suppliers and reallocate jobs between different people or departments as the lowest 
sub-factor under the flexibility construct (ranked 41 of 44 overall capability sub-factors). The 
public organisations’ finished products or designs are not flexible to change (in the bottom five 
capability sub-factors), which could be an issue considering the reported high unpredictability 
of demand shift by clients (a top ten vulnerability sub-factor in Table 4.7). On the other hand, 
the public organisations greatest strength under the flexibility construct is their access to many 
alternative suppliers for key inputs (a top 10 capability sub-factor in Table 4.11). Suppliers 
here are considered as the external organisations that provide the services required for 
operations, such as contractors, consultants and nominated sub-contractors. However, it was 
reported that collaboration with their supply chain members is still significantly poor (the 
weakest main capability factor). In terms of capacity, the public organisations reported to 
significantly low excess capacity of materials, equipment and personnel to quickly boost output 
if needed (the lowest capability sub-factor in Table 4.11). Redundant capacity such as backup 
energy sources and access to alternative facilities (ranked 31 and 33 respectively) are also still 
poor and need to be improved.	 
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Table 4.10: Ranking of the Public Organisations’ Capability Main Factors 
Rank Main Capability Factors Factor Label 
Average 
Score 
Standard 
Deviation 
1 Adaptability C5 3.52 0.49 
2 Security C11 3.47 0.58 
3 Market Position C10 3.44 0.58 
4 Dispersion C8 3.43 0.52 
5 Visibility C4 3.42 0.69 
6 Recovery C7 3.42 0.59 
7 Anticipation C6 3.38 0.56 
8 Financial Strength C12 3.36 0.55 
9 Efficiency C3 3.27 0.62 
10 Flexibility C1 3.20 0.57 
11 Capacity C2 3.14 0.57 
12 Collaboration C9 3.12 0.55 
 
Table 4.11: Ranking of the Public Organisations’ Capability Sub-factors 
Rank Capability Sub-factors Mean Rank Capability Sub-factors (cont’d) Mean 
1 C5.4 Learning from experience 3.69 23 C12.3 Financial reserves & liquidity 3.33 
2 C5.3 Alternative technology development 3.63 24 C11.1 Access restriction 3.33 
3 C11.2 Employee involvement in security 3.61 25 C4.2 Products, Assets, People 
visibility 
3.31 
4 C8.4 Geographic dispersion of markets 3.59 26 C3.3 Product variability reduction 3.31 
5 C4.1 Business intelligence gathering 3.57 27 C12.2 Portfolio diversification 3.31 
6 C10.3 Customer relationships 3.54 28 C7.1 Crisis management 3.31 
7 C5.1 Process Improvement 3.52 29 C8.1 Distributed decision-making 3.30 
8 C10.4 Customer communications 3.52 30 C6.5 Recognition of opportunities 3.30 
9 C7.3 Consequence mitigation 3.50 31 C2.3 Backup energy sources 3.28 
10 C1.2 Multiple sources 3.48 32 C3.1 Labor productivity 3.26 
11 C10.2 Brand equity 3.48 33 C2.2 Redundancy (assets, labor) 3.26 
12 C6.3 Deviation, Near-miss analysis 3.48 34 C5.2 Seizing advantage from 
disruptions 
3.24 
13 C6.4 Contingency planning 3.46 35 C1.5 Fast re-routing of requirements 3.22 
14 C6.1 Monitoring early warning signals 3.46 36 C10.1 Market share 3.22 
15 C11.3Cyber-security 3.46 37 C6.2 Forecasting 3.20 
16 C12.1 Insurance 3.44 38 C1.3 Alternate distribution channels 3.20 
17 C7.2 Resource mobilization 3.44 39 C3.2 Asset utilization 3.09 
18 C8.3 Decentralization of key resources  3.43 40 C1.1 Product commonality  3.07 
19 C8.2 Distributed capacity & assets 3.41 41 C1.4 Multi-sourcing 3.02 
20 C3.4 Failure prevention 3.41 42 C9.3 Risk sharing with partners 3.00 
21 C9.1 Communications - internal, external 3.39 43 C9.2 Postponement of orders 2.98 
22 C4.3 Collaborative information exchange 3.37 44 C2.1 Reserve capacity 2.87 
 
Private Organisations 
Similarly, the contractors and consultants reported adaptability as their strongest capability 
factor, as presented in Table 4.12. The high adaptability scores of both the public and private 
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organisations indicate that they are able to adapt to disruptive events, perhaps explaining why 
so many respondents reported that they dealt with disruptions as part of business-as-usual (see 
Figure 4.3 ). As with the public organisations, elements of the adaptability capability such as 
process improvements, learning from experience and alternative technology development are 
all of high strength in the private organisations, scoring in the top ten capability sub-factors 
(Table 4.13). However, unlike the public organisations, the private organisations also excel at 
seizing advantage from disruptions in public projects (ranked 12 of 44 capability sub-factors). 
They also have a higher visibility score (3.80) than the public organisations (3.42), which 
includes the ability to gather business intelligence information on the future trends of the 
industry (ranked 4), the ability to consistently exchange information with their supply chain 
members ( ranked 5) and their awareness of the current status of their resources and operations 
(ranked 13) in delivering public projects. Financial strength is also a strong capability of these 
private organisations, and is led by insurance coverage (the second strongest capability sub-
factor) followed by financial reserves (ranked 14 of 44 sub-factors in Table 4.13). The 
diversification of their financial portfolio, however, is still weak and need improvement 
(ranked 28) to mitigate vulnerabilities such as unpredictability of demand by client (ranked 13 
of 41 vulnerability sub-factors in Table 4.9) and threats from competitive innovations (ranked 
16 of 41 vulnerability sub-factors).  
 
However, despite having high visibility of their operations and good financial strength, 
collaboration among supply chain members is relatively poor, as reflected through the low 
collaboration score of respondents from both the public organisations and the contractors and 
consultants (see Tables 4.11 and 4.12). This is a significant issue as collaboration among supply 
chain members is important in handling disruptions in public projects. Based on the data in 
Table 4.13 below, like the public organisations, the contractors and consultants were found to 
have low ability to postpone orders when their operation is hampered by disruptions (2.98 
average score) and low risk sharing with partners (3.20) (both in the bottom three of the 
capability sub-factors). The contractors’ and consultants’ level of flexibility is also poor, with 
four out of the five elements of the flexibility construct ranked in the bottom ten of the overall 
capability sub-factors. The survey shows that although these private organisations have several 
alternative suppliers (ranked 18 of 44 capability sub-factors), their ability to quickly relocate 
orders or reallocate jobs between different people when necessary is still weak (ranked 34 of 
44 capability sub-factors). This could also contribute to the low scoring of their collaboration 
capability factor in Table 4.12. This might be problematic considering the high unpredictability 
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of demand faced by the contractors and consultants (ranked 13 of 41 vulnerability sub-factors 
in Table 4.9) and the market pressures (the highest vulnerability factor in Table 4.8). The 
contractors’ and consultants’ ability to quickly increase capacity of storage and distribution 
(ranked 37 of 44 capability sub-factors in Table 4.13) and quickly re-route materials or 
products when necessary (ranked 41) are also areas that need to be improved under the 
flexibility construct. As with the public organisations, the private organisations’ finished 
products are also inflexible to change (39 of 44 sub-factors). The contractors and consultants 
also have low scores in their capacity capability factor, as shown in Table 4.12. Factors such 
as multiple redundant resources (i.e access to alternative facilities and equipment for backup) 
and reserved capacity of materials, equipment and labour, are areas of concern, ranking in the 
bottom ten of the overall 44 capability sub-factors in Table 4.13. Backup utilities such as 
electricity and water for operation, on the other hand, is a moderate capability (ranked 22).  
 
Table 4.12: Ranking of the Private Organisations’ Capability Main Factors 
Rank Main Capability Factors Factor Label 
Average 
Score 
Standard 
Deviation 
1 Adaptability C5 3.84 0.58 
2 Visibility C4 3.80 0.60 
3 Financial Strength C12 3.72 0.52 
4 Security C11 3.62 0.51 
5 Efficiency C3 3.61 0.64 
6 Market Position C10 3.60 0.50 
7 Dispersion C8 3.55 0.57 
8 Anticipation C6 3.54 0.52 
9 Recovery C7 3.54 0.56 
10 Capacity C2 3.46 0.57 
11 Flexibility C1 3.43 0.62 
12 Collaboration C9 3.27 0.53 
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Table 4.13: Ranking of the Private Organisations’ Capability Sub-factors 
Ra
nk 
Capability Sub-Factors Mean Rank Capability Sub-Factors (cont’d) Mean 
1 C5.1 Process Improvement 3.98 23 C8.2 Distributed capacity & assets 3.59 
2 C12.1 Insurance 3.96 24 C9.1 Communications  3.57 
3 C5.4 Learning from experience 3.86 25 C3.1 Labor productivity 3.57 
4 C4.1 Business intelligence gathering 3.86 26 C11.3 Cyber-security 3.55 
5 
C4.3 Collaborative information 
exchange 
3.80 27 C11.1 Access restriction 3.53 
6 
C5.3 Alternative technology 
development 
3.80 28 C12.2 Portfolio diversification 3.51 
7 C11.2 Employee involvement in security 3.78 29 C8.1 Distributed decision-making 3.51 
8 C10.4 Customer communications 3.76 30 C8.4 Geographic dispersion of 
markets 
3.51 
9 C7.3 Consequence mitigation 3.76 31 C3.2 Asset utilization 3.49 
10 C10.3 Customer relationships 3.75 32 C6.4 Contingency planning  3.49 
11 C3.3 Product variability reduction 3.75 33 C7.2 Resource mobilization 3.47 
12 C5.2 Seizing advantage from disruptions 3.73 34 C1.4 Multi-sourcing 3.47 
13 C4.2 Products, Assets, People visibility 3.73 35 C2.2 Redundancy (assets, labor) 3.43 
14 C12.3 Financial reserves & liquidity 3.69 36 C7.1 Crisis management 3.37 
15 C10.2 Brand equity 3.69 37 C1.3 Alternate distribution channels 3.37 
16 C6.5 Recognition of opportunities 3.67 38 C2.1 Reserve capacity 3.35 
17 C3.4 Failure prevention 3.65 39 C1.1 Product commonality  3.35 
18 C1.2 Multiple sources 3.61 40 C6.2 Forecasting 3.33 
19 C6.3 Deviation, Near-miss analysis 3.61 41 C1.5 Fast re-routing of requirements 3.33 
20 C8.3 Decentralization of key resources  3.59 42 C9.3 Risk sharing with partners 3.20 
21 C6.1 Monitoring early warning signals 3.59 43 C10.1 Market share 3.20 
22 C2.3 Backup energy sources 3.59 44 C9.2 Postponement of orders 3.06 
 
 	
Comparisons of vulnerability and capability scores between the public and private 
organisations 
	
Further detailed comparative statistical tests (as presented in Figure 3.6 in Section 3.6) were 
conducted between the public and private organisations’ vulnerability and capability scores, as 
shown in Tables 4.14 and 4.15 respectively. The Mann-Whitney U test reveals that the public 
organisations are significantly more vulnerable to political or legal pressures (mean rank = 
59.81) than are the private organisations (mean rank = 45.79): U = 1009.5, z = -2.43, p = .015, 
r = .24. It can also be observed that the public organisations are statistically significantly more 
vulnerable to the sub-factor exposure to political disruptions (mean rank = 60.29) than are the 
private organisations (mean rank = 45.28), as per Table 4.14. Nevertheless, no significant 
differences in score between the public and private organisations were identified for the 
vulnerability sub-factor changes in government regulations (U = 1139.0, z = -1.67, p = .094, r 
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= .16) under the political or legal pressures construct, suggesting that the contractors and 
consultants are also to some degree affected by changes in government regulations. Further 
assessment of other vulnerability sub-factors shows that the public organisations are also 
statistically significantly more vulnerable to the sub-factor visibility of disruption to 
stakeholders (mean rank = 61.13) and product quality problem (59.64) compared to the private 
organisations (44.39 and 45.97 respectively). 
 
Table 4.14: Results of Vulnerability Factors Perceived Differently between Public and Private 
Organisations using Mann-Whitney U Test 
 Mean Rank Test Statistics 
Vulnerability Factors Public Organisations 
Private 
Organisations 
(Contractors and 
Consultants) 
Mann-
Whitney 
U 
Z P-value 
Main Factors           
Political/Legal Pressures 59.81 45.79 1009.50 -2.425 0.015 
Market Pressures 46.68 59.70 1035.50 -2.275 0.023 
Sub-Factors         
Visibility of disruption to 
stakeholders 
61.13 44.39 938.00 -2.992 0.003 
Product quality problem 59.64 45.97 1018.50 -2.422 0.015 
Exposure to political disruptions 60.29 45.28 983.50 -2.692 0.007 
Natural disasters 46.32 60.07 1016.50 -2.468 0.014 
Price pressures 47.17 59.18 1062.00 -2.165 0.030 
 
On the other hand, the private organisations are significantly more vulnerable to market 
pressures (mean rank = 59.70) than are the public organisations (46.68): U = 1035.5, z = -2.28, 
p = .023, r = .22. It can be observed from Table 4.14 that under this construct, the private 
organisations are significantly more susceptible to the sub-factor price pressures (59.18) than 
the private organisations (47.17). Natural disasters, a sub-factor of environmental factors, were 
also perceived as a critical vulnerability by the private organisations (mean rank = 60.07), 
compared to the public organisations (mean rank = 46.32).  
 
In terms of the capability factors, Table 4.15 shows that there are statistically significant 
differences in scores between the public and private organisations in five of the overall 12 main 
capability factors. The Mann-Whitney U test reveals that the private organisations  have 
significantly higher capability scores for capacity (mean rank = 61.90), which includes greater 
strengths in the areas of reserve capacity (62.16) and backup energy sources (59.03) compared 
to the public organisations (44.35 and 47.31 respectively). On the other hand, Table 4.15 
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reveals that the public organisations have a statistically significantly lower overall efficiency 
level (mean rank = 45.21) than the contractors and consultants (61.25). This includes areas 
such as labour productivity (47.66), asset utilisation (46.33), and product variability reduction 
(45.68), indicating inconsistency in the quality of the public organisations’ operation. The 
public organisations also have a significantly lower level of financial strength (mean rank = 
45.07) than the private organisations (61.39), which includes significant low scores in the areas 
of insurance and financial reserves (43.07 and 46.17 respectively) under this construct. 
 
Table 4.15: Results of Capability Factors Perceived Differently between Public and Private 
Organisations using Mann-Whitney U Test 
 
The Mann-Whitney U test also reveals (Table 4.15) that the private organisations have a 
statistically significantly higher capability score in the visibility of their supply chain operation 
(mean rank = 61.25) than the public organisations (45.20). Evidently, all sub-factors under this 
 Mean Rank Test Statistics 
Capability Factors Public Organisations 
Private 
Organisations 
(Contractors and 
Consultants) 
Mann-
Whitney 
U 
Z P-value 
Main Factors           
Capacity of Resources  44.59 61.90 923.00 -2.981 0.003 
Efficiency of Operation  45.21 61.25 956.50 -2.738 0.006 
Visibility of Supply Chain 
Operation  
45.20 61.25 956.00 -2.775 0.006 
Adaptability in Responding to 
Challenges  
45.70 60.73 983.00 -2.574 0.010 
Financial Strength  45.07 61.39 949.00 -2.818 0.005 
Sub-Factors          
Reserve capacity  44.35 62.16 910.00 -3.191 0.001 
Backup energy 
sources/communications  
47.31 59.03 1069.50 -2.165 0.030 
Labor productivity  47.66 58.66 1088.50 -1.999 0.046 
Asset utilisation  46.33 60.06 1017.00 -2.473 0.013 
Product variability reduction  45.68 60.75 981.50 -2.785 0.005 
Business intelligence gathering  47.34 58.99 1071.50 -2.228 0.026 
Products, assets, people visibility  46.65 59.73 1034.00 -2.381 0.017 
Collaborative information 
exchange 
46.40 59.99 1020.50 -2.530 0.011 
Process improvement  44.72 61.76 930.00 -3.363 0.001 
Seizing advantage from 
disruptions  
45.00 61.47 945.00 -3.019 0.003 
Recognition of opportunities  46.42 59.97 1021.50 -2.513 0.012 
Insurance  43.07 63.51 841.00 -3.947 0.000 
Financial reserves & liquidity   46.17 60.24 1008.00 -2.632 0.008 
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construct were identified by the private organisations to be strengths, with significantly higher 
scores in their business intelligence gathering (mean rank = 58.99), products, assets and people 
visibility (59.73) and collaborative information exchange (59.99), as per Table 4.15. The 
private organisations are also highly adaptable in terms of continuously improving their process 
(mean rank = 61.76) and seizing advantage from disruptions (61.47) compared to the public 
organisations (44.72 and 45.00 respectively). It is therefore not surprising that they also had a 
significantly higher score in the capability sub-factor of recognition of opportunities (mean 
rank = 59.97) than the public organisations (46.42), as shown in Table 4.15. 
 
Level of Agreement on the Vulnerability and Capability Factors 
	
Spearman’s coefficient of rank correlation was used to test the level of agreement or 
disagreement among the different groups of respondents (the public organisations, consultants 
and contractors) on the vulnerability and capability factors, as discussed in Section 3.5.1.3. 
Table 4.16 presents the results of the Spearman rank correlations and the significance level 
between the different pairs of groups of respondents. The results show a significantly high level 
of agreement between the consultants and contractors in ranking the vulnerability and 
capability factors, approximately 82% and 89% respectively. Indeed, it would be expected that 
the consultants and contractors have similar views on the ranking of the vulnerability and 
capability factors as both parties represent the private organisations. The public organisations 
also seem to have relatively good agreement with the consultants and contractors in ranking 
the vulnerability factors, approximately 78% with the consultants and 77% with the 
contractors. As these parties are within the same public sector supply chain, it is reasonable to 
have positive agreement on the supply chain vulnerability factors.  
 
Table 4.16: Spearman Rank Correlation 
Groups of Respondents 
Vulnerability Capability 
Spearman 
rank 
correlation 
coefficient 
Significance 
level 
Spearman 
rank 
correlation 
coefficient 
Significance 
level 
Consultants - Contractors 0.818 0.01 0.891 0.01 
Public Organisations - Consultants 0.782 0.01 0.595 0.05 
Public Organisations - Contractors 0.773 0.01 0.670 0.05 
 
However, there seem to be conflicting views on the capability factors, with the lowest degree 
of agreement between the public organisations and consultants in ranking the capability factors, 
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approximately 59%. Similarly, contrary opinions on the capability factors could also be 
observed in Table 4.16 between the public organisations and contractors, approximately 67%. 
The results therefore imply that there are opposing views on the level of capability between the 
public and private organisations. Certainly, the statistical comparison test between the public 
and private organisations’ capability scores (Table 4.15) show significant differences in the 
scores of five of the main capability factors and 13 of the capability sub-factors between the 
two groups of respondents. 
 
Comparisons of vulnerability and capability scores between the organisations with explicit 
disruption management strategies and organisations without disruption management 
strategies 
 
Next, the vulnerability and capability scores were tested against those organisations that have 
explicit disruption management strategies and those without. The respondents were grouped 
by their answers to their current disruption management approach (Figure 4.5): those who 
indicated they have none of the abovementioned strategies were grouped as being without 
explicit disruption management strategies, and the remaining respondents as organisations with 
explicit disruption management strategies. The Mann-Whitney U test in Table 4.17 reveals that 
the vulnerability and capability scores were found to be significantly different at the 95% 
confidence level between the two groups.  
 
Table 4.17 shows that the organisations with no explicit disruption management strategies were 
vulnerable to more of the main factors assessed in the survey (personnel vulnerability, process 
vulnerability, supplier or customer disruptions) than those adopting specific disruption 
management strategies. The latter had the higher capability scores in areas such as labour 
productivity (mean rank = 57.26), contingency planning (57.39), distributed decision-making 
(57.30) and cyber-security (57.09). The results suggest that having a formal disruption 
management approach (i.e. risk management, disaster management, crisis management) could 
help to reduce the level of susceptibility to the critical vulnerability factors, and improve 
organisations’ capabilities in responding to disruptions in construction projects. 
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Table 4.17: Results of Vulnerability and Capability Factors Perceived Differently between 
Organisations with Explicit Disruption Management Strategies and Organisations without Disruption 
Management Strategies using Mann-Whitney U Test 
 Mean Rank Test Statistics 
Vulnerability and  
Capability Factors 
Organisations 
with disruption 
management 
strategies 
Organisations 
without disruption 
management 
strategies 
Mann-
Whitney 
U 
Z P-value 
Vulnerability Factors           
Personnel Vulnerability 48.64 62.52 874.00 -2.193 0.028 
Process Vulnerability 48.90 61.94 893.00 -2.041 0.041 
Supplier/Customer Disruptions 47.97 63.97 826.00 -2.514 0.012 
Technology Vulnerability 48.88 61.98 891.50 -2.104 0.035 
Political/Legal Pressures 48.99 61.74 899.50 -2.050 0.040 
Environmental Factors 47.01 66.06 757.00 -3.000 0.003 
Physical Damage Disruptions 48.07 63.76 833.00 -2.487 0.013 
Liquidity/Credit Vulnerability 48.74 62.29 881.50 -2.212 0.027 
Capability Factors           
Labor productivity 57.26 43.70 881.00 -2.290 0.022 
Contingency planning  57.39 43.42 872.00 -2.419 0.016 
Distributed decision-making 57.30 43.62 878.50 -2.292 0.022 
Cyber-security 57.09 44.08 893.50 -2.250 0.024 
 
 
4.5 Importance of Vulnerability and Capability Factors 
	
Importance of Vulnerability Factors 
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 present the importance of vulnerability factors as perceived by the public 
and private organisations respectively. From Figure 4.7, the public organisations are found to 
consider management vulnerability and strategic vulnerability as critical vulnerability factors 
that should be mitigated, possibly because they are highly susceptible to these two factors 
(ranked 2 and 4 respectively out of the 10 factors in Table 4.6). However, despite their low 
vulnerability scores for process vulnerabilit’ and personnel vulnerability (ranked 6 and 9 
respectively ), they perceived these factors as highly important, and to be improved in the 
public sector supply chain, as depicted in Figure 4.7. On the other hand, political or legal 
pressures and liquidity or credit vulnerability were perceived to be of moderate importance to 
the public organisations, albeit both are critical (top three vulnerability factors in Table 4.6). 
Lastly, environmental factors, physical damage disruptions and market pressures were of minor 
importance to the public organisations, possibly because they were perceived as external 
factors beyond the public organisations’ control. 
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Figure 4.7: Importance of vulnerabilities by the public organisations 
	
As did the public organisations, the private organisations prioritised management vulnerability 
and strategic vulnerability as the top important factors to be improved in the supply chain (see 
Figure 4.8). However, unlike to the public organisations, they also prioritised supplier or 
customer disruptions as one of the top factors to be mitigated, despite their low vulnerability 
to this factor indicated in Table 4.8. Understandably, being commercially driven, the private 
organisations place great importance on their customers and supply chain members in order to 
maintain their position in the market. On the other hand, the public organisations perceived 
market pressures and political/legal pressures to be of low importance in spite of being highly 
vulnerable to such external pressures (both in the top five vulnerability factors in Table 4.8). 
Similarly, liquidity or credit vulnerbility is of moderate importance to the private organisations 
even though it is one of the top three critical factors to which they are highly vulnerable (see 
Table 4.8).  
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Figure 4.8: Importance of vulnerabilities by the private organisations 
 
On the other hand, although the private organisations are not highly vulnerable under process 
vulnerability and personnel vulnerability (ranked 8 and 9 out of 10 factors in Table 4.8), they 
placed moderate and high importance on these factors in Figure 4.8. Overall, it can be observed 
from Figure 4.8 that, like the public organisations, the private organisations give higher priority 
to internal factors within their organisations and the supply chain network than to external 
factors such as physical damage disruptions and environmental factors. 
 
Importance of Capability Factors 
The public and private organisations’ perceived importance of capability factors are depicted 
in Figures 4.9 and 4.10 below. The public organisations gave higher priority to efficiency, 
financial strength, recovery and anticipation as the important factors on which to build their 
resilience to disruptions. Understandably, they had received moderate scores on these factors 
(see Table 4.10) and recognised the importance of these capabilities in mitigating their critical 
areas of vulnerability such as political pressure, inadequate management and financial 
vulnerability (see Table 4.6). Meanwhile, collaboration, flexibility and capacity were identified 
as being of moderate importance (Figure 4.9) even though these factors were ranked as the 
bottom three capability factors of the public organisations (see Table 4.10). At the opposite 
end, five low importance capability factors perceived by the public organisations (Figure 4.9) 
(security, market position, dispersion, visibility and adaptability) had been their top strengths 
(see Table 4.10). The results therefore suggest that the public organisations might have 
developed these capabilities and hence given them lower priority.  
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Figure 4.9: Importance of capabilities by the public organisations 
 
Looking at the private organisations’ results in Figure 4.10, although they were strong in 
financial strength and efficiency (top five capabilities in Table 4.12), these factors were 
perceived as critically important factors to be improved in building resilience to disruption. It 
can therefore be seen that, despite their strength in these areas, significant financial reserves 
and high efficiency of operations are important and need continuous improvement in 
responding to disruptive events. However, one could also argue that the private organisations 
might have overutilised their resources in improving their financial strength and efficiency 
instead of mobilising their resources for other capability factors in which they were still weak. 
This is followed by the high importance of flexibility and capacity factors, which is reasonable 
as the private organisations had received low scores in both of these areas (bottom three 
capability factors in Table 4.12).  
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Figure 4.10: Importance of capabilities by the private organisations 
 
On the other hand, the private organisations placed low priority on improving market position 
(Figure 4.10), which is of concern as they face strong market pressures (see Table 4.8) and 
have moderate strength in this factor (Table 4.12). Collaboration was also given moderate 
importance although it was the lowest capability factor of the private organisations reported in 
the earlier Table 4.12. Lastly, as in the public organisations, security was perceived as the least 
important factor. 
	
Prioritisation of Vulnerability and Capability Factors 
A scatterplot was computed from the results of the vulnerability scores (see Tables 4.6 and 4.8) 
and the importance of vulnerability (Figures 4.7 and 4.8) of the public and private 
organisations, as depicted in Figure 4.11. The scatterplot is divided into four quadrants: high 
vulnerability but low importance factors, high vulnerability and high importance factors, low 
vulnerability and low importance factors, and lastly, low vulnerability but high importance 
factors. It can be observed from Figure 4.11 that three of the private organisations’ vulnerability 
factors (political or legal pressure, strategic vulnerability, management vulnerability) fell 
within the high vulnerability and high importance quadrant while the remaining three 
( personnel vulnerability, process vulnerability, supplier or customer disruptions) lie within the 
low vulnerability and high importance quadrant. Similarly, the private organisations have the 
same factors grouped within the high vulnerability and high importance quadrant as the public 
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organisations, although ‘environmental factors’ also fell within the high vulnerability and high 
importance quadrant. Overall, the vulnerability factors that lie within the quadrant of high 
vulnerability and high importance in Figure 4.11 are identified as the critical vulnerabilities 
that need to be mitigated by both public and private organisations in the public sector supply 
chain to build resilience to disruptions. However, this does not mean that the low vulnerability 
factors that were given high importance should be neglected; the scatterplot in Figure 4.11 
should be treated as a guide for the public and private organisations to prioritise spending on 
those vulnerability areas which they want their organisations or supply chain members to 
alleviate.  

Figure 4.11: Critical vulnerability factors 
The scatterplot in Figure 4.12 presents the prioritisation of capability factors based on the 
results of the capability scores (see Tables 4.10 and 4.12) and importance of capability (Figures 
4.9 and 4.10) of the public and private organisations. In this case, the capability factors that lie 
within the quadrant of low capability but high importance are identified as the critical 
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V3.	Personnel	Vulnerability	
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V7.	Environmental	Factors	
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						Public	Organisations	
						Private	Organisations						
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capabilities that need to be improved to mitigate their vulnerabilities and build resilience to 
disruptions. The gap between the public and private organisations’ levels of strength can be 
clearly observed in the scatterplot. In this case, Figure 4.12 shows that the majority of the public 
organisations’ capability factors lie within the low capability and high importance quadrant, 
only ‘adaptability’ and ‘security’ fell under the high capability and high importance quadrant.  
	
Figure 4.12: Prioritisation of capability factors 
In contrast, the majority of the private organisations’ capability factors lie within the high 
capability and high importance quadrant, and only three capabilities (flexibility, capacity and 
collaboration) under the low capability and high importance quadrant. This shows that although 
the public organisations are highly adaptable and have strong security measures, they still need 
to improve most areas of the capability factors in order to reduce their vulnerabilities identified 
in Table 4.6 and be on a par with their supply chain members’ (i.e. private organisations’) 
capability level. This includes improving their strengths in factors such as finance, 
collaboration and capacity. On the other hand, although the private organisations have high 
strengths in most of the capability factors, they might be eroding profits by investing in areas 
Factor	Label:	
C1.	Flexibility	
C2.	Capacity	
C3.	Efficiency	
C4.	Visibility	
C5.	Adaptability	
C6.	Anticipation	
C7.	Recovery	
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C9.	Collaboration	
C10.	Market	Position	
C11.	Security	
C12.	Financial	Strength	
						Public	Organisations	
						Private	Organisations						
						(Contractors	&	Consultants)	
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of high capabilities that are moderately important such as visibility and adaptability. Overall, 
the scatterplot in Figure 4.12 allows the public and private organisations to prioritise spending 
their resources on the capabilities that they want their organisations or supply chain members 
to improve in order to build their resilience to disruptions in public projects. 
4.6 Correlation Analysis 
The next step of the analysis is the identification of critical linkages between the vulnerability 
and capability factors through correlation analysis (n=105). As the data involves slightly 
skewed distributions, the non-parametric correlation analysis of Spearman rho was computed 
to identify statistically significant correlations (p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.10) between the 
vulnerability and capability scores, as presented in Table 4.18. Some of the vulnerability factors 
listed in this table positively correlate with capability factors, that is low vulnerabilities are 
matched with low capabilities and high vulnerabilities with high capabilities. For instance, 
respondents that face severe threats from environmental factors might have developed strong 
capabilities in developing the necessary recovery measures, hence employing a well-balanced 
resilience in this area. On the other hand, negative correlations exist when high vulnerabilities 
are matched with low capabilities and vice versa. For instance, respondents might have low 
levels of capacity to mobilise resources, causing them to be highly vulnerable to any political 
or regulatory changes. Both significant positive and negative correlations are therefore taken 
into account in this study as the main purpose of the correlation analysis is to identify 
significant relationships that exist between the vulnerability and capability factors regardless 
of the direction of the relationship. The critical linkages, however, were subject to further 
validation by respondents through the subsequent semi-structured interviews. 
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Table 4.18: Critical linkages of public sector supply chain vulnerability and capability factors 
Vulnerability Factors Linked Capability Factors 
V1.Strategic Vulnerability No specific linkages 
V2.Management Vulnerability C1.Flexibility** 
  C3.Efficiency*** 
  C10.Market Position* 
V3.Personnel Vulnerability C3.Efficiency* 
V4.Process Vulnerability C3.Efficiency** 
V5.Supplier/Customer Disruptions No specific linkages 
V6.Political/Legal Pressures C2.Capacity** 
  C3.Efficiency* 
  C11.Security* 
V7.Environmental Factors C2.Capacity** 
  C4.Visibility*** 
  C5.Adaptability*** 
 C7.Recovery* 
 C8. Dispersion* 
  C12.Financial Strength* 
V8.Physical Damage Disruptions No specific linkages 
V9.Market Pressures C2.Capacity** 
  C12.Financial Strength*** 
V10.Liquidity/Credit Vulnerability C3.Efficiency** 
            *** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
                ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
                 * Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed) 
 
The overall linkages identified in the Table 4.18 are also presented in the supply chain 
vulnerability and capability matrix for further validation, as depicted in Figure 4.13.
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Figure 4.13: Supply chain vulnerability and capability matrix 
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4.7 Summary 
 
This chapter has presented the findings from the questionnaire survey based on the total 105 
respondents from the public and private organisations. They include the respondents’ general 
profiles, the perceived frequent disruptive events in public projects and their critical impacts, 
the management approach to current disruptions adopted by the respondents, and finally, the 
main assessment of the supply chain’s vulnerability and capability. The chapter also compared 
the public and private organisations’ critical vulnerability and capability factors through the 
Mann-Whitney U Test, and the level of agreement between the public organisations, 
contractors and consultants in rating these factors. Finally, critical linkages between the 
vulnerability and capability factors were presented through correlation analysis.  
 
The key findings from this chapter will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 6. The results 
of the survey will be triangulated with the findings identified in the interviews in the following 
Chapter 5. Overall, this chapter fulfilled part of Objective 3 (see Section 1.4) of the study, in 
analysing the emergent vulnerability and capability factors of the public sector supply chain in 
coping with supply chain disruptions. The results will help the researcher to achieve the aim of 
developing the resilience response framework to improve the public sector supply chain’s 
resilience to disruptions in public projects. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DATA ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEWS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
As part of Phase III of the research (see Figure 3.9), this chapter looks at the analysis of results 
from the semi-structured interviews conducted with 12 construction professionals involved in 
delivering Malaysian public sector projects (see research method in Section 3.5.2). During the 
interviews, each respondent described examples of recent disruptive events they had faced in 
delivering public projects, including their impacts on operations. They also described their 
organisation and supply chain’s actions in dealing with the disruptions (see guidelines of 
interview questions in Appendix D) and explained what they believe had caused them. This 
was to fulfil Objective 4 (see Section 1.4).  
 
This chapter presents the four critical pathogens (refer Section 2.7) that emerged from the 
interviews as causing disruptions: practice, circumstance, convention and organisation. A 
further pathogenic influence of behaviour was also identified (see Section 5.8). Examples from 
the disruptive events highlighted by the respondents are used to describe these critical 
pathogens. It is worth noting here that some of these pathogens overlap due to their 
interdependence in causing the disruptive events. Along with the pathogens, the critical 
vulnerability factors presented in the survey results in Chapter 4 (political or legal pressures, 
market pressures, management vulnerability, liquidity or credit vulnerability and strategic 
vulnerability) were identified in the interviews as part of the validation of the survey results. 
These vulnerabilities, however, are discussed in detail in Chapter 6, with examples from the 
interview data. 
 
5.2 Respondents’ Background 
 
The 12 respondents interviewed were five professionals representing the public organisations, 
three engineering consultants representing the external private organisations working with 
public projects, and four contractors engaged by the public organisations (see sampling method 
in Section 3.5.2.1). Each respondent had over 20 years of experience working in public projects 
and was therefore able to provide insightful data of the current real-world scenario of 
disruptions in public projects. Their background is presented in Table 5.1.  
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  Table 5.1: Background information on respondents 
Experts Professional Background and Responsibilities 
Expert PO1 A project manager and principal assistant director with civil and structural 
engineering background from the public state department. He also designs 
and advises on infrastructure works such as roads and bridges. He is 
involved mostly at the planning and design phase of the project, before the 
project goes to tender.  
Expert PO2 Superintending officer and senior assistant director from the public state 
department. She has a background in civil and structural engineering and 
is responsible for managing and overseeing construction works on-site. 
She has been involved in building projects, but is currently supervising 
roadworks and infrastructure projects. 
Expert PO3 A civil and structural engineer from the Head of Project Team (HOPT) in 
the main public works department’s headquarter in Kuala Lumpur. He is 
mainly involved in government ‘sick projects’ and acts as an advisor in 
recovering the projects to get back on track. He is currently dealing with 
many public building works, but has experience dealing with 
infrastructure works. 
Expert PO4 A principal assistant director and civil and structural engineer from HOPT 
who is an expert in work scheduling. He is involved in the planning phase 
of the public projects. His tasks include preparing the risk management 
plan, and liaising with public works department’s design team in capturing 
the client’s brief on the project. He has experience in building works, but 
is currently working with consultants on Mass Rapid Transit projects. 
Expert PO5 A principal assistant director and project manager who represents the 
public organisations during the construction phase. He ensures 
construction works on-site meets the expected timeline in the schedule and 
helps to coordinate the team on-site. He has a background in civil and 
structural engineering and is mainly involved in building works.  
Consultant CS1 A senior civil and structural engineer from a small-sized consultant 
engineering firm (20 employees). She prepares design drawings for the 
public state department from planning to design phase and is mainly 
involved in roadworks. Her firm also engages specialists to assess traffic 
management plans for the roadworks. She assists PWD in responding to 
public road users’ complaints.  
Consultant CS2 A civil and structural engineer from a medium-sized consultant 
engineering firm (more than 50 employees). She prepares design drawings 
for tender and consults public works department on the structural designs 
of the infrastructure works. She also assists public works department in 
acquiring land and in dealing with contractors’ enquiries on roadworks 
design.  
Consultant CS3 A civil and structural engineer from a medium-sized family-owned 
consultancy (more than 50 employees). He deals mostly with the structural 
design of public buildings. He prepares the design drawings for public sate 
department during design, and also provides a quantity surveying service 
to estimate the design works.  
Contractor CO1 A main contractor from a large construction company involved in 
construction, contract administration, quantity surveying, trading and 
training services (more than 100 employees). He has experience working 
in public infrastructure and building construction works, and has also 
worked as a sub-contractor and supplier through his company’s 
departments.  
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Contractor CO2 A main contractor from a medium-sized construction company (more than 
50 employees). His past experience includes both public and private 
projects, and is experienced in dealing with international projects. He is 
currently focusing on two public projects.  
Contractor CO3 A main contractor who is also the CEO of his small company (20 
employees). He directly manages his company’s finance and the 
construction works on-site. His company is mainly involved in 
government and semi-government projects (government-owned company 
projects).  
Contractor CO4 A main contractor from a small family-owned company (less than 20 
employees). The company has run for more than 20 years through his 
father, and has been  a supplier and sub-contractor in past public projects. 
He is currently working as the main contractor on two public projects. 
 
	
5.3 Pathogenic themes  
	
As previously discussed in Section 3.5.2, the computer software package Nvivo (version 11) 
was used to conduct the content analysis. The recorded interviews were transcribed and 
uploaded in the software to identify the major themes from the interview data. In this case, 
predetermined pathogenic themes from existing literature (Busby and Hughes, 2004) were used 
to classify the data. The emergent theme of behaviour was also identified from the interviews, 
and was included in the analysis. Figure 5.1 presents the coding structure developed on the 
critical pathogenic influences that contribute to the occurance of supply chain disruptions in 
public projects.  
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Figure 5.1: Coding structure of critical pathogenic influences 
 
The output in Figure 5.1 above highlights five critical pathogens that emerged from the 
interviews: practice, circumstance, convention, organisation and behaviour. The cognitive 
map of these pathogens were developed following the analysis of the interview, as shown in 
Figure 5.2 below. 
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Figure 5.2: Cognitive map of the critical pathogenic influences
	 151	
The critical pathogenic influences in Figure 5.2 are further discussed below. 
	
5.4 Practice pathogen  
The practice of poor assumption during decision making has caused significant disruptions to 
the public projects, This is prevalent especially in public infrastructure projects delivery. 
Understandably, given the nature of highly complex engineering projects, many assumptions 
have to be made during the initial planning and design phase. This evidence is based on 
Consultant CS1’s experience in dealing with a bridge project. In this case, the public 
organisations initially wanted to utilise an existing bridge and upgrade it into a main road 
instead of building a new road, in order to reduce costs. Although this practice was seen as a 
way to save money, the initial estimates for the existing bridge failed to consider the high traffic 
load that would come when the bridge became a main road.  
The existing bridge is used mainly by the local people to commute to their plantation farm. If 
we were to modify this existing bridge to become the main road, there would be significantly 
more traffic. These costs unfortunately were not captured during the award stage.  
The consultant stated that the estimates were based on basic upgrading works which were not 
sufficient to the project. Further inspection, simulation and projection of the traffic load over 
10 to 20 years had to be conducted by additional specialists to ensure the bridge could carry 
the expected high loading, which subsequently added to the budget. It can be seen here that 
poor assumption by the public organisations on the costs of reusing the bridge had increased 
their vulnerability to budget overruns. In making such decision to save costs, additions to the 
design and resources when reusing the bridge went unnoticed throughout the planning stage, 
causing a significant increase in the project budget. This shows that the practice of satisfying 
cost-saving goals could result in being pathogenic to the public organisations. In this case, the 
public organisations’ decision to conform to the lower-cost solution of reusing the existing 
bridge instead of building a new one further increased the budget due to the current condition 
of the bridge. The consultant’s practice of outsourcing work to assess the bridge could also be 
pathogenic to the project budget as additional external parties need to be engaged to execute 
the design work. 
Expert PO2 addressed a similar pathogenic practice of poor assumption in decision making. 
During the construction of a roadwork project, a utility was discovered on-site that could not 
be replaced because of high costs. She believes that this was caused by carelessness in terms 
of the planning and design work, as the parties involved did not actually visit the site during 
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the planning and design phase. The practice of poor assumption by looking at design drawings 
in the initial phase without actual verification on-site had a pathogenic effect on the subsequent 
construction phase of the project. However, Consultant CS2 argued that such carelessness in 
assumption can not be predicted as an error until an actual disruption occurs on-site. It was 
noted that while some risks can be identified earlier, underground utilities such as water pipes 
and piling can only be identified later during excavation on-site. 
Because we are dealing with a very long highway, we can not afford to survey all 50 points of 
the site due to the limited cost and time imposed by the public organisations. So we can map 
only 7 to 8 points or locations in our design. (CS2) 
Thus, it might be that the public organisations not wanting to spend much money and time on 
the planning phase contributed to their vulnerability to the utility disruption in the first place. 
Expert PO1 also acknowledged that despite having a project management plan, the public 
organisations usually rushed things and did not work according to plan. This acceleration in 
delivering plans is usually due to the added pressure by top management, leading to the 
consultant proceeding with tentative assumptions based on the limited time and resources 
available for producing the final design. Examples of these disruptions and the pathogens that 
contributed to their occurrence are represented in Figure 5.3a below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3a: Underlying practice pathogen that caused disruptions 
	
On the other hand, Expert PO3 stated that sometimes disruptions arise from the bottom tier of 
the supply chain (i.e. sub-contractors, suppliers). He highlighted that even though the public 
organisations have identified the list of qualities or the checklist of specifications beforehand, 
the team or sub-contractors selected by the contractors may not comply with the government 
Pathogens 
• The practice of poor 
assumption by looking at 
design drawings at the initial 
phase without the actual 
verification. 
• The practice of acceleration 
and cost saving at planning 
phase by the public 
organisations. 
 Disruptive Event 
• Budget was not sufficient to cover the 
costs of reusing the bridge 
• A utility was discovered on site that 
could not be replaced due to high costs 
of replacement 
•  
Disruption Effect 
• Budget overruns 
• Delay in operation 
• Increase in the costs 
of operation due to 
rework 
	
Supply Chain Vulnerability 
• Additions to the design and resource 
went unnoticed  
• High reliance upon specialty sources by 
consultant  
• Consultant proceed with tentative 
assumptions due to limited time and 
resource  
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standard. This is attributed to the fact that the sub-contractors want to cut costs, for higher 
profit. This shows that the practice of cost saving is prevalent not just in the contractor’s 
operation but also by the sub-contractors at the bottom tier of the supply chain. This act is 
perceived as pathogenic to the project manager as it could ultimately disrupt the quality of the 
final product. Furthermore, the practice of cost saving by sub-contractors was also perceived 
as pathogenic to Contractor CO4. He stated that the main contractor ultimately bears the loss 
when they outsource their work to such incompetent sub-contractors or suppliers, as the 
schedule and timeline are under the control of the main contractor. He further argued that it 
was hard to predict that the cost saving act by his sub-contractors could lead to disruption in 
his operations, until his sub-contractors made the actual mistakes on-site. Consequently, this 
pathogen of cost saving by sub-contractors causes loss of productivity and profit on the 
contractor’s side and affect the public organisations’ ability to get the best value of money from 
the project due to the poor quality of work. Nevertheless, Contractor CO2 found that such  
pathogen arising from sub-contractors can ultimately be controlled by the main contractor by 
ensuring timely payment to the sub-contractors.  
The practice of prioritising projects by their prominence in the public organisations was also 
perceived as pathogenic to the consultant’s operations. Consultant CS2 reflected on cases 
where such prioritisation had halted the design phase of another public roadwork project. The 
consultant emphasised that as the same people in the public organisations handle multiple 
projects at a time, the projects have to be narrowed down and prioritised. The project that the 
consultant was specifically involved in, however, was not under the priority category, further 
drawing out the decision-making process. The slow decision-making process had subsequently 
caused disruptions and delay to the design process of over a year, when initially the consultant 
was supposed to be contracted for only one year. This also caused loss of productivity on the 
consultants’ side of the work. The consultant expressed their predicament that they still needed 
to continue with the design despite the halt of this phase as they still needed to submit a monthly 
progress report to the public organisations to show progress. For the consultant, this was a 
waste of time, as necessary design work could have been done during that time if the public 
organisations had made a decision. This shows how the public organisations’ practice of 
prioritising projects is seen as pathogenic to the consultants as it could disrupt their ability to 
design the roadwork progressively and on time. Indeed, Expert PO2 from the public 
organisation also highlighted the fact that as a superintending officer (SO), she has several 
projects to manage and can not dedicate her full time to a single one. Hence, it appears that the 
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pathogenic practice of prioritisation of projects was preceded by the public organisations’ poor 
utilisation of additional resources, as the same professionals in the firm handled multiple 
projects at a time and their consultant was left waiting for a response. This ultimately affected 
the project team’s efficiency in delivering the project on time. The subsequent construction 
phase of the roadwork project then faced significant delay because the preceding design work 
had been halted.  
The summary of the pathogens that contribute to the supply chain’s vulnerabilities from the 
abovementioned cases are highlighted in Figure 5.3b below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3b: Underlying practice pathogen that caused disruptions  
	
Next, the circumstance pathogen highlighted by the respondents is discussed below. 
	
5.5 Circumstance pathogen   
 
The circumstances arising from the unstable political environment in which the projects are 
operating were identified as one of the main underlying latent conditions for disruption. Expert 
PO1 acknowledged that,  
If you look at the list of risk priorities in public infrastructure projects, in terms of ranking, the 
first project priority is always political. Second rank in terms of priority is probably safety, 
followed by traffic capacity and so on. This is unfortunately the risk we have to take.  
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Indeed, disruption due to political influence is inevitable in public projects, thus the reason it 
has always been considered as one of the public projects’ risks. However, the pathogenic 
effects of political influence are sometimes not always obvious until actual disruptions or 
deficiencies arise in the supply chain operations. For instance, Contractor CO1 expressed his 
concern at the circumstance when nominated sub-contractors were selected directly by the 
public organisations,  
It is like a forced marriage. The public organisations tender, but we have to sign the sub-
contractors under us. That itself is a disruption.  
In this case, the direct appointment of the sub-contractors by the public organsiations was due 
to the political influence during the tender evaluation process. This shows that the circumstance 
of unfavourable project team selection, that could be linked with the political environment, is 
perceived as pathogenic to the contractor. The project team’s vulnerability to political 
disruptions could ultimately disrupt the public project delivery due to poor collaboration and 
ineffective teamwork. Changes in political power were also identified as pathogenic to 
Contractor CO4’s operations. Based on this contractor’s experience, following the change to 
the political party that governs the state where the site was located, the existing government 
authority protested and closed down their services in that state. Subsequently, this caused 
significant delay in the approval of land acquisition. The contractor explained that,  
We submitted our plan for land acquisition but they did not process the plan we submitted for 
two years; they gave us a lot of excuses for not processing it and made it difficult for us to get 
their approval.  
This shows how the political change had ultimately disrupted progress causing the roadwork 
project to suffer. Expert PO2 agreed that,  
When it comes to government, we have a lot of political effect, we have to check and deal with 
a lot of things that have to do with monetary and political issues, especially during elections.  
Hence, even though the external political parties are not directly related to the project, such 
political changes could still disrupt the public organisations’ and contractor’s operation. This 
shows the high vulnerability of the public organisations and its supply chain to unstable 
political environment in delivering public projects. 
	
The circumstance of the nature of infrastructure projects that involve complex design is also 
pathogenic to the project team. This is prevalent in Consultant CS2’s experience, especially in 
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identifying the location of existing underground utilities in mapping the roadworks (as 
discussed in Section 5.4). The consultant explained that,  
We do not want to disrupt the energy and water supply to the public as this will have a social 
and economic impact, making it even more difficult to carry out the project.  
Similarly, land acquisition for roadworks was perceived as a difficult process due to its 
complexity. According to the consultant, when a small road is expanded to a wider road, 
additional land has to be acquired for access by the public organisation. However, when roads 
are widened, nearby buildings will be affected, as will plantation farms. The public 
organisations have to compensate for the losses incurred by the owners of the palm trees based 
on the projected future profit that should have been generated from these plantations. The 
consultant stated that land acquisition for infrastructure projects itself can take 12 to 18 months. 
This shows how the circumstance of the complex nature of infrastructure projects could also 
send pathogenic effects to the local community and the agricultural economy if the projects’ 
land acquisition is not managed wisely.  
Furthermore, the public organisations and their supply chains were highly vulnerable to public 
scrutiny. For instance, the public organisations have to deal with constant reports or complaints 
from road users. In dealing with these complaints, Expert PO2 highlighted the public 
organisations’ dilemma that, apart from satisfying the road users’ requirements, they also have 
to satisfy the client who provides the money for the roadworks. Under the client’s budget, some 
of the objectives must be compromised and not all objectives can be fulfilled. However, Expert 
PO2 believes that when such roadwork projects become the local people’s problems, this could 
subsequently have a social impact. This shows that the nature of public infrastructure projects 
and its exposure to the public can also be pathogenic to the public organisations as it could 
have both social and economic impacts. Furthermore, both Expert PO2 and Consultant CS1 
highlighted that although they are used to public complaints, such circumstance of public 
scrutiny become pathogenic when recovering from disruptive events in public projects. 
Consultant CS1 had faced circumstances whereby they were pressured by the public and media 
to resolve the collapse of a roadwork quickly within two days. This was deemed as an 
unrealistic timeline by the consultant, as further testing and road diversion have to be made 
when a road collapses. The consultant also found that in this case, the client did not always 
understand the process needed to resolve the issue, putting further significant pressure on the 
project team. This has resulted in the slow operations of the project team as they have to 
constantly response to media and make further justifications to the client in their recovery 
	 157	
measures. It can also be seen here that the high visibility of disruptions in public projects to the 
public organisations’ stakeholders, including both the client and the local people, could also 
cause reputational damage to the public organisations. Overall, the circumstance pathogens 
discussed above are summarised in Figure 5.4a below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4a: Underlying circumstance pathogen that caused disruptions 
The financial circumstances of the public organisations were also deemed as pathogenic by 
Expert PO1, as they limit the design standards. He stated that the public organisations’ design 
team usually has to accept optimisation rather than maximising the design standards. The 
engineer explained,  
We have to optimise the design based on the available budget without compromising safety. 
Apart from safety, we can slightly improve the capacity as well and that is sufficient. Even if 
we produce the best design, in the end, the ministries do not have the sufficient resource or 
budget, hence we cannot continue with the design. 
The lack of financial resources had led to the reduced standard of design in the public projects, 
which could subsequently affect the quality of the completed buildings or infrastructure works. 
This in turn, could make the public organisations highly exposed to further public scrutiny due 
to the quality of works. The circumstance of limited financial resource by the public 
organisations could also result in late payment to the contractors and their contracting parties 
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(further discussed in Section 6.2.1). On the other hand, Contractor CO1 had also faced 
significant financial disruptions due to economic circumstances. The Prime Minister’s 
announcement of the rise in oil prices had affected the contractor’s operation with a projected 
immediate loss of RM28 billion. This is because when the price of oil increases, the price of 
bitumen increases, and when the bitumen price increaseds, the cost of materials and transport 
will also increase significantly. The major increase in the oil price had subsequently caused 
transportation disruption to the contractor’s operation, as the transport cost for the material was 
even more expensive than the material itself. In this case, the contractor had to absorb all the 
losses due to the current procurement arrangement with the public organisations, as in the 
turnkey contract there is no Variation of Price (VOP). This shows how the pathogenic effect 
of the current circumstance of economic pressure and contractual arrangement was indeed 
critical to the contractor, causing substantial loss of profit. The low risk sharing arrangement 
between the contractor and the public organisations also made it harder for the contractor to 
recover from such disruptions, eventually having to mobilise resources by cutting down on the 
sub-contractors to reduce losses.  
The circumstance of contractual arrangements was also highlighted by the respondents. Expert 
PO2 explained that when there were incompetent people in the project team, as the SO she 
could not simply remove them due to contractual matters. For example, disruptions arose from 
the incompetence of the external consultant engaged, who failed to communicate with the 
utility company to relocate the existing utilities on-site before the contractor could commence 
work. In this case, under the terms of the contract Expert PO2 could not simply dismiss the 
consultant. Subsequently, she decided to call in another response team from the contractor’s 
side to help expedite the process of utility relocation by directly dealing with the utility 
company themselves, without waiting for the consultant. On the other hand, Expert PO5 
observed that some of the contractual payment arrangements between the main contractor and 
their sub-contractors or suppliers could result in the bottom tiers of the supply chain not 
receiving adequate payment. He explained that, 
The contract is supposed to be back to back, meaning what the government pays to the main 
contractor, the supplier will get. But the supplier’s contract with the contractor is not back to 
back, it’s a different contract, so that’s why it becomes a problem. If the contract is back to 
back, it’ll be easier because whatever payment the government gives, the supplier will receive 
it. So that’s one of the issues.  
Subsequently, this caused a significant delay in acquiring the material because the supplier 
wanted to wait until the price was stable before proceeding with the order. Hence, inconsistent 
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contractual terms among the contractors and their team of sub-contractors could result in 
cascading delayed payment among the parties in the bottom tiers of the supply chain.  
	
Furthermore, the circumstance of lack of skilled workers was perceived to be pathogenic to the 
contractors, as it resulted in their high dependency on foreign workers. Contractor CO2 
explained that there are cases where disruptions arise due to the poor quality of workmanship 
of the foreign workers on-site, causing further reworking of their operations. He added, 
The beginning of hiring foreign workers is always a problem, one of the problems. They usually 
can’t cope with the energy levels needed in construction. What we can do is just train them. 
After a few months, only then do they have the energy to work hard. 
This affects the level of productivity of the workers on site. Contractor CO2 found a further 
big loss when the foreign workers who have been well trained in Malaysia return to their home 
country, 
Malaysia is like a training centre, we take foreign workers from Indonesia, Bangladesh, and 
when they are well trained after some years, they go back to their own country, so it’s a bit of 
a loss. For instance, in this one job, we took foreign workers from Bangladesh; from no 
knowledge we trained them until they were good at their job within two years. At last, they 
have to go back, so we face a loss. And maybe they will go to another country to work, so that 
country will get the benefit from it, right? It’s not easy to develop that skill. 
This resulted in the further loss of skilled workers to the local construction industry. Overall, 
it can be observed that although the contractor could overcome the high reliance on foreign 
workers by training them on-site, over time, this could be pathogenic to the contractor as more 
skilled foreign workers leave the country. This has resulted in the contractor having to 
repeatedly engage and train new workers in subsequent projects, which adds time and money 
to their operations.   
Overall, the abovementioned underlying circumstance pathogens are summarised in Figure 
5.4b below.  
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Figure 5.4b: Underlying circumstance pathogen that caused disruptions 
	
Next, the convention pathogen arising from standards and procedures is discussed below. 
	
5.6 Convention Pathogen  
Pathogens arising from standard procedures were also reported to have contributed to the 
supply chain’s vulnerability to disruptive events. The majority of the respondents interviewed 
found that the late decision making in the public sector supply chain is due to the unnecessary 
bureaucracy in the decision-making process. In most cases, such hierarchical decision making 
resulted in project team members prioritising their response to parties according to their level 
of authority. For instance, Contractor CO1 pointed out that,  
As a contractor, you can’t do anything when dealing with the public organisations team. They 
prefer to hear from their own personnel. They do not entertain contractors. Government to 
government basis is different, it is easier. But when the contractor or consultants come to deal 
with the public organisations, it is harder and will take a lot of time. 
He further argued that although the public sector supply chain is accustomed to such 
bureaucracy in practice, the public organisations’ habit of prioritising responses by the level of 
authority power is not helpful when a prompt reply is needed during disruptions. On the other 
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hand, Expert PO3 argued that similar cases arise when the public organisations’ representatives 
deal with the contractors on-site. He recalled his visits to the government sick projects (i.e. 
projects that faced more than than three months’ delay),  
When I go to visit each sick project, I advise that we need to redo the scheduling: they have to 
revise their programme, increase manpower and machinery. The contractors listen but they 
don’t do it, so the project becomes problematic. So lastly, I tell them, I don’t want to see this 
new problem any more, unless I have instructions from the authority. Because I don’t have the 
top authority, the top-most authority is from another division. So it’s different from when I go 
to a project site where I have been given the authority from the top number one director. 
Whatever I say or advise, it’s like I’m his representative, and the contractor follows my 
instructions. 
In this case, in saving the sick projects, Expert PO3’s advice to the contractors usually does not 
work, as the contractors refuse to adhere to his instructions. Similarly, Expert PO4 pointed out 
that even as the public organisation’s main scheduler on-site, he has no authority when it comes 
to handling the design work on-site. The suppliers usually want to deal with the people from 
the public organisations’ design department, instead of with the scheduler appointed. He further 
addressed his concern that, 
The design team has not yet made their decision, it takes a long time. They are not used to the 
timeline and are unaware of the problems on-site, so to them, like time is not of the essence. So 
the problem lies with me at the site.  
This could also be attributed to the poor distribution of decision making in the public 
organisations (further discussed in Section 6.3.3). Similarly, Consultant CS2 faced difficulties 
in dealing with external stakeholders involved in public projects. This is because they will only 
respond and provide necessary information if the direction comes from the public 
organisations. She added that in such cases,  
We have to ask the public organisations’ help sometimes, “Sir, can you help us because the 
sub-consultant does not want to answer the phone”. So they will go and make the phone call. 
In dealing with external parties, if we are from public organisations, they will entertain us. If it 
comes from the private organisations, they do not really accept us. So whatever it is the public 
organisations sometimes become the middle person to speed up the process. 
Hence, in this case, it was faster for the consultant to retrieve external data from the 
stakeholders through the public organisations’ request. This shows that when disruptions occur, 
the convention of only responding to directions from a higher level of authority is perceived 
by the respondents as pathogenic, as it could cause a slow response and late decision making, 
as described in these cases. 
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Furthermore, Expert PO3 identified that the public organisations’ convention of recording their 
lessons learnt from disruptions without the opinion of other supply chain members involved in 
the project could be pathogenic to subsequent public projects. In this case, Expert PO3 argued 
that, 
There’s no point in us just getting our public organisations project team during the lessons 
learnt, because we end up saying the other side was at fault. Usually when we do lessons learnt, 
these problems are the contractor’s fault, and this one is indeed the consultant’s fault, but there 
are our faults in some part of it. We have to accept that some of the problems arise from our 
team as well. We have to learn from our mistakes, or else it is a blaming game, and we kept 
asking other parties to improve, but not entirely improve together. So we must contribute to the 
improvements. 
He added that such lessons learnt by the public organisations are not documented properly and 
do not reveal their true weaknesses. He believes that the public organisations should listen to 
the contractor’s and consultant’s sides of the stories in documenting the lessons learnt. Indeed, 
such poorly recorded lessons learnt could be pathogenic as the public organisations would be 
repeating the same mistakes in following projects. This is evident in the case highlighted by 
Expert PO4. One of the outcomes from the lessons learnt in the public project in which he was 
involved was about the procurement arrangement that caused the significant delay. He 
explained that, 
The public organisations want to write the outcome as, “it should have been a conventional 
contract”. It is always like that, when they fail doing design and build because of their 
incompetence, they say they always prefer the conventional way. If you ask people like me, 
because I deliver 10 packages of design and build (D&B), it’s no problem, ’cause I understand 
it, I would prefer D&B. I would argue that D&B can be delivered very fast. And even the pre-
construction period I can do it within 8 months. It is easier to control. 
It can be observed here that the public organisations failed to admit that their competence level 
on design and build was rather low. Expert PO4 added that,  
Using conventional contracts in the next projects still doesn’t solve the delay. Let’s say if it’s 
conventional, one problem is the time, if you still can’t control the design changes due to end-
user, there’ll still be variation order (VO), once there’s VO, there’s extension of time. 
Hence, the main outcome of the lessons learnt on using conventional contracts in the next 
projects could be pathogenic to the public organisations as in fact they take longer time to 
deliver compared to design and build. Indeed, Expert PO1 found that despite having the lessons 
learnt recorded, the public organisations usually returned to their routine practice and usual 
habits. He acknowledged that,  
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We attended workshops for the lessons learnt. But in the end, we do not follow the lessons we 
learnt from these workshops. We usually go back to our usual practice that we are comfortable 
with even though it has been proven that it is the wrong way of delivering the project. 
It can be observed here that the public organisations are reluctant to change their conventional 
habits or adapt to new methods. This could be pathogenic to the public organisations as they 
are continually exposed to the same risk of disruptions. Indeed, Expert PO5 concluded that, 
even though the public organisations are tied in to their conventional procedures, public project 
performance can be improved if the public organisations are brave enough to accept changes 
in their procedures. Figure 5.5a below presents the summary of the pathogens discussed above.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5a: Underlying convention pathogen that caused disruptions 
	
Another pathogenic convention that was highlighted by one of the respondents is the public 
organisations’ procedure in promoting staff immediately. For instance, Expert PO2 cited a case 
where there was a change in the SO representative in the project,  
Sometimes we do not have a choice, when working with the government, the SO representative 
could not stay for long in a project, as they will be promoted. Based on our regulations, once 
we are promoted we have to move immediately. They will give us two weeks to move. So if 
the SO representative has to move, and the new SO representative is incompetent, it will 
become a disaster. Sometimes the project is already almost complete, but the SO has to move. 
That is the government regulation. That is another factor, the government system.  
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Hence, this convention of quick changes of staff was perceived as pathogenic to Expert PO2 
as it disrupts the progress of the public projects. In this case, waiting for the new SO to adapt 
to the project and its team members resulted in further delay in the public project delivery.  
	
In other cases, weaknesses were identified in the public organisations’ contractual terms with 
the utility companies (water and electricity). One of the contractual conditions set by the public 
organisations for roadwork projects is that any identified existing utilities on-site are required 
to be relocated by the utility companies at their own cost. However, Contractor CO1 argued 
that this obligation resulted in the utility companies having no sense of urgency to move their 
facilities, causing delay to the contractor’s operations. He added that, 
So for the utility companies, it’s not urgent to do the relocation, they’ll do it at the end of the 
year, because there’s no penalty, the government does not penalise utility. How the government 
builds the utility company later on I’m not sure, but they are too lenient, when actually they can 
charge or penalise utility companies for late relocation.  
Similarly, Contractor CO1 highlighted the drawback of one of the public organisations’ 
contractual terms with the contractors. For instance, in a turnkey project, there is a clause in 
the public organisations’ contract on the contractor’s design proposals, whereby any savings 
from the proposals go to the public organisations. He explained that, 
That clause is not fair to me. So why would I want to initiate savings on alternative design 
solutions? They should have a 50-50 distribution of the savings gain. 
On the other hand, the contractor has to bear the financial loss for any weaknesses arising from 
their design proposals. It should be noted here that parties should know well in advance their 
obligations and responsibilities when signing a contract (Love et al., 2011), hence should 
understand the risks allocated to them. However, in this case, the contractual terms might be 
perceived as pathogenic to the contractor due the lack of incentives by the public organisations 
to motivate the contractor to save costs in the projects. Similarly, Contractor CO2 pointed out 
that even in design and build contracts, all the savings go to the government. For example, the 
contractor instanced a project where there were eight different embankment designs for the 
eight different bridges that needed to be constructed even though all span were all the same 
length, because the designs of the embankments came from different design teams. In the end, 
upon approval of the SO, the contractor decided to select one particular design for all the 
bridges to save time and costs. However, due to the contractual terms, such savings from the 
value engineering go to the public organisations. Contractor CO2 added that, 
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A lot of these value engineering things can sometimes be done to save costs for both parties. 
But the public organisations must be open-minded to accept the proposed changes. 
He found that the public organisations’ contract is rigid and without the flexibility to 
accommodate such design improvements. This could therefore result in the public 
organisations missing out on potential cost savings solutions in public projects. 
Furthermore, Contractor CO3 found the government terms on the use of 80% of Industrialised 
Building System (IBS) content in public building projects to be pathogenic to the contractors’ 
operations. Although there are many benefits from adopting IBS (i.e. less waste on-site), the 
contractor argued that the government’s delivery of the plan in transitioning the local 
construction industry from labour intensive to highly mechanised was too rushed. He indicated 
the frequent problems in the implementation of IBS projects, such as the poor quality of the 
IBS components provided by suppliers, the monopolisation of price by IBS suppliers, and the 
poor handling of IBS components on-site due to the contractor’s inexperience. Contractor CO3 
believes that,   
If the government wants to make the transition, it must be some sort of evolutionary process, 
not a one-shot policy. You should start actually at what, 40% IBS for certain types of building, 
then go higher and higher. If you’re building a hospital, it’s a complicated and complex 
building, right? And of course the IBS will become very expensive because you have to tailor 
it to the hospital. But if you’re building a school, then it is very cheap. 
Hence, while the use of IBS could improve the efficiency of operations in public projects, poor 
implementation of the IBS provision could result in negative impacts on the contractor’s 
operations. The government should deliver the IBS plans gradually to allow some time for the 
contractors and the rest of construction professionals to adapt.  
Overall, the convention pathogens discussed above are depicted in Figure 5.5b below. 
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Figure 5.5b: Underlying convention pathogen that caused disruptions 
	
The organisation pathogen is further discussed in the following section. 
5.7 Organisation Pathogen 
The majority of the respondents (PO1, PO2, PO5, CS1, CS3, CO2, CO3) found that the 
structure of the public organisations resulted in late decision making. For instance, the various 
departments handling tasks in different phases (i.e. planning, design, tender) of the projects 
make it harder for the project team to identify any problems arising from deficiencies in their 
operations. As discussed in Section 5.6, the late approval process is attributed to bureaucratic 
decision making. In this case, discrepancies exist between the team who do the planning and 
the project management at the public works department’s main headquarters (Head of Project 
Team, HOPT), and the team who do the design and tender works (Head of Design Team, 
HODT) and the team who manage the construction works on-site (state organisations). Expert 
PO2 pointed out that, 
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These things can sometimes be problematic as all tasks in the project are done by different 
departments. For us in the state organisations, we usually face the problems on-site when HOPT 
and HODT do not perform. 
Hence, any problems arising from the operations of the planning (HOPT) and design (HODT) 
teams in the public organisations could cascade down to the state organisations if not rectified 
beforehand. Consultant CS1 added that this organisational structure has resulted in unclear 
roles between the departments in the public organisations as each is led by different managers, 
causing delay in their operations. It also causes confusion for the contractors and consultants, 
especially those who are still not familiar with the public organisations’ system, in navigating 
through their process and identifying the key person in charge to report to when disruptions 
arise. Expert PO1 pointed out that usually when disruptions arise during construction, 
If the state representatives cannot solve the problems on-site, they will go to the HOPT office 
to solve it. Sometimes they can’t solve them because of their own capacity, but mostly because 
of the limitations in the contractual agreement that requires decision with approval from higher 
authority in HOPT. 
This makes it difficult for the public organisations to respond quickly during disruptions. 
Moreover, multiple departments in the client’s organisation were also deemed as pathogenic to 
the project team’s operations. Expert PO5 said,  
Within the client itself there are a lot of layers of authority that need to approve the contractor’s 
proposal on materials, etc. A lot of stages. Starts with the bottom team, then goes to another 
administration stage, their head administrator, and he has to satisfy the secretary board, and 
then it goes to the main director, then the secretary has to go back to the other stage to report 
the decision. So that’s why it becomes slow sometimes. We previously estimate that this 
decision making will only take three months, but because of these layers of authorities, it now 
goes beyond those three months. 
Understandably, it is common for such large organisations such as the public and client 
organisations to have multiple departments working on different tasks. However, it could also 
be pathogenic to the project team operations if the system could not produce a fast response. 
Expert PO5 found that simplifying the different levels of approval would save time in public 
project delivery, especially when a quick response is needed during disruptions. On the other 
hand, the majority of the respondents who deal with external stakeholders such as the utility 
companies also find it difficult to navigate through their systems. This is prevalent especially 
in public roadworks projects, as necessary information on existing utilities on-site are required 
by the consultants and contractors. Consultant CS1 shared her experience in dealing with utility 
companies,  
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During the design phase, in order to get information on existing pipes on-site, we have to make 
an appointment with the utility providers, which takes a lot of time because the provider has a 
lot of departments that deal with different things. For instance, for the energy provider, they 
have different levels, 11Kv, 33Kv, 275 Kv and so on, which are all from different departments. 
They also have several projects to deal with, so we have to know when they are available. To 
get their confirmation after we have done the site visits takes a lot of time. 
Similarly, Consultant CS2 stated that the various departments within the utility companies 
resulted in confusion for the consultants in terms of submitting documents to the right person, 
causing delay in the consultants’ operations. She added that,  
Sometimes, there is no coordination between the utilities’ district departments and the main 
utilities headquarters. It does not mean that the information or resources that are available at 
the headquarters are available at the district departments and vice versa. The communication 
between them internally also takes time. So unfortunately, we have to wait. 
It can be seen here that the consultants rely heavily on a continuous information flow from the 
utility companies, affecting any deficiencies arising from these external companies’ operations. 
Overall, these cases show that the pathogen of multiple layers of approval in organisational 
structure is prevalent not just in the public organisations’ system but also in other stakeholders’ 
organisations such as the client’s and utility companies’. This makes the public sector supply 
chain highly vulnerable to late decision making.  
The organisation pathogens discussed above are presented in Figure 5.6 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Underlying organisation pathogen that caused disruptions 
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The following section presents the emergent theme of behaviour pathogen identified in the 
interviews. 
	
5.8 Behaviour Pathogen 
Various types of behaviour were identified in the interviews, including opportunistic behaviour 
by contractors, which was seen as pathogenic to the consultant and the public organisations. 
For instance, according to Consultant CS1, the contractors tend to use unsettled land matters 
as an excuse to claim for extension of time (EOT) for roadwork projects, whatever their reason 
for not starting work on-site. However, this consultant claimed that,  
When we go on-site, we can clearly see those areas where the contractor can already start their 
work, also known as the ‘green areas’. It is only those ‘red areas’ that are still unsettled and 
they are not able to touch yet. The contractor wanted to wait until all the areas are ‘green’ and 
all the existing utilities relocated before he started work on site, which is not necessary. He was 
able to justify and use the land matters as an excuse to get the EOT three times. 
The consultant found that this illustrates poor planning by the contractor in terms of the 
sequence of commencing work on-site. The contractor’s act of taking advantage of the 
unsettled land matters eventually caused the contractor to be penalised by the public 
organisations for liquidated damages due to the late completion of the overall project. It also 
caused the contractor to face a significant loss of profit. Contractor CO1 acknowledged that, 
for contractors, with every disruption comes an opportunity because as a contractor, problem 
means money. He explained that he managed to recover from financial losses in a recent project 
by taking advantage of the work sequence, technicalities and the specifications of the project, 
which he justified as,  
I took advantage of alternative specifications to cut cost but I never break the law, I only bend 
the law. It is like if we take a ruler and bend it as much as we can but never break it.  
Nevertheless, Expert PO1 identified this act as pathogenic,  
The contractor usually finds an area where they can cut their costs, they will try hard to do that 
to make a profit. This affects the quality of the work. 
This opportunistic behaviour can in some cases be seen as pathogenic by other parties, but in 
the case of the contractor, this behaviour of taking opportunities was seen as reaction to recover 
from disruptive events.  
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The behaviour of external parties’ lack of a sense of urgency also makes the project team 
vulnerable to disruptions. Expert PO2 stated that it is easier to gather the internal project team 
to mitigate the problem when disruptions occur, but when it involves external parties (i.e. utility 
providers and other stakeholders), there is no sense of urgency in responding to disruptions. 
There were cases where a utility provider simultaneously constructed their cables right next to 
the public projects’ site. Expert PO2 explained that, 
They just started constructing about 30% of their cable, but they almost hit our embankment 
area that we want to construct. But these people are just lazy and simply do whatever they want 
to do. So I have to call them up, send a formal letter, call for a utility meeting. I have to urge 
them to make them understand that they have to be fast, because the moment they touch my 
line of area, I can not proceed with the work on-site, and the contractor will claim for EOT. 
Usually when I call for a meeting, some of them just take it easy, they do not come even after 
several warnings. 
Hence, when the public organisations depend on external parties, it will be difficult to adhere 
to the project timeframe as they do not have the same sense of urgency as the project team. 
Expert PO2 believes that things like this cannot be avoided,  
I can control my team, but I can not control the utility providers because I am not their boss. It 
is not an easy task, it is really challenging. 
This attitude of no sense of urgency results in a substantial waste of time and money to the 
public organisations.	There were also cases where disruptions arose through the contractor’s 
attitude of delaying small works. Expert PO5 claimed that sometimes the public project is 98% 
to 99% complete, and yet the contractor is not able to finish it off. He believes that this delay 
is not because of the money, but is due to their attitude: “they were too lazy to finish one or 
two things”. It can be seen here that the contractor’s attitude is perceived as a risk to the public 
organisations. Expert PO5 believes that this attitude is the most problematic risk as it is hard to 
alter someone’s behaviour. Naturally, the public organisations can not hand over an unfinished 
project to the client. In this case, due to the sluggish attitude of the contractor, the public 
organisations had to engage a third party just to complete the remaining 0.1% of the project, 
for minor things such as planting grass.  
The respondents also identified a common “us versus them” attitude among project team 
members; conflicting behaviours among parties is one of the main pathogens contributing to 
the vulnerability of the project team to disruption. Contractor CO1 pointed out that,   
It is usually the case where the client goes, “oh, I am the client, listen to me”, the contractor 
says, “oh, I am the contractor, I have got to make profit, I do not want any losses”, and for the 
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consultants, “oh, I am the policeman here!” and they only observe our mistakes. Sometimes the 
public organisations also have this attitude, “oh, you are just a contractor, what do you know, I 
am from the public organisation, I have authority”. That is problematic as well. 
This divergence usually leads to problems as each party has their own priorities. Nevertheless, 
it is important for the contracting parties to arrive at a certain agreement so that the project can 
be delivered effectively. This shows poor collaboration and risk sharing between the 
contracting parties. Furthermore, the blame culture is prevalent in public projects, which results 
in a poor level of sharing information among parties who do not trust each other. For instance, 
Contractor CO3 stated that during risk management meetings, contractors usually do not share 
all the information about risks on their side with the public organisations, because they do not 
want to be blamed by other parties if such risks occur. This was evident in Contractor CO4’s 
case, 
Everyone will find a way to blame another party when disruptions happen. So when the pillar 
cracks, the client blames the contractor and says we stole some of the steel, and then asks us to 
hack back the concrete to check if there’s steel in it, and there is steel in it. And then test the 
concrete because they are scared that we might lie about the concrete properties. Another test. 
So the victim is the contractor. 
Consultant CS3 also expressed his views on the blame culture when design failure occurs,  
People say, when the building design is beautiful, the architect gets the credit; they won’t 
mention us, the civil and structural (C&S) engineers. The C&S engineer is behind the scene 
and won’t get credit for it. But when the building collapses or faces design failure, the 
engineering consultant will be blamed first. It’s just the culture. 
Similarly, Expert PO2 pointed out that disruption due to design changes usually end up with 
arguments and blaming other parties for not considering the matter beforehand, causing further 
time and cost overruns. She observed that, 
If there’s one party that’s not committed to the project, this person is usually the weakest link. 
We can break at any time because of this particular person. We’re like a chain, the moment the 
chain breaks, we face disaster. We cannot let incompetent people stay for long, we have to settle 
it quickly because the ‘disease’ can be transmitted and spread like cancer to other parties in the 
team. So we have to eliminate that. Anyone’s problem is everyone’s problem. 
Indeed, Rice and Caniato (2003, p. 22) stated that “the supply network is inherently vulnerable 
to disruptions, and the failure of any one element in it could cause the whole network to fail”. 
This shows that ultimately, everyone plays a part from the upper tiers to the bottom tiers of the 
supply chain, as this will influence the level of resilience of the supply chain to disruptions. 
Expert PO2 found that attitude is the most problematic risk as it is hard to mitigate someone’s 
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behaviour. On the other hand, all three consultants and two out of the four contractors (CO3 
and CO4) argued that they could foresee the public organisations’ behaviour from their past 
experience in dealing with public projects. Thus, this risk of behaviour is included as a potential 
problem in their risk management plans. Consultant CS2 found that,  
We can try to minimise the risks, but we can not eliminate them entirely, because after all we 
are human; you can control your quantity of concrete or the size of your bar, but you cannot 
control the person that operate the things. 
Indeed, it is hard to control inappropriate acts by people who are in direct contact with the 
operations. Such acts are also known as ‘active failures’ by Love et al. (2011); when combined 
with the pathogens they can cause significant problems and have an adverse impact on project 
performance. This shows that the problem exists and lies within the behaviour of the 
contracting parties. However, behaviour has not been classified as a pathogen in past studies 
(Busby and Hughes, 2004; Love et al., 2011) but rather was considered as one of the triggers 
that could cause the pathogens to arise. However, in treating the pathogens as subjective 
interpretations (i.e. what the respondents considered as being pathogenic) in this study, the 
researcher believes that behaviour is one of the main pathogens that was constantly raised by 
the respondents as an underlying condition that makes projects susceptible to disruption. 
Indeed, Reason (1990) recognised that behaviour is difficult to change, but believed that the 
conditions under which people work can be improved and remedied before disruption occurs. 
Understanding the behaviour of the project team could therefore help in mitigating other 
pathogens identified in this study. 
Overall, the behaviour pathogens discussed above are presented in Figure 5.7 below. 
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Figure 5.7: Underlying behaviour pathogen that caused disruptions 
	
5.9 Summary 
This chapter discussed the relevant pathogens and vulnerability of public organisations and the 
supply chain to disruptions in public projects. Pathogens identified from the interviews were 
people’s deliberate practice, the circumstance the project operates in, the convention of 
government standards and regulations, and the organisational structure. In this case, the 
practice of poor assumptions at the planning and design phase disrupts the subsequent 
construction phase of the project. The inadequacy of these assumptions is not realised until an 
actual failure occurs on-site. The current circumstances of political interference and poor 
financial and economic conditions also result in unfavourable project team selection, limited 
quality standards and a significant loss of profit faced by the contractor. The established 
convention in the government system on the other hand, such as hierarchical decision making, 
the lessons learnt process, and their contractual terms, make them reluctant to change, 
remaining highly exposed to potential disruptions in public projects. The organisation structure 
that involves multiple departments and hierarchical decision-making processes causes 
fragmentation in the project delivery, making it harder for the project team to deal with the 
public organisations. Additionally, behaviour was identified as pathogenic by the respondents, 
whereby opportunistic behaviour by the contractor, lack of a sense of urgency by stakeholders, 
and conflicting behaviours among parties, affect project performance.  
Pathogens 
• The opportunistic behaviour by 
contractors 
• The behaviour of poor sense of 
urgency by external parties 
• The “us versus them” behaviour 
in project team 
• The blame-game behaviour 
among project team 
Disruptive Event 
• Unnecessary claims by 
contractors 
• Late completion of projects 
• Contractor delay small works 
• Interface with utility’s 
construction works  
• Additional risks went unnoticed   
Disruption Effect 
• Contractor faced 
penalisation 
• Loss of profit 
• Delay and cost 
overruns in operations 
 
Supply Chain Vulnerability 
• Poor collaboration and risk 
sharing among parties 
• Poor level of sharing information 
among parties 
• Lack of trust among contracting 
parties 
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It was also observed through the interviews that the pathogens identified could be interrelated. 
The interview findings show that the circumstance (i.e. political environment, economic 
conditions, lack of skilled workers) in which the public sector supply chain operates influences 
individual practice (i.e. poor assumptions in decision making) and behaviour in response to 
such a project environment. Existing organisational structure and established convention in 
government procedures also influences their management in operational and strategic decision 
making. The findings of this study on the practice and circumstance agree with previous studies 
(Busby and Hughes, 2004; Love et al., 2011). However, unlike these studies, the nature of the 
task performed was not identified as pathogenic to our respondents, although an emergent 
theme of behaviour was identified as pathogenic instead. Overall, the identification through 
these interviews of the pathogenic influences gave the researcher a good understanding of the 
areas in which the parties are vulnerable.  
The triangulation of the findings identified in the interviews and the questionnaire survey 
(Chapter 4) are discussed in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the discussion on the triangulation of data from both the questionnaire 
and interview analysis. It discusses the key findings identified in the questionnaire survey 
results (Chapter 4), with justification from the interview findings (Chapter 5) and the literature. 
It begins by examining the public sector supply chain’s past experiences in dealing with 
disruptive events, based on the survey analysis (Section 4.3): the frequent disruptive events and 
critical effects of acute disruptions in public projects, the level of frequency and severity of 
these disruptions, the current disruption management approach employed by the organisations, 
and the respondents’ proposed suggestions for managing disruptions. This is followed by a 
summary of Section 4.4: analysis of the public sector supply chain’s critical vulnerabilities and 
capabilities. Finally, the final framework of this study and its validation are presented to 
highlight the key findings and propose related resilience measures. This is in line with 
Objective 5 (Section 1.4), in developing a resilience response framework to improve supply 
chain performance in meeting its resilience goals to mitigate against disruptive events in 
Malaysian public sector projects. 
 
6.2 Supply Chain’s Past Experiences of Disruptive Events in Public Projects 
 
The following is based on the analysis presented in Section 4.3 on the respondents’ past 
experiences in dealing with disruptions. Respondents from the questionnaire includes 54 
number of respondents from the public organisations, and 51 respondents from the private 
organisations engaged by the public organisations to carry out the public projects (see 
respondents’ profile in Section 4.2). 
 
6.2.1 Frequent Disruptive Events in Public Projects 
 
Quality problems 
The survey results in Figure 4.1 revealed that only 13% of the contractors and consultants 
considered quality problems to be the most frequent cause of disruptions faced in public 
projects, as against 26% of the public organisations. The emphasis of the latter on quality is 
due to the influence of the Malaysian Construction Industry Development Board’s (CIDB) aim 
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to improve the quality of work, through their Construction Industry Master Plan (2006-2015). 
This seems rational given the importance placed on the functionality of the final product, 
chiefly public buildings and infrastructure, as pointed out by Expert PO2, 
…for us who represent the client, it is more the technical and quality issues that are important 
as we want to provide the road and facilities for the public, for the safety of the public. 
One of the consultants (CS3) interviewed observed the discrepancy between the public 
organisations’ and contractors’ emphasis on quality in their design,  
There is a difference between the designs proposed by the contractor and the public 
organisations’ design team. For the contractor’s version, they will give a proposal based on 
their cost effectiveness and time effectiveness because of the profit, but for the public 
organisations’ design team, they will provide a proposal based on quality and technical 
effectiveness, and whether the design can save costs. So apart from cost, quality is very 
important to the client. 
	
Indeed, the researcher’s review of the literature (Abdul-Rahman, 1997; El-Sayegh, 2008; 
Sambasivan and Soon, 2007) confirmed the public organisations’ concern with quality, 
highlighting acute disruptive events caused by poor workmanship on-site, often the 
contractors’ fault. However, the contractors and consultants surveyed took quality for granted 
and did not perceive it as a key or frequent cause of disruption in public projects. An expert 
from the public organisations (PO3) explained that, 
Sometimes the disruption arises from the contractors when they select their team. The team 
they choose sometimes does not care to comply with our quality standards. As long as they 
construct the building, they do not care about whether they follow the concrete grade 
specification, the right formwork. This effects the quality of the work. This is because they 
want to cut cost. So contractors usually find areas where they can cut their costs, they will try 
to do that the best that they can to make a profit. But the public organisations already identify 
the quality or checklist of things that we want. 
This shows the diverse goals between the public organisations and contractors in terms of 
prioritising quality versus cost, which could affect public project performance. 
	
Failure of key customers  
On the other hand, the contractors and consultants seem to have experienced several episodes 
of acute disruptions caused by their key supplier or customer (17%). Both contractors (CO2 
and CO3) and consultants (CS1 and CS2) seem to be in agreement in raising the issue relating 
to the failure of their key customers, in this case, the public organisations who, they claimed, 
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always make frequent design changes and take a long time in finalising their decisions, causing 
disruption to the design and construction operations,  
Due to added pressure by the client or higher authorities, the public organisations get stressed 
and keep asking us to review the designs many times, and up until the last minute, we are still 
reviewing drawings. (CS2) 
Clients like to follow their heart and change designs as and when they like, and want it 
immediately, like tomorrow. So it depends, everyone is forced to work against an unrealistic 
deadline. (CO3) 
The analysis of the supply chains and the different perspectives of the public and private 
organisations (contractors and consultants) suggests diverse concerns relating to the perceived 
cause of acute disruptions. Ironically, considering that the public organisations blame quality 
problems on the contractors’ deficiencies, and that the private organisations blame failure oo 
their customers (i.e. the public organisations) as the most frequent disruptions in public 
projects, this suggests a possible issue of trust between the two groups of respondents. 
Failure of key suppliers 
In terms of the failure of key suppliers, the result of this study is consistent with data obtained 
in similar studies conducted in other developing countries such as Vietnam (Le-Hoai et al., 
2008) and Nigeria (Aibinu and Odeyinka, 2006), whereby shortage of materials due to 
unreliable suppliers and sub-contractors’ or suppliers’ slow mobilisation of materials was 
perceived to be in the top five most frequent causes of delay and cost overruns in local 
construction projects. Suppliers here are referred to as external organisations that supply the 
materials, information or services required for the respondents’ operations. One of the 
contractors (CO2) stated that,  
Usually what happens with suppliers is the delay during supply. Their reason usually is because 
the material is imported from other countries and the shipping caused delay. So the supply to 
site is late because some suppliers acquire resources from outside the country. When the supply 
to site is late, it will affect our construction completion date. 
Another contractor (CO3) addressed his experience in dealing with inconsistencies in the 
quality of the materials imported by their suppliers, 
….usually the material or sample that we initially approved was good, the ones we test are the 
correct ones from the supplier in China. But later when the actual material arrives on site, the 
quality is different. That is the problem when dealing with imported materials. Such as imported 
steel, the sample that the supplier sends sometimes has a different composition from that 
delivered to site; the material property that arrives on-site differs. 
A consultant (CS1) also addressed frequent disruptions due to the failure of their key supplier 
of information (the utility organisations),  
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It does not necessarily mean that the information that the utility provider gave is correct, it is 
usually a 50-50 scenario. When we receive such data from them on the mapping of existing 
cables on site before we started designing the roadworks, we usually comment and check the 
same data over three times to ensure whether it is correct. This inconsistency in the information 
provided causes delays to our design work. Sometimes we are forced to make our own 
assumptions.  
On the other hand, the acuteness of this factor might also be due to the effect of the supply 
chain relationships with private clients (see supply chain network in Figure 2.4) where the same 
key suppliers or customers might pose a threat of disruption, resulting in interdependent 
impacts on other supply chains. This is evident in the case highlighted by Contractor (CO3),  
…one other thing that affects our construction is, as we are a developing country, when we 
want to implement something, our raw material actually is not there, for example, steel bars. 
So at the end of the day when all the public and private projects overlap or clash, especially 
with a mega-rail project like Mass Rapid Transit that begins at the same time as our government 
hospital project, the demand for steel becomes very high. At the end of the day the supplier 
increases the price. There is no consistency. 
Given that the contractors and consultants could be doing one public project with several 
private projects involving international suppliers, the failure of any supplier or customer arising 
from not only the public but also the private sector-initiated supply chains could disrupt all the 
contractors’ operations.  
	
Financial crisis  
Financial crisis was highlighted by both the public (16%) and private organisations (17%) as 
one of the most frequent disruptive events faced. As discussed in Section 2.2.1, the volatility 
of the Malaysian economy indeed affects the construction industry’s operation. According to 
Contractor CO1, 
When the oil price increases, the material and transportation prices increase. For this recent 
public project, we had financial problems due to the increase in oil price, and I had to absorb 
all the losses. 
Contractor CO3 pointed out similar issues on how the devaluation of the Ringgit Malaysia 
against major currencies affected their financial cash flow, 
So the problem that we are facing now is the currency that goes up and down, that is very bad. 
There are a lot of building components that are actually affected by the currency such as steel. 
So when we tendered for the hospital project, the exchange rate was RM3.20 to 1 US dollar. 
But now it is 4 US dollars, an 80 cents increase. If we consider the cost of equipment, say RM50 
million, this means we are losing almost RM32 million. You see? If the currency goes up 20 or 
30 cents it is still reasonable, but no, an 80 cents increase is high. 
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Payment issues due to financial constraints on the public organisations is also a problem in 
public projects. Interviewees from the different sectors held similar opinions,  
…the public organisations made late payments to the contractor. The contractor claimed today, 
but only received payment 12 months later. (CS3) 
The public organisations usually do not pay on time. Even if I worked like mad it does not 
guarantee that I will receive timely payment from the public organisations. (CO4) 
Sometimes we have to compromise on the objective based on the available budget, so not all 
objectives are achieved. Even if we produce the best design, in the end, the client does not have 
sufficient resources or budget, hence we cannot continue with the design. So we have to find 
an alternative solution. (PO1) 
Similarly, a joint study by CIDB and University Malaya in 2006 had identified that payment 
issues were severe and a source of major concern to the construction industry; the majority of 
the 333 contractors surveyed faced delays in receiving payments during project delivery 
(CIDB, 2006). Subsequently, this late payment caused delay of the contractor’s work progress 
due to the inadequate cash flow to support the construction expenditures (Sambasivan and 
Soon, 2007, Abd. Shukor et al., 2010), thus threatening the overall success of the construction 
project (Alaghbari et al., 2007). Financial problems such as delayed payments and financial 
difficulties in construction are also prevalent in other developed and developing countries such 
as in Vietnam (Le-Hoai et al., 2008), Jordan (Sweis et al., 2007), Nigeria (Aibinu and 
Odeyinka, 2006), Hong Kong (Lo et al., 2006), Kuwait (Koushki et al., 2005) and Ghana 
(Frimpong et al., 2003), making it imperative for the construction supply chain to improve their 
resilience to such financial disruptions.   
 
Regulatory issues 
The next most frequent disruption faced by both groups of respondents was regulatory issues 
(11%). This is reasonable as all public projects come under government rules and regulations; 
approval from different levels of the public organisations are needed before projects can be 
implemented, as pointed out by Expert PO3, 
…our strategy is tied up to contractual terms, politics and procedure. So we could not just alter 
things like that; if we want to do something that is out of the procedure, we have to go one step 
higher by meeting with the higher level authority or minister. 
Another expert from the public organisation (PO1) and consultant organisation (CS1) 
contended that some of the government procedures that take a long time could be disruptive to 
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the public project, especially when recovering from a disruptive event (e.g. design changes, 
change of budget), 
When design changes occur, the design itself is easy and can be completed quite fast. But this 
process does not involve the design only, it involves revising the Bill of Quantities (BQ) and 
contract, there is a procedure for this. We have to coordinate with other parties and agencies 
and that usually take a lot of time. (PO1) 
To increase the allocated budget of a project is not an easy process. The public organisations 
have to prepare all the necessary documents to justify the increase in budget and request 
additional money from the relevant authorities. The decision will take a long time as it will go 
back and forth from the higher manager to us, the consultant. Procedurally, the public 
organisations usually request 10 working days for the higher level directors to make a decision. 
But in most cases, it takes a longer time than that. (CS1) 
This shows how strict government regulations can hinder the project team members’ operations 
in reacting to and recovering from disruptive events. This result, however, differs from similar 
studies (Le-hoai et al., 2008; Sambasivan and Soon, 2007; Lo et al., 2006) where obstacles 
from government regulations were not highlighted. Nevertheless, considering that the public 
organisations in this study are service providers for the government and are bound by its policy, 
treasury circulars, technical instructions and specifications, it is rational that strict regulations 
could restrict the supply chain’s operations. The report by the CIDB (2008) highlighted a 
similar problem, where the government’s unfavourable legislation and inefficient bureaucratic 
practices were the subject of complaint by local construction industry players in Malaysia, 
affecting public project delivery.  
 
6.2.2 Critical Effects of Acute Disruptions in Public Projects 
 
Delay and cost overruns 
Based on Figure 4.2, the majority of the organisations found that the most critical effect of 
disruptions on project performance was delay in delivering products or services to customers 
(56%) and higher cost of operations (33%). This is consistent with the literature, where the 
frequent cost and time overruns have been stressed (Sambasivan and Soon, 2007; Abdul-
Rahman et al., 2006; Ng et. al., 2001). Similarly, the survey conducted by Ahmad et al. (2009) 
on delays in the Malaysian construction industry revealed that the majority of their respondents 
had encountered delays in their projects 10 to 40% in excess of the actual contract duration. 
Another report also found that 80% of government projects faced significant delay (Joshi, 
2009). Indeed, the issue of delay and cost overruns is evidently a concern shared across the 
respondents in this study. The factors that contributed to time and cost overruns, such as the 
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frequent disruptive events (i.e. quality problems, failure of key suppliers), could arise from any 
part of the supply chain, including client, public organisations and contractors. For instance, 
two experts from the public organisations pointed out how disruption due to the client’s 
constant design changes had caused significant delay and cost overruns to their operations, 
…due to delay in decision making we rescheduled and we gave the client another deadline to 
finalise their decisions on the design. But they have still have not finalised the design , and this 
has caused delay to the overall construction works and discrepancies in costs. (PO1) 
…during the initial phase of the project, there is also delay due to the client’s requirement that 
caused us to keep revising the design. This affects a lot of other things. For instance, there were 
additional changes to the interior design’s (ID) lighting works. So basically, even though in 
terms of the work programme the ID works can be conducted at the end, the information needs 
to be gathered much earlier. Because after they agree, only then can we fabricate the lights at 
the factory, which takes time. (PO6) 
It is worth noting here that the client could also be affected by additional professional fees and 
possibly a reduced return in their investments when projects face such significant delays (Endut 
et al., 2009). It is also evident here that late decision making by the client could affect the public 
organisations’ timely decision making on subsequent work. It was therefore not surprising that 
Expert PO4 and Contractor CO1 reported significant delays due to the late decision making on 
the public organisations’ side in some public projects,   
…the public organisations delayed for about five to six months in appointing the contractor. 
They ended up giving the appointment letter in just an ad-hoc manner. Like in a forced way, 
they had to do it because it was too late. That caused the substantial delay to the subsequent 
works. (PO4) 
The project was delayed for three years due to late land acquisition by the public organisations. 
That was really slow, the original contract was three years, but the project was completed in six 
years with significant high cost overruns. (CO1) 
It might be the case here that the frequent disruption by regulatory issues previously reported 
by the public organisations had caused the length of time it took for approvals and decision 
making. Apart from the client and public organisations, delay could also arise from the bottom 
tiers of the supply chain, such as the contractors and suppliers, as highlighted by Consultant 
CS3,  
	
…the bridge project faced delay about one year due to the contractor’s mismanagement in terms 
of their communication with their team on-site. The procurement of the material from the 
suppliers was also really late, which had caused significant time overruns during construction.  
Indeed, past researchers (Koushki et al., 2005; Frimpong et al., 2003) shared similar views that 
construction projects often faced delays in the procurement and arrival of material on-site, 
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holding up the overall completion date. In most cases, surplus material was also on site after 
project completion (Abdul-Rahman and Alidrisyi, 1994), causing significant construction 
waste. It is therefore reasonable that the failure of key supplier was perceived by the contractors 
and consultants to be the most frequent disruptive event in the survey, as previously discussed 
(see Figure 4.1). The critical effect of delay and cost overruns due to external parties was also 
evident in the disruptions highlighted by the contractors, 
…the utility companies delayed their operation in relocating the existing utilities on-site 
because for them, it is not urgent. But for the public organisations, it is urgent and for us, the 
contractor, it is urgent. If they do not do the relocation, we cannot proceed with our work on 
site and the project faces delay. That is the conflict. (CO1) 
We faced severe disruptions due to design failure by the consultants engaged. It becomes a big 
problem to contractors when design fails, it is not a minor problem. The worst thing was that 
the structural design failure was identified after everything had been completed. So the project 
was put on a halt and we had to demolish the building and redo it. That is the worst disruption 
I have ever faced. The project faced delay for a long time, delayed for five years, and of course, 
the costs exceeded the budget tremendously. (CO4) 
	
This shows how timely and costly it is for not just the public organisations but for the 
contractors as well to get the public projects back on track once disrupted. Hence, albeit the 
various scale and magnitude of disruptive events, the critical effect is definitely felt across the 
supply chain. This is a great concern as about 17.3% of 417 public projects in Malaysia were 
considered ‘sick projects’ in 2005, facing more than three months of delay or, even worse, 
being abandoned (Sambasivan and Soon, 2007). Furthermore, when delay occurs, disputes 
often arise between the public organisations and the contractor on the contractual terms in 
deciding whether the contractor is entitled to claim for the extra cost incurred. Certainly, delay 
is considered a major cause of construction claims (Abdul-Rahman et al., 2006) that affect both 
the public organisations’ and contractor’s finance. The duration of the construction projects is 
either extended or accelerated when delay occurs, contributing to the critical effect of cost 
overruns (Sambasivan and Soon, 2007), as reflected in the survey results. Ultimately, the 
findings imply that the public organisations are still vulnerable in managing and controlling 
the costs, design and scope of public projects, seriously exposing their supply chain to the 
critical effect of time and cost overruns. The interdependencies between the supply chain’s 
operations also make it imperative for all parties to work together in building their resilience 
to such disruptive events in an effort to improve public project performance.  
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Defects in quality 
Surprisingly enough, as with the previous results on frequent disruptions, the contractors and 
consultants did not find defects in quality as one of the critical effects of disruptions (7%), 
despite the assertion in previous studies that the risk of disruptions could hamper the quality of 
construction projects (Ibrahim et al., 2010; Le-Hoai et al., 2008; Pratt, 2000). The public 
organisations, however, have a different view on this and placed higher pressure on defects in 
quality (21%) as one of the major effects of disruptions. This is possibly due to the fact that as 
a public government body, any delay, quality problem or other disruption faced by these 
organisations has a significant impact on their reputation in the public’s eyes. For instance, 
when public roadworks face quality problems, the public organisations are hit by constant 
complaints from the local road users, as reflected by Expert PO1, 
	
For instance, the ELITE highway that collapsed has still not been settled. Media coverage of 
the case and complaints by the public put pressure on us to resolve the issue quickly. We ended 
up suffering because the public put pressure to us to settle this within two days, which is 
unrealistic.  
It is indeed difficult to meet the high expectations of quality in public projects. The same expert 
added that most of the times, the locals underestimate the amount of work that has to be done 
in recovering from such quality defects. This includes diverting the traffic, engaging 
contractors to do the recovery, and improving the overall quality of the road. He further argued 
that, 
…such quality problems become a social problem, not technical any more because people do 
not understand why we have to design the road a certain way. When we talk with people in the 
same field it is easier, but as a user, their perspectives are different. All they know is that they 
want to drive to their destination quickly, they are not considerate. We have to compromise on 
certain aspects, and not everybody is happy. 
This is one of the reasons why maintaining quality is important to the public organisations. 
Furthermore, as previously discussed, quality problems often arise due to deficiencies of 
operations in the construction phase. Expert PO2 emphasised how defects in quality could 
result from the inconsistencies of material provided by the suppliers, 
…let’s say the material is made off-site. Like in this project now, the suppliers send the 
completed mixed concrete on-site, but how are you going to control the quality? We have this 
problem that because the suppliers want to make money, they want to optimise their mix. 
Sometimes we found slippage in our concreting because we did not get the right quality of mix, 
and this disrupts our work progress. So we had to hack back the concrete three times and redo 
the work. We still have not achieved the concrete strength that we want right now. 
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In this case, the quality of the concrete they tested had only achieved marginal strength. 
Subsequently, the section of the building that was already built using the supplier’s mixed 
concrete had cracked, causing substantial rework and disrupting the overall work progress. 
Hence, the incompetence of other parties in the supply chain can affect the level of quality of 
the public organisations’ operations. The frequent financial crises reported earlier by the 
respondents could also be a contributory factor to quality issues, as cash-flow problems may 
result in the contractors or suppliers sacrificing quality to save costs. Abdul-Aziz (2001) and 
Sambasivan and Soon (2007) also raised concerns about the quality of work provided by 
unskilled foreign workers. The Malaysian construction industry relies heavily on foreign 
workers, who come predominantly from neighbouring Indonesia (MALBEX, 2005). However, 
Sambasivan and Soon (2007) contended that some of them are illegal workers and are not as 
well trained as the local labourers in carrying out the work on-site. Indeed, Contractor CO4 
shared his difficulties in dealing with the foreign workers, 
At one time I worked with more than 300 workers from Indonesia. It is just tiring in terms of 
answering their queries because they are not as competent as us and do not think ahead yet. If 
we say A, they will do A only, they do not know where to modify or alter works if problems 
arise. Like for plastering, they will do just plastering.  
Consequently, unskilled foreign workers could hamper the quality and efficiency of the project 
delivery. The same contractor further justified why he prefers to engage his own foreign 
workers, 
I hire my own foreign workers from Indonesia and train them because I am brave enough to 
take that risk. If I want to make my job easier, I will sub the works to other labour under the 
sub-contractors. But by hiring my own foreign workers, I can get more profit than what was 
stated in the Bills of Quantities (BQ); instead of RM2 million, I can get profit up to RM3 
million. So it all depends on the risk the contractor is willing to take, because it is indeed a high 
risk to train your own foreign labour. 
	
Ultimately, it can be seen from interviewee PO2’s and CO4’s experience that there is a degree 
of inconsistency in the goals set by the public organisations and those of the suppliers or 
contractors in terms of prioritising profit as opposed to quality, which could affect the public 
projects’ overall performance. This scenario is indeed not ideal to encourage quality in the 
supply chain operations. Hence, substantial improvements are needed by both parties to 
achieve and maintain quality standards in public projects.  
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Loss of productivity 
On the other hand, the contractors and consultants reported having faced higher critical effects 
of disruptions on their internal performance: loss of productivity (16%), decrease in profit 
(15%) and loss of skilled workers (9%). Based on Figure 4.2, the contractors and consultants 
rated loss of productivity as one of the top three critical effects of disruptions on their 
operations. These results are in line with the findings identified in the Business Continuity 
Institute’s (2014) survey of the global construction sector, whereby the loss of productivity was 
reported to be one of the key consequences of supply chain disruptions, above increased cost 
of working and loss of revenue. Certainly, researchers in the Malaysian construction industry 
(Abdul-Kadir et al. 2005, Ibrahim et al., 2010; Durdyev et al., 2016) have acknowledged that 
it is facing low productivity due to inadequate technology usage, over-dependence on foreign 
workers, poor performance monitoring and control, unskilled labour, shortage of construction 
manpower, and material supply. It seems that other developing countries are facing similar 
issues: constant rework, inadequate equipment and the lack of materials were perceived as 
major constraints to construction productivity in Nigeria (Olomolaiye et al., 1987). Issues such 
as the method and technology adopted in the construction projects, planning and supervisory 
system, as well as weather and site conditions, are major factors affecting sub-contractors’ 
productivity in Iran (Ghoddousi and Hosseini, 2012). In the case of the public sector supply 
chain, poor productivity can be attributed to inefficient practices within the supply chain 
operations. These include the previously discussed client’s constant design changes mentioned 
by interviewees PO1, PO6, CS2 and CO3, and inconsistencies in the quality of the 
workmanship on-site highlighted by interviewees PO3 and CO3. External factors such as 
fluctuation in material prices addressed by Contractors CO1 and CO3, and the lengthy 
government regulations pointed out by interviewees PO3, PO1 and CS1, could also affect the 
level of productivity in delivering public projects. Moreover,	Contractor CO3 found that the 
size of the construction organisation could also affect their level of productivity, 
Large companies have too many layers of authority causing slow decision making. It is not easy 
to go straight to the board of directors in large companies to make decisions and it is not the 
directors’ priority to manage problems as they have other things to do. For us, a medium-sized 
company, we do not have a project manager, but we have a project director who reports to me 
daily. Sometimes I call him hourly. So we are more productive and efficient in terms of 
handling problems on-site. It is different with the big companies, I do not think the director will 
call the lower level project director or go all the way to the supervisor to ask what is the 
problem?  
Ultimately, this contractor believes that small and medium-sized construction organisations are 
more productive and efficient because all of the work is done within the company without too 
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many layers or departments. Contractor CO1 added that increasing productivity is crucial, 
especially when recovering from disruptive events,  
…we did the recovery day-to-day, by having daily targets to overcome the delay. For recovery 
we added more machines and manpower to recover from the disruptive events. We want to 
increase productivity and cut time. 
Indeed, looking at the contractor’s operations, their main inputs are labour, materials, 
machinery, services, sub-contractors, suppliers, profits and other costs (Bernold and AbouRizk, 
2010). Hence, any disruptions due to the failure of their manpower and resources will affect 
their level of productivity.  
 
Decrease in profit 
The survey results revealed that the contractors also faced higher loss of profit in their 
operations than the public organisations. Understandably, when construction projects face time 
overruns, the contractors’ performance will be seriously affected, resulting in increased costs 
in their operations and reduced profit margins (Endut et al., 2009). For instance, Contractor 
CO1 shared his experience in dealing with the loss of profit due to late land acquisition by the 
public organisations,  
We had to bear a lot of loss due to the delay in land acquisition. We lost about RM8 million 
due to this problem. We had to fight with the public organisations to justify the claims for the 
loss and expense incurred due to late land acquisition. 
Disruptions arising from incompetent sub-contractors also affected contractors’ profits, as 
pointed out by Contractor CO4,   
Problems arise when the sub-contractors do not perform. Because the schedule and timeline is 
under the main contractor, the one who bears the loss is the main contractor. So if when sub-
contractors do not perform on time, the contractor’s time and money will be affected. 
This shows the level of interconnected risks between the supply chain operations, whereby 
disruptions caused by other parties in the supply chain (i.e. public organisations, sub-
contractors) can ultimately affect the contractor’s level of profit. Furthermore, Contractor CO3 
shared his concern in dealing with very low profit margins when undertaking public projects 
adopting the Industrialised Building System (IBS), 
	
If 80% of the contract cost is to be spent on the suppliers for the IBS components, how much 
does the main contractor need to mark up their price in the tender to get profit? Just imagine, if 
that project is RM5 million for a school, the IBS component alone is over RM3 million, and 
the remaining RM2 million is for the main contractor to construct it. 
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In this case, the contractor had to make large initial payments to the supplier for the IBS 
components. A large amount of the contract sum was therefore spent on the supplier’s 
operations, resulting in the contractor working with a limited profit margin. Evidently, this 
shows the high exposure of contractors to losses in construction projects. On the other hand, 
the public organisations (4%) do not perceive the loss of profit as a critical impact, possibly 
because they are more concerned about the cost effectiveness of the project and ensuring that 
the public’s money is spent wisely (see Section 2.2.1). Certainly, this is a different case from 
the private organisations, because as a business entity, maintaining and gaining profit is even 
more crucial for the long-term survival of these organisations. The lack of ability to bounce 
back from disruptions in construction, however, could impede the progress of their operation, 
causing immediate and long-term negative impacts on the growth of their business.  
 
Loss of skilled workers 
The survey also highlighted that some of the contractors and consultants were affected by the 
loss of skilled workers in their operations. Indeed, Ofori (2012) found that the lack of skilled 
construction workers is prevalent, especially in developing countries, due to the inadequate 
training of the workforce. Contractor CO2 explained that,  
	
It is not easy to develop the required skills, especially for foreign workers, due to the language 
barriers and their existing skills or knowledge. Maybe in their country, they serve as a farmer, 
and suddenly when they come here they have to use tools such as hammer and material such as 
concrete. Indeed the beginning is always a problem. What we can do is train them and give 
them just general work at the beginning. 
It is indeed challenging to deal with a construction workforce that does not provide the quality 
of service that the local professionals are used to (Ofori, 2012). Another contractor (CO3) 
contended that the Malaysian construction industry still needs to rely on foreign workers 
because the local people will not do this kind of ‘dirty and dangerous’ work in construction,  
	
…some people do not agree with engaging foreign workers, but for the people who are actually 
involved in the industry like us, without the foreign workers, who wants to do the work? Out 
of 22 to 25 million people in Malaysia, the skilled workers that we have constitute about 30 
percent. So foreign workers are favourable to my industry. But when the government stops 
foreign work applications and do a lot of raids on-site, despite having a work permit or not, 
these workers will run away. And we end up facing the loss of workers on-site.  
He added that the construction industry will not move forward without the engagement of 
foreign workers. Similarly, Ibrahim et al. (2010) found that the construction industry’s human 
resources were a key issue with a significant impact on the Malaysian construction industry’s 
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performance in meeting demands.Two of the contractors interviewed also addressed their 
concerns regarding the local consultants’ current level of knowledge and skills, 
…even though the consultant engineers do the design, it does not mean that they can construct. 
Let’s say they want to use Y32 steel bars in their design, that is big, with the spacing between 
the bars, 8 millimetres. They do not even know if there are enough spaces to pour the concrete 
in between the steel gaps. You see? Engineers, but they do not know up to that level. But people 
like us, who work on-site, would know. With the spacing they suggested between the bars, we 
know there is a risk that we will not be able to pour the concrete in that small space. 
Hence, in reality, despite being qualified as professional engineers, some of the consultants’ or 
designers’ knowledge could not be applied to what is actually on site. This shows the great 
discrepancies between the consultants who plan, design (including both architectural and 
engineering), and prepare documentation and the parties who plan, implement and execute the 
actual construction on-site, such as the contractors (Ibrahim et al., 2010). Contractor CO4 had 
a similar view, 
The local engineers think they are smarter, but the fact is, sometimes they do not know the 
actual work on-site. The labourers on-site are sometimes smarter than the local engineers. For 
instance, we usually have to calculate first, one tonne of Y32 steel bars equals how many 
numbers of bars? But the workers on-site can straight away tell us that one tonne equals 12 
bars, they know more than us. But in the end, the engineer gets the credit. 
Subsequently, the inadequate level of skills among the project team members could be 
problematic, causing the significant loss of productivity previously discussed in the supply 
chain’s operations.  
	
Reputation damage 
Unlike the contractors and consultants, the public organisations perceived that disruptions 
could critically damage their reputation (14%). This is possibly due to the sensitivity of 
reputation in the eyes of the public higher up the hierarchy. It can be observed through the 
survey results that the risks in time, cost and quality impacts frequently damaged their 
reputation. According to one interviewee from the public organisations (PO3),  
 
…if we do not solve our problems, the client, public and media will not trust us any more. 
Indeed, when disruptions arise, the public organisations’ reputation is at stake, and it is 
shameful if we do not provide the quality of services that we are expected to give. It also 
involves the pride of the different state and the country. 
Indeed, the public organisations are highly exposed to public scrutiny as they play a significant 
role in providing major infrastructure to achieve the nation’s socio-economic needs and raise 
the national quality of life and standard of living (Othman et al., 2006). It is evident from the 
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interviews that the public organisations still faced various complaints from the public and their 
stakeholders on project performance. For instance, the interviewees highlighted various 
complaints from the public on the newly upgraded highway projects delivered by the public 
organisations. Consultant CS2 pointed out complaints by local road users in rural areas due to 
drastic changes in the traffic flow; Consultant CS1 mentioned the significant pressure the 
project team faced from the media to fix a collapsed road very quickly; while Expert PO5 
highlighted that they are not able to entertain all public complaints because it is not feasible to 
fulfil everyone’s requirements. Another expert from the public organisations (PO2) explained 
that, 
When we work we need to have two sets of skills, the hard skills for the technical work, and 
soft skills as well. Soft skills are the ones we need in terms of how you want to deal with the 
complaints from local people who do not have the same understanding as an engineer or 
manager. It depends on how do you want to deal with them. We have to handle complaints 
individually and give them justification. 
Indeed, dealing with the public that does not have the same technical background as the 
construction professionals could affect the public’s perception of the public organisations’ 
operations. Contractor CO4 shared his experiences in controlling the impact of a design failure 
in a completed public project, 
The project was in the middle of the city, so when it stopped due to design failure, the public 
organisations did not want the public or media to know. So we had to demolish the building by 
excavating it slowly so that people could not see what we actually did on-site. We could not 
straight away bulldoze it and demolish everything. The people only know that the building there 
is not completed yet. 
This shows how important it is to prevent the impact of disruption from spreading, in order to 
maintain the public organisations’ reputation. An article in the Malay Mail entitled, “We must 
learn from past disasters” (2009) highlighted one of the worst disasters faced by the public 
organisations, when the roof of the completed Sultan Mizan Zainal Abidin Stadium in Kuala 
Terengganu, that had cost RM292 million, collapsed. This questioned the professional conduct 
of the various parties involved in the construction of the stadium, and the public demanded a 
thorough and transparent investigation at the time of the incident (Malay Mail, 2009). 
Undeniably, cases like this could reduce the public’s confidence in the public organisations. It 
is therefore very important for public projects to be completed on time and to meet the quality 
standards, as the clients, users, stakeholders and the general public usually look at project 
success in relation to time, quality and cost (Lim and Mohamed, 2000). On the other hand, the 
private organisations (7%) do not consider reputational damage as one of the critical impacts 
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of disruptions. As discussed in Section 2.2.1, they have much more flexibility in their 
operations than do public organisations, as they are not responsible for handling the public’s 
money.  
 
Overall, the discrepancies between the public and private organisations’ perceptions in this 
survey suggest that they have different priorities, with the former’s main concern being higher 
quality and public reputation, and the latter’s, as business entities, the long-term profitability 
of their operations. This degree of dissimilar goals within the same supply chain is problematic 
considering the interconnected risks they share (see interdependency in Sections 1.1 and 2.3). 
Finding common ground or mutual objectives is therefore imperative to reduce the impact of 
disruptions in public projects and build supply chain resilience. 
 
Table 6.1 summarises the key findings on frequent disruptive events and the critical effects of 
acute disruptions in public projects. 
 
Table 6.1: Summary of the frequent disruptive events and the critical effects in public projects  
Frequent disruptive events in public projects Critical effects of acute disruptions  
1. Quality problems due to poor workmanship 
on-site 
2. Failure of key customers including frequent 
design changes by client 
3. Failure of key suppliers (including utility 
companies) due to delay in supplying 
materials and inconsistent information shared 
4. Financial crisis due to devaluation of 
currency and late payment by public 
organisations 
5. Regulatory issues such as strict government 
regulations and layers of approval  
1. Delay and cost overruns in operations 
2. Defects in quality due to poor workmanship 
and material supply 
3. Loss of productivity due to inefficient 
practices in operations 
4. Decrease in profit faced by private 
organisations 
5. Loss of skilled workers on-site 
6. Reputational damage to the public 
organisations 
 
6.2.3 Level of Frequency and Severity of Disruptions in Public Projects 
 
One of the key findings identified in the survey is the statistically significant differences in the 
scores on the perceptions of level of disruption frequency among the public organisations, 
contractors and consultants, as shown in Figure 4.3 and the Kruskal-Wallis test in Table 4.5. 
Over half of the respondents from the private organisations reported that they often or always 
face disruptions in dealing with public projects. Further detailed statistical results showed that 
the contractors from the private organisations overall recorded a higher mean rank, 70.08, than 
the public organisations (mean rank = 47.68) and consultants (mean rank = 47.63) in rating the 
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level of frequency of disruptions in public projects. This indicates that despite all parties in the 
supply chain facing disruptions, disruptive events were perceived to have originated in the 
contractors’ operations from the bottom tier of the supply chain (see Figure 2.4) during public 
project delivery. Considering the interdependence of the design-construction process in a 
construction project, it might be that inefficiencies earlier in the supply chain are realised at the 
construction phase, in which the contractors are mainly involved. An expert from the public 
organisation (PO2) who supervises construction work on-site contended that,  
	
Usually problems arise at the planning phase and spread to the procurement, design, 
construction until the handing over phase. Because everything is done based on planning. 
 
Indeed, Hamid et al. (2008) argued that disruptions during construction frequently arise as a 
result of poor integration and deficiencies in the pre-construction phase, which subsequently 
leave the parties involved in the following construction phase exposed to potential disruptions 
and the impact of such inefficiencies.	An interviewee from the public organisations (PO4) 
highlighted a similar case in which frequent disruptions occurred during the construction phase 
of a public sports hall project, due to poor planning and late awarding of the contractor at the 
tendering phase. In this case, the time was fixed as the construction had to be completed before 
the fixed date of a sports event that would be held at the hall, 
None of the deficiencies at the pre-construction phase, such as late decision making on 
procurement, unclear drawings, and the scope of work not being presented well in the public 
organisations’ negotiation with the contractor, was rectified before construction began. From 
this point onwards, those issues accumulated over time causing all these disruptions during 
construction. The construction period was supposed to be eight to ten months, but it was 
reduced to three months because of the late appointment of the contractor. In the end, it became 
a rushed job. When the time is short, it affects the contractor’s resourcing and capacity, resulting 
in low flexibility for the contractor to make any design changes. 
	
This example shows how deficiencies in the earlier pre-construction phase could disrupt the 
subsequent construction phase if not managed properly. Abdul-Karim (2008) also reported that 
public projects in the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006 to 2010) had faced problems associated with 
acquiring the list of projects from ministries, preparing resources and master plans, and 
inadequate briefing, causing delay to the project delivery on-site. The fact that the public 
organisations and consultants did not acknowledge this in the survey suggests that the risks 
might have been transferred to the contractors at the subsequent construction phase, explaining 
the high frequency of disruptions reported by the contractors.  
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In terms of the impact of the disruptive events, the majority of respondents from both the public 
and private organisations dealt with the disruptions in public projects as part of business-as-
usual, as depicted in Figure 4.4. As discussed in Sections 1.1 and 1.2, disruptions often occur 
in the day-to-day operations of the construction industry, perhaps explaining why most 
respondents dealt with disruptive events as part of the project delivery process. However, a 
further Kruskal-Wallis test (Table 4.5) revealed that the disruptions overall had a greater impact 
on contractors than on the consultants and the public organisations. The greater repercussion 
of disruptions on the contractors compared to other parties in the supply chain is of great 
concern as it suggests that most of the risk of disruptions is borne by the contractors. This does 
not necessarily mean that the contractors are more vulnerable to disruptions than the other 
parties; rather, it may be that the present practice in the industry is that the contractors are 
expected to bear the impact of many risks, whether they could appropriately manage them or 
not (Ahmed et al., 1999). Contractors CO4 claimed that,  
When we do not foresee problems during the planning phase, our construction will be really 
bad, the impact is bad to our construction. The public organisations should be better prepared 
at the planning and design phase because the moment they fail, we at the construction phase 
are the ones who will receive the severe consequences and are likely to fail too. The project 
cost will increase and we have to do so many things to recover on-site.  
However, it should be noted that any disruptions affecting the contractors’ work will eventually 
have an impact on the consultants, who will need to extend their consultancy services with no 
additional fees if delay occurs, and to the public organisations who will end up paying for the 
increased costs of these disruptions, as highlighted by the project manager from the public 
organisations (PO5). Hence, in building the resilience of the supply chain to disruptions, this 
interdependence is an important consideration as the risk of disruptions might have a knock-
on effect on the upper tiers of the supply chain if not managed properly. 
 
6.2.4 Current Disruption Management Approach employed by the Organisations 
 
In managing disruptions, the majority of the respondents from the public organisations reported 
that risk management is adopted by their organisation (see Figure 4.5). This is reasonable, as 
risk management has been widely practised in the Malaysian construction industry. In this case, 
the public organisations have developed a standard guideline on risk management to be adopted 
by the project team and stakeholders in implementing public projects. This includes the general 
risk management process of identifying and analysing risks through workshops, prioritising 
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risk based on likelihood and impact, developing risk-mitigation plans, and monitoring and 
reviewing risks during implementation (PWD, 2008). However, Expert PO1 pointed out that,  
Although we have a risk management plan, things usually do not follow according to plan 
during implementation. We sort of rush things to be done and do not work according to plan. 
We have the risk workshops and seminars, to beautify the process. But once we receive a 
project, it is usually not the case. 
Hence, although ideally the public organisations should follow the risk management plan 
throughout the project delivery, the actual response departs from the plan in various ways 
depending on the circumstances. Expert PO4 justified why it is hard for the organisations to 
contain the disruption impacts despite having good planning, a project management plan, risk 
management workshops and scheduling, 
When disruption occurs, it has cascading effects and spreads. Until the reactive and recovery 
phase, there are still cascading effects that we have to deal with. So it is all firefighting after 
that. It is not like there was just one disruptive event and the impacts occur straight away, there 
were a series of preceding events that caused the project to suffer. Because in terms of planning, 
all the preparation was fine. 
Indeed, the impacts of disruption are not always immediate. As discussed in Section 2.3.1, it 
may take time for the disruption to show its full impact on supply chain performance (Sheffi 
and Rice, 2005). On the other hand, it might also be that the segregation between the 
departments in the public organisations (discussed in Section 5.7) in delivering the planning, 
design, tender and construction phase makes it harder to implement the risk management plan 
effectively. The SO from the public organisation (PO2) stated that, 
Although the people from Head of Project Team (HOPT) do the risk management at the 
planning phase, I can only consider risk management during the planning work as a guide, but 
I can not use it on-site, because they only mention risks during the planning work. HOPT does 
not deal with contractors, we are the ones who are in charge of the contractor. So when it comes 
to me, when we want to start the construction, we have to do this risk workshop again, but only 
dealing with the risks during construction. 
All the project team members and stakeholders, including civil and structural engineers, 
architects, mechanical and electrical engineers and utilities departments, are involved in this 
three-day risk workshop to discuss any variation orders or any changes and contractual matters 
in the construction phase. The SO also appoints her own risk manager to assess the risks on a 
monthly basis during construction in an attempt to reduce the risks with the rest of the project 
team. However, the SO expressed her concern at the lack of involvement of professionals from 
the public organsiations’ planning team (HOPT) during the risk meeting on-site, 
HOPT do not always attend the site meeting, they only attend if I asked them to come. If I do 
not call them, they will not be there. 
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However, the planning team perceives that problems arise because the public organisations’ 
state representatives do not adhere to the initial risk management plan provided by the HOPT. 
Expert PO4 from the HOPT contended that, 
Within the risk management that we did for the state representatives, we have stated that for 
instance, if the contractor’s appointment is late, a lot of problems will occur. All in the details. 
And then when the things we said happened, we also have some sort of mitigation plan, because 
we have done the risk management right. The state representatives however did their own thing 
as they go along despite knowing from the risk management plan that the disruption impacts 
will occur. 
In this case, Expert PO4 felt that the risk mitigation measures set up by the planning team were 
not effectively carried out by the public organisations’ state representatives. This shows that 
despite having a comprehensive risk management system, the blame-game is still prevalent 
between the departments within the public organisations themselves. Consequently, poor 
coordination among these departments makes them vulnerable in responding efficiently to any 
potential risk of disruptions. 
Apart from the conventional risk management approach, 16% of the public organisations also 
have disaster management plans in place to deal with disruptive events. Disaster management 
in Malaysia deals with natural disasters such as flood, which includes activities such as the 
‘detection’ of flood through the collection of meteorological data, ‘forecasting’ flood through 
the interpretation of the data collected, and the dissemination of ‘warnings’ to the public (Billa 
et al., 2006). This differs considerably in the case of the contractors and consultants. Despite 
the fact that they have faced frequent serious disruptions due to natural disaster or severe 
weather conditions in their operations, compared to the public organisations (see Figure 4.1), 
only a small percentage (6%) of these private organisations employ disaster management in 
their operation. Instead, emergency management (21%) and crisis management (13%) are 
adopted by the contractors and consultants to handle disruptions, as highlighted by Consultant 
CS2,  
…if there is an accident, we have an emergency response team. It depends on the type of 
incident as well, the type of damage. If it involves small damages, we will respond within two 
hours, some response is within one day, and there are some cases where the recovery takes 
months. So that such emergency does not occur, we make plans first before it happens. 
In this case, emergency management refers to the handling of incidents on-site such as 
accidents and the collapse of roadwork. On the other hand, crisis management refers to the 
handling of a disruption during construction that threatens the project team’s high priority goals 
and demands a time-pressured response (Loosemore, 2000). An additional concern identified 
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in the findings is that the majority of the contractors and consultants (28%) have no specific 
management in place to handle disruptions. Consultant CS3 found that, as a consultant, a 
formal risk management approach is not essential to their operations, unlike the contractor’s 
operations that involve more risks,  
In terms of risk management, the contractor needs more risk management. Like for us 
consultants, we do not really practise risk management 100 percent, we just have it but do not 
really practise it.  
On the other hand, the contractors seem to prefer to handle disruptions as they arise without 
engaging a specific risk manager, as explained by Contractor CO4,  
If it is a big project, we will engage a risk manager, but most of the time we just handle the 
risks ourselves. And usually we do not call the risk manager from the start; only when the 
project is sick do we call them. That is usually the case for contractors in Malaysia based on 
my observation. Because contractors in Malaysia do not like to pay blindly if their (risk 
manager) service is not needed. Same goes to safety officer, we only called them when needed.  
Here, ‘sick projects’ are referred to as public projects that face a delay of more than three 
months, or are abandoned (Sambasivan and Soon, 2007). This ad-hoc approach to engaging 
the risk manager only when disruptions arise badly exposes the contractors to disruptive events. 
It was also clear from the interviews that the contractors are reluctant to invest in a risk manager 
because they want to save costs and maintain their profit. However, the lack of investment in 
proactive measures may result in costly recovery actions, as discussed in Section 6.2.2. On the 
other hand, it might also be the case that the contractors and consultants rely heavily on the 
public organisations’ risk management meetings in managing disruptions, 
We do not have a specific risk manager. Usually we depend on the public organisations’ project 
manager to manage the risks. (Contractor CO1) 
Every month we have a site meeting with the public organisations, contractor, supplier and 
sometimes, authority to discuss all the problems on-site. (Consultant CS3) 
This is promising as it encourages collaboration among the public organisations and their 
supply chain members in handling disruptions collectively. However, during the risk meetings, 
the contractors do not share with the public organisations all their information on the risks they 
are currently facing in their operations,  
…as contractors, we are not putting all the risks to public organisations’ risk team. We are not 
going to tell them all the risks, because sometimes it backfires on us. So we just tell them what 
is related to them only. For example like the poor supply of electricity, that is a risk, but that is 
the risk on our side. Same goes for labour, currency, finance, those risks are our risks that we 
have to overcome.(CO3) 
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Like for risks, actually we do not encourage ourselves to create the risks that are already there, 
we will think whether it is worth for us to classify them as risks. Because in construction, 
everything is risk. So not everything is included in the risk meeting.(CO2) 
In other words, the contractors seem to inform the public organisations’ risk management team 
only of the potential risks of disruption if the risks are considered crucial to them. The lack of 
information shared on potential risks could ultimately hinder the public organisations’ ability 
to detect any hidden problems that lie within their supply chain. Hence, it is not surprising that 
some of the contractors found that risk meetings were ineffective, 
…but most of the time with public organisations risk management meetings, the risk meeting 
can be repetitive because the problems were not solved.(CO3)  
…what we identify and list in risk meetings have already occurred, even though we tried to 
mitigate them, they still occur. And we do modify the plan slightly as there are new risks that 
we identify during construction that we did not foresee before this.(CO2) 
This suggests that in some cases, the contractors adopt a firefighting approach to rectify the 
impacts of disruption, instead of during project delivery. Similarly, some of the respondents 
from the public organisations (15%) do not employ a risk management plan in their operations, 
as clarified by Expert PO4, 
…sometimes our stakeholders or clients do not adhere to the mitigation measures we stated in 
the risk management plan, and keep on making design changes. In the end, it becomes like ad-
hoc actions, as we go along we settle the problem.  
This shows that in some cases, the public organisations have to take a more reactive approach 
in reducing the impacts of disruptions due to the external parties’ (stakeholders’) failure to 
consider potential risks.  
 
6.2.5 Respondents’ Proposed Suggestions to Manage Disruptions  
	
As shown in Figure 4.6, over half the total respondents find that planning is important in 
managing disruptions. Contractor CO3 believes that good planning can eliminate a lot of risks,  
…if you manage the risk earlier, which is proactive, then the risk will not be there, so there are 
no such reactive actions. So we override and think about that risks ahead, that is considered as 
planning. Better to be proactive. 
However, he added that certain risks, like fluctuations in currency, will not work in this case, 
as they are outside their control. Contractor CO4, on the other hand, found that planning could 
help contractors to control potential disruptions from lack of finance, 
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When talking about finance, it affects your planning. How do you plan your work? You must 
know your sequence of work, to what extent the finance will return to you, and how long before 
will you receive payment from the public organisations. You need to plan all that.  
Meanwhile, Consultant CS1 acknowledged that planning the work is essential in order to 
understand each other’s responsibilities and tasks and to coordinate the response between the 
project team in handling disruptions,  
Most importantly when you want to do the planning, you have to know the sequence of work. 
Who has to deal with who, this is under who’s authority. This will result in prompt response. 
Hence, all the respondents seem to agree that planning is important in their operations. Indeed, 
the results in Table 4.17 show that organisations with explicit disruption management strategies 
have higher capability scores in contingency planning. By having formal plans to cover a range 
of contingencies in the supply chain operations, they will be better prepared in responding to 
disruptions. However, it is worth noting that the success of a risk management plan depends 
on how well the developed contingency plans are implemented during disruptions (Berg et al., 
2008). In this regard, the public sector supply chain must also work on how to implement the 
risk management plan effectively, as there are still mixed perceptions of the current risk 
management practice, as discussed in Section 6.2.4. Furthermore, Expert PO1 considered that 
more time should be spent on the planning phase in order to reduce the risks of disruptions,  
Planning should take a lot of time, it should take at least 40% of the overall project duration. In 
our case, we only allocate 5 to 10% of the project time for planning. Most of the time, 80% of 
the time we use for construction. For example, 10% planning, 80% construction, and 10% for 
the post-construction phase. So there is only limited time for planning, which is not right. 
Increasing the time spent on planning could also reduce the severe impacts of disruptions felt 
by contractors in the subsequent construction phase, as reported in Section 6.2.3.  
 
Collaboration with supply chain members was also perceived by the respondents in the survey 
as a key factor in mitigating disruptions. This was confirmed in the interviews, 
Looking at the World Bank study, our main problem is that we have no integration among 
parties. There should be no problems in construction if we have integration. From the bottom 
until the upper tiers of the chain, everyone play a part. It is like a single chain line, and if the 
chain is strong, we will be strong, our project will be completed on time or even ahead of time. 
(Expert PO1) 
We are trying to encourage this practice of collaboration, but to implement good practice takes 
a lot of effort and everyone’s cooperation. Convincing people is not easy. (Consultant CS2) 
This might be attributed to the behaviour pathogen discussed in earlier Section 5.8. Consultant 
CS2 added that one of the challenges to collaboration is the inconsistent goals between the 
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project team members. This is in line with the results discussed in Section 6.2.2, that 
discrepancies exist between the public and private organisations’ (contractors, suppliers) goals 
in terms of prioritising quality versus profit respectively. The survey respondents also identified 
that staff engagement and involvement in responding to disruptions are important in controlling 
the disruptions. Expert PO2 contended that, 
…when people are not included in the team, they will not feel like it is their problem. So if you 
make the problems their business, they themselves will not be a problem but become a problem 
solver instead in the team. More or less, their mentality changes a bit. If not, the people will 
stay in complacency state. 
In other words, the project team members will feel committed when they are part of the 
problem, and thus are motivated to help to reduce disruptions. On the other hand, compared to 
the public organisations (14%), having insurance is perceived to be more important to 
contractors and consultants (19%) to recover from disruptions. However, the contractors 
interviewed found that insurance could be costly,  
Let’s say the project is worth RM20 million, the work insurance alone, minimum is RM40,000 
to 45,000.. We also have to pay 0.025% levy for total construction work contracts that exceed 
RM500,000 to the CIDB (Construction Industry Development Board) first, even before the 
work begins, it is like paying tax. So these alone have taken up our cash, at least 4 to 5% from 
the total amount of contract costs.(CO4)  
This essentially means that before the contractors start work on-site, they have to spend money 
on things that are not physical, such as insurance. Hence, it is important for the contractors to 
manage their finance wisely in order to accommodate any potential losses that might result 
from disruptive events. 
	
6.3 Critical Supply Chain Vulnerability Factors and Its Related Capabilities 
 
The following discussions are based on the analysis presented in Section 4.4.  
 
6.3.1 Political/Legal Pressures  
 
Exposure to political disruptions 
 
The construction industry, compared with other industries in Malaysia, experiences 
consistently more disruptions (Yin, 2006) as it is faced with constant changes in the 
environment that hamper the construction organisations’ ability to survive and sustain growth 
in the industry (Abu-Bakar et al., 2011). Similarly, this survey reveals that challenges from 
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external threats are still prevalent, particularly in the public sector supply chain. The most 
interesting result here is that what the public organisations perceived as their greatest external 
threat differs considerably from that perceived by the contractors and consultants as their 
greatest challenge arising from the volatile external environment. The detailed comparative 
analysis conducted using the Mann-Whitney U test (see Table 4.14) shows that while 
political/legal pressures were perceived as the greatest threat to the public organisations, this 
was not the case for the private organisations, where market pressures were identified as a 
greater problem affecting the contractors’ and consultants’ operations.  
 
Understandably, the government bodies have an obligation to spend public money wisely, 
following a set of rules and regulations (Jaafar and Nuruddin. 2012), hence making them even 
more vulnerable to any political disruptions or changes in government rules. The public 
organisations are ultimately bound by the government’s policy, treasury circulars, technical 
instructions and specifications (Ibrahim et al., 2010) in executing public projects. This is not to 
say that the contractors and consultants do not have to adhere to government policy; however, 
the case is different for the private organisations as they have much more autonomy when 
proceeding with a project award (Jaafar and Nuruddin, 2012; Gould, 1997). Unlike the private 
organisations, the public organisations are highly accountable and can be constantly questioned 
in terms of how they manage public assets and use taxpayers’ money. Indeed, based on the 
results presented in Table 4.14, there is a significant difference between the public and private 
organisations’ scores for the vulnerability sub-factor exposure to political disruptions, the 
former being significantly more vulnerable.  
 
In this regard, the Malaysian public sector has frequently faced political interference especially 
during project award stages (Jaafar and Radzi, 2013), which contributes to the higher 
significance of this score within public sector projects. Expert PO1 addressed his concern on 
this matter, 
	
We should be transparent, everything should be open tender, but it did not happen. Ideally, we 
should tender it. Then only it is fair and square. Even after tendering, inside those parties there 
is this person and your person. So it is like politics. We as a technical body should have ethics, 
but cannot even manage this. It is hard. 
In this case, the public organisations generally use the cut-off system in their open tender, 
whereby the contractor is selected according to the organisations’ tender limit. However, 
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Contractor CO4 observed that the public organisations do not always have the final say in 
selecting the contractor. He explained that, 
…because the public organisations does not supply the money. The ones who provide the 
finance, like the client, can give instructions, “I want this person, full stop”. But the contractor’s 
tender price must be reasonable too. 
This shows that politics as well as monetary terms could disrupt the tender selection process. 
Subsequently, such political involvement could cause tensions among the project team 
members. The appointed contractor’s competence is also questionable in this case, as pointed 
out by Expert PO2, 
Sometimes we do not know the contractor because during evaluation there could be political 
interference. There are cases where the contractor won the project but was not able to execute 
the job. He managed to sustain it for just a short time, for one year, then we have to terminate 
the contract because we know he cannot deliver the job. 
Furthermore, Jaafar and Radzi (2013) argued that, regardless of the procurement system 
adopted, the strong tendency to political involvement in awarding public projects contributes 
to the increase in the number of contracting firms that are only interested in winning the 
contracts. This has consequently led to the contracting firms sub-letting the total project to 
other contractors or sub-contractors, which then raises the issue of payment due to the multi-
layered sub-contracting. Political involvement may also affect the price of materials. 
Contractor CO4 pointed out that some material supply has been heavily politicised and 
monopolised, 
…it is political, steel is a monopolised item. Once there is political interference, we cannot do 
anything because they are the ones who control the price. For instance, we bought the steel at 
the factory based on the index price of RM3,800, but when making claims, the government 
used a lower RM2,800 index price as recommended by the National Trade Agency. But when 
we bought it, it was a different price. And then sometimes we have to pay in cash. This is the 
same problem that other contractors face, not just me. 
The contractor may not be able to progress with their work due to the inconsistencies in the 
price of steel. Indeed, steel is a controlled item in Malaysia, and the National Trade Agency 
publishes the price index. However, it is evident in this case that there are differences between 
the published and the actual price paid by the contractor, as a result of political involvement. 
Political pressure can also disrupt the consultant’s design work, as pointed out by Consultant 
CS2, 
Sometimes the public organisations want to review our designs at short notice, because they 
have been chased by higher authorities and politicians who kept asking about the project. So 
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their boss got stressed and kept asking us how long will it take to finish? They want to review 
designs a lot of times, and up until the last minute, we are still reviewing drawings.  
Frequent design changes cause delay in finalising the design drawings. Consultant CS1 
observed that sometimes the impact of political interference is indirect,   
Political involvement, it can affect the project so that we cannot even see the connection, that’s 
how powerful politics is. For instance, changes in political power when the project is ongoing. 
They (political party) can simply say, “stop this project, there is no need to construct the project 
here”. Because of what? In another two weeks’ time, he wants to make a speech there before 
the election.  
This shows that political influences are sometimes not obvious but could have a catastrophic 
impact when they occur, such as halting public project operations. Hence, although the private 
organisations are not as badly exposed to political disruptions as the public organisations, the 
impact of political disruptions can spread across the supply chain, affecting the consultants, 
multiple contractors and sub-contractors and resulting in time and cost overruns. 
 
Considering that such political influences have always been a problem in public projects, the 
public organisations are able to anticipate such disruptions in their operations. As previously 
discussed in Section 5.5, one interviewee from the public organisation (PO1) highlighted that 
political risk is the top risk listed in the list of risk priorities in public projects. This is consistent 
with the survey results on the public organisations’ capabilities (see Section 4.4). The public 
organisations were reported to have good business intelligence (a top five capability sub-factor, 
Table 4.11) to anticipate the behaviour of their key players, including potential political 
interference. Nevertheless, despite this strength, their lack of transparency in communicating 
information not only with their stakeholders, but also with the contractors and consultants 
(rated as a moderate capability, 21 of 44 in Table 4.11) makes it hard to control the spread of 
political impacts on their supply chain operations. An interviewee from the public organisation 
(PO3) acknowledged that one of the things that the public organisations suffer from is poor 
communication with supply chain members. Clear communication, however, is important to 
facilitate collaborative decision making and counteract the critical political interference.  
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  Table 6.2: Summary of the critical vulnerability of exposure to political disruptions 
Critical Vulnerability 
Factor Pathogens 
Linked Capability 
Factors 
Exposure to political 
disruptions 
 
• Practice of lack of transparency in 
tender selection 
• Circumstance of unfavorable project 
team selection 
• Practice of acceleration in delivering 
plans due to added pressure by top 
authorities 
• Circumstance of monopolisation of 
material 
• Practice of frequent design changes 
due to added pressure by top 
authorities 
• Circumstance of changes in political 
power  
 
C5. Anticipation of 
potential political 
disruptions 
C4.1 Business 
intelligence gathering 
C9.1 Communication 
with supply chain 
members 
C4.3 Collaborative 
information exchange 
 
 
 
 
Changes in government regulations 
	
On the other hand, there were no significant differences in score between the public and private 
organisations in the other sub-factors of changes in government regulations (see Table 4.14). 
This suggests that although the contractors’ and consultants’ operations are not as highly 
exposed to political disruptions as the public organisations, they are still to some degree 
affected by changes in government regulations. Certainly, regulatory frameworks involving 
multiple authorities at the federal, state and local levels that govern the construction industry 
in Malaysia can be very complex and difficult to navigate (CIDB, 2015). This is evident from 
the case highlighted by Expert PO1 in managing highway projects,  
The planning of roadworks involves two cities in making the public transport effective. Two 
cities that have different regulations or codes of practice, which makes it hard to get approval 
from both sides of authorities.  
This makes the private organisations extremely vulnerable to differences in regulations which 
may vary from one state to another. It has also been reported that certain states place restrictions 
on architects and engineers gaining planning permission during the design phase of a project 
(CIDB, 2015). The regulations imposed affect not just public projects, but also private ones 
carried out by the contractors and consultants in a particular state. Consultant CS2 pointed out 
that the regulations set by the local authorities are unclear, 
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Our planning permission is constantly rejected because of the unclear regulations, we had to 
make further amendments and resubmit. And when we have enquiries on the unclear terms, it 
is so hard to reach them by phone, we have to go to the office just to ask for clarification on the 
regulations. It’s a waste of time. 
	
This consultant added that they have to get planning permission from several departments in 
the local authorities, which have different regulations. For instance, the building design is 
approved by one department, and approval for the land use is from another department. Plus, 
not all the departments will approve the plans at the same time, causing delay in the planning 
approval process. Additionally, according to Consultant CS1, it takes two to three months just 
to get the official approval letter from the local authorities. He shared his frustration with the 
local authorities’ delay in providing the official letter, 
I had to go to the local authority office to ask for the letter and collect the letter myself. And 
the letter was actually issued at an earlier date, they just didn’t send it to us. So although it was 
approved, in black and white, we couldn’t use the approval letter because of the issuance date, 
it was invalid. 
Hence, inconsistency in regulations between different departments in the local authority could 
result in confusion and misinterpretation of the terms by different stakeholders. This reduces 
the ease of the private organisations in doing business, and could also create disputes between 
the public and private organisations that can be costly in terms of time, money and effort. 
Abdul-Aziz and Ali (2004) argued that quite often, the lack of knowledge of government 
regulations and procedures of the consultants engaged by the public organisations resulted in 
confusion over the terms in the regulations. This might be due the public organisations’ layers 
of administrative procedures identified in the organisation pathogen, as discussed in Section 
5.7. Smith and Gavin (1998) believe that this risk should be best managed by the owner (i.e. 
the public organisations), by including in the contract clear statements on the responsibilities 
of all parties under the regulations, and updating the private organisations on any new policies 
imposed. Interaction between private organisations and the government is also imperative and 
needs to be pragmatic as well as participatory in managing policy changes (Wu and Ramesh, 
2013; Tan, 2010). 
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		Table 6.3: Summary of the critical vulnerability of changes in government regulations 
Critical Vulnerability 
Factor Pathogens 
Linked Capability 
Factors 
Changes in government 
regulations 
 
 
• Convention of complex regulations 
that are hard to navigate 
• Convention of inconsistent 
regulations imposed by different 
authorities 
• Convention of high bureaucracy in 
decision making process 
• Organisation structure with multiple 
departments 
 
C1. Flexibility in 
approval process  
C8.1 Distributed 
decision-making 
C6. Anticipation of 
potential regulation 
changes 
C9. Collaboration with 
supply chain members  
 
 
 
 
 
6.3.2 Market Pressures 
 
Severe price fluctuation 
	
Less than the public organisations, the survey highlighted that the contractors and consultants 
are seriously vulnerable to market pressures (see Table 4.14). The volatility of the external 
environment is felt most by the private sector, as expected. This essentially means that the 
contractors and consultants are highly susceptible to severe price fluctuation and strong price 
competition (both ranked in the top ten vulnerability sub-factors in Table 4.9) caused by the 
construction market and economy. The result, however, is surprising in that the contractors and 
consultants claimed to have good financial strength (a top three main capability in Table 4.12) 
to cover threats such as price fluctuations. This shows that financial strength alone is not 
sufficient to overcome the unforeseen bad economic conditions. Poor economic conditions, 
especially in developing countries, can affect a construction project in many ways, such as 
escalation of material prices (Toor and Ogunlana, 2008; Sweis et al., 2007; Frimpong et al., 
2003), increase in the cost of financing due to higher interest rates (Toor and Ogunlana, 2008) 
and lower returns on investment once the project is completed (Hoe, 2013). Indeed, despite 
government attempts to boost the economy through infrastructure spending, it can be observed 
that the broader national economic troubles are taking their toll (Freitas, 2016). For instance, 
the knock-on effect of the falling Ringgit Malaysia resulted in increasing the cost of overseas 
materials and equipment, and consequently in local suppliers raising the price of scarce 
material. This led to the contractors facing severe price fluctuations, as in the case highlighted 
by Contractor CO3, 
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…for example, the hospital project that we are doing right now, a lot of the medical equipment 
is actually imported. So with the currency that’s now changing, the price increase drastically. 
That is the exposure to losses for the contractor on the financial part. 
This shows how the contractors’ vulnerability to price fluctuations can reduce their profit, as 
indicatedin the survey (see Section 6.2.2). In this case, even though the contractors can claim 
Variation of Price (VOP) from the public organisations for changes in material price, according 
to the majority of interviewees it takes a long time for the contractors to get approval and 
receive payment from the public organisations. This subsequently affects their cash flow, as 
illustrated by Contractor CO4, 
…because we use our money to buy the material. Contractors usually say they have the money, 
but at certain times, when it reaches a certain level, we do not have sufficient money. We have 
to bear these risks. Depends on the project, if the project is big, then the model will be higher.  
On the other hand, contractual arrangements such as the design and build and turnkey contracts 
have a fixed price, so the contractors are unable to claim VOP, as the maximum contract sum 
has alrready been agreed. The contractor has to bear the financial risks of fluctuations in 
material prices in such cases. Contractor CO3 found that the risk of fluctuations is hard to 
manage, because disruption such as currency devaluation is outside the contractors’ control. 
Indeed, price fluctuation is generally difficult to predict and is principally the result of the high 
inflationary trend, especially in developing countries (Le-Hoai et al., 2008). However, 
Contractor CO2 argued that contactors can reduce the impact of such disruption by being 
proactive and ordering the material much earlier, when the currency is stable, in order to lock 
the price, 
When the currency falls, like this parliament project, for the cable, lift, and computers that we 
imported, all the prices become higher. Because in the contract we don’t have VOP, we have 
to lock the price of certain things much earlier by making the order in advance to be safe, even 
though we don’t need the material right now. But there are materials that we ordered at the last 
minute, so for that we have to bear the costs.  
This shows how important it is for the contractors to build their resilience by reserving imported 
materials ahead (a low capability sub-factor, ranked 38 of 44 in Table 4.13), in case the local 
currency falls. Meanwhile, Contractor CO1 opted for a more reactive approach, by modifying 
the method of construction and mode of transportation of materials when faced with the 
significant rise in the oil price. He also reduced the number of sub-contractors engaged to 
reduce the losses, 
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What I did was, we reduced the sub-contractors, we did most of the work ourselves. If you 
reach sub-contractors, they will take at least 8 to 10% of the profit, so there was saving there. 
Before this we outsourced everything, we just managed the works on-site. But in this case, 
when this happened, with having to cut down the losses, we did it ourselves. So I only 
outsourced machinery. 
This shows that adding flexibility to the contractors’ operations (a bottom two capability factor 
in Table 4.12) and utilising their current resources (ranked 31 of 44 capability sub-factors in 
Table 4.13) could help in reducing the impact of disruption. These capabilities allow 
contractors to modify their operations (ranked 41 of 44 capability sub-factors in Table 4.13) 
and mobilise their resources quickly (ranked 33 of 44) in recovering from disruptions such as 
fluctuations in the price of materials. Nonetheless, the threat of price fluctuation would best be 
shared between both the public and private organisations by including contract clauses that 
define the required parameters and conditions for sharing (Smith and Gavin, 1998). This is 
because a rise in material price will also subsequently affect the public organisations, causing 
a substantial increase in the overall cost of the public projects. This could be problematic 
considering that cost overruns were reported to be one of the critical effects faced by the public 
organisations (Section 6.2.2). However, risk sharing between the public organisations and 
contractors is still rare (a bottom three capability sub-factor in Tables 4.11 and 4.13), 
suggesting the lack of agreement between the parties. Both parties should therefore find a 
middle ground where they can agree on the contract conditions to counteract price fluctuations.  
 
  Table 6.4: Summary of the critical vulnerability of severe price fluctuation 
Critical Vulnerability 
Factor Pathogens 
Linked Capability 
Factors 
Severe price fluctuation 
 
 
• Circumstance of unpredictable 
economic conditions 
• Circumstance of contractual 
arrangements 
• Convention of late payment by 
public organisations 
• Circumstance of monopolised 
materials 
• Circumstance of limited material 
supply when in high demand 
 
C2.1 Reserve capacity 
C1. Flexibility in 
operations 
C3.2 Resource utilisation 
C1.5 Fast re-routing of 
requirements 
C9.3 Risk sharing with 
contractual parties 
C12. Financial strength 
 
 
 
Price pressures 
	
Further detailed analysis in Table 4.14 also identified that the private organisations are 
significantly more vulnerable to price pressures than the public organisations. Understandably, 
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unlike the public organisations, profitability of projects is their main priority in surviving in 
the competitive market of the construction industry, making them even more vulnerable to 
price pressures. It can be observed from the survey that the highly competitive construction 
market causes significant downward pressure on the private organisations’ profits and market 
share, based on the low ranking of this capability (43 of 44 capability sub-factors in Table 4.13) 
by the contractors and consultants. The tender price of government projects is extremely 
competitive, especially in an open-tender system. Although this system is the best way to 
ensure completion of any project or contract at the lowest price, it is the most difficult obstacle 
any contractor has to face in the real competitive world (Yin, 2006). The contractors are 
burdened with the responsibility to produce good quality work at the cheapest price. In order 
to submit a tender at a competitive price, the contractors must make effective strategic decisions 
to obtain the cheapest rate from their suppliers, difficult in the current unpredictable economic 
conditions. Moreover, the majority of the contractors interviewed commented that the public 
organisations’ goals for higher quality and low cost resulted in the under-pricing of tenders by 
contractors, eventually affecting their profit margin. Consequently, this under-pricing could 
severely increase the contractors’ vulnerability to the fluctuations in material price, as 
evidenced in the survey result (ranked in the top 10 vulnerability sub-factors in Table 4.9). 
Contractor CO3 explained that although it may seem that large contractors have a better chance 
of winning public project tenders, given their strong financial background, this does not 
necessarily means that big companies can deliver a better quality job than the small contractors,  
Like me, we are a small company, but we deliver a job like our hospital right now that costs 
billions of RM. But who are we? We’re small, we only have 20 people employed for the direct 
work. And my salary, is not like the CEO of the big companies. And I go to the site, I’m making 
decisions daily because in terms of the money, it is directly mine. Compared to other people in 
the big companies, you are the CEO and you have too many things to do, what is a couple of 
million RM job to you? You have to get another director to look after that project, a project 
manager, a contractor manager, etc. (CO3) 
In other words, this contractor believes that small companies have a better competitive price 
than large companies as a result of their lower project overheads. However, Expert PO5 had an 
opposing view, arguing that in some cases large construction companies can offer more 
favourable pricing, because as long as they have other projects in hand that can sustain them, 
they can lower their profit margin in their tender price. He added that, 
Usually the small contractors’ dilemma is that if they accept a low profit margin, they worry 
that they can not continue after the project is completed with no further project in hand. But if 
they put in a higher tender price, there is a high risk that they will not get the job. 
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Hence, the contractors’ strategic decision plays a significant role in overcoming strong price 
competition. In this case, Chan and Pasquire (2002) and Solomon (1993) suggested that 
contractors can gain a competitive advantage by adjusting their project overheads. They tend 
to overlook the importance of project overhead estimates as they contribute to a relatively small 
percentage (15-30%) of the contract sum, but the main variations in the contractors’ bids are 
the estimates for these indirect costs (Assaf et al., 1999, Chan and Pasquire, 2002). Reasonable 
pricing of project overheads will not only help to increase the chance of the contractor winning 
the bid, but also serve as a way for the contractor to gain profit. As confirmed by Contractor 
CO3,  
	
The big companies’ overheads are very high, for the layers of departments and for the people 
who are not doing the actual job, but they are still overheads. But to us, every single man in the 
company, as long as they are getting their salary, they have a function there, otherwise they are 
out.  
This shows how important it is for contractors to utilise their resources (a low capability, ranked 
31 of 44 capability sub-factors) to maintain efficiency and gain competitive advantage.  
 
Similarly, competition among consultants is high as the public projects contribute to their 
annual turnover. Obtaining repeat projects from the public organisations is essential in 
developing their portfolios for commercial reasons. However, unlike the contractor, the 
consultant’s fees are fixed, as they are paid on the scale of fees determined by the Board of 
Engineering Malaysia. Consultant CS3 added that,  
	
Yes, definitely, there’s a high market competition in public projects. But for consultants, 
whatever it is you can’t give discounts like contractors, because we will be paid based on the 
scale of fees. So how do we lobby our service? We can only polish or showcase our technical 
know-how. And you can build the relationship with the client by maintaining social, good 
reputation, etc. It will take some time, but once people remember you, it gets easier. 
Thus the competititive edge for the consultants in this case is their technical background and 
the quality of the service they have to offer. Both contractors and consultants also face market 
pressure from foreign players; several international parties have gained an increasing market 
share across various types of project in Malaysia over the last few years (CIDB, 2015). This 
threatens the private organisations’ current market position, as reflected in the survey results 
(bottom two capability sub-factors in Table 4.13). Hence, in order to remain competitive and 
be on a par with the foreign competition, local private organisations have to be able to foresee 
the future market conditions during the contract period, increasing their chance of bidding at a 
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competitive price and being awarded the contract (Yin, 2006). The private organisations could 
also utilise their current strength in gathering business information on possible market changes 
and the trends of their competitors (a top five capability sub-factor in Table 4.13) to design a 
more efficient process to reduce the cost of operation, thus maintaining a competitive 
advantage.  
 
As already mentioned, good financial strength alone does not protect contractors and 
consultants from severe market pressure. Thus, while it is important to maintain their current 
financial strengths, the private organisations must also work on their weaknesses, such as 
developing their ability to anticipate and recover from potential market disruptions to survive 
in the long run; these are still weak, based on the low ranking of both capabilities (bottom five 
capability factors in Table 4.13). Learning from previous public tendering experience is also 
important, as suggested by Fu et al. (2003) who explained that frequent bidding opportunities 
for similar work contracts present contractors with ample learning opportunities which are then 
reflected in their competitiveness in bidding for contracts of similar types.  Maintaining long-
term relationships with their bottom-tier supply chain (i.e. sub-contractors, suppliers) is also 
important for the contractors to obtain the best prices for material from their domestic or foreign 
suppliers. However, Contractor CO4 founds that getting reasonable prices from specialists is 
hard because they control the payment from the start,  
	
Specialists are troublesome to us, they control the material and payment. You must pay 30% 
first, just to book them, but we only need the supply in two years’ time, so our money has been 
buried there. So the ones who are making business is them. They hold 30% of our money, that’s 
not fair. They have no competition. After that to ask them to go on-site, pay another 20%, then 
only they deliver the materials. And then when they start to do work on-site, we have to pay 
another 30% and so on. 
In this case, the contractors are required to take the specialists proposed by the public 
organisation for certain items, and so have no choice but to adhere to the specialists’ terms. It 
is therefore not surprising that the survey results show that the contractors’ collaboration with 
their sub-contractors and suppliers is still poor, based on the lowest ranking of this main 
capability factor (see Table 4.12). Collaboration and partnership between the private 
organisations and the upper tier of supply chain members (i.e. public organisations) can also 
be improved to mitigate the negative effects arising from severe price competition. For 
consultants, maintaining a good reputation with the public organisations could promote 
partnerships in future projects, as highlighted by Consultant CS3, 
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Whatever the client wants, we’ll try to do it the best possible. So that they can remember, “ok, 
this consultant can really perform”. When we perform, they know we can attend meetings on 
time, and the design is produced on time, tender is on time. So reputation is number one. And 
quality is important to the client. So we have to groom our capability in that area. 
Matthews et al. (1996) suggested a semi-project partnering approach, meaning that the 
tendering process involves limited competition, so that price negotiations between the 
contractors and public organisations would be encouraged.  
 
 Table 6.5: Summary of the critical vulnerability of exposure to price pressures 
Critical 
Vulnerability Factor Pathogens Linked Capability Factors 
Price pressures 
 
 
• Circumstance of competitive open 
tender 
• Circumstance of unpredictable 
economic conditions 
• Convention of public organisations’ 
goals for higher quality and low cost 
• Practice of underpricing by 
contractors 
• Circumstance of market pressures 
from foreign players 
• Convention of supplier controlling 
price 
• Convention of specialists selection 
by public organisations 
C10.1 Market share 
C3. Efficiency of operations 
C3.2 Resource utilisation to 
lower overheads 
C6. Anticipation of potential 
market condition 
C4.1 Business intelligence 
gathering on future market 
trends 
C7. Recovery from 
disruptions 
C5.4 Learning from tendering 
experience 
C9. Collaboration with supply 
chain members 
 
 
6.3.3 Management Vulnerability  
 
Timing of business decisions 
	
Management vulnerability is ranked as the second factor that both the public and private 
organisations experience, as presented in Tables 4.6 and 4.8 respectively. In this case, timing 
of business decisions (a sub-factor of management vulnerability) was identified as the greatest 
vulnerability facing both the public and private organisations (rated 1 of 39 vulnerability sub-
factors in Tables 4.7 and 4.9). This result is similar to that reported in the Malaysian 
Construction Industry Master Plan (2006-2015) whereby duplication of work, lengthy 
approvals and work time were identified to be problematic in local construction projects 
(CIMP, 2007). Delay is indeed a significant issue generally in the construction industry 
worldwide (Koushki et. al., 2005; Choudhury and Rajan, 2003; Ng et. al., 2001) and 
specifically in Malaysia, where it is one of the main factors hampering the performance of local 
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construction projects (Mehdi-Riazi et al., 2013; Endut et al., 2009; Sambasivan and Soon, 
2007; Othman et al., 2006; Chan, 2001). Further detailed analysis shows that the organisations’ 
strategic operations might have contributed to delay in the decision-making process. Decision 
making takes time in the case of the public organisations possibly, because of the lack of 
distribution of their key resources (rated as moderate capabilities, 18 of 44 in Table 4.11) in a 
highly distributed market (a top five capability sub-factor in Table 4.11). Chan (2001) agrees 
that resources such as skilled labour are less plentiful in the less developed areas compared to 
the capital city in Malaysia, suggesting that the non-uniform distribution of resources could 
cause late information flow and slow decision making in public sector projects located across 
different geographic regions. The private organisations’ market, on the other hand, is not as 
geographically dispersed as the public organisations’ (30 of 44 capability sub-factors in Table 
4.13), but dealing with a large number of supply chain members (a top 10 vulnerability sub-
factor) with services or production operations that are very complex (ranked 18 of 39 
vulnerability sub-factors) might contribute to the late decision making on the private 
organisations’ part. Hence, instead of the common blame-game often played out among supply 
chain members when projects face delay (see Section 5.8), it is important to have a good 
understanding of how parties in both the upper tier (i.e. public organisations) and lower tier 
(i.e. private organisations) operate to reduce delays in decision making collectively in the 
supply chain. 
 
Based on the survey results, it seems that decision-making power is still concentrated at the top 
management level for both the public and private organisations (29 of 44 capability sub-factors 
in Tables 4.11 and 4.13). Expert PO1 acknowledged that for federal government projects, 
approval headquarters (HQ) is required,  
The public state representatives can only make certain decisions but with approval from the 
higher authority, either from HQ or client departments. In financial terms as well you can’t 
comment much, all the approvals in terms of the cost of work come from another unit. If there 
are changes in design, the management will coordinate with the design office at a different 
level.  
These layers of approval could result in poor communication and slow decision making among 
employees, especially during disruptions. The time-consuming communication channels could 
also cause distortion and discontinuity of ideas (Gold et al., 2001), discouraging imaginative 
solutions (Deal and Kennedy, 1982) to deal with disruptive events. This is evident in the case 
observed by Expert PO4,  
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The state representatives decided to do pad footing for the foundation, but due to the approval 
procedure, the people on-site had to refer to the designer in HQ, and that alone took one month. 
That’s why the public works department become slow.  
Hence, regardless of whether the representatives onsite have the technical expertise, they are 
unable to make the final decisions without referring to the designers in HQ (as previously 
discussed in Section 5.6). Expert PO4 added that this disrupts the progress of work as it is time 
consuming to have to rely on other people and wait for their decision every time disruption 
occurs. Indeed, distributing the decision making was perceived by Expert PO5 as a reactive 
response to disruptions. In this case, the project manager faced disruptions on-site due to 
discrepancies in the design drawings. He then took a reactive response to make his own 
decision on-site to mitigate the disruption impact quickly,  
I was reactive, I have to respond quickly, no need to refer to any other authority, just me and 
the contractor discuss how to modify the design, extra piling things like that. So I directly deal 
with my engineer, because of one beam that has no detail, I asked him to design, then I’ll check. 
I told him I’ll take responsibility if things don’t work. So a month after that, then only the 
official instruction arrive from the designer in HQ, and it was the same decision as what we 
already did. If I hadn’t reacted and made that decision earlier, there would have been a one-
month delay.  
In this case the project manager decided to take responsibility for the decisions he made, 
believing that the people on-site wers sufficiently expert in rectifying problems and saving 
time. This distributed decision making would also help to improve the public organisations’ 
ability to seize advantage from disruptions occurring on-site (rated as a low capability, 34 of 
44 in Table 4.11) and also reducing the organisations’ vulnerability to inadequate management 
control over supply chain members (a top 10 vulnerability sub-factor in Table 4.7). Similarly, 
large contractors also face late decision making in their organisations, as observed by 
Consultant CS3. In this case, the construction site was in Kuala Lumpur, but the contractor’s 
headquarters were in another state, resulting in miscommunication in terms of the decision 
making. Consultant CS3 explained that, 
For instance, the work is starting tomorrow, the site staff want to buy concrete, cement, etc, but 
they have to get approval from their HQ, but the HQ was quite slow, so due to the distance they 
had miscommunication. Even though there’s Internet and all, the things on-site are equally 
important, because they have to liaise with their HQ. The site staff is just for supervision, 
monitoring, delivering. Usually for big mega-projects only they have their on-site team. 
Because this project is quite small, maybe they took it for granted. 
As a result of the contractor’s poor communication and mismanagement within their own team, 
the project faced a year’s delay. Hence, it can be observed in the former case of the public 
organsation and the latter case of the contractor, empowering experts on-site to make key 
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decisions, regardless of their level of authority, is important in overcoming late decision 
making. Understandably, it is unrealistic for the management to allow thousands of employees 
to have decision-making authority without some limits (Argyris, 1998). However, employees 
should be given a degree of freedom and autonomy in the decision-making process, especially 
for decisions directly related to their own work (Johari and Yahya, 2009), to encourage prompt 
communication through any part of the supply chain when disrupted.  
 
 Table 6.6: Summary of the critical vulnerability of timing of business decisions 
Critical Vulnerability 
Factor Pathogens Linked Capability Factors 
Timing of business 
decisions 
 
 
 
• Blame-game behaviour among 
project team 
• Convention of centralised decision-
making 
• Organisation structure with multiple 
departments 
• Practice of poor assumptions in 
decision-making 
• Practice of prioritisation of project 
by public organisations based on its 
importance 
 
C8.3 Decentralisation of 
key resources 
C8.4 Geographic dispersion 
of markets 
C8.1 Distributed decision 
making 
C9.1 Communication 
C5.2 Seizing advantage 
from disruptions 
C1. Flexibility in approval 
process 
C4. Visibility of supply 
chain operations 
 
 
Reliance upon information flow 
	
The survey also revealed that both the public and private organisations rely heavily on a 
continuous information flow in their operations (a top three vulnerability sub-factor in Table 
4.7 and 4.9). Understandably, this is crucial to operations which are outsourced operations to 
many different parties in the supply chain (4 and 7 of 39 vulnerability sub-factors in Tables 4.7 
and 4.9). Considering a consistent information flow between parties is critical to the 
organisations’ operation, enhancing collaboration, but the weakest capability for both parties 
(see Tables 4.10 and 4.12). Increased transparency in communication (a low capability sub-
factor in Tables 4.11 and 4.13) is imperative for both parties to overcome this vulnerability 
collectively. Indeed, information flow between project team members is important in managing 
the supply chain, and sharing information is the key feature of collaboration (Nawi et al., 2013; 
Cohen and Russel, 2005). However, transparency in sharing information might be hard to 
achieve without an adequate level of trust between the public organisations and the supply 
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chain. As discussed in Section 6.2.4, the lack of information revealed by Contractor CO3 on 
the actual risks on-site during the risk management meeting could mean that certain risks of 
disruption within the supply chain might be overlooked by project team members. In this case, 
the contractor was discreet about sharing certain information with the public organisations to 
avoid being blamed should any risks occur. It is therefore not surprising that risk sharing among 
the supply chain members is still poor, as reported in the survey results in Tables 4.11 and 4.13 
(a bottom three capability for both parties). Similarly, Briscoe and Dainty (2005) identified that 
lack of confidence in the working relationship between client and contractor could result in 
poor information exchange among the supply chain members. For instance, the lack of direct 
information exchange between the client and the bottom tiers of the supply chain depended on 
the willingness of the main contractor to facilitate it (Briscoe and Dainty, 2005). The 
centralised decision making of both public and private organisations could also make the 
respondents even more vulnerable to timely continuous information flow. Hence, in addition 
to improving communication, enhancing collaborative data sharing between the public 
organisations and the supply chain (a moderate capability, 22 of 44 in Table 4.11) is essential 
to manage a continuous flow of information. In this case, Information Technology (IT) tools 
such as Building Information Modelling (BIM) could be useful in improving information flow 
and encouraging  collaboration in the supply chain (Kamar and Hamid, 2011). Visibility of the 
public organisations’ supply chain’s operations can also be enhanced by having real-time data 
on the location and status of key resources (a low capability, 25 of 44 in Table 4.11).   
 
Table 6.7: Summary of the critical vulnerability of reliance upon information flow 
Critical Vulnerability 
Factor Pathogens Linked Capability Factors 
Reliance upon 
information flow 
 
 
 
• Practice of lack of transparency 
in sharing information 
• Behaviour of  “us versus them” in 
project team 
• Convention of outsourcing work 
to external parties 
 
 
C9. Collaboration with supply 
chain members 
C9.1 Communication 
C4.3 Collaborative information 
exchange 
C9.3 Risk sharing with 
partners 
C4. Visibility of supply chain 
operation 
C4.2 Products, assets, and 
people visibility 
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6.3.4 Liquidity/Credit Vulnerability  
 
Lack of financial resources 
	
Financial vulnerability is also a top threat to the public organisations, based on the reported 
high susceptibility to liquidity/credit vulnerability (a top three vulnerability) in Table 4.6. This 
includes the vulnerability to any changes in financial and economic policies and the lack of 
financial resources to cover all potential needs (ranked 9 and 12 respectively of 39 vulnerability 
sub-factors). This result is consistent with Goh and Abdul-Rahman’s (2013) study in which 
financial risk was identified as one of the major risks in the Malaysian construction industry. 
This could be problematic considering that financial crisis was reported earlier to be one of the 
top three most frequent disruptive events in public projects (see Section 6.2.1), and higher cost 
of operation as one of the critical effects of disruptions on public projects (see Section 6.2.2). 
The public organisations also had a significantly lower score in financial strength (mean rank 
= 45.07), as per Table 4.15, compared to the private organisations (mean rank = 61.39). This 
result is surprising considering that as a government body it is expected that it should have 
sufficient funds to deliver public sector projects effectively in the interest of the stakeholders, 
particularly the public. Hence, it might be that insufficient funds were available to public sector 
clients (i.e. the local ministries) ultimately in charge of providing funds to the public 
organisations to carry out the respective projects.  
 
In the Malaysian public projects case, the client department (e.g. Ministry of Higher Education, 
Ministry of Health) is ultimately responsible for providing the funds to public organisations for 
the implementation of public projects, based on the budget allocated by the Economic Planning 
Unit (EPU) of the Prime Minister’s Department (Ibrahim, 2011). The budget allocation for 
intended public projects is planned well in advance, and clients are required to bid for their 
annual budget from EPU during March for implementation of their respective projects in 
following year (Economic Planning Unit, 2009). Ahmad et al. (2012), however, pointed out 
that more often, the scope of works for the proposed public projects is reduced and lower 
budgets are approved by EPU because of the department’s focus on cost reduction. The lack 
of financial resources for the public organisations compared to the private organisations might 
therefore stem from the rigidity of this financial policy that requires the cost of the project to 
be estimated a year ahead for budgetary purposes, and consequently might not be sufficient to 
accommodate any changes during project delivery. This limited budget could also have an 
impact on the quality of the project as the public organisations have to adjust the project scope 
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accordingly. As previously discussed in Section 5.5, Expert PO1 explained that the public 
organisations can only optimise their design according to their available budget,  
For our engineering design, we mostly optimise what we have, we cannot maximise the design. 
Sometimes the client requests for the design to be implemented in two phases, so that the 
subsequent phase can be implemented when they receive the necessary funding. But what if the 
money does not arrive in the subsequent phase of the project? That’s quite risky. So it is better 
to plan ahead and reduce the standard of design according to the budget they currently have. 
Limited budgets have also resulted in limited resources spent on the overall planning phase. 
Expert PO2 explained that, 
We try to identify as much risks at the planning phase but with restraints such as cost. We 
cannot put our costs for planning so much. For the planning phase, there is only a limited budget 
for us to prepare documents, a little bit of drawings, like for roadwork, we need utility mapping, 
survey, things like that. We can’t cost for it that much. 
On the other hand, as discussed in Section 6.2.5, Expert PO1 stated that only limited time is 
spent on the planning phase, possibly because of the limited budget provided by the client. This 
could result in disruptions in the subsequent construction phase of the project, due to 
deficiencies that were not realised much earlier at the planning phase (as discussed in section 
6.2.3).  
 
Table 6.8: Summary of the critical vulnerability of lack of financial resources 
Critical Vulnerability 
Factor Pathogens Linked Capability Factors 
Lack of financial 
resources 
 
 
 
 
• Circumstance of limited budget 
by client 
• Convention of financial 
allocation to be estimated a year 
ahead 
• Practice of cost savings by 
government 
• Circumstance of reduced scope 
of works due to lesser budget 
approved  
 
C12. Financial strength 
C12.3 Financial reserves and 
liquidity 
 
 
Finance policies and procedures 
 
The survey result on the public organisations’ financial vulnerability is a great concern as it 
could have a knock-on effect on the operation of the private organisations. A majority of the 
professionals interviewed stressed the issue of late payments to the contractors from the public 
organisations. Contractor CO4 explained that, previously, part of the contractual terms for 
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progress payment by the public organisations had amounted to a payment of 75% of the 
material price that have arrived on-site. More recently, to help alleviate the contractors’ 
financial problems, the public organisations increased this payment to 100%. However, 
Contractor 4 stated that, 
	
Even if you send 100% of the material price, they won’t pay you 100%, the most I can get 
based on my experience is 75%. But based on the current terms, they are supposed to make 
100% payment. So we should receive full payment. But their people do not dare to take the 
risk, they play safe a lot. We receive 100% payment only when we have completed the work 
on-site. 
In reality, therefore, the public organisations still follow the previous terms of paying 75% of 
the material price, even though the contractors need prompt payment to execute the 
construction work on site and to make the necessary payments to their suppliers and sub-
contractors. This explains why the private organisations are equally highly vulnerable to any 
changes made in financial policies and procedures (ranked 2 of 39 vulnerability sub-factors in 
Table 4.9). Expert PO3 acknowledged that, in some cases, the public organisations’ 
representatives on-site are very strict in terms of the valuation,  
But on our side, like our payment was not really up to mark. Our team on-site were very strict 
on payment. They were checking here and there, checking so thorough. They didn’t make the 
payment every two weeks like they’re supposed to.  
He added that this should not be the case as the public organisations can always recover the 
expense through the next interim payment if the contractor actually did not deliver the work 
on-site. Expert PO2 observed that some of the smaller contractors depend heavily on the public 
organisations’ interim payments to carry out the work on-site,  
If the contractor depends on our payment entirely, when he fails, how to recover and pay the 
rest of the team on-site? The worst-case scenario that could happen is that the project faces 
severe delay for more than 60 days, or is even abandoned’. 
On the other hand, Expert PO5 stated that some of the contractual payment arrangements 
between the main contractors and their suppliers could also result in the suppliers not receiving 
adequate payment (as discussed in Section 5.5). Certainly, Abdul-Kadir et al. (2005) revealed 
the detrimental effects of late payment which resulted in suppliers not getting paid on time by 
the contractors, causing frequent stoppages of material delivery and loss of trust in the 
contractors, hindering overall progress. Thus, the private organisations’ good financial strength 
does not guarantee that they can overcome the effect of under-payment or late payment by the 
public organisations. Late payment to the consultants by the public organisations was also 
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reported. As the consultants have fixed fees, they are paid in stages from the preliminary design 
to the final design. Expert PO5 justified this,  
…sometimes when the consultant overdesigns stage 1 or needs a variation order, they will 
claim some money from the stage 2 percentage of payment, and when that happens, it becomes 
a headache. The more variation orders and redesign, the more it overlaps here and there on the 
payments. That’s why our financial team haven’t paid them because they have to estimate the 
fees properly.  
In this case, although the consultants’ payment is not as high as that of the people that involved 
in the construction phase, the consultants still need timely payments to pay for their staff. 
Timely payment also ensures timely progression of the design work by the consultants. 
Payment issues in construction projects are also prevalent in other developing countries such 
as Vietnam (Le-Hoai et al., 2008), Kuwait (Koushki et al., 2005), Ghana (Frimpong et al., 
2003) and Nigeria (Aibinu and Odeyinka, 2006), making it even more imperative for the 
construction supply chain to manage the difficulties arising from this financial threat. The 
contractors also tend to mobilise financial resources among their public and private sector 
projects to maintain the progress of work, so any delayed payment from the public sector 
projects will subsequently affect the resources available to carry out other private sector 
projects. This shows how the impact of financial vulnerability could also spread and cascade 
from one project to another in the supply chain. 
	
Understandably, the external threat of changes to financial policies is difficult to overcome as 
it is beyond the control of the public organisations and the supply chain. It is to the 
responsibility of the policymaker to reduce the detrimental effects of this problem and provide 
a more efficient solution through reasonable financial procedures. What both public and private 
organisations can do, however, is to improve their capacity to reduce the impact of this financial 
threat on their operation. The public organisations’ significantly low efficiency level in Table 
4.15 (mean rank = 45.21) compared to the private organisations (mean rank = 61.25) is not 
reassuring to reduce this threat. It includes significant lower efficiency scores in areas such as 
labour productivity (mean rank = 47.66), asset utilisation (mean rank = 46.33) and product 
variability reduction (45.68), indicating inconsistency in the quality of the public organisations’ 
operation. This is of concern as the government bodies are tightly in charge of the crucial 
briefing, tendering and design process in the pre-construction phase that will determine the 
outcome of the whole project. It is therefore not surprising that inefficient traditional 
approaches which have dominated the Malaysian industry have constantly been blamed for the 
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industry’s project failures (Munns & Bjeirmi, 1996). On the other hand, the survey revealed 
that the private organisations have balanced their vulnerability to changes in financial policies 
with top three capability factors of having good financial strength, high visibility of their supply 
chain operations and high adaptability in responding to these changes (see Table 4.15). 
Nonetheless, their anticipation of and recovery capabilities (bottom five main capability factors 
in Table 4.12) from expected payment delay and return to normal operation, once disrupted by 
such threat, can be further improved to counteract this problem. Indeed, Contractor CO3 
suggested that contractors should anticipate the extent of the finance that will return to them, 
and manage the construction works accordingly, 
You must programme your work at the site accordingly. Don’t overwork day and night when 
the government’s financial provision for that year is only this much. That means you’re ahead 
twice from the government’s price allocation for that year. Who shall pay you later? And that’s 
why it is very important for us to always ask the public departments, is there sufficient financial 
provision? And to what extent? We have to ask them that. So we have to do the job based on 
the financial provisions they have.  
Ye and Rahman’s (2010) studies also identified that understanding and researching the owner’s 
ability to pay was perceived by contractors as the most effective solution in mitigating the risk 
of late payment. Overall, it can be seen here that resilience to financial threats would be difficult 
to achieve in isolation, considering that the weakness of the public organisations’ operations 
could ultimately hamper the private organisations’ ability to deliver the project efficiently. 
Hence, both parties need to work cooperatively to deliver the project within the available 
budget and ensure that the terms of payment in the procurement contract are clear and 
reasonable between the client and the project team; in practice, they still have trouble achieving 
this, based on the lowest ranking of the collaboration factor in Tables 4.10 and 4.12.  
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Table 6.9: Summary of the critical vulnerability of finance policies and procedures 
Critical Vulnerability 
Factor Pathogens Linked Capability Factors 
Finance policies and 
procedures 
 
 
 
 
• Practice of late payment by 
contracting parties 
• Behaviour of lack of trust 
among parties 
• Circumstance of contractual 
payment arrangements 
between contractors and their 
team 
• Convention of government 
payment arrangements 
• Circumstance of complexity in 
estimating design fees when 
variation occurs 
C12. Financial strength 
C3. Efficiency of operations 
C4. Visibility of supply chain 
operation 
C5. Adaptability in responding to 
changes 
C6. Anticipation to forecast 
potential payment delay 
C7. Recovery from late payment 
C9. Collaboration with supply 
chain members 
 
	
	
6.3.5 Strategic Vulnerability 
 
Degree of outsourcing 
 
In the Malaysian public sector, it is common for the pre-construction tasks (i.e. design, brief 
preparation, tender evaluation) to be outsourced to external consultants (Abdul-Aziz & Ali, 
2004) such as independent quantity surveyors and architects. Indeed, the survey result shows 
that the public organisations have a high degree of outsourcing, a top five vulnerability sub-
factor in Table 4.7. Although this strategic initiative of outsourcing provides an opportunity for 
the private organisations to engage in public projects, the survey shows that the public 
organisations failed to evaluate the associated risks. Unlike the private organisations, the public 
organisations seem to have lost control over the visibility of their supply chain (a low capability 
sub-factor, ranked 25 of 44 in Table 4.11), hindering the collection of information and 
collaborative data sharing among project team members (a moderate capability, 22 of 44). The 
loss of control and visibility reflect the public organisations’ uncertainty about the state of the 
public sector supply chain, making it harder for the public organisations to detect any 
disruptions arising from the supply chain or obtain a complete picture of the current situation 
affecting project delivery. Plus, unlike the private organisations, any deficiencies in the public 
organisations’ operations are highly visible to stakeholders (a top 5 vulnerability sub-factor in 
Table 4.11), making it even more imperative for the public organisations to detect any 
abnormalities in the outsourced operations before they escalate to other parts of the supply 
chain. 
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In this case, the public organisations’ high degree of outsourcing in their design work could be 
attributed to incompetence in their internal team. For instance, Expert PO2 pointed out that the 
public organisations’ design teams do not have the capacity to design steel structures. This has 
been an issue especially in conventional procurement where the in-house design team is 
required to provide the design. He explained that,   
The design team had asked the contractor to do the steel design in this conventional contract. 
And then the planning team questioned, “we already asked you to design, why did you ask the 
contractor to design it?”. So it ends up that a portion of work becomes design and build. 
He added that the design team’s current software used standardised sizes of steel members 
which could not accommodate the complexity of the structural steel design of the building. The 
internal design team was not confident of producing the design, resulting in the contractor 
designing the steel structure. Experts PO3 and PO5 attributed this incompetence to the fact that 
the public organisations’ training centre had been closed for 20 years. Expert PO3 explained 
this, 
Our competence level left out a lot because our training centre has been closed. For such a big 
organisation like a public organisations, if you don’t have a training centre, it’s not good. That’s 
why I hope my young engineers aged 41, 44, 48 can survive. I try to groom them back and train 
them, because we lost this training centre nearly 20 years ago. We have to train our young 
engineers to become experts.  
He concluded that only with the relevant knowledge and experience could the professionals in 
the public organisations improve their competence. Indeed, Expert PO4 pointed out that this 
lack of competence in the team resulted in poor administration of non-conventional contracts, 
such as design and build. He explained the confusion of the internal team, 
Some of them think, for design and build, they assume they don’t need to distribute the work, 
don’t need to be concerned with the work at all. They just leave all the works to the external 
party. But some said, they get too involved in design and build because they’re used to the 
conventional way. So the concept is still, not really that it cannot be delivered, but there are still 
many areas to be improved.  
This lack of relevant competence in the public organisations’ internal team resulted in the high 
degree of outsourcing in their design and procurement work. The poor administering of non-
conventional contract might also be due to the convention pathogen of poor documented 
lessons learnt (discussed in earlier Section 5.6). The public organisations’ vulnerability to poor 
administration of the contract could also result in the contractors’ opportunistic behaviour 
(pathogen discussed in Section 5.8) in using the contract conditions to secure additional finance 
when faced with costly disruptions.   
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Sheffi (2005) pointed out that managing additional suppliers and having deep relationships 
with multiple suppliers are often too costly to maintain, which explains why the public 
organisations have inadequate management control over their supply chain members (a top 10 
vulnerability sub-factor in Table 4.7). Plus, when disruptions occur, the private organisations 
who serve only as an alternative source to the public organisations may not be inclined to take 
the risk of investing ahead of time to help the public organisations who chose not to do business 
with them in the first place (Sheffi, 2005). This can be seen in the reported low risk sharing of 
the public organisations with their suppliers (a bottom three capability sub-factor in Table 
4.11). Hence, for their procurement strategy to be successful the public organisations should 
consider either deepening their relationships with their key suppliers, especially those 
providing specialty sources, or developing shallow connections with multiple suppliers (Sheffi, 
2005).  
 
Table 6.10: Summary of the critical vulnerability of high degree of outsourcing 
Critical Vulnerability 
Factor Pathogens Linked Capability Factors 
High degree of 
outsourcing 
 
 
 
 
• Circumstance of high visibility 
of disruptions to stakeholders 
• Circumstance of poor 
competency of design and 
procurement team 
• Organisation with poor training 
centre 
• Convention of poor documented 
lessons learnt  
• Opportunistic behaviour by 
contractors 
C4. Visibility of supply chain 
operations 
C4.3 Collaborative information 
exchange 
C9.3 Risk sharing with partners  
 
 
	
Reliance upon specialty sources 
	
Similarly, the private organisations also outsource their operations to many different suppliers 
(ranked 7 of 39 vulnerability sub-factors in Table 4.9). This might be due to the fact that they 
rely heavily on specialty sources in delivering the construction projects (a top five vulnerability 
sub-factor in Table 4.9). However, despite the high level of outsourcing, the private 
organisations seem to have better control of their supply chain and are well aware of the 
location and status of their current resources, compared to the public organisations, based on 
the high scoring of their visibility capability in Table 4.12 (a top three capability factor). Further 
detailed analysis through the Mann-Whitney U test (Table 4.15) reveals that the private 
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organisations have a statistically significant higher capability score in visibility compared to 
the public organisations. However, one of the problems highlighted by the private organisations 
in the interviews is the difficulties in reserving materials from outsourced suppliers. This is 
common, especially for specialist items such as steel. For instance, Contractor CO4 pointed 
out that, 
The maximum material I can reserve, like for steel, we can buy them in cash money maximum 
80 tonnes only. For instance, my current project is being disrupted due to the increase in steel 
price. Because the maximum you can buy is only 80 tonnes of steel. Yes, the supplier is careful 
not to give more than that, because they know that the price of steel will keep on increasing. So 
this means, you can only buy maximum 80 tonnes of steel and you have to make payment at 
that time. 
This can be attributed to the uncertainty in economic conditions highlighted in Sections 6.2.1 
and 6.3.2. This interviewee added that there are few suppliers of steel, and therefore no option 
but to order the limited amount the contractors are allowed. Similarly, Consultant CS3 stated 
that the public organisations cannot reserve capacity such as electrical services should 
disruptions occur on site. She explained that,   
For electricity, if we request this much energy from the utility provider, and we do not fully 
utilise it, they can penalise you. All utilities have their own requirements.  
Contractor CO2 commented that in order to mitigate the low reserved capacity, a lot of time 
must be devoted to the procurement of the material, 
Let’s say in the normal situation, the material will be delivered in one month, but maybe we 
can order it one and a half or two months before the date of delivery, so we have a buffer time 
there. Because in projects, the quantity is usually fixed, you can’t buy extra, if you buy extra 
maybe you can buy just about 5% extra, to cover any material damage or disruptions.  
It is therefore not surprising that reserved capacity was rated as one of the lowest capability 
factors of both public and private organisations (ranked in the bottom 10 capability sub-factors 
in Tables 4.11 and 4.13 respectively). Furthermore, the circumstance of lack of skilled workers 
has also resulted in the contractors’ dependence on engaging foreign workers (see Section 5.5). 
This strategic measure, however, has resulted in the public organisations being exposed to 
defects in quality due to poor workmanship on-site, as discussed in Section 6.2.2. 
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Table 6.11: Summary of the critical vulnerability of reliance upon specialty sources 
Critical Vulnerability 
Factor Pathogens Linked Capability Factors 
Reliance upon specialty 
sources 
 
 
 
 
• Convention of outsourcing 
operations for specialists work 
• Circumstance of lack of skilled 
workers 
• Convention of high dependency 
on foreign workers 
C4. Visibility of supply chain 
operations 
C2.1 Reserve capacity 
C2. Capacity of resources 
C6.4 Contingency planning in 
procuring specialists materials 
 
 
	
6.3.6 Supplier or Customer Disruptions 
 
In addition to these top five critical vulnerability factors, it is important to note the relatively 
low ranking of the vulnerability of the public organisations to supplier and/or customer 
disruptions, as shown in Table 4.6. Despite reporting earlier that they faced disruption from to 
the failure of their key suppliers during public project delivery (see Figure 4.1), the public 
organisations claimed that their suppliers and clients do not suffer from frequent disruptions 
(bottom 10 vulnerability sub-factors in Table 4.7) and that their suppliers have enough capacity 
to deal with unplanned changes in demand (ranked 27 of 39 vulnerability sub-factors). This 
raises the question of whether the public organisations face more supplier or customer 
disruptions than reported, and whether they are fully aware of the condition of their supply 
chain members. Based on the survey, contrary to the public organisations’ perception, the 
private organisations reported the capacity of their supply chain members capacity as one of 
their weakest capabilities (Table 4.12). Factors such as multiple redundant resources (i.e. 
access to alternative facilities and equipment for back-up) and reserved capacity of materials, 
equipment and labour are areas of concern for the private organisations (ranked 35 and 38 of 
44 capability sub-factors in Table 4.13). As discussed in Section 6.3.5, the public organisations 
do not have full visibility of their supply chain members (ranked 25 of 44 capability sub-factors 
in Table 4.11) and therefore are not fully aware of the current condition of the private 
organisations. The public organisations’ assumption that the private organisations engaged can 
deal adequately with demand changes could be problematic, as it will put an unnecessary 
burden on the private organisations to meet unexpected demand changes within their limited 
resource capacity. It is therefore not surprising that the private organisations reported being 
highly vulnerable to unpredictability of demand (ranked 13 of 39 vulnerability sub-factors in 
Table 4.9), as indicated by the survey result. Hence, despite the public organisations having 
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many alternative supply chain members in case of disruptions (a top 10 capability sub-factor 
in Table 4.11), they will not be able to obtain the full advantage of this capability if poor 
visibility of their supply chain members (ranked 25 of 44 capability sub-factors) and 
insufficient management control over them (a top 10 vulnerability sub-factor in Table 4.7) 
persist. 
 
Table 6.12: Summary of the critical vulnerability of supplier or customer disruptions 
Critical Vulnerability 
Factor Pathogens Linked Capability Factors 
Supplier or customer 
disruptions 
 
 
 
 
• Circumstance of 
unpredictability in demand 
• Practice of poor assumption of 
supply chain’s capacity to deal 
with changes 
• Practice of frequent design 
changes 
 
C2. Capacity of resources 
C2.2 Redundancy (assets, 
labour) 
C2.1 Reserve capacity 
C4. Visibility of supply chain 
operations 
C1.2 Multiple sources 
C4.2 Products, assets, people 
visibility 
 
	
The public and private organisations’ capability factors are discussed in the following section.  
  
6.4 Supply Chain Capability Factors 
 
6.4.1 Public Organisations’ Capabilities 
 
Based on the scatterplot in Figure 4.12, the public organisations scored adaptability as their 
strongest capability factor; lies within the high capability and high importance quadrant of the 
scatterplot. Nevertheless, despite these strengths, the public organisations’ ability to take 
advantage of disruptions is still weak, based on the reported low ranking of this sub-factor in 
the adaptability category (ranked 34 of 44 overall sub-factors in Table 4.11). Considering that 
the public organisations are still highly vulnerable to political/legal pressures, management 
vulnerability and liquidity/credit vulnerability, one could argue whether their adaptability, as a 
capability factor might rather act against these vulnerabilities, and whether it could obstruct or 
strengthen their ability to manage disruptions effectively.  
According to Limnios and Mazzarol (2011), adaptive organisations tend to fall into the rigidity 
trap by continuously reinforcing past successful strategies and failing to identify changing 
market conditions. This organisational state is also known as routine rigidity, from the inability 
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to change the patterns and logic that underlie organisational investments (Gilbert, 2005). In 
other words, although the public organisations are very adaptable, in the case of disruptions in 
public projects, they either actually learn from the past or eventually fall back into normal 
routines or traditions (as discussed in the convention pathogen in Section 5.6). March (1991) 
argued that the process of organisational adaptation and learning can either involve the 
adoption of exploitation (i.e. utilising or improving existing skills and resources) or the process 
of exploration (i.e. looking for new opportunities). Highly adaptable organisations, such as the 
public organisations in this study, are said to characteristically improve exploitation more 
rapidly than exploration, resulting in cycles of exploitation reinforcement that tend to 
discourage exploration (March, 1991). This can be seen through the survey results where, 
despite the public organisations’ strong capacity to learn from experience, their ability to seize 
advantage from disruptions is still very poor. In this case, their over-reliance on exploitation 
for organisational learning might work against them. They must therefore consider how to 
balance their exploration and exploitation strategies to be able to continuously scan their 
environment and identify the need and opportunity for change when it presents itself, while 
maintaining and evolving the key organisational capabilities (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004).  
The public organisations’ attributes of high levels of adaptability but low levels of planning 
(high susceptibility to management vulnerability and strategic vulnerability) also suggest that 
these organisations are highly agile but unsystematic in their approach. Previous researchers 
have referred to these attributes as adaptive resilience (Pal et al., 2012). Although the inherent 
adaptability of such organisations may contribute to their resilience, allowing them to perform 
well and survive disruptions, their tendency towards a more adaptive rather than a planned 
approach can undermine their ability to find strategic opportunity from disruptions (Vargo and 
Seville, 2011). This might further explain the weaknesses identified in their current risk 
management approach (Section 6.2.4), where despite their pre-planned measures, a more ad-
hoc approach is adopted when disruptions occur. Hence, it is important for the public 
organisations to overcome their management and strategic vulnerabilities and to balance the 
two complementary behaviours of planning and adaptation, which can improve their overall 
ability to grow in the face of disruptions in public projects. 
6.4.2 Private Organisations’ Capabilities 
 
Like the public organisations, the contractors and consultants reported adaptability as their 
strongest capability factor, as presented in the scatterplot in Figure 4.12. This is possibly why 
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the majority of the private organisations reported that they dealt with disruptions as part of 
business-as-usual (Figure 4.4). On the other hand, unlike the public organisations, the private 
organisations excel at taking advantage from disruptions in public projects, as reflected in the 
Mann-Whitney U test results in Table 4.15. This is surprising considering that, unlike the public 
organisations, most of the contractors and consultants have no specific disruption management 
approach (Section 6.2.4). The private organisations’	strong ability to adapt and seize advantage 
from disruptions might therefore be due to the fact that they are more experienced in dealing 
with a high frequency of disruptions in their operations (see Section 6.2.3) than are the public 
organisations, and have developed the necessary skills to take advantage of such disruptions. 
It could also mean that the private organisations’ opportunistic behaviour materialised due to 
the public organisations’ vulnerabilities in areas such as poor procurement and poor visibility 
of their supply chain (see Section 6.3.5), thus enabling the private organisations to take 
advantage of disruptive events. However, as most of the private organisations also claimed to 
have no detailed contingency plans to deal with disruptions (ranked 32 of 44 capability sub-
factors in Table 4.13), they might have adopted more of a firefighting approach in handling 
them, whereby short-term solutions are used to fix problems as they occur during project 
delivery; hence, the reason they also claimed to be willing to take immediate action to mitigate 
the effects of disruptions despite the short-term costs (a top ten capability sub-factor). The 
firefighting approach might work as a temporary solution, but its hidden effects in the long run 
can be problematic and might have a cascading effect on contractors’ and consultants’ 
operations. Considering that the private organisations are still vulnerable to the volatility of the 
construction market and their own poor management (both in the top three vulnerability factors 
in Table 4.8), they should perhaps consider a more planned approach in dealing with 
disruptions to maintain their position in the market and survive in the long term.  
 
6.5 Recommendations on Resilience Response Strategies by Respondents 
	
Table 6.13 below presents a summary of the respondents’ recommendations on the appropriate 
resilience response strategies to mitigate the identified critical vulnerabilities and pathogenic 
influences discussed throughout Section 6.3 of the thesis. Overall, along with the supply chain 
capabilities assessed in the survey (Section 4.4), these recommendations were used as a guide 
in developing the capabilities in the final resilience response framework presented in the 
following Section 6.6 of the thesis.  
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Table 6.13: Summary of the recommendations on resilience response strategies from interviews 
Pathogens Recommendations on resilience response strategies 
Exposure to political disruptions 
Practice of lack of 
transparency in tender 
selection 
 
• Public organisations must have a systematic and well documented 
tender evaluation based on actual facts and data. 
• Selection of tender board committee should be persons of high 
integrity.  
• Public organisations’ top management should communicate well with 
regular briefings with politicians on the integrity and outcome of the 
evaluation. 
• Malaysian anti-corruption commission should be invited as observer 
in tender board meetings. 
• Sign off “integrity pack” between contractor and public organisations,  
with terms not to involve in any lobbying or bribery practices where 
the consequences is that they can be disqualified or contract can be 
terminated (if awarded). 
Circumstance of 
monopolisation of 
material 
 
• Government should liberalise market for key construction materials 
suppliers e.g. more permits for importer permits or manufacturing 
licence.  
• Private organisations should report to government any suppliers that 
impose any infavourable condition that contravene with the 
government approved permit. 
Practice of frequent 
design changes 
 
• Head of Project Team must be competent in handling design team to 
avoid any unnecessary changes to design. Must control the time 
element in design schedule. 
• Consultants should produce design complying to all specific standards, 
regulations, government policy on green and environment to avoid 
many changes.  
Circumstance of changes 
in political power  
 
• Public organisations to communicate with the new government on the 
outcome/implication/consequence of the project being halt including 
possibility of being sued by the contractor. 
• Private organisations to take action according to what is entitle to in 
the contract. 
Changes in government regulations 
Convention of complex 
regulations that are hard 
to navigate 
• Public organisations should engage the relevant professional bodies to 
be part of any changes. 
• Private organisations should be more proactive in preparing, accepting, 
and keeping abreast to government regulation changes e.g. IBS, BIM 
and green policy. 
• Public organisations to include in the contract clear statements on the 
responsibilities of all parties on the regulations, and updating the 
private organisations on the new policies imposed. 
Convention of 
inconsistent regulations 
imposed by different 
authorities 
• Government should set several committees of relevant government 
agencies such as professional bodies to address the inconsistencies. 
• Local authority should embark on local government transformation 
program to increase the efficiency and standardisation of local 
government practices and regulations. 
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Severe price fluctuation 
Circumstance of 
unpredictable economic 
conditions 
• Include contract clauses between public and private organisations that 
define the required parameters and conditions for sharing risk of price 
fluctuations 
• Contractors must be proactive and reserve imported materials much 
ahead when currency is stable. 
Circumstance of 
contractual arrangements 
• Public organisations should have base value of ringgit in contract at 
tendering for high cost equipment that are supply at a later stage of the 
projects. 
Circumstance of 
monopolised materials 
• Public organisations to incorporate Variation of Price calculations 
especially for imported equipment. 
Circumstance of limited 
material supply  
• Add flexibility in construction operations to accommodate changes. 
• Utilise current resources and modify operations accordingly. 
• Ability to mobilise available resources quickly. 
Price pressures 
Circumstance of 
competitive open tender 
• Contractors should make reasonable pricing of project overheads to 
increase chance of winning bid. 
• Learning from previous public tendering experience to improve 
bidding. 
Circumstance of 
unpredictable economic 
conditions 
• Contractors to utilise current resources available when oil price 
increase. 
• Increase efficiency in construction operations to reduce the loss of 
profit. 
Convention of public 
organisations’ goals for 
higher quality and low 
cost 
• Statistical cut-off price in tender evaluation should be modified 
whereby the cut-off price from the tender selected cannot be much 
lower than 10% of government estimates. 
Circumstance of market 
pressure from foreign 
players 
• Private organisations must be able to anticipate and recover from 
potential market disruptions to survive in the long run. 
Convention of supplier 
controlling price 
• Maintaining long-term relationship with bottom tier supply chain to 
obtain the best reasonable prices. 
Convention of the 
engagement of specialists 
by public organisations 
• Collaboration and partnership with suppliers. 
• Maintain good reputation with public organisations. 
 
Timing of business decisions 
Convention of excessive 
bureaucracy in decision-
making process 
• Some government process have to relook using “lean project 
management” to reduce unnecessary bureaucracy and too many 
hierarchy of authority. 
• Simplify layers of approval process. 
Convention of centralised 
decision-making 
• Empower workers on site to make decision to be able to seize 
advantage from disruptions. 
• Distribute final decision making to professionals carrying out the 
work. 
Practice of poor 
assumptions in decision 
making 
• More training and certification programme for government project 
team to increase competency in decision making.  
• Must have better planning and as much information as possible at 
planning phase to reduce further rework at later stage. 
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Reliance upon information flow 
Practice of lack of 
transparency in sharing 
information 
• Public organisations should come up with good communication plan 
at every level of project phase, covering all the important stakeholders. 
Tools like stakeholders analysis and communication matrix can be 
used.  
• Information Technology (IT) tools such as Building Information 
Modeling (BIM) could be useful to improve information flow and 
encourage collaborative supply chain. 
Convention of 
outsourcing work to 
external parties 
 
• Public organisations should engage competent scheduler to assist 
project manager in better control of site progress.  
• Good scheduler can assists project manager to make decision or 
procure in time all the necessary resources needed.  
• Supervising consultant should be able to monitor and control project 
well and address all possible risk that can impact progress.  
Lack of financial resources 
Circumstance of limited 
budget by client 
 
• Public organisations should include value management at planning 
stage to optimise scope.  
• For clients who wants project scope that includes future needs but have 
limited finance, when design, do a master plan to include future needs 
but implement in phases, phases based on financial provisions 
available at that time.  
• Focus on immediate needs first, then can expand the project scope 
when finance is obtained. 
Convention of financial 
allocation to be estimated 
a year ahead 
• Public organisations should have realistic and achievable schedule so 
can better estimate budget needed for following year. 
Practice of cost savings 
by government 
 
• Efficiency in managing yearly budget requirements from client is 
essentials.  
• Programme manager should be competent in preparing yearly budget. 
• Public organisations should increase efficiency, labor productivity and 
resource utilisation. 
 
Circumstance of lower 
budget approved 
• Consultant to have competency in coming up with more functional 
design eliminating wastage. Design to cost or budget. 
• Increase collaboration with project team to work cooperatively to 
deliver the project within the available budget. 
 
Financial policies and procedures 
Practice of late payment 
by contracting parties 
• Government to intervene during operation if late payment arise. 
• Contractor should make immediate payment as and when materials 
arrive on-site. 
• Anticipate the extent of finance that will return to the contractor, and 
managing the construction works accordingly. 
Circumstance of 
contractual payment 
arrangements between 
contractors and their team 
• Contractors should collaborate with suppliers who can give better 
credit facilities. 
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Convention of 
government payment 
arrangements 
 
• Include timely payment in Key Performance Indicator (KPI) for 
project manager. Report monthly payment performance to top 
management, record those projects with payment within 7 days.  
• Public organisations should make payment immediately or weekly, 
instead of monthly, especially when problems arise.  
High degree of outsourcing 
Circumstance of high 
visibility of disruptions to 
stakeholders 
 
• Improve visibility of supply chain members by monitoring closely 
operations and managing the contract with supply chain members 
efficiently. 
• Increase risk sharing with supply chain members. 
• Deepen relationships with key suppliers, especially those providing 
specialty sources. 
Circumstance of poor 
competency of design and 
procurement team 
• Public organisations should select competent consultant that are used 
to government requirements. 
• Include new agreement that can penalise consultant if they delay 
completion of design. Can be reported to the professional board and 
suspension of license for professional misconduct.  
Reliance upon specialty sources 
Convention of 
outsourcing operations for 
specialists work 
 
• Control supply chain through contract management and quality 
management system.  
• Contractor should build trust with supplier that they have done 
business with in the past.  
• Contractor to build trust with banker that issue the letter of credit to 
finance for imported items. 
Convention of high 
dependency on foreign 
workers 
• Contractor should invest more on skilled workers. 
• Government should ease the permit process for skilled foreign labours. 
 
 
6.6 Synthesis and Development of Final Framework 
 
The research findings indicated that the top five critical vulnerability factors of the public and 
private organisations are political or regulatory changes, market pressures, management, 
liquidity or credit and strategic vulnerability. Additionally, supplier or customer disruptions 
were included as critical vulnerabilities, as the failure of key customer or supplier was reported 
as one of the most frequent disruptions in public projects (see Section 6.2.1). It can be observed 
throughout the survey results that vulnerability arising from any part of the chain could impact 
another supply chain. These impacts are presented through the layered cascading impact (CI) 
channels in Figure 6.1. For instance, the increase in the price of materials imposed by the 
suppliers and manufacturers (CI 1) due to the market pressures identified in supply chains B 
and C causes the contractors and sub-contractors to face price fluctuation in their operation. 
This results in the escalation of the overall cost of both public and private projects in which the 
supply chain partners are involved. It shows how poor performance in one supply chain can 
	 232	
result in a set of organisations entering a vicious cycle of poor performance based on the 
organisations’ vulnerability levels. The survey also revealed how vulnerabilities arising from 
one organisation could ultimately affect the capabilities of other parties in the supply chain. The 
result shows that despite the private organisations’ high capabilities in financial strength, the 
public organisations’ financial vulnerability destabilises the entire supply chain (as discussed 
in Section 6.3.4). Late payment to the contractors by the public organisations in (CI 2) causes 
delayed payment to the suppliers by the contractors, resulting in frequent stoppages of material 
deliveries, and hindering overall progress. Furthermore, misinterpretation of the terms in the 
government regulations by the consultants (CI 3) causes inadequate valuation of the interim 
payments, resulting in insufficient payment by the public organisations to the contractors, who 
then need adequate finance to make timely payment to their subcontractors. This subsequently 
creates disputes among contracting parties that can be costly in terms of money, time and effort. 
 
Figure 6.1: Cascading impacts on supply chains represented through a layered framework 
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On the other hand, considering the public organisations’ high level of outsourcing (see Section 
6.3.5), they should take into account other parties engaged in their supply chain network in 
making timely decisions, as this can affect the related parties’ operations. Furthermore, the 
public organisations’ low efficiency level in project delivery also deters the private 
organisations from delivering public sector projects on time (Section 6.3.4). Limited time and 
cost spent by the public organisations in the planning phase could also result in deficiencies in 
the following design and construction phase in which the private organisations are involved. 
Indeed, the survey showed that the public organisations should not think in isolation, as some 
of their actions will have an impact on a different supply chain with only private sector players. 
The degree of incongruent goals identified among the supply chain members (i.e. quality by the 
public organisations and profitability by the private organisations) is also of great concern as 
collaboration between the public and private organisations is important in overcoming these 
critical vulnerabilities that will affect not only the organisations individually but also the 
network of supply chains. 
 
It was also identified from the survey that some of the capabilities, such as high dispersion of 
resources, work against the organisations’ operations; instead, they make them vulnerable to 
other factors as a result of their own strategic decisions. For instance, the public organisations’ 
capability of having a highly dispersed market and the private organisations’ strategic decision 
to engage a large number of supply chain members increased their vulnerability to late 
information and slow decision making (see Section 6.3.3). The public organisations also failed 
to evaluate the risks associated with outsourcing and seem to have lost control over the 
visibility of their supply chain as a result of this strategic initiative. Hence, despite having many 
alternative supply chain members in case disruptions occurs, the public organisations will not 
be able to obtain the full advantage of this capability if poor visibility and insufficient 
management control over their supply chain members persist. The contractors were also 
identified as facing a higher repercussion from disruptions to public projects as compared to 
other parties in the supply chain (see Section 6.2.3), suggesting that the impact of inefficiencies 
is not always immediate but may be realised later in the project. It is also of concern that the 
majority of the contractors do not employ any specific disruption management strategies, as 
they have adopted short-term solutions to fix problems as they occur during project delivery 
(see Section 6.2.4).  
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It was found that the critical vulnerabilities are attributed to the pathogenic influence of 
circumstance (i.e. political environment, economic conditions, lack of skilled workers) in 
which the supply chain operates, which influences individual practice (i.e. poor assumptions 
in decision making) and behaviour in response to this project environment. Existing 
organisational structures and established conventions in government procedures also influence 
management in operational and strategic decision making. Overall, these critical vulnerabilities 
and pathogens are presented in Table 6.14, along with the resilience capabilities proposed to 
reduce the vulnerabilities. The capabilities in Table 6.14 were identified from the discussions 
throughout this chapter. Recommendations by respondents in Section 6.5 was also considered 
in addressing the resilience capabilities. This table was used as a guide in developing the final 
resilience response framework, described in the following section. 
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Table 6.14: The proposed resilience capabilities to reduce critical vulnerabilities in public sector supply chain 
 
Critical Vulnerability 
Factors Pathogens Resilience Capabilities 
Exposure to political 
disruptions 
 
 
• Circumstance of political interference in tender selection 
• Practice of acceleration in delivering plans 
• Circumstance of monopolisation of material 
• Practice of client’s frequent design changes 
• Circumstance of changes in political power  
 
C5. Anticipation of potential political disruptions 
C4.1 Business intelligence gathering of future trends and 
behaviour in the industry  
C9.1 Improve transparency in communicating information 
with supply chain members 
C4.3 Collaborative information exchange with project 
team members 
 
 
Changes in government 
regulations 
 
 
• Convention of complex regulations that are hard to navigate 
• Convention of inconsistent regulations imposed by different 
authorities 
• Convention of excessive bureaucracy in decision-making 
process 
• Organisation structure with multiple departments 
 
C1. Flexibility in approval process  
C8.1 Distributed decision making among project team 
members 
C6. Anticipation of potential regulation changes 
C9. Collaboration with supply chain members in 
responding to changes in regulations 
Severe price fluctuation 
 
 
• Circumstance of unpredictable economic conditions 
• Circumstance of contractual arrangements 
• Convention of late payment by public organisations 
• Circumstance of monopolised materials 
• Circumstance of limited material supply when in high demand 
 
C2.1 Reserve imported materials when currency is stable 
C1. Add flexibility in construction operations to 
accommodate changes. 
C3.2 Utilise current resources and modify operations 
accordingly 
C1.5 Fast re-routing of resources to reduce losses 
C9.3 Risk sharing with contractual parties in making 
claims 
C12. Financial strength; reserve finance to cover potential 
needs 
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Critical Vulnerability 
Factors Pathogens Resilience Capabilities 
Price pressures 
 
 
• Circumstance of competitive open tender 
• Circumstance of unpredictable economic conditions 
• Convention of public organisations’ goals for higher quality 
and low cost 
• Practice of underpricing by contractors 
• Circumstance of market pressure from foreign players 
• Convention of supplier controlling price 
• Convention of specialists selected by public organisations 
C10.1 Market share 
C3. Efficiency of operations 
C3.2 Resource utilisation to reduce overheads 
C6. Anticipation of potential market conditions 
C4.1 Business intelligence gathering on future market 
trends 
C7. Recovery from disruptions 
C5.4 Learning from tendering experience 
C9. Collaboration with supply chain members 
 
Timing of business 
decisions 
 
 
 
• Blame-game behaviour among project team 
• Convention of excessive bureaucracy in decision-making 
process 
• Convention of centralised decision-making 
• Organisation structure with multiple departments 
• Practice of poor assumptions in decision making 
• Practice of prioritisation of projects by public organisations 
based on its importance 
• Convention of prioritising response based on level of authority  
• Practice of frequent design changes by client 
• Behaviour of poor sense of urgency by parties 
C8.1 Distribute decision making and empower workers on 
site to make decision  
C9.1 Improve communication lines with project team 
members 
C5.2 Seize advantage from disruptions by making prompt 
decisions 
C1. Flexibility in approval process to reduce time of 
waiting for approval 
C4. Improve visibility of supply chain operations to 
ensure timely decision-making 
Reliance upon 
information flow 
 
 
• Practice of lack of transparency in sharing information 
• Behaviour of “us versus them” in project team 
• Convention of outsourcing work to external parties 
• Organisation structure with multiple departments  
 
 
C9. Collaboration with supply chain members 
C9.1 Transparency in communication with project team 
members 
C4.3 Collaborative information exchange among project 
team members 
C9.3 Risk sharing with partners 
C4. Improve visibility of supply chain operation to ensure 
consistent information flow 
C4.2 Improve visibility on current materials, resources 
and people through information technology tools 
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Critical Vulnerability 
Factors Pathogens Resilience Capabilities 
Lack of financial 
resources 
 
 
 
• Circumstance of limited budget by client 
• Convention of financial allocation to be estimated a year 
ahead 
• Practice of cost savings by government 
• Circumstance of reduced scope of works due to lower budget 
approved  
C12. Financial strength; ensure financial allocation is 
sufficient to cover project scope 
C3. Improve efficiency of operations through value 
management 
C3.1 Increase labour productivity  
C3.2 Utilise current resource 
C3.3 Consistent quality in operations to avoid rework 
C4. Improve visibility of supply chain operations to 
ensure operations meet the current budget 
 
 
Financial policies and 
procedures 
 
 
 
• Practice of late payment by contracting parties 
• Behaviour of lack of trust among parties 
• Circumstance of contractual payment arrangements between 
contractors and their team 
• Convention of government payment arrangements 
• Circumstance of complexity in estimating design fees when 
variation occurs 
C12. Financial strength to cover potential late payment 
C3. Efficiency of operations  
C4. Visibility of supply chain operations to know the 
current progress for payment 
C5. Adaptability in responding to changes in financial 
policies 
C6. Anticipation of potential payment delay 
C7. Recovery from late payment 
C9. Collaboration with supply chain members 
 
 
High degree of 
outsourcing 
 
 
 
• Circumstance of high exposure of disruptions to supply chain 
members 
• Circumstance of poor competency of design and procurement 
team 
• Organisation with poor training centre 
• Convention of poor documented lessons learnt  
• Opportunistic behaviour by contractors 
C4. Visibility of supply chain operations to have adequate 
control over outsourced works 
C4.3 Collaborative information exchange with supply 
chain partners 
C9.3 Risk sharing with partners  
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Critical Vulnerability 
Factors Pathogens Resilience Capabilities 
Reliance upon specialty 
sources 
 
 
 
• Convention of outsourcing operations for specialists work 
• Circumstance of lack of skilled workers 
• Convention of engaging foreign workers 
C4. Visibility of supply chain operations by closely 
monitoring outsourced works 
C2. Adequate capacity of resources 
C6.4 Contingency planning in procuring specialists’ 
materials 
C9. Collaboration; deepen relationships with key suppliers 
providing specialty sources 
Supplier or customer 
disruptions 
 
 
 
• Circumstance of unpredictability of demand 
• Practice of poor assumption of supply chain’s capacity to deal 
with changes 
• Practice of frequent design changes 
 
C2. Sufficient capacity of resources to respond to 
unpredictability of demand 
C2.1 Reserve capacity to quickly boost output if needed 
C4. Visibility of supply chain operations to understand 
their current capacity 
C1.2 Multiple sources; alternative sources to deal with 
changes in demand 
C4.2 Products, assets, people visibility 
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6.6.1 Presentation and Validation of Final Resilience Response Framework 
 
The study was based on the conceptual framework developed in Section 2.8 of the literature 
review. The conceptual framework enabled the researcher to identify the key areas in the 
literature that could help fulfil the aim of the study, developing a resilience response framework 
to improve supply chain performance in mitigating against disruptions in public projects.	
Subsequently, the study had identified the critical areas of vulnerability, pathogenic influences, 
and resilience capabilities of the public sector supply chain, and developed the final resilience 
response framework accordingly, as depicted in Figure 6.2 below. The resilience response 
framework in Figure 6.2, together with Table 6.14 and Figure 6.1, was validated by five experts 
in the field (two professionals from the public organisations, two professionals representing 
the private organisations, one researcher). The experts were asked to give their comments in 
terms of the clarity and their understanding of the research results. The experts found that the 
layered supply chain network in Figure 6.1 was clear and helpful in understanding how the 
supply chain vulnerabilities can send cascading impacts to layers of supply chain network. The 
experts from the private organisations added that apart from the identified private supply chains 
in Figure 6.1, other stakeholders such as utility companies and foreign suppliers can also have 
their own supply chain network that overlap with the public sector supply chain. Nevertheless, 
the experts agreed that the supply chain network and vulnerabilities identified in Figure 6.1 
were sufficient in reflecting the main respondents and focus of the study.  
	
Furthermore, the experts also found that the critical vulnerabilities, pathogens and its related 
capabilities listed in Table 6.14 were clear and useful as a guide in developing the necessary 
capabilities required to build their resilience in responding to disruptions in public projects. 
However, some wording in the table was changed in response to their recommendations, to suit 
the public and private organisations’ understanding of the terms. Finally, in validating the 
proposed resilience response framework in Figure 6.2, all experts agreed that the matrix of the 
vulnerabilities and its proposed capabilities was very clear and easy to understand. 
Additionally, the experts recommended that the current strengths of the public and private 
organisations’ should also be highlighted in the framework, to obtain a holistic view of the 
results of the study. In light of their recommendations, the following Figure 6.3 was developed 
based on the analysis in Section 4.5 to show the current level of the public sector supply chain 
capabilities. Figure 6.3 was then included as a reference in the final resilience response 
framework, as shown in Figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2: Final resilience response framework 
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Figure 6.3 below highlights the critical capability factors of the public and private 
organisations. It shows that although the public organisations are highly adaptable and have 
strong security measures, they still need to improve their strengths in areas such as finance, 
efficiency and collaboration with supply chain members. On the other hand, the private 
organisations should prioritise spending on improving in areas such as their flexibility in 
operations, capacity of resources and collaboration.  
 
	
Figure 6.3: Current level of supply chain capabilities 
 
Overall, by including Figure 6.3 in the final resilience response framework, the public and 
private organisations will be able to prioritise spending their resources on the capabilities that 
they want their organisations or supply chain members to improve in reducing the critical 
vulnerabilities identified in the final framework. This in turn, will enable the supply chain to 
achieve better preparedness and resilience in responding to disruptions in public projects and 
improve their supply chain performance.  
 
Factor	Label:	
C1.	Flexibility	in	operations	
C2.	Capacity	of	resources	
C3.	Efficiency	in	operations	
C4.	Visibility	of	supply	chain	
operations	
C5.	Adaptability	in	
responding	to	challenge	
C6.	Anticipation	of	potential	
disruptions	
C7.	Recovery	from	
disruptions	
C8.	Dispersion	of	resources	
C9.	Collaboration	with	
supply	chain	
C10.	Market	position	
C11.	Security	against	threat	
C12.	Financial	strength	
							
					Public	Organisations	
						
						Private	Organisations						
						(Contractors	&	Consultants)	
Critical	capability	
factors		
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6.7 Summary 
 
Overall, the findings of this study have conveyed a full picture for construction professionals 
on how the impact of interdependencies could set in motion a chain reaction to manifest and 
destabilise the entire supply chain if not managed properly (Figure 6.1). Indeed, resilience to 
supply chain disruptions would be difficult to achieve in isolation due to the interdependencies 
of the supply chain vulnerabilities identified in this survey. This chapter has also provided 
managers with the relevant insight into the public organisations’ and their supply chain 
partners’ critical vulnerabilities and their current capabilities,	which might not have been 
obvious before. As the vulnerability of any parties in the supply chains can dramatically 
degrade the overall resilience of the supply chain, the output from this study (Figure 6.2) that 
considers all parties will be useful in guiding the organisations and their supply chain to build 
resilience to disruptions in the delivery of construction projects. Overall, the presentation and 
validation of the final resilience response framework at the end of this chapter had fulfilled 
Objective 5 of the study (in Section 1.4). 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
	
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 introduced the research background and topic, 
highlighting the research problem, research gap and aim and objectives of the study. The 
critical literature review was presented in Chapter 2, and the conceptual framework introduced; 
the research process and methodology were highlighted in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 presented the 
results of the questionnaire survey and Chapter 5 those gathered from the subsequent 
interviews. The main findings from these analyses were triangulated in Chapter 6, and the final 
framework developed and discussed. Finally, this chapter provides a summary of the study by 
revisiting the research aim and objectives and presenting the key findings. It underlines the 
theoretical and practical contributions, along with the limitations of the study, and makes 
suggestions for potential future research areas.  
 
7.2 Summary of Research 
	
The Malaysian construction industry has faced several supply chain disruptions (see Section 
1.2.3) that hinder the government’s goal of becoming a developed country by the year 2020. 
Understandably, managing these risks and the parties from different tiers of the supply chain 
is indeed challenging, especially with disruptions that cause large swings in capacity and 
resources in project delivery. These disruptive events prevent the public organisations from 
getting the best value from their expenditure, consequently damaging their reputation in the 
public eyes. Many initiatives have been put forward by the Malaysian government and previous 
researchers in light of this supply chain issue, such as partnering and outsourcing (Nawi et al., 
2013), but there is still a lack of understanding on the current resilience of the public 
organisations and its supply chain and how they currently respond to and recover from actual 
disruptions. Furthermore, the supply chain as a concept, and especially how risks transcend 
organisational boundaries, is not well-understood in Malaysia and there is much discontinuity 
in supply chain partnerships in the local construction industry (Mehdi-Riazi et al., 2011). As 
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the emerging risk of disruptions reaches the level of networks, this calls for studies beyond 
organisational boundaries to develop resilience within organisations and supply chains.  
 
The purpose of the study is to improve the supply chain resilience in public projects so that 
they become more efficient in delivering public projects. In assessing the public sector supply 
chain’s resilience level, Pettit et al.’s (2010) study a foundation for this research, identifying 
organisations’ vulnerabilities and a set of capabilities to mitigate the critical areas of 
vulnerability. In addition, pathogenic influences were identified to help explain why supply 
chain members might be highly vulnerable in some areas rather than other, and to identify 
hidden effects. Overall, the research aims to develop a resilience response framework to 
improve preparedness and build resilience of the supply chain against disruptions in the effort 
to improve the Malaysian public sector project delivery. The study has achieved its aim by 
meeting the following objectives:  
 
Objective 1: To examine the phases of supply chain disruptions faced by Malaysian public 
sector projects. 
 
The study has investigated the characteristics of the Malaysian construction industry and the 
current challenges faced by the public sector supply chain (Section 2.2). Deficiencies in 
construction supply chain performance, identified from the literature (see Section 2.2.1), have 
resulted in the government not achieving the best value for money in its projects. The industry 
has also faced disruptions due to global economic shocks, such as the severe fall in the prices 
of major export commodities and devaluation of the Ringgit Malaysia against major currencies 
(EPU, 2015), that affected the overall cost of public sector projects. Calls for improvements in 
public project performance have been made throughout the series of national plans to improve 
public service productivity and efficiency. As a result, the researcher was intrigued to develop 
the best resilience strategy to address the supply chain disruptions faced in public projects, in 
order to improve the supply chain’s efficiency in delivering construction projects.  
 
Workable definitions of supply chain disruptions were examined in Section 2.3 through the 
comprehensive literature search. Supply chain disruptions are defined in this study as any 
foreseeable or unforeseeable event which affects the usual operation and stability of an 
organisation or a supply chain (Barroso et al., 2008). It is an event that takes place at one point 
in the chain and can adversely affect the performance of one or more parties in other parts of 
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the supply chain, disrupting the normal flow of goods and materials in their operations 
(Craighead et al., 2007). A typical supply chain network in the context of the Malaysian 
construction industry is represented in Figure 2.4. The pre-, during, and post-disruption phases 
were examined in greater detail in Section 2.3.1, to understand how supply chains prepare, 
respond to and recover from disruptive events. The pre-disruption phase includes the proactive 
approach of the risk management process before construction begins on-site, which is common 
in the Malaysian construction industry. During the disruption, the effective reactive response 
depends on how well the risk management programmes set by the construction organisations 
in the supply chain are followed and implemented. However, in some cases, alternative 
responses outside the traditional work routines are required to prevent the spread of the 
disruption. Finally, the post-disruption phase involves the recovery and learning process of the 
organisations to reduce the likelihood of future disruptions. The integrated proactive and 
reactive responses are presented in the summary of disruption phases depicted in Figure 2.7, 
enabling the researcher to establish a workable definition of supply chain disruptions and 
understand the issues arising from them.  
 
Objective 2: To examine the concept of resilience and its applicability in managing supply 
chain disruptions. 
 
In order to manage supply chain disruptions, the concept of resilience was examined in Section 
2.4 through an extensive literature review. The study presents a workable definition of supply 
chain resilience as the supply chain’s ability to react to the negative effects of disruptions that 
occur at a given moment, in order to maintain the supply chain’s objectives or recover to a 
better state (Barroso et al., 2008). The study highlights that in assessing supply chain resilience, 
it is important to identify the disruption areas, vulnerabilities, and how the disruptions can be 
mitigated through the development of capabilities (Pettit et al., 2010). The researcher then 
reviewed the extensive literature on supply chain resilience and compiled a classified list of 
vulnerability (see Section 2.5) and capability (see Section 2.6) factors, that was used as the 
basis of the questionnaire design. The concept of pathogens in construction projects and the 
integration of pathogens in resilience studies were also critically discussed to fill the gap 
identified in the supply chain literature (see Section 2.7). Ultimately, pathogens were identified 
as the key factors that contribute to the supply chain’s vulnerability to disruptions in 
construction projects. The main categories of pathogens were also presented and are used as a 
guide in analysing the interview data. Lastly, the conceptual framework was introduced in 
	 246	
Section 2.8, integrating the three major knowledge domains: supply chain disruptions, supply 
chain resilience, and pathogens. The conceptual framework became a useful guide for the 
researcher in developing the final resilience response framework in this study.   
 
Objective 3: To analyse the emergent vulnerability and capability factors of the public sector 
supply chain in coping with supply chain disruptions.  
 
The questionnaire survey developed from the literature review was used to determine the 
emergent vulnerability and capability factors of the public sector supply chain. The respondents 
consisted of two main groups: construction professionals from the public organisations (51%), 
and the professionals (i.e. consultants and contractors) from the private organisations (49%) 
appointed by the public organisations to deliver the public projects. An analysis of the supply 
chain vulnerability and capability fron the survey results was presented in Section 4.4. It was 
identified from the survey that the public organisations are statistically significantly more 
vulnerable to political pressures than were the private organisations. In particular, the public 
organisations were identified as being significantly more vulnerable to exposure to political 
disruptions than were the private organisations. However, no significant differences in score 
between the public and private organisations were identified for the vulnerability of changes 
in government regulations, suggesting that the private organisations are also to some degree 
affected by changes in government regulations. Meanwhile, the private organisations were 
identified as being significantly highly vulnerable to market pressures compared to the private 
organisations, especially in terms of significant price pressures in the market.  
 
In terms of capabilities, the public organisations have statistically significantly lower capability 
scores in the visibility of their supply chain operation than the private organisations, which 
makes it harder for the former to detect any disruptions arising from their supply chain 
members. The private organisations, on the other hand, were identified as having higher 
financial strength than the public organisations, which was surprising considering that the latter 
as a public entity should have the required financial reserves to deliver public projects. Overall, 
the top five critical vulnerabilities of the public sector supply chain were identified from the 
scatterplot in Section 4.5, as political or legal pressures, market pressures, management 
vulnerability, liquidity or credit vulnerability and strategic vulnerability. These critical 
vulnerabilities from the survey were also used as a guide for the researcher in the subsequent 
interviews to identify the inherent pathogenic influences that make the supply chain highly 
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vulnerable in these critical areas. The critical vulnerabilities and capabilities are further 
discussed in Section 7.3 below on the main findings of the study.  
	
Objective 4: To identify the causes and the cascading effects of supply chain disruptions to the 
Malaysian public sector project performance.  
 
The causes and cascading effects of supply chain disruptions in public projects were identified 
from the interviews with 12 construction professionals in the field. The identification of the 
pathogenic influences in the interviews enabled the researcher to systematically assess why the 
public and private organisations are more vulnerable in some areas than other, as part of the 
intermediate process in developing appropriate resilience strategies to mitigate the 
vulnerabilities. Five critical pathogens emerged from the interviews as causing disruptions: 
practice, circumstance, convention, organisation and behaviour, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
The interview findings show that these pathogens are interrelated. In this regard, the individual 
practice (i.e. poor assumptions in decision making) and behaviour (i.e. opportunistic 
behaviour, blame-game) of the public sector supply chain were attributed to the circumstance 
in which the projects operate, such as the political environment and current economic 
conditions. It was also identified that the established convention in government procedures and 
existing organisational structure of hierarchical departments of the public organisations, 
clients and external stakeholders result in late approvals and decision making in the supply 
chain operations. The relationship between these pathogens and how they influence the top five 
critical vulnerabilities identified are further discussed in Section 7.3.  
 
The study also discussed how disruptions can cascade from one point to another through the 
layers of supply chain network, as presented in Figure 6.1. For instance, late payment of 
contractors by the public organisations causes delayed payment by the contractors to their 
suppliers, resulting in delay in the material supply that in turn affects the contractors’ 
operations. This shows that poor performance by any parties in the chain could impact another 
supply chain network at a different level, resulting in a set of organisations entering a vicious 
cycle of poor performance based on their vulnerability levels. Critical effects were also 
identified from the questionnaire results and interview data, including delay and cost overruns 
in operations, defects in quality due to poor workmanship and material supply, loss of 
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organisations, loss of skilled workers on-site, and reputational damage to the public 
organisations (see Section 6.3.2). 
 
Objective 5: To establish and validate the resilience response framework to improve supply 
chain performance in meeting its resilience goals to mitigate against disruptive events in 
Malaysian public sector projects. 
 
The final resilience response framework in this study was developed from the triangulation of 
the findings of the questionnaire survey, interviews and literature on the critical vulnerabilities, 
pathogenic influences, and resilience capabilities of the public sector supply chain (see Table 
6.14). The final framework presented in Figure 6.2 is a matrix of the critical vulnerability 
factors and linked capability factors. The sets of capabilities identified to mitigate these 
vulnerabilities were based on the interview data presented throughout Chapters 5 and 6, and on 
the literature. The inherent pathogens are also presented in the framework to highlight the 
underlying causes that make the public sector supply chain highly vulnerable in these critical 
areas. The proposed resilience response framework was validated by five experts in the field, 
on its clarity and their understanding of the framework. The interview data also served as a 
qualitative validation of the questionnaire findings on the supply chain vulnerabilities and 
capabilities, as discussed throughout Section 6.4. Overall, the final framework allowed the 
experts from the public sector supply chain to understand the areas of critical vulnerability of 
their organisation and their supply chain members. The set of capabilities identified in the 
framework also serve as a guide for the public sector supply chain to reduce the disruptive 
impacts arising from these critical vulnerabilities, in the effort to build better preparedness and 
resilience against disruptions in public sector project delivery. 
 
7.3 Research Main Findings 
 
Frequent disruptions and critical effects of disruptions 
• The study revealed a possible issue of trust between the public and private organisations 
considering that the public organisations blamed quality problems on contractors’ 
deficiencies, and that the private organisations blamed the failure on their customers 
(i.e. the public organisations) for the most frequent disruptions in public projects. The 
failure of key suppliers was prevalent in the contractors’ operations as most of the 
specialist materials such as steel were imported from foreign suppliers. This resulted in 
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late supply of material on-site and inconsistencies in terms of the quality of the 
materials imported by their suppliers. The volatility of the economic situation in 
Malaysia also affected the construction industry’s operations, as both the public and 
private organisations reported having faced frequent financial crises due to the drop in 
value of the Ringgit Malaysia. The public sector supply chain also faced regulatory 
issues such as strict government regulations and layers in the approval process, 
suggesting that government’s unfavourable legislation and inefficient bureaucratic 
practices could hinder the project team members’ operations in reacting to and 
recovering from disruptive events. 
• The study highlights the effect of transcending supply chain relationships with private 
clients (see layered supply chain network in Figure 6.1) where the same key suppliers 
or customers might pose a threat of disruption resulting in interdependent impacts on 
other supply chains in the layered framework. In this regard, the shortage of material 
such as steel was prevalent due to high demand from both public and private projects, 
especially when projects were being delivered concurrently with mega-infrastructure 
work such as the Mass Rapid Transit (MRT). This resulted in the substantial increase 
in steel prices. The study found that as the contractors and consultants could be working 
on one public project and several private projects involving international suppliers for 
private sector clients, the failure of any one supplier or customer arising from eith 
public or private sector-initiated supply chains could disrupt their operations in the 
projects, including the public projects. 
• The study identified that the private organisations faced higher critical effects of 
disruptions on their internal performance, such as the loss of productivity, decrease in 
profit, and loss of skilled workers. The loss of profit and poor productivity were 
attributed to the inefficient practices within the supply chain operations, such as 
unpredictable changes in demand by clients, and incompetent sub-contractors. The lack 
of skilled workers was due to inadequate training of the construction workforce and the 
lack of interest of local people in construction work on-site, causing the Malaysian 
construction industry to rely heavily on foreign workers. The inadequate level of skills 
among the project team members could be problematic as it could cause a significant 
loss of productivity and efficiency in the supply chain operations.  
• The critical effects of disruptions such as quality problems could critically damage the 
public organisations’ reputation, as they are widely exposed to public scrutiny and 
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media pressure. In fact, the public organisations’ main concern for higher quality and 
public reputation, and the private organisations’ main concern for profitability, suggests 
that they have different priorities. This degree of dissimilar goals within the same 
supply chain is problematic considering the interconnected risks they share due to the 
interdependence of their operations. Finding common ground or mutual objectives is 
therefore imperative here, to reduce the impact of disruptions to public projects and to 
build supply chain resilience. 
• The study found that while all parties in the supply chain face disruptions in public 
projects, the frequency and severity of disruption were felt most in the contractors’ 
operations during public project delivery. Considering the interdependence of the 
design-construction process, the deficiencies arising in the pre-construction phase are 
only realised in the subsequent construction phase, causing cascading impacts on the 
contractors’ operations. The repercussion of disruptions on the contractors is higher 
than that on other parties in the supply chain, a serious problem as it suggests that most 
of the risks of disruption are borne by the contractors rather than the consultants and 
public organisations. However, any disruptions affecting the contractors’ work 
eventually have an impact on the consultants, who are required to extend their 
consultancy services with no additional fees if delay occurs, and to the public 
organisations who end up paying for the costs stemming from these disruptions. 
 
Current disruption management approach by public sector supply chain 
• The public organisations’ current risk management practice appears not to be 
effectively carried out due to the fragmentation of the various departments’ 
interdependent tasks. Despite having a comprehensive risk management system, the 
blame-game is still prevalent between the departments within the public organisations, 
making it hard to coordinate the risk management plan from the planning to the 
construction phase. Consequently, poor coordination among the public organisations’ 
departments makes them vulnerable in responding efficiently to any potential risk of 
disruptions. The lack of transparency among project team members in sharing 
information during risk management meetings was also identified as making it harder 
to detect any potential disruptive events. The private organisations also seem to depend 
heavily on the public organisations’ risk management plans as they can not justify the 
expense of a risk manager of their own. Most disruptions were tackled as they arose by 
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their own employees in a firefighting approach. This ad-hoc approach, however, makes 
the contractors highly exposed to unexpected disruptive events. 
 
Critical vulnerabilities and capabilities of public sector supply chain  
 
Political/Legal Pressures 
• The study found that the public sector supply chain is highly vulnerable to political 
interference especially during project award stages, causing unfavourable project team 
selection and the questionable competence of contractors. The strong tendency to 
political involvement in awarding public projects identified in the literature contributes 
to the increase in the number of contracting firms that are only interested in winning 
the contracts. This had led to these firms sub-letting the total project to other contractors 
or sub-contractors, resulting in complex payment through multi-layered sub-
contracting. The cost of materials such as steel is determined by political power, causing 
the inconsistencies.  
• The study found that although the private organisations are not as badly exposed to 
political disruptions as the public organisations, the impact of political disruptions 
could spread across the supply chain affecting the consultants, multiple contractors and 
sub-contractors and resulting in time and cost overruns. The public organisations are in 
a better position to anticipate potential political interference, but despite this strength, 
their lack of transparency in communicating the information with their stakeholders and 
private organisations makes it hard to control the spread of political impacts through 
their supply chain operations. 
• The private organisations were extremely vulnerable to any changes in government 
regulations, especially as they vary from one state to another. The regulatory 
frameworks involving multiple authorities at the federal, state and local levels that 
govern the construction industry in Malaysia are complex and difficult to navigate. The 
confusion and misinterpretation of government regulations by different stakeholders 
cause further difficulties for the private organisations. as well as creating disputes 
between the public and private organisations that can be costly in terms of time, money 
and effort. This risk should be best managed by the public organisations, by including 
in the contract clear statements of the responsibilities of all parties according to the 
regulations, and updating or providing training for the private organisations on the new 
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policies imposed. The interaction between the private organisations and the government 
is also imperative and needs to be participatory in managing policy changes. 
 
Market Pressures 
• Despite the private organisations’ great financial strength, they are highly susceptible 
to severe price fluctuations and strong price competition caused by market and 
economic circumstances. Severe price fluctuations were attributed to the falling of the 
local currency, resulting in local suppliers raising the price on scarce materials. The 
process of claiming for Variation of Price (VOP) from the public organisations was 
found to be time consuming for the contractors in obtaining approval and receiving 
payment. Certain contractual arrangements limit the ability of the contractors to claim 
VOP, where the maximum contract sum has been agreed upon in advance by both the 
public and private organisations. The contactors can reduce the impact of such 
disruption by being proactive and ordering materials much earlier when the currency is 
more stable, in order to lock in the price. They could also consider modifying their 
method of construction and mode of transportation of materials when faced with 
significant rises in the price of materials. 
• The highly competitive nature of the construction market puts significant downward 
pressure on the private organisations’ profits and market share. The private 
organisations also face market pressure from foreign players; international parties have 
increasingly gained a market share across various types of project in Malaysia in recent 
years. The tender price of government projects is also found to be extremely 
competitive, especially in an open tender system. The public organisations’ goals of 
higher quality and low cost have resulted in the under-pricing of bids by contractors, 
resulting in the contractors working on a low profit margin. In this case, they can gain 
competitive advantage by adjusting their project overheads to increase their chance in 
winning the bid. Learning from past tendering experience can also increase the 
contractors’ competitiveness in bidding for contracts of similar types. Additionally, 
maintaining long-term relationships with key sub-contractors and suppliers is important 
to obtain the most reasonable prices of materials from domestic or foreign suppliers. 
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Management Vulnerability 
• The public sector supply chain is identified as being highly vulnerable to late decision 
making. This is attributed to the public organisations’ concentration of decision-making 
power in their highly dispersed market. The organisation structure pathogen of layers 
of approval in the various departments of public organisations results in poor 
communication and slow decision making among the project team members, especially 
during disruptions. Empowering experts on-site to make key decisions regardless of 
their level of authority could help the public organisations to overcome late decision 
making. It would also help to improve their ability to seize advantage from disruptions 
and reduce their vulnerability to inadequate management control over supply chain 
members. 
• Both the public and private organisations rely heavily on a continuous flow of 
information in their operations, due to the extent of their supply chain network. 
However, the study found that transparency in information sharing was hard to achieve 
due to the inadequate level of trust between the public and private organsiations. This 
can be attributed to the behaviour pathogen of “us versus them” in project teams. The 
centralised decision making of the public sector supply chain also makes them highly 
vulnerable regarding timely information flow. Information Technology (IT) tools such 
as Building Information Modelling (BIM) should be used to improve information flow 
and encourage collaboration in the supply chain. This will, in turn, increase the 
visibility of the status and resources of the public organisations’ supply chain. 
 
Liquidity/Credit Vulnerability 
• The public organisations were identified as having a lack of financial resources and 
significantly less financial strength than the private organisations. This result is 
surprising as the public organisations would be expected to have sufficient funds to 
deliver the public sector projects effectively. The study found that insufficient funding 
rises from their clients’ (i.e ministries’) limited budgets. The convention pathogen in 
the financial policy that requires the cost of public projects to be estimated a year ahead 
for budgetary purposes also limits their spending in response to unpredictable changes 
in demand. The financial constraints limit the design scope of projects and the resources 
available in the planning phase. The public organisations should therefore improve their 
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efficiency level in areas such as labour productivity and utilisation of resources to 
overcome financial limitations. 
• The public organisations’ financial vulnerability has led to late payment of contactors, 
which subsequently causes late payment by the contractors to their suppliers and sub-
contractors. Contractual terms of payment of materials on-site are not adhered to by the 
public organisations, due to the lack of trust in the contractors’ operations. This makes 
the contractors highly vulnerable to any changes in financial policies and procedures. 
The impact of financial vulnerability could also spread and cascade from one project to 
another in the supply chain, as any delayed payment in the public sector projects could 
affect the resources available to contractors for private sector projects. The study found 
that even the private organisations’ greater financial strength could not overcome the 
impact of under-payment or late payment by the public organisations. The private 
organisations have to increase their ability to anticipate the extent of the finance that 
will return to them, so that they can plan their work accordingly.  
 
Strategic Vulnerability 
• The public organisations’ strategic decision to outsource many of their operations has 
resulted in poor visibility of their supply chain members’ operations. This makes it 
difficult to detect potential disruptions arising from the supply chain, or to obtain a 
complete picture of the current situation affecting project delivery. The study found that 
this high degree of outsourcing was attributed to the incompetence of their internal 
team. Lack of expertise in administering non-conventional contracts such as design and 
build also resulted in the contractors’ opportunistic behaviour in taking advantage in 
making claims. The public organisations’ training centre was closed down over 20 years 
ago, resulting in the convention of poor documentation of lessons learnt , exposing them 
to repeat the same mistakes in subsequent public projects. The public organisations 
should either strengthen their relationship with their key suppliers, especially those 
providing specialty sources, or develop less formal connections with multiple suppliers 
for their procurement strategy to be effective. 
• The private organisations rely heavily upon specialty sources in their operations. 
Despite the high degree of outsourcing, they seem to have better control of their supply 
chain and are fully aware of the status of their current resources, unlike the public 
organisations. However, reserving materials from outsourced suppliers proves difficult 
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for the contractors in uncertain economic conditions. The contractors can order only a 
limited amount of specialist materials such as steel, and are therefore unable to reserve 
extra capacity in case of disruption. The contractors should make contingency plans for 
procuring specialist materials to ensure they arrive on-site within the stipulated time.  
 
Supplier or Customer Disruptions 
• The public organisations’ reported assumption that the private organisations have 
sufficient capacity to deal with unplanned changes in demand raises the question of 
whether the public organisations are fully aware of the condition of their supply chain 
members. The private organisations in fact rated capacity as one of their weakest 
capabilities, especially concerning multiple redundant resources and reserved capacity 
of materials. This further supports the study’s findings that the public organisations 
have poor visibility of their supply chain operations and resources. Their assumption 
that the private organisations can deal with changes in demand puts an unnecessary 
burden on the private organisations to meet unexpected demand changes within their 
limited resource capacity. In order to obtain the full advantage of their strategic 
outsourcing, the public organisations need to have full visibility of their supply chain 
members’ operations in order to adequately manage and control the delivery of public 
projects.  
 
7.4 Research Contributions to Theory 
 
This study adds an important angle to the existing literature by considering a holistic view of 
managing supply chain disruptions in construction. To date, researchers in the Malaysian 
construction industry have largely focused on the risk management aspects at the pre-disruption 
stage by analysing the probability and impact of the risk of potential disruptions in construction 
projects. The lack of research on the supply chain’s response following actual disruptions has 
resulted in its not being able to take the opportunity to learn from existing disruptions or utilise 
current capabilities to mitigate such problems. While it is important to be ready to mitigate the 
potential risk of disruptions, managing disruptions as they materialise through reactive 
strategies such as increasing flexibility and adaptability are equally important in handling 
disruptions efficiently. Hence, by utilising an integrated approach of both pre-disruption and 
post-disruption phases and considering both proactive and reactive strategies, this study brings 
a holistic view of managing disruptions to the existing construction literature. 
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Another theoretical contribution is the addition to the literature on supply chain resilience of 
pathogenic studies. Although the concept of pathogens has been presented in previous 
construction studies, there is still no research integrating pathogens in the resilience literature. 
Inherent pathogens that reside in the system or supply chain could hinder the effort to build 
resilience in the construction supply chain. Without addressing the pathogenic influences of the 
problem, organisations will continue to repeat the same mistakes, making them more vulnerable 
to disruptive events. Previous resilience studies also tended to overlook these latent conditions 
or pathogens that made an organisation vulnerable to disruptive events in the first place. By 
introducing pathogenic influences to the supply chain’s vulnerability and capability factors, the 
level of supply chain resilience can be assessed through a different approach, offering a 
significant new perspective on both the construction and resilience studies.  
 
Furthermore, the existing theory documents several commercial pressures on the construction 
industry and its firms, hence many of its players tend to operate with very low margins. Some 
of the new procurement systems tend to anticipate cost savings year-on-year to keep supply 
chain relationships intact. In such a context, this research provides some theoretical insights to 
assess an organisation’s vulnerability not just in terms of its explicit dimensions but also the 
hidden dimensions. This builds up new theoretical pragmatic risk management approaches in a 
field where the current theories only allow general contingency measures. 
	
The final theoretical contribution to knowledge is the assessment of supply chain resilience in 
the context of the Malaysian construction industry, inadequately studied to date. Although 
pathogenic effects such as quality problems, delays and cost overruns are common in Malaysia, 
there has been no formal study on the pathogens affecting the resilience of the construction 
supply chain. This research therefore bridges this gap by identifying the significant pathogens 
that affect the construction supply chain’s vulnerability and that undermine their capability to 
recover and thrive from disruptions, which have not been considered by previous researchers.  
 
7.5 Research Contributions to Practice 
 
Contributions to Practitioners 
In terms of the study’s practical contributions, this research can offer the managers of the public 
organisations relevant insights into their organisations’ and supply chains’ critical areas of 
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vulnerability and capabilities. The significant linkages between the pathogenic influences, 
vulnerabilities and capabilities presented in this study will allow the public sector supply chain 
to make full use of their current capabilities and prioritise their spending on other areas that 
need further improvement. The research outcome that considers both the upper tiers and bottom 
tiers of the supply chain network (i.e. the public organisations and private organisations) is also 
valuable in informing and guiding the public sector supply chain to build their preparedness 
and resilience to disruptions in order to improve public project delivery. While it is impossible 
to eliminate all the risks of disruption in construction projects, by improving the supply chain’s 
resilience in public projects, it can become more efficient in delivering the projects. It is worth 
noting here that the idea of the study is not to prevent risk-taking by the project managers and 
clients in the construction industry, but rather to give them guidance on being mindful of the 
pathogenic effects, vulnerabilities and capabilities (Table 6.14) and to identify them more 
effectively. The study also gives them a pathway to recognise how disruptive the full brunt of 
a pathogenic impact can be, as depicted in the cascading effect illustrated in Figure 6.1. Such 
new knowledge will give a better opportunity for project managers, clients and other 
stakeholders to take a firm grip on construction projects.	Although this study concentrated on 
public projects in Malaysia, it may offer advantages in similar contexts in terms of 
understanding the dynamics of the supply chain’s vulnerabilities and capabilities in a layered 
supply chain network, as presented in Figure 6.1. Future research can also take this study 
forward by considering the dynamics and interdependence in assessing bottlenecks across 
several layers of supply chains, not just in construction but also in other industries.  
 
Contributions to Construction Industry 
Considering that the Malaysian construction industry’s output is smaller than other sectors’ 
such as services (GDP 55.2%) and manufacturing (GDP 24.5%) (Department of Statistics 
Malaysia, 2014), a higher level of efficiency developed through supply chain resilience 
strategies in one project could result in a significant increase in the growth of the construction 
industry. The improvement in supply chain performance might also have multiplier effects on 
other interdependent industries, moving the economy towards the Malaysian Vision 2020 goals. 
There is indeed a concept of dynamism in risk management, in which risks do not disappear 
fully; it is a case of transferring risk from one party to another rather than removing it. For 
instance, the private organisations used some of the disruptive events and the public 
organisations’ vulnerabilities as opportunities through the opportunity to submit claims for 
losses and expenses, which is a way of increasing profitability to the detriment of another party. 
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From the point of view of a public project client, it will be in their best interests to find ways of 
reducing or removing the impacts by a resilience response strategy. This is practically the case 
in the construction industry. This study therefore helps to understand the hidden vulnerabilities 
by analysing performance in terms of vulnerability and capability factors, which are the two 
sides of the coin in terms of resilience against disruptive events in supply chain operations, and 
can be extremely useful to organisations and supply chains. Ultimately, the ability to reduce the 
impact of disruptions such as a cost overrun, or to identify a potential future cost overrun, could 
add value to both practice and theory. 
	
Contributions to Policy-makers 
In terms of the policy-making point of view, the research can offer policy makers an input into 
the current level of competencies of the construction supply chain and their critical 
vulnerability areas that need to be improved. Policy-makers can take forward the results of the 
study and consider improving the resilience of the supply chain by encouraging partnering in 
public projects, setting up policies on the training of foreign workers, and ensuring consistent 
quality and costs of material from qualified foreign suppliers. Policy-makers could also 
gradually introduce the use of innovative solutions such as the use of Building Information 
Modelling (BIM) to improve transparency in information flow and encourage collaborative 
decision-making. This will, in turn, increase the visibility of the status and resources of the 
construction supply chain and improve their productivity in the construction operations. 
Ultimately, the research outcome shows that there should be a coherent strategy in the policies 
where all organisations within the supply chain all pull together in the same direction with 
better goal congruence to improve project performance. 
	
Contributions to Professional Bodies 
The research also allows professional bodies such as the Malaysian Construction Industry 
Development Board (CIDB), Malaysian Institute of Architects, the Malaysian Institute of 
Engineers, and the Malaysian Institution of Surveyors to understand the dynamics of the public 
and private organisations’ vulnerabilities and capabilities in improving resilience within the 
construction supply chain. In building the competencies of the construction professionals, the 
professional bodies can use the results from the resilience response framework (Figure 6.2) as 
a guide to prioritise their investments on the capability areas that need further improvements 
in reducing the critical vulnerabilities. The professionals bodies could also work closely with 
the Government in building these competencies, such as promoting high level of integrity in 
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the professionals’ operations especially in the tendering process of government projects to 
reduce misconduct in their practices (i.e. political interferences), and encouraging alternative 
partnering procurement approach to improve supply chain integration. The research also 
suggests that there are still confusion among the professionals in understanding the government 
rules and regulations, as identified through the convention pathogens in this study. In this case, 
the professional bodies should ensure that the private organisations are well informed of any 
new practices and regulations imposed by the Government through their respective bodies. 
This will allow the professionals to be proactive in preparing for any changes in the policies 
and regulations.  
	
7.6 Research Limitations 
	
The limited time available to conduct the study posed constraints in terms of the number of 
semi-structured interviews that could be conducted with the professionals in Malaysia. Only 
12 construction professionals were interviewed to triangulate the findings identified in the 
questionnaire survey. Furthermore, given the large size of the population, the sample group of 
contractors in the questionnaire survey was limited to Class G7 contractors involved in projects 
greater than RM10 million in the state of Selangor and the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur. 
These states were selected as the economic and administrative centre of Malaysia; it was 
assumed that the characteristics of this area qualify the sample to represent the Malaysian 
construction industry as a whole. The questionnaire survey was also limited to professionals 
working with Malaysian public organisations, consultants and contractors. External 
stakeholders such as the client, utility companies, and suppliers were not included in the study 
sample due to the limited costs and time available. 
	
Furthermore, in the interview analysis, while identification of some of the pathogens in the 
interview data was generally straightforward, other pathogens overlap (i.e. the same pathogens 
could be classified in two different categories). As in Love et al.’s (2009) study, separation of 
a specific pathogen proved difficult, especially in terms of convention and circumstance. The 
pathogens were also based on the respondents’ interpretations of the root cause of the problems 
they faced, and so may vary from case to case. The classification of pathogens also relied on 
the researcher’s own interpretations, based on examples from previous studies (Busby and 
Hughes, 2004; Busby and Zhang, 2008; Love et al., 2008). 
	
7.7 Recommendations for Future Research and Final Remarks 
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Future research might include the assessment of pathogenic influences and supply chain 
resilience in related industries in the manufacturing and services sectors. It would be interesting 
for future researchers to assess the dynamics and interdependencies between supply chains 
from different industries, in terms of how bottlenecks across the several layers of the supply 
chain network have cascading effects on other interdependent industries: for instance, how the 
supply chains in the steel industry could affect the operations of supply chains in the 
construction industry. Future research could also consider the scale of disruptions; in terms of 
its frequency and severity in applying the resilience response framework. This will help to 
determine the relevant capabilities required to respond to the different level of magnitude of 
disruptions. Quantitative studies of the pathogens could also be useful in terms of classifying 
the factors and conducting inferential analysis of the pathogenic effects.  
	
Further recommendations from the research in building the public sector supply chain’s 
resilience to disruptions in construction projects are as follows: 
• The public organisations should consider simplifying their approval process by 
distributing the decision making to the professionals that are directly involved in the 
project. This would ease the process of decision making, especially when fast response 
are needed in handling disruptions that disrupt the current work progress. The public 
organisations should also ensure that the scope of the project is within the allocated 
financial provision and the design is finalised before proceeding to the subsequent 
phase of the project to reduce deficiencies in their supply chain’s operations and 
mitigate cost overruns.  
• The public organisations could also provide professional training to their in-house team 
to ensure that their knowledge can be shared across the different departments, 
especially in terms of the lessons learnt from previous public projects. Training should 
also be adequately available for the private organisations engaged in delivering public 
projects, so that they have a better understanding of the government’s system, process 
and procedure. This in turn, will reduce disputes and encourage collaboration among 
the public sector supply chain. Public organisations could also consider the use of 
project team communication matrix and stakeholder analysis to improve visibility of 
their supply chain operations and manage their stakeholders’ expectations.	 
• In terms of the policy-making point of view, any new policies imposed by the 
government should be implemented gradually to allow time for the construction 
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professionals to adapt to the new requirements and gain adequate information on the 
new practice that they are not used to. Policy maker should be involved in building the 
competencies of the construction professionals and ensuring high level of integrity 
among the professionals to reduce misconduct in their operations.  
• The private organisations should ensure that they are up to date and well informed in 
current government policies and regulations to ensure they are well prepared when new 
policies are implement. Consultants should know well in advance the government’s 
terms and regulations especially in dealing with the contractors’ claims so that they 
could manage the contract and payments sufficiently.  
• The contractors should improve their transparency in sharing information on the current 
risks in their operations to the public organisations so that the project team can 
collectively identify the best response to such risks. They should also consider building 
their relationship with key suppliers especially those providing specialty sources to 
ensure timely procurement and delivery of material. Credible suppliers that have been 
qualified by the government should be engaged to ensure consistent quality in their 
operations.  
• The private organisations should plan their resources and work well based on the 
expected return on finance (i.e. the expected timing of payment by the public 
organisations) to ensure they have sufficient resources and finance throughout their 
operations. The private organisations should also prepare contingency plans in their 
operations to reduce the impacts of supply chain disruptions. 
	
Overall, the thesis has discussed the relevant research problem, the vulnerability of the 
construction supply chain to disruption. Malaysia, a developing country, is facing disruptions 
in local public construction projects that cause time and cost overruns, resulting in loss of 
revenue and poor reputation of the public entities. This presents an ideal scenario for the study 
to investigate the level of resilience of the public sector supply chain in dealing with disruptions 
and subsequently to develop a resilience response framework to strengthen their preparedness 
and resilience to disruptive events. By assessing the vulnerability and capability factors through 
the questionnaire survey and identifying the pathogenic influences through the interviews, this 
study offers public and private organisations a better understanding of their supply chain 
disruptions, enabling them to develop the actions required to utilise their supply chain 
capabilities and mitigate their vulnerabilities, in the effort to improve public project 
performance.  
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Appendix A – Case Study of Pharmaceutical Industry 
The impact of interconnected risks to other industries was highlighted in Section 2.0. The 
objective of this case study is to show how the impact of risks can cascade and spread from 
one industry to another. A few years ago, the pharmaceutical industry was almost paralyzed 
due to the ripple effects from three major events; the Olympics, a hurricane and the financial 
crisis. The problem started when China shut a chemical plant to reduce air pollution for the 
Olympic Games in Beijing in August 2008. The following month, Hurricane Ike knocked out 
another chemical plant in Texas. Then Lehman Brothers failed, marking the start of the global 
financial crisis. Subsequently, new home construction and car sales dried up, fewer new carpets 
and new cars were being bought, which then caused the sinking demand for the main material 
called acrylonitrile. Acrylonitrile was used to produce plastic things like car parts and acrylic 
fibres for carpets (Zurich, 2011). Although it may seem like these events are completely 
irrelevant to the pharmaceutical industry, the acrylonitrile’s by-product, acetonitrile was used 
by pharmaceutical companies to measure impurities in the drugs they make. Since acetonitrile, 
was just a by-product, its production had also dropped subsequently. As a result, 
pharmaceutical companies found themselves out of stock, and unable to continue clinical trials 
because of a lack of the solvent. Prices of acetonitrile also shot up as companies scrambled to 
get a few gallons (Zurich, 2011). This shows how events from completely unrelated sectors 
could also cause disruptions to other industry. It also shows just how interconnected risks have 
become in a global economy and how these risks are beyond an organisation’s control. 
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Appendix B - Summary of disruption phases from previous literature 
Table B1: Summary of disruption phases from previous literature 
Authors	(Year)	
Disruption	Phases	
Area	of	Study	
Pre-Disruption	 During	Disruption	 Post	Disruption	
Asbjornslett	and	
Rausand	(1997)	
1.	Stable	Situation	 2.	Disruption	Time	
				-	Mitigation	
3.	New	Stable	Situation	
				-	Restoration	&	Restart	
				-	Final	result	
	
Assessing	vulnerability	
of	production	system	
Becker	et	al	(2011)	 1.	Anticipate	
				-	Risk	assessment	
				-	Forecasting	
2.	Recognise	
					-	Impact	assessment	
3.	Adapt	
				-	Response	
				-	Recovery	
	
4.	Learn	
				-	Evaluation	
Community	resilience	
Behdani	(2013)	 1.	Risk	Management	
				-	Risk	identification	
				-	Risk	quantification		
				-	Risk	evaluation	&	treatment		
				-	Risk	monitoring	
	
2.	Disruption	Detection	
3.	Disruption	Reaction	
4.	Disruption	Recovery	
5.	Disruption	Learning	
Managing	disruption	
risks	in	supply	chain	
Berg	et	al	(2008)	 1.	Proactive	Risk	Management		
				-	Identify,	evaluate,	manage	and				
						monitor	risks	
2.	Reactive	Risk	Handling		
				-	Incident/accident	handling	
				-	Execution	of	contingency	plans	
	
3.	Results	and	Outcomes	
				-	Achievement	of	business		
						objectives	
				-	Cost	of	risks	
Assessing	supply	chain	
risk	management	
programs		
Billa	et	al	(2006)	 1.	Detection	
2.	Forecasting	
3.	Warning	
	
	
4.	Response	 5.	Reaction	 Flood	management	
planning	
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Authors	(Year)	
Disruption	Phases	(Cont’d)	
Area	of	Study	
Pre-Disruption	 During	Disruption	 Post	Disruption	
Blackhurst	et	al	
(2005)	
	 1.	Disruption	Discovery	 2.	Disruption	Recovery	
3.	Supply	Chain	Redesign	
	
Managing	supply	chain	
disruptions	
Burnard	and	
Bhamra	(2011)	
	 1.	Detection	
2.	Activation	
3.	Response	
4.	Positive/Negative		
				Adjustment	
5.	Organisational	Learning	
Organisational	resilient	
response	framework	
Cockram	and	Van	
Den	Heuvel	(2012)	
	
1.	Pre-crisis	Preparation	 2.	Crisis	Response	 3.	Post-crisis	Recovery	 Crisis	management	
Cutter	et	al	(2008)	 1.	Antecedent	Conditions	
				-	Inherent	vulnerability	
				-	Inherent	resilience	
	
2.	Event	
				-	Immediate	effects	
3.	Coping	Responses	 Community	resilience	
to	natural	disasters	
Ishak	(2004)	 1.	Prevention	
2.	Mitigation	
3.	Preparedness	
	
4.	Disaster	Impact	
5.	Response	
6.	Recovery	
7.	Development	
Disaster	planning	and	
management	
Ocal	et	al	(2006)	 1.	Management	before	the	crisis	
				-	Issues	analysis	
				-	Early	warning	systems	
2.	Management	during	the	crisis	
				-	Decision-making	
				-	Managing	crisis	plan	
	
3.	Management	after	the	crisis	
					-	Feedback	on	performance	
					-	Strategic	changes	
Crisis	management	in	
construction	industry	
	
	
	
	
	 278	
Authors	(Year)	
Disruption	Phases	(Cont’d)		
Area	of	Study	
Pre-Disruption	 During	Disruption	 Post	Disruption	
Jaques	(2010)	 1.	Crisis	Preparedness	
					-	Planning	processes	
					-	Systems,	manuals	
					-	Training,	simulations	
2.	Crisis	Prevention	
					-	Early	warning,	scanning	
					-	Issue	&	risk	management	
					-	Emergency	response	
3.	Crisis	Event	Management	
					-	Crisis	recognition	
					-	System	activation/response	
					-	Crisis	management	
4.	Post-crisis	Management	
				-	Recovery,	business		
						resumption		
				-	Post-crisis	issue	impacts	
				-	Evaluation,	modification	
Issue	and	crisis	
management	
relational	model	
Mitroff	et	al	(1987)	 1.	Proactive	
				-	Prevention	
				-	Preparation		
2.	Reactive	
				-	Coping	
3.	Recovery	
					-	Return	to	normalcy	
4.	Learning	
					-	Broaden	detection	
					-	Redesign	the		
							organisational	system	
Crisis	management	
model	
Ponomarov	and	
Holcomb	(2009)	
1.	Readiness	and	Preparedness	 2.	Response	and	Adaption	 3.	Recovery/Adjustment	 Elements	of	resilience	
Pyke	and	Tang	
(2010)	
1.	Readiness	 2.	Responsiveness	 3.	Recovery	 Mitigating	product	
safety	risks	via	3Rs	
Sheffi	and	Rice	
(2005)	
1.	Preparation	 2.	Disruptive	Event	
3.	First	Response	
4.	Initial	Impact	
5.	Time	of	Full	Impact	
6.	Preparation	for	Recovery	
7.	Recovery	
8.	Long-term	Impact	
Supply	chain	view	of	
the	resilient	enterprise	
Wilhite	and	
Svoboda	(1999)	
1.	Risk	Management	(Protection)	
				-	Preparedness	
				-	Mitigation	
				-	Prediction	&	early	warning								
						systems	
2.	Disaster	
				-	Impact	assessment	
				-	Response	
3.	Recovery	
4.	Reconstruction	
Drought	preparedness	
and	mitigation	
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Figure B1 below provides an example of an integrated model of handling disruptions by Sheffi 
(2005) as highlighted in Section 5.1. The description of the stages of disruptions are further 
discussed below (Sheffi, 2005): 
 
Figure B1: The eight stages of disruption (Sheffi, 2005) 
	
1. Preparation  
In some cases, a company can foresee and prepare for disruption, minimizing its effects. 
Warnings range from the 30-minute tornado alert General Motors Corp. received in Oklahoma 
on May 8, 2003, to the several months of deteriorating labor negotiations at West Coast ports 
that preceded the October 2002 lockout. In other cases, such as 9/11, there is little or no warning. 
 
2. The Disruptive Event  
The tornado hits, the bomb explodes, a supplier goes out of business or the union begins a 
wildcat strike. 
 
3. First Response  
Whether there’s a physical disruption, a job action or an information technology disruption, 
first response is aimed at controlling the situation, saving or protecting lives, shutting down 
affected systems and preventing further damage. 
 
4. Initial Impact  
The full impact of some disruptions is felt immediately. Union Carbide Corp.’s chemical plant 
in Bhopal, India, went off-line immediately after the gas leak disaster in December 1984. Other 
disruptions can take time to affect a company, depending on factors such as the magnitude of 
the disruption, the available redundancy, and the inherent resilience of the organization and its 
supply chain. When inventories of critical parts ran out during the 2002 West Coast port 
lockout, it took New United Motor Manufacturing Inc., the joint venture of General Motors and 
Toyota, four days to halt production. During the time between the disruptive event and the full 
impact, performance usually starts to deteriorate. 
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5. Full Impact  
Whether immediate or delayed, once the full impact hits, performance often drops 
precipitously. 
 
6. Recovery Preparations  
Preparations for recovery typically start in parallel with the first response and sometimes even 
prior to the disruption, if it has been anticipated. They involve qualifying other suppliers and 
redirecting suppliers’ resources (as Nokia Corp. did in the aftermath of the 2000 fire in a Royal 
Philips Electonics NV manufacturing plant that disrupted its chip supply) and determining what 
parts are available and selling products built from those parts. 
 
7. Recovery  
To get back to normal operations levels, many companies make up for lost production by 
running at higher-than-normal utilization, using overtime as well as suppliers’ and customers’ 
resources. After the West Coast port lockout, NUMMI made up for its one-week plant closure 
and posted record sales by year’s end despite the work stoppage. 
 
8. Long-Term Impact  
It typically takes time to recover from disruptions, but if customer relationships are damaged, 
the impact can be especially long-lasting and difficult to recover from. For example, the 
network of small-scale shoe factories in Kobe, Japan, responsible for some 34 million pairs of 
shoes a year, lost 90% of its business in the wake of that city’s 1995 earthquake as buyers 
shifted to other Asian factories, and most buyers never came back. 
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Appendix C – Sample of the Questionnaire  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
UNIVERSITY OF SALFORD 
SCHOOL OF THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT 
Maxwell Building, the Crescent, 
Salford, Greater Manchester 
 M5 4WT, United Kingdom 
 
Project Overview 
Working Title:  
Resilience of the Malaysian Public Sector Supply Chain to Disruptions in Construction 
	
The Problem: 
Supply chains in construction face disruptions during project implementation that can cause poor 
project performance and deviations from project objectives (i.e. adverse weather conditions, 
information technology outage, new laws/regulations, accidents, competitive threats and transport 
network disruptions). Good resilience response strategies are needed to cope and thrive in these 
environmental conditions in order for the supply chain to overcome disruptions during project 
delivery. 
 
Objectives of the Questionnaire: 
Resilience is defined as the ability for the supply chain to survive, adapt and grow in the face of 
disruptions. This questionnaire will investigate two main factors, 
 i) Vulnerability factors - fundamental factors that make an enterprise susceptible to disruptions  
ii) Capability factors - attributes that enable an enterprise to anticipate and overcome disruptions  
 
Research Aim: 
To develop a resilience response framework to achieve better preparedness and build supply chain 
resilience against supply chain disruptions in the effort to improve the Malaysian public sector projects 
delivery.  
 
 
Researcher: 
Nurul Afroze Zainal Abidin 
School of the Built Environment 
University of Salford 
Email: n.a.b.zainalabidin@edu.salford.ac.uk 
 
 
Supervisor: 
Dr. Bingu Ingirige 
Senior Lecturer / Programme Director 
Centre for Disaster Resilience 
School of the Built Environment 
University of Salford 
Email: m.j.b.ingirige@salford.ac.uk 
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SECTION 1: RESPONDENT’S PROFILE 
(Please tick (/) where appropriate) 
 
1. Department: 
     
    ____________________________________    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
  
2. Profession  :  
 
  
   If other, please specify: ______________________ 
 
 
4. Which of the following project phase(s) are you involved in?   
	
	
 
 
 
    If other, please specify: _____________________ 
 
 
SECTION 2: PAST EXPERIENCE OF DISRUPTIVE EVENTS IN PUBLIC PROJECTS 
(Please tick (/) where appropriate) 
 
1. How often do you face disruptions when dealing with public projects? 
 
Never 
Rarely 
Sometimes 
 
2. What are the frequent disruptive event(s) faced by your organisation when dealing with public 
projects?   
Natural disaster/severe weather conditions 
Financial crisis 
Major accident/fire 
Fraud 
Regulatory issues 
Failure of key supplier/customer 
     If other, please specify:  
 
 
Project Manager 	
Engineer 	
Architect 	
Quantity Surveyor 	
Contractor 	
< 3 years 	
4-5 years 	
6-10 years 	
>10 years 	
Planning 	
Design 	
Tender 	
Construction 	
3. Working Experience:	
Transportation disruption 
Loss of critical services (i.e. electricity, water) 
IT system failures 
Quality problems 
Employee sabotage 
Technological change 
	
Often 
Always 
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3. How severe the most recent disruption was for your organisation?  
 
We dealt with it as part of business-as-usual  
It challenged us but was not overly disruptive  
It definitely challenged us and was moderately disruptive  
It definitely challenged us and was very disruptive  
It could have shut us down permanently  
Don’t know 
 
4. What were the critical effect(s) of disruptive events to your operation and project performance?  
 
Loss of productivity 
Decrease in profit 
Higher cost of operation 
Damage to operation facilities 
Reputation damage 
     If other, please specify: 
 
 
 
 
5. Our organisation currently employs people in the following area(s). 
 
Risk management  
Crisis management  
Emergency management 
 
6. How do you suggest your organisation to anticipate, response and/or recover from disruptions in public  
    projects? 
 
Planning 
Insurance 
      Other further suggestions: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Delay in delivering products/services  
to customers 
Defects in quality 
Loss of skilled workers 
	
Business continuity management 
Disaster management 
None of the above 
Staff engagement & involvement 
Collaboration with supply chain members 
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SECTION 3: SUPPLY CHAIN VULNERABILITY FACTORS 
The	statements	below	describe	the	vulnerability	factors	that	currently	challenge	construction	supply	chain	
operations.	Please	tick	(/)	on	the	degree	of	your	agreement	or	disagreement	for	each	statement	based	on	
your	experience	working	in	Malaysian	public	sector	projects.	
	
Strategic	Vulnerability	
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
(3) 
 
Agree 
(4) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
V1.1	 We	outsource	our	operations	to	many	
different	suppliers*.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V1.2	 We	rely	on	specialty	sources	or	
components	in	delivering	our	
products/services.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V1.3	 Our	products/services	are	threatened	by	
frequent	competitive	innovations.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V1.4	 Our	suppliers*	/operation	facilities	are	
geographically	concentrated	at	the	same	
area	and	highly	co-dependent.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V1.5	 Our	services/	production	operations	are	
very	complex.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
*	Consider	your	suppliers	to	be	the	complete	set	of	firms	outside	of	your	firm	supplying	raw	materials,	finished	
products,	components,	equipment	or	services	required	for	your	operations.	
	
Management	Vulnerability	
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
(3) 
 
Agree 
(4) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
V2.1	 We	have	insufficient	management	control	
over	our	supply	chain	members.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V2.2	 Late	information	and	decision	making	
frequently	affect	our	operation	progress.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V2.3	 Errors	or	deficiencies	in	our	operations	
are	highly	visible	to	stakeholders.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V2.4	 Continuous	information	flow	is	critical	to	
our	operations.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V2.5	 We	often	incur	budget	overruns	and	
unplanned	expenses	during	operation/	
production.	
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Personnel	Vulnerability	
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
(3) 
 
Agree 
(4) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
V3.1	 We	have	shortage	of	highly	skilled	
workers.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V3.2	 We	regularly	face	labor	disputes	or	strikes	
during	our	operations.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V3.3	 Our	workers	sometimes	operate	in	
extreme	or	hazardous	conditions.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V3.4	 We	often	face	the	loss	of	key	personnel	
during	operations.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
	
Process	Vulnerability	
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
(3) 
 
Agree 
(4) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
V4.1	 Our	supply	chain	has	a	large	number	of	
members.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V4.2	 Our	products/services	face	unpredictable	
demand	shifts	by	client.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V4.3	 Raw	materials	for	our	product/design	are	
scarce	or	in	high	demand.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V4.4	 The	availability	of	our	utilities	(electrical	
power,	water,	sewer)	for	production	is	
poor.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V4.5	 Some	equipment/	product	used	in	our	
operations	are	failure-prone.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V4.6	 Our	production	capacity	is	limited.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V4.7	 We	have	limited	access	to	capacity	to	
distribute	products/services.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V4.8	 Our	products/services	often	face	quality	
problems.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V4.9	 We	often	face	transportation	disruption	
during	our	operation.	
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Supplier/Customer	Disruptions	
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
(3) 
 
Agree 
(4) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
V5.1	 Our	suppliers*	frequently	face	significant	
disruptions.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V5.2	 Our	suppliers*	have	limited	capacity	in	
dealing	with	unplanned	changes	in	
demand.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V5.3	 We	often	face	the	loss	of	key	supplier(s)	
during	operations.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V5.4	 Our	client(s)	frequently	face	significant	
disruptions.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
*	Consider	your	suppliers	to	be	the	complete	set	of	firms	outside	of	your	firm	supplying	raw	materials,	finished	
products,	components,	equipment	or	services	required	for	your	operations.	
	
Technology	Vulnerability	
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
(3) 
 
Agree 
(4) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
V6.1	 The	technology	changes	in	our	industry	
highly	affect	our	services/	products	design	
and	performance.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V6.2	 We	regularly	face	unforeseen	technology	
failures	in	our	operations.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
	
Political/Legal	Pressures	
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
(3) 
 
Agree 
(4) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
V7.1	 Our	operations	are	susceptible	or	
vulnerable	to	political	disruptions.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V7.2	 Our	operations/products	are	subject	to	
strict	or	changing	Government	
regulations.	
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Environmental	Factors	
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
(3) 
 
Agree 
(4) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
V8.1	 Social	&	cultural	changes	have	had	
significant	impact	on	our	ability	to	
provide	our	services.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V8.2	 Our	facilities/operations	are	frequently	
exposed	to	adverse	weather	events	or	
natural	disasters.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V8.3	 Our	operations	are	susceptible	to	a	
potential	health	pandemic	affecting	our	
employees.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V8.4	 Public	opinion	can	exert	significant	
pressure	on	our	operations.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
	
Physical	Damage	Disruptions	
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
(3) 
 
Agree 
(4) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
V9.1	 Our	products	are	regularly	stolen	or	
vandalized.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V9.2	 We	often	face	accidents	during	
operations/productions	(i.e.	fire,	
workers	accident).	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V9.3	 Our	facilities	or	personnel	may	be	
targets	of	terrorism	or	sabotage.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
	
Market	Pressures	
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
(3) 
 
Agree 
(4) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
V10.1	 Our	operations	often	face	severe	price	
fluctuations.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V10.2	 Our	services/products	face	strong	price	
competition.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
	
Liquidity/Credit	Vulnerability	
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
(3) 
 
Agree 
(4) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
V11.1	 Changes	in	financial	&	economic	policies	
highly	affect	our	management	of	money	
and	assets.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
V11.2	 We	have	lack	of	financial	resources	to	
cover	all	potential	needs.	
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SECTION 4: SUPPLY CHAIN CAPABILITY FACTORS 
The	statements	below	describe	the	capability	factors	that	enable an enterprise to anticipate and overcome 
disruptions.	Please	tick	(/)	on	the	degree	of	your	agreement	or	disagreement	for	each	statement	based	on	
your	experience	working	in	Malaysian	public	sector	projects.		
	
Flexibility	
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
(3) 
 
 
Agree 
(4) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
C1.1	 Our	finished	products/	designs	are	flexible	
to	changes.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C1.2	 Our	supply	contracts	can	be	easily	
modified	to	change	specifications,	
quantities	and	terms.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C1.3	 We	have	many	alternative	
suppliers/sources	for	key	inputs.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C1.4	 We	can	quickly	increase	capacity	of	
storage	and	distribution	services	when	
necessary.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C1.5	 We	can	quickly	reallocate	orders	to	
alternative	suppliers	&	reallocate	jobs	
between	different	people/	units.	
 
	 	 	 	 	
C1.6	 We	have	a	sophisticated	inventory	
management	system	that	combines	
demand	projections	and	current	orders.	
 
	 	 	 	 	
C1.7	 We	can	quickly	change	the	route	and	
mode	of	transportation	of	the	
materials/products.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
	
Capacity	
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
(3) 
 
Agree 
(4) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
C2.1	 We	have	significant	excess	capacity	of	
materials,	equipment	and	labor	to	quickly	
boost	output	if	needed.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C2.2	 We	maintain	access	to	alternative	
facilities	and	equipment	for	back	up	in	the	
event	of	disruption	at	the	main	facility.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C2.3	 We	have	reliable	back-up	utilities	
(electricity,	water)	for	operation	when	the	
primary	sources	are	disrupted.	
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Efficiency	
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
(3) 
 
Agree 
(4) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
C3.1	 We	have	effective	preventative	measures	
to	minimize	the	waste	of	unnecessary	
production.		
	
	 	 	 	 	
C3.2	 Our	labor	productivity	is	very	high.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C3.3	 Our	resources	(labor,	plant	or	material)	
are	consistently	utilized	with	no	limiting	
bottlenecks.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C3.4	 We	produce	products/services	with	
consistent	quality.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C3.5	 Our	equipment/products	are	very	reliable	
and	are	not	prone	to	failure.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
	
Visibility	
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
(3) 
 
Agree 
(4) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
C4.1	 We	are	highly	aware	of	future	trends	in	
the	industry	and	the	behavior	of	our	
competitors,	technologies	&	markets.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C4.2	 We	have	effective	information	systems	
that	accurately	track	all	operations.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C4.3	 We	have	real-time	data	on	location	and	
status	of	supplies,	finished	goods,	
equipment	and	employees.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C4.4	 We	have	regular	interchange	of	
information	among	departments,	
suppliers,	clients	and	other	external	
sources.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
	
Adaptability	
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
(3) 
 
Agree 
(4) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
C5.1	 We	continually	strive	to	further	reduce	
lead-times	for	our	operation/products.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C5.2	 We	excel	at	seizing	advantages	from	
changes	or	disruptions	in	the	market.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C5.3	 We	develop	innovative	technologies	to	
improve	our	operations.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C5.4	 We	effectively	employ	continuous	
improvement	programs.	
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Anticipation	
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
(3) 
 
Agree 
(4) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
C6.1	 We	monitor	and	recognize	early	warning	
signals	of	possible	disruptions.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C6.2	 We	effectively	employ	demand	
forecasting	methods.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C6.3	 We	monitor	deviations	from	normal	
operations,	including	any	near	misses.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C6.4	 We	have	detailed	contingency	plans	to	
deal	with	possible	disruptions.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C6.5	 We	have	a	formal	risk	management	
process.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C6.6	 We	recognize	new	business	opportunities	
and	take	immediate	steps	to	capitalize	on	
them.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
	
Recovery	
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
(3) 
 
Agree 
(4) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
C7.1	 We	are	very	successful	at	dealing	with	
crises,	including	addressing	public	
relations	issues.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C7.2	 We	can	quickly	organize	a	formal	
response	team	of	key	personnel,	both	on-
site	and	at	the	corporate	level	to	deal	
with	disruptions.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C7.3	 We	have	an	effective	strategy	for	
communications	in	a	variety	of	
extraordinary	situations.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C7.4	 We	take	immediate	action	to	mitigate	the	
effects	of	disruptions,	despite	the	short-	
term	costs.	
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Dispersion	
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
(3) 
 
Agree 
(4) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
C8.1	 Our	organisation	empowers	on-site	
experts	to	make	key	decisions,	regardless	
of	level	of	authority.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C8.2	 Our	operation/production	facilities	are	
distributed	at	various	locations.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C8.3	 Our	key	inputs	are	sourced	from	a	
decentralized	network	of	suppliers.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C8.4	 Our	senior	leaders	are	based	at	a	variety	
of	different	locations.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C8.5	 Our	products	are	sold	to	customers	in	a	
variety	of	geographic	locations.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
	
Collaboration	
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
(3) 
 
Agree 
(4) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
C9.1	 Our	information	flows	transparently	
between	supply	chain	members	to	
facilitate	collaborative	decision-making.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C9.2	 Our	clients	are	willing	to	delay	their	
orders	when	our	production	capacity	is	
hampered	by	disruptions.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C9.3	 We	have	proactive	product	life-cycle	
management	programs	that	strive	to	
reduce	both	costs	and	risks.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C9.4	 Our	firm	invests	directly	in	our	suppliers’	
or	customers’	operations,	as	well	as	other	
actions	to	share	risks.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
	
Organisation	
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
(3) 
 
Agree 
(4) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
C10.1	 We	are	a	learning	organization,	regularly	
using	feedback	and	benchmarking	tools.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C10.2	 We	strongly	encourage	teamwork	and	
creative	problem	solving.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C10.3	 We	train	employees	in	a	wide	variety	of	
skills.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C10.4	 We	are	capable	of	filling	leadership	voids	
very	quickly	in	the	event	of	disruptions.	
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Market	Position	
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
(3) 
 
Agree 
(4) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
C11.1	 Our	clients	can	clearly	differentiate	our	
products/services	from	competitors’	
products.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C11.2	 Our	products/services	control	a	significant	
share	of	the	market.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C11.3	 Our	products/services	have	excellent	
customer	recognition	and	a	strong	
reputation	for	quality.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C11.4	 Our	firm	has	strong,	direct	long-term	
relationships	with	each	of	our	clients.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C11.5	 Representatives	of	our	firm	communicate	
effectively	with	our	customers.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
	
Security	
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
(3) 
 
Agree 
(4) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
C12.1	 We	employ	layered	defenses	against	
deliberate	threat	and	do	not	depend	on	a	
single	type	of	security	measure.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C12.2	 We	employ	strict	restrictions	of	access	to	
our	facilities	and	equipment.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C12.3	 We	have	active	security	awareness	
programs	that	involve	all	
personnel/employees.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C12.4	 We	have	a	high	level	of	information	
systems	security	to	protect	stored	digital	
information.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
	
Financial	Strength	
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
(3) 
 
Agree 
(4) 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
C13.1	 We	have	significant	insurance	coverage	
for	facilities,	equipment,	goods	and	
personnel.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C13.2	 Our	financial	portfolio	is	very	diverse.	
	
	 	 	 	 	
C13.3	 We	have	significant	financial	
reserves/funds	to	cover	all	potential	
needs.	
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SECTION 5: IMPORTANCE OF FACTORS 
What are the critical vulnerability areas that are currently affecting you and your supply chain 
operations? Please circle on the relative level of importance (scale of 1 to 5) of each factor 
based on your opinion.  
 
 
Vulnerabilities	
	
Not	Very	
Important	
(1)	
	
Minor	
Importance	
(2)	
Moderately	
Important	
(3)	
Important	
(4)	
Critical	
(5)	
V1.	 Vulnerability	in	Strategic	Decisions		
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
V2.	 Vulnerability	in	Management	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
V3.	 Personnel/Staff	vulnerability	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
V4.	 Process/Operation	vulnerability	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
V5.	 Supplier/	Customer	disruptions	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
V6.	 Technology	vulnerability	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
V7.	 Political/legal	pressures	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
V8.	 Environmental	factors	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
V9.	 Physical	damage	disruptions	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
V10.	 Market	pressures	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
V11.	 Liquidity/credit	vulnerability	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
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What are the critical factors that your organisation and supply chain need to 
improve/prioritize on to overcome the vulnerabilities above? Please circle on the relative 
level of importance (scale of 1 to 5) of each factor based on your opinion.  
 
 
Capabilities	
	
Not	Very	
Important	
(1)	
	
Minor	
Importance	
(2)	
Moderately	
Important	
(3)	
Important	
(4)	
Critical	
(5)	
C1.	 Flexibility	in	sourcing	&	order	fulfillment	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
C2.	 Capacity/availability	of	resources	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
C3.	 Efficiency	of	operation	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
C4.	 Visibility	of	supply	chain	operation	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
C5.	
Adaptability	in	
responding	to	
challenges	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
C6.	
Anticipation/ability	
to	detect	potential	
disruptions	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
C7.	 Recovery	from	disruptions	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
C8.	 Dispersion	of	resources	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
C9.	
Collaboration	with	
other	entities	for	
mutual	benefits	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
C10.	
Organisation’s	
human	resource	
structures	&	skills	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
C11.	 Market	position	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
C12.	 Security	against	deliberate	threats	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
C13.	 Financial	strength	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
	
END OF SURVEY 
Thank you for your patience in completing this survey. 
 
	
295	
Letter of Invitation 
 
Portfolio Management Office 
Public Works Department Headquarters 
Jalan Tun Razak 
Kuala Lumpur 
50400 
Malaysia 
	
Dear Sir / Madam, 
 
Invitation to participate in research study 
 
In reference to the title above, I am currently undertaking a research for a PhD degree at the School 
of the Built Environment, University of Salford in Manchester, UK.  
I am conducting a research study on building resilience of Malaysian public sector supply chain to 
disruptions in construction. As supply chains in today’s world are operating in a very dynamic and 
complex business environment, good resilience response strategies are needed to cope and thrive 
in these environmental conditions in order for the supply chain to overcome disruptions during 
operation. 
The purpose of the survey is to therefore investigate the ‘vulnerability factors’ that make the Public 
Works Department (PWD) and its supply chain susceptible to disruptions in public projects, and 
the current ‘capability factors’ they have to anticipate and overcome disruptions. The outcome of 
this study is the development of an appropriate action plan required to utilize their supply chain 
capabilities and overcome their vulnerabilities in the effort to improve project performance. 
I would be grateful if you could spend a few minutes to complete this survey as your professional 
views and opinions are very important to the research. Please be assured that your response will 
be treated confidentially and with anonymity as the data obtained will be used for the purpose of 
this research only. 
If you have any question or concern about completing this survey, or more generally about my 
study, you may contact me or my supervisor through our contact details below. 
 
Thanking you in advance for your time and input. 
 
Kind regards, 
Nurul Afroze Zainal Abidin 
PhD Candidate 
School of the Built Environment 
University of Salford 
n.a.b.zainalabidin@edu.salford.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Supervisor: 
Dr. Bingunath Ingirige 
Senior Lecturer / Director 
Centre for Disaster Resilience  
School of the Built Environment. 
University of Salford 
M.J.B.Ingirige@salford.ac.uk 
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Participant Information Sheet 
 
Study Title:  
Resilience of Malaysian Public Sector Supply Chain to Disruptions in Construction 
 
I would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Before you decide you need to understand 
why the research is being done and what it would involve for you. Please take time to read the 
following information carefully. You are completely free to decide whether or not to take part in 
this research. In order to become a participant, you must meet the following criteria: 
1. You must work in one of these organisations: (a) Government sector; (b) private 
consultancy firm; (c) private contracting firm; 
2. You must have the experience working with public projects in Malaysia. 
 
    What is the purpose of this study? 
 
The Problem: 
Supply chains in today’s world are operating in a very dynamic and complex business 
environment. Like other industries, supply chains in construction face disruptions during project 
implementation such as adverse weather conditions, information technology outage, new 
laws/regulations, accidents, competitive threats and transport network disruptions that cause poor 
project performance and deviations from project objectives. In Malaysia, the local public 
construction projects are facing disruptive events that cause time and cost overruns, resulting in 
loss of revenue and poor reputation of the Government entities. Good resilience response strategies 
are therefore needed to cope and thrive in these environmental conditions in order for the supply 
chain to overcome such disruptions during operation. 
 
Objectives of the Questionnaire: 
Resilience is defined as the ability for the supply chain to survive, adapt and grow in the face of 
disruptions. This questionnaire will investigate two main factors in assessing the construction 
supply chain’s resilience to disruptions, 
i. Vulnerability factors - fundamental factors that make an enterprise susceptible to 
disruptions; 
ii. Capability factors - attributes that enable an enterprise to anticipate and overcome 
disruptions. 
 
Research Aim: 
To develop a resilience response framework to achieve better preparedness and build supply 
chain resilience against supply chain disruptions in the effort to improve the Malaysian public 
sector projects delivery.  
 
    Do I have to take part in the study? 
 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part, as participating in this study is completely 
voluntary and you may withdraw at any time you wish, without giving a reason. This information 
sheet contains description of the study, and the attached consent form will need to be signed by 
you to show you agree to take part. 
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    What will I have to do if I take part in the study? 
 
Questionnaire: 
Complete an electronic questionnaire (or postal questionnaire if required).	 The questionnaire 
should take approximately 10 minutes to complete. 
 
Interview (optional): 
If you wish, you may also agree to undertake a face to face interview at a venue and time suitable 
to you (subject to research timescales). The interview questions will be sent to you before the 
interview is conducted to offer enough time for you to think of the subject matter. It will take 
approximately 45 minutes and will be recorded upon your consent for transcription purposes, after 
which time the recording will be deleted. A number of 10 to 15 professionals working in Malaysian 
public projects will undertake this interview.  
 
    What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
The development of the action plan in the resilience response framework will help the 
professionals working in public projects to have a clear understanding of their supply chain 
vulnerabilities and strengthen their capabilities to anticipate, respond and adapt to disruptions in 
the effort to improve public project performance. 
	 
    Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
 
We can assure you that the data shall be treated confidentially and anonymity of both the 
respondent and company will be ensured at all times. Data stored electronically will be on a 
password protected computer and soft copies data will be stored in locked filing cabinets, accessed 
only by the researcher. The collected data may be kept for possible use in future research up to a 
maximum of 3 years from the researcher’s graduate award before they will be destroyed. All 
publications of data will be written in a way so as to disguise the identity of the research 
participants involved unless prior consent has been obtained. A copy of the survey result can be 
provided to you upon request. 
 
    Who is organising or sponsoring the research? 
 
The study is part of the PhD research degree at the School of the Built Environment, University of 
Salford in Manchester, UK. 
 
    Further information and contact details: 
 
Nurul Afroze Zainal Abidin 
PhD Candidate 
School of the Built Environment 
University of Salford 
n.a.b.zainalabidin@edu.salford.ac.uk 
Dr. Bingunath Ingirige 
Senior Lecturer / Director 
Centre for Disaster Resilience  
School of the Built Environment. 
University of Salford 
M.J.B.Ingirige@salford.ac.uk 
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Participant Consent Form 
 
Title of study: Resilience of Malaysian Public Sector Supply Chain to Disruptions 
in Construction 
 
Researcher: Nurul Afroze Zainal Abidin 
 
Please tick the appropriate boxes Yes No 
Taking Part   
I have read and understood the Participant Information Sheet and have had the opportunity to ask 
any questions. 
   
o o 
I understand that my taking part is voluntary; I can withdraw from the study at any time and I do not 
have to give any reasons for why I no longer want to take part. 
 
o o 
I agree to take part in the questionnaire phase of this study. 
 
o o 
I will complete the questionnaire electronically/postal copy (delete as appropriate). 
 
o o 
I agree to take part in the subsequent face to face interviews.  
 
o o 
I agree for the interview to be recorded. This is to facilitate transcription of the data after which time 
the recording will be deleted. 
 
o o 
I want to view the interview transcript for approval purposes. Any required alteration to the transcript 
will be notified to the researcher within 10 working days of receipt. After which time the transcript will 
be deemed to have received my approval. 
 
o o 
Use of the information I provide for this project   
I understand that if I decide to participate in this research, then the results obtained from this research 
may be kept for possible use in future research up to a maximum of 3 years from the researcher’s 
graduate award. 
 
o o 
I understand my personal details such as phone number and address will not be revealed to people 
outside the project. 
 
o o 
I understand that my words may be quoted in publications, reports, web pages, and other research 
outputs. 
 
o o 
 
 
 
________________________ _____________________ ________  
Name of participant   Signature               Date 
 
 
___________________________ __________________  _________  
Researcher    Signature                  Date 
 
 
Project contact details for further information:   
Nurul Afroze Zainal Abidin (n.a.b.zainalabidin@edu.salford.ac.uk) 
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Appendix D – Semi-structured Interview Questions 
(Adapted from Pettit et al, 2010 and McManus, 2008) 
 
Part 1: Pre-Disruption Phase 
1. What are the methods that you use to prepare for potential disruptions? 
2. What types of security do you employ to protect against threats? (natural disasters, disruptive 
events, deliberate threats) 
3. How do you anticipate disruptions? 
4. How do you determine the possible treatment and response plan for potential disruptions? 
	
Part 2: During Disruption 
 
Please briefly describe some examples of recent disruptions that you have faced during your 
operation in delivering Malaysian public sector projects. 
 
2.1 Disruption Detection 
1. When was the disruption first identified? 
2. Did you have any warning? 
3. How was the disruption first identified? 
4. Who were the first to identify the problem? Who else was affected? Were you/your 
company/supplier prepared?  
 
2.2 Immediate Impact 
1. What was the immediate impact of the disruption? 
2. When, if at all, did your customers notice any negative impacts? How? 
3. Does this type of event happen often? 
 
2.3 Reactive Response 
1. What was the initial response to the disruption? What were your initial thoughts and 
actions? 
2. Was this completely successful? 
i. Yes – Were there any other responses taken later? 
ii. No – What other responses were necessary? 
3. Did any of your actions make the problem worse? 
4. Was your primary concern is the length of time that the disruption would last or the severity 
of the disruption? 
	
Part 3: Post-Disruption Phase 
3.1 Disruption Recovery 
1. What are key roles that you play during recovery operations? 
2. Do you inform your clients of current or projected disruptions? What was your clients’ 
reaction? 
3. Are your preparedness plans used during recovery or are they heavily modified each time? 
4. Did the organisation manage to identify the root cause of this disruption? 
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5. How long did it take to overcome the disruption? Did you return to your original state 
(processes, relationships, resources) or move into a new and more desirable state? 
 
3.2 Long-Term Impact 
1. Were you able to quantify the total impact of the disruption? (i.e. through financial, 
performance or customer service/satisfaction) 
2. Once the initial disruption was resolved, were there any longer term impacts?  
3. Is there any positive affects/change that has created opportunities to the supply chain? 
 
3.3 Learning 
1. Following a disruption, do you discuss the event and create an after-actions report? 
2. What did your company learn from this disruption? Are the lessons learned communicated 
to the entire workforce?  
3. How did the firm change following this disruption (policy, structure, etc.)?  
4. How long did it take to implement these changes, or have procedures reverted to previous 
methods? 
5. What types of issues can impede implementation of improvements/changes? 
6. How can the members in your supply chain (consultants, contractors, suppliers, clients) 
help you to be prepared for a disruption? 
7. How can they help you respond to an event? 
8. Do they provide any insight into future events or trends?  
9. Who else can assist you in responding to an event? 
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Appendix E - Breakdown of the computed items’ content validity ratio and index 
 
Table E1: Breakdown of the computed items’ content validity ratio (CVR) results 
 
* Where ne = number of experts selected “1=essential” or “2=important, but not essential”, N = total number of experts 
* Rating of the degree of relevancy (0=‘irrelevant’; 1= ‘useful but not essential’; 2= ‘essential’) 
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Table E1: Breakdown of the computed items’ content validity ratio (CVR) results (cont’d) 
 
* Where ne = number of experts selected “1=essential” or “2=important, but not essential”, N = total number of experts 
* Rating of the degree of relevancy (0=‘irrelevant’; 1= ‘useful but not essential’; 2= ‘essential’) 
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Table E2: Breakdown of the computed items’ content validity index (I-CVI) and scale content validity index (S-CVI)  
 
* Where N3 or 4 = number of experts rated “3=quite relevant” and “4=very relevant”, N = total number of experts 
* Rating of the degree of relevancy and clarity in measuring the construct (1=not relevant, 2=somewhat relevant, 3=quite relevant and 4=very relevant)  
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Table E2: Breakdown of the computed items’ content validity index (I-CVI) and scale content validity index (S-CVI) (cont’d) 
 
* Where N3 or 4 = number of experts rated “3=quite relevant” and “4=very relevant”, N = total number of experts 
* Rating of the degree of relevancy and clarity in measuring the construct (1=not relevant, 2=somewhat relevant, 3=quite relevant and 4=very relevant)  
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Appendix F – Results of Corrected Item-Total Correlation  
 
Table F1: Corrected Item-Total Correlation of Vulnerability Factors 
Vulnerability Factors 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
V1. Strategic Vulnerability   
V1.1 Degree of outsourcing to different suppliers 0.38 
V1.2 Reliance upon specialty sources in delivering products/services 0.56 
V1.3 Threat by competitive innovations 0.44 
V1.4 Concentration of suppliers/operation facilities at the same area 0.41 
V1.5 Complexity of services/production operations 0.32 
V2.3 Visibility of errors or deficiencies to stakeholders 0.65 
V2. Management Vulnerability   
V2.1 Inadequate management oversight 0.40 
V2.2 Late information and decision making 0.57 
V2.3 Reliance upon information flow in operations 0.36 
V2.4 Budget overruns/Unplanned expenses 0.37 
V3. Personnel Vulnerability   
V3.1 Shortage of skilled workers 0.65 
V3.2 Labor disputes or strikes 0.69 
V3.3 Loss of key personnel 0.67 
V4. Process Vulnerability   
V4.1 Unpredictability of demand by client 0.71 
V4.2 Scarce or limited raw material availability  0.68 
V4.3 Poor availability of utilities (electrical power, water, sewer) for 
production 
0.84 
V4.4 The use of failure-prone equipment/product 0.78 
V4.5 Limited production capacity 0.75 
V4.6 Limited distribution capacity 0.76 
V4.7 Product quality problem 0.61 
V4.8 Transportation disruption during operation 0.71 
V5. Supplier or Customer Disruptions   
V5.1 Suppliers face frequent disruptions 0.81 
V5.2 Suppliers have limited capacity in dealing with demand changes 0.75 
V5.3 Loss of key supplier 0.65 
V5.4 Customer face frequent disruptions 0.83 
V5.5 Large number of members in supply chain 0.30 
V6. Technology Disruptions   
V6.1 Technology changes in the industry 0.20 
V6.2 Unforeseen technology failures 0.20 
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V7. Political or Legal Pressures   
V7.1 Exposure to political disruptions 0.53 
V7.2 Political/Regulatory changes affecting operation 0.53 
V8. Environmental Factors   
V8.1 Exposure to natural disasters 0.63 
V8.2 Health pandemic/spread of disease affecting employees 0.62 
V8.3 Pressure from public opinion/reputation 0.83 
V8.4 Operating in extreme or hazardous conditions 0.65 
V9. Physical Damage Disruptions   
V9.1 Products regularly stolen or vandalised 0.32 
V9.2 Accidents during operation (i.e. fire, workers accident) 0.41 
V9.3 Terrorism & sabotage 0.51 
V10. Market Pressures   
V10.1 Fluctuations in prices  0.60 
V10.2 Price pressures from competition  0.60 
V11. Liquidity or Credit Vulnerability   
V11.1 Finance policies & procedures affecting management of money 
& assets 
0.58 
V11.2 Lack of financial resources 0.58 
 
  Table F2: Corrected Item-Total Correlation of Capability Factors 
Capability Factors 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
C1. Flexibility   
C1.1 Product commonality (modularity, interchangeability) 0.67 
C1.2 Multiple sources 0.73 
C1.3 Alternate distribution channels 0.92 
C1.4 Multi-sourcing 0.91 
C1.5 Fast re-routing of requirements 0.87 
C2. Capacity   
C2.1 Reserve capacity (materials, assets, labor, inventory) 0.12 
C2.2 Redundancy (assets, labor) 0.34 
C2.3 Backup energy sources/communications 0.70 
C3. Efficiency   
C3.1 Labor productivity 0.83 
C3.2 Asset utilization 0.85 
C3.3 Product variability reduction 0.86 
C3.4 Failure prevention 0.71 
C4. Visibility   
C4.1 Business intelligence gathering 0.56 
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C4.2 Products, Assets, People visibility 0.69 
C4.3 Collaborative information exchange 0.73 
C5. Adaptability   
C5.1 Process Improvement, Lead time reduction 0.62 
C5.2 Seizing advantage from disruptions 0.66 
C5.3 Alternative technology development 0.62 
C5.4 Learning from experience, Reengineering 0.57 
C6. Anticipation   
C6.1 Monitoring early warning signals 0.69 
C6.2 Forecasting 0.63 
C6.3 Deviation, Near-miss analysis 0.76 
C6.4 Contingency planning, Preparedness 0.60 
C6.5 Recognition of opportunities 0.60 
C7. Recovery   
C7.1 Crisis management 0.72 
C7.2 Resource mobilization 0.85 
C7.3 Consequence mitigation 0.79 
C8. Dispersion   
C8.1 Distributed decision-making 0.40 
C8.2 Distributed capacity & assets 0.48 
C8.3 Decentralization of key resources (including data) 0.73 
C8.4 Geographic dispersion of markets 0.56 
C9. Collaboration   
C9.1 Communications - internal, external 0.61 
C9.2 Postponement of orders 0.70 
C9.3 Risk sharing with partners 0.61 
C10. Market Position   
C10.1 Market share 0.48 
C10.2 Brand equity 0.93 
C10.3 Customer relationships 0.80 
C10.4 Customer communications 0.59 
C11. Security   
C11.1 Access restriction 0.79 
C11.2 Employee involvement in security 0.65 
C11.3 Cyber-security 0.31 
C12. Financial Strength   
C12.1 Insurance 0.67 
C12.2 Portfolio diversification 0.87 
C12.3 Financial reserves & liquidity 0.53 
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